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Thursday, July 16, 2026

GAO Report Tidbits

The annual Government Accountability Office weapons assessment report is out and here are some the lowlights.


AARGM-ER – The anti-radiation missile is experiencing production delays.
 
The AARGM-ER program continues to experience production delays. The program reported that the delays were related to missile qualification, hardware capability, and software problems discovered during testing.[1]

That’s what you get from concurrency.
 
As GAO notes,
 
We found that starting production before demonstrating a system will work as intended—which the Navy did—increases the risk of discovering deficiencies that require costly, time-intensive rework.[1]

Does the Navy have a regulation against doing anything smart?  It certainly seems so.
 
 
Ford Class – The class is a money pit;  a black hole of finances.
 
CVN 79 costs have increased by over $1.5 billion since 2021. Further, since last year, CVN 80 and 81 costs increased $500 million and $1.2 billion, respectively. The program began lead ship construction before completing design and implemented design changes on CVN 79 during its construction—out of line with our leading shipbuilding practices. According to officials, changes resulted, in part, from installing immature technologies that required further development.[1]

The Navy continues to demonstrate their inability to learn any lessons.
 
The Navy delayed planned delivery of CVN 79 by almost 2 years, until March 2027, since last year. Program officials attributed this delay to continued challenges with an elevator subsystem and a landing subsystem.[1]

Elevators and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) are the same problems the Ford encountered and the Navy went ahead and installed the problematic equipment on the succeeding ships and are now surprised that they’re causing delays.
 
GAO now reports that the unit cost for the carriers is over $16B [1] and that’s with a LOT of buried and deferred costs since the Ford is still not fully operational.  The true cost is likely around $20B each.
 
 
Burke Flt III – Delays plague the program.
 
According to Navy estimates from June 2025, the first 13 follow-on DDG 51 ships are now up to 55 months behind schedule compared with up to 41 months, as we found in our last review. Further, cumulative delays across these ships grew from 323 months to 414 months since last year … [1]

Here’s an interesting aspect of ship costs that no one considers:
 
Additionally, the DDG 51 program office has invested nearly $1 billion since fiscal year 2021 in infrastructure initiatives at both shipyards.[1]

Thus, the cost of Burkes is the unit cost PLUS infrastructure money donated to the shipbuilder.  You won’t see that reported in any explanation of the ship cost.
 
 
F-18 IRST – The IRST program is an unmitigated disaster.
 
DOD and Navy independent testers assessed that IRST was neither operationally effective nor suitable based on test results, due in part to poor reliability. … Navy testers recommended that IRST continue to be introduced to the fleet, despite their findings.[1]

????  It’s not operationally effective or suitable so let’s send it to the Fleet???  I don’t even know how to comment on the level of stupidity demonstrated by this.
 
 
MQ-25 Unmanned Tanker - Attempting to explain significant cost estimation errors,
 
Program officials stated that due to the fixed-price nature of the development contract, they did not previously have access to data showing the actual cost of building the aircraft.[1]

Wait … the Navy entered into a contract without actual cost data?  If you were writing a farcical comedy, you couldn’t make this stuff up.
 
 
ORCA Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) - Attempting to explain software delays, the Navy stated,
 
… the Navy has reported that it did not have any licenses for data rights or visibility into the ORCA software and was reliant on the contractor to make changes to the software.[1]

This has been a recurring problem that we’ve highlighted and some people still refuse to believe it.  The Navy, far too often, does not have access to product data or software rights.
 
 
Columbia SSBN -  Columbia is falling behind schedule.
 
SSBN 826, the lead ship, is at least 18 months behind its contracted delivery date as of July 2025.[1]

Virginia SSN – The Navy keeps assuring us that the submarine shortfall will be mitigated by producing 2-3 subs per year.  However,
 
The [Virginia] construction rate has generally stabilized, with shipbuilders working at a one-per-year pace as of June 2025—half the rate of the Navy’s two per year goal.[1]
 
While the Navy received delivery of two Block IV submarines in 2025, both were over 3 years late.[1]
 
The projected delivery dates for the first 10 Block V submarines continue to worsen, slipping by an average of almost 3 years since original contract award.[1]

 
 
Conclusion
 
The level of stupidity and the demonstrated lack of responsibility and integrity evidenced by these findings is mind-numbing.  Where is SecDef Hegseth?  Does he not read these reports?  He should be firing people by the truckload.  He is every bit as culpable as every other moron associated with these programs.

 
 
_____________________________
 
[1]Government Accountability Office, "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment", Jul 2026, p.144

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25 comments:

  1. BA 1959July 16, 2026 at 9:33 AM

    Seems like we can avoid ordering any more of these ships for a number of years until actual production catches up to annual budgets. If we're years late in receiving the ships, why add to the order book so early? I think we bank that savings, or direct it to smaller simpler ships that we really need.

