The US participated in an island defense exercise as part of
‘Balikatan 2026’. The following
statement from a USNI News article on the exercise demonstrates why this kind
of exercise is worse than useless.
“Overwhelming torrent of fires” ????
“ripped apart any notional enemies” ????
Who wrote this article … Steven Spielberg?
Where was the intelligent, free acting, well equipped enemy
force with their own “overwhelming torrent of fires” ripping apart any notional
defenders after having pounded the defenses with an overwhelming torrent of
missiles, rockets, and drones? Where was
the attacker’s Gen. Van Riper?
One might be tempted to say, yeah, this wasn’t a perfect exercise
but it was a start and better than nothing, right? Wrong.
At this point in the Littoral Deep Battle plan, an overwhelming torrent of fires ripped apart any notional enemies that made it to the beach.[1]
“Overwhelming torrent of fires” ????
“ripped apart any notional enemies” ????
First, it’s not a “start” on anything.
We should have been practicing assault defense for decades. We should be well past the “starting”
point.
Second, and worse, we now have a
group of officers and men who think this is how reality will be and they’ll
have no idea what to do when the perfect, scripted actions they're used to are demolished by
the enemy’s vote. An NBA basketball team
wouldn’t practice against a high school team and believe that would somehow
prepare them for a championship game.
Why would we practice against a ludicrously simplistic “assault force”
and believe for a second that it was in any way realistic or helpful? All this did was establish and reinforce bad
habits in our doctrine and our people.
I guess we learned our lesson from Millennium Challenge
2002. You avoid controversy by making
the exercise ridiculously easy.
___________________________
https://news.usni.org/2026/05/05/littoral-deep-battle
As soon as I read that article this morning, I knew CNO was going to comment on it!!!
ReplyDeleteFew things that stood out to me:
"Two notional amphibious landing vehicles and a maritime drone boat represented as the targets during the live-fire Littoral Deep Battle...." We all know it was China but let's not say it?!? Plus, seriously, I hope our military is planning to defeat a bigger landing force than 2 LVTs and a drone boat!!!!
"....After receiving their fire orders, two launchers a few hundred meters to the rear of the defensive line slewed their launching pods toward the coast and rippled off a total of six rockets in their first salvo....." we know they fired another 6 rockets afterwards....and that's it?!?!? Not even pretend to shoot and scoot a few more times to get used to that?!? Nope! Guess it was getting dark....any mention of how we would resupply the launchers? What happens when we don't have airlift? Ships? trucks? how does the whole supply chain works?
"....The defensive line shifted some of its fire towards the drones, downing several in quick succession. However, American Stinger man portable air defense system teams missed two shots against a drone target. The final missile tore the target drone apart, with the exercise concluding shortly after." Why after 4 years of Ukraine war are we firing expensive missiles at drones?!? Again, that's not a good success rate, need 3 missiles to down 1 drone? that raises a bunch of questions....
"At the conclusion of the three-hour anti-invasion exercise,....." again seriously?!?! Even 3 days wouldn't have been enough but would be far more interesting and lessons learned....this is what we used to call in the Army a dog and pony show. Nothing learned but everyone leaves happy.
The list of silliness and pointlessness in that exercise was long. I could have ripped on it for many paragraphs but what's the point? After a while, it's just boring to keep highlighting the same nonsense over and over. I settled for just making the point that this kind of exercise is not just useless but actually degrades our competency by fostering bad habits.
DeleteI particularly enjoyed