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    1. ComNavOpsJuly 16, 2026 at 2:52 PM

      "If we're years late in receiving the ships"

      Without explicitly naming it, you've brought up one of the [many] major problems with our current acquisition pace which sees aircraft and ships requiring years or decades to actually produce a product. By the time the aircraft or ship is ready to actually be built and then, years after that, enters the fleet, parts obsolescence has become a significant problem. We are seeing this play out with nearly every major acquisition project today. The F-35 that was spec'ed decades ago no longer has available parts. A brand new ship entering the fleet is no longer repairable because parts that were available and used years prior during construction are no longer manufactured. GAO, DOT&E, and other official reports repeatedly document this phenomenon. We need to drastically speed up our acquisition process and we need to stockpile sufficient parts for future use.

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  2. AnonymousJuly 16, 2026 at 3:53 PM

    This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.

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    1. BA 1959July 16, 2026 at 4:02 PM

      One would expect, since we're talking electricity and not steam generation, that each of four catapults could have their own independent EMALS system. At least then total failure would be upstream at the point of generating the electricity and be both a more serious problem, and a less likely one.

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  3. G2milJuly 16, 2026 at 10:26 PM

    The cost of weapons systems are often debated and people cite contractor sales pitches. But the actual numbers are published by the DoD. Here is the FY2027 request in a nice simple format that is interesting to skim through.

    https://comptroller.war.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2027/FY2027_Weapons.pdf

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    1. ComNavOpsJuly 17, 2026 at 7:59 AM

      "actual numbers are published by the DoD"

      Yes and no. The costs appear not to be unit production costs but, rather, some type of total program expenditures. For example, the F-35 discretionary numbers show a 2027 qty of 8 USN/USMC aircraft at a cost of $3.2B which is $400M apiece. I know the actual costs are more than what is publicly claimed but even I don't believe they cost $400M each! Somewhat contradictorily, the mandated figures show 39 aircraft at $6.2B which is $159M apiece which, again, doesn't match up with any publicly claimed number.
      Clearly, there are other types of program costs (software development, perhaps?) included and, unfortunately, the document doesn't make clear what is, or is not, included.

      The Trump battleship shows expenditures even though no construction contract has been issued so, clearly, non-production costs are included in the tables.

      Similarly, the carrier figures show costs for the three years covered but no quantities. Thus, the costs must be for long lead items or some other types of costs but what those are is not specified. Neither is the split among the covered carriers currently under contract/construction.

      To be fair, other weapons, such as individual missiles, may be closer to actual production costs. I don't know.

      Thus, the document is interesting in very broad terms but, in many instances, lacks sufficient detail to be useful.

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    2. G2milJuly 17, 2026 at 1:27 PM

      I agree, but this is the slop they provide Congress. There is always money for "development" and that could mean lots of things. And as you noted, production money is often listed with no units, meaning lead costs or overruns.

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    3. ComNavOpsJuly 17, 2026 at 2:48 PM

      And the costs that ARE listed are not final costs, at least for ships. The Navy now routinely accepts ships incomplete and then finishes construction and aspects of fitting out with money from other, non-specified accounts.

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  4. AnonymousJuly 17, 2026 at 1:29 PM

    https://www.defensenews.com/industry/techwatch/2026/07/15/us-air-force-turns-to-cheaper-cruise-missiles-it-can-buy-by-the-thousand/
    This seems like good news for once. I specifically like the incentive structure with ongoing competitive production. Good on Hegseth...it all has a whiff of WW2 weapon "good enough" production style.

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    1. ComNavOpsJuly 17, 2026 at 2:57 PM

      Let's be clear what we're talking about. As the article notes, none of these missiles have yet been ordered and must still undergo trials before ordering. Further, we need to recognize that these missiles are cheaper because they lack the features of more expensive missiles - features the military has emphasized. I'm quite alright with that approach but we must bear the downgraded capabilities in mind.

      So, all that said, it's a very good thing. Now, we'll see if we can actually get any missiles within five years. I'm dubious about that given our highly bureaucratic procurement process.

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    2. AnonymousJuly 17, 2026 at 6:49 PM

      Whoa, ComNavOps....I do believe we saw you smile approvingly for once.

      Delete
    3. ComNavOpsJuly 18, 2026 at 8:56 AM

      "I do believe we saw you smile approvingly for once."

      I did! Of course, should I recount the hundreds of times I started to smile only to be disappointed by the Navy? Will this be the one that changes history? We'll see.

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    4. AnonymousJuly 21, 2026 at 3:55 AM

      fingers crossed.

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  5. G2milJuly 17, 2026 at 1:39 PM

    By accounts I've read, the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) is a complete failure in the Persian Gulf. It was placed on shore bases and small ships of Gulf States. It's just a bad idea, a million dollar supersonic missile with an IR tracker designed to chase down fast jets with hot tail pipes is used. But the slow, low flying missiles and drones have turbo jet engines or small motor bike engines that produce little heat. Moreover, they are flying head on with a tiny target area and their little IR signature in the rear. They use human (FPV) video guidance or Chinese/Russian GPS for targeting.

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    1. ComNavOpsJuly 17, 2026 at 2:53 PM

      Okay, now, we've got to be fair. The RAM is not a failure because it isn't effective against targets it was not designed to defeat. The infantry rifle is not a failure because it can't destroy a tank. It wasn't intended to do that. It's good at what it was meant to do.

      As you noted, the RAM was intended for a different target set and is [one hopes!] good at that. We simply have the wrong weapons for drones. As you are aware, I've long favored the CIWS over (or, better, in addition to) RAM and this is one reason why. Beyond that, we need to be significantly expanding our electronic warfare capabilities on ships to include drones and similar targets.

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    2. ExJuniorSailorJuly 17, 2026 at 10:35 PM

      While range is probably still an issue, I think microwave systems will become the cure for most drones, especially since they don't need to be precisely aimed like a gun or laser.

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    3. ComNavOpsJuly 18, 2026 at 9:01 AM

      " systems will become the cure for most drones,"

      I hope so, however, twenty years ago lasers were going to be answer to everything. Then rail guns. Then microwave. Then ... And we have nothing that's widely effective and implemented. So, the wait continues.

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    4. ExJuniorSailorJuly 19, 2026 at 3:23 PM

      Agreed... the lasers were certainly hyped long before maturation. But the Leonidas certainly seems promising. The Navy seems to be interested in a naval variant, although not in any rush.

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    5. AnonymousJuly 23, 2026 at 2:18 AM

      It helps that we're coming on almost a century of work with microwaves - the physics are significantly more understood and executed than lasers.

      In fact, we've had microwave based sensor systems since the 1940s, in the form of the CXAM radar and other such systems.

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    6. ComNavOpsJuly 23, 2026 at 9:37 AM

      "the physics are significantly more understood and executed than lasers."

      I don't know whether that's true or not but, setting that aside, I'm unaware of any functional microwave air defense weapon. Perhaps you know of one? I'd be interested.

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  6. G2milJuly 17, 2026 at 6:12 PM

    I'd use the same RAM launch tubes for a new missile. Slower because it only needs to maneuver in front of the incoming threat using CWIS radar or operator aiming. Then it has a proximity fuze or the radar or operator can explode it.

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    1. AnonymousJuly 23, 2026 at 2:23 AM

      As a matter of perspective, when fired at a target at its maximum engagement range, RAM has a TOT of 15 seconds (which, to be fair, is a ballpark figure shared by similar missiles in the same weight class).

      In contrast, the guided 76mm DART round has a TOT of 8 seconds when engaging a target 10km away (so it flies significantly faster and further than RAM). Now, that's only 7 seconds, perhaps, but 7 seconds of extra time is 7 seconds of extra time.

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    2. AnonymousJuly 23, 2026 at 2:24 AM

      my point being, I'm not sure it's viable to have an interceptor that's slower than RAM.

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    3. ComNavOpsJuly 23, 2026 at 9:56 AM

      "interceptor that's slower than RAM."

      I'm not sure that's true. The 76mm gun seems to impart an exit velocity of around Mach 2.6. The only spec I can find on RAM suggests a velocity of "in excess of Mach 2". That could be Mach 2.000001, Mach 2.999999, or anything in between. So, the two are close by some unknown difference. Perhaps you have an exact RAM speed figure?

      Setting aside the exact difference, if any, the obvious question, then, is does it matter? Is the speed difference, if there is one, significant? I suspect not because the difference, is there is any, is going to be minor.

      Finally, and rendering speed concerns irrelevant, is guidance. The ONLY relevant question is can the system place the munition at an intersection point with the target. That's all about guidance. That guidance can come from active guidance or, simply, fire control ballistic prediction. I've read about RAM maneuverability and how many g's it can pull but I don't remember the figure off hand and can't find it in a quick search but it was enormous. I don't know what a DART round maneuverability is but I highly doubt it's on par with RAM. Perhaps you have figures?

      Time is irrelevant. It's accuracy which, in this case, means guidance and I suspect RAM is superior.

      Finally, I am unaware of any realistic testing of DART. Again, perhaps you know of some? RAM has been tested against sub- and supersonic targets with a claimed accuracy of 95+%. How realistic those claims are, I don't know and am suspicious of any such claims.

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  7. AnonymousJuly 18, 2026 at 5:36 AM

    The USN keeps extending old ships further and further out. It has to hurt all facets of USN operations in the present and the future.

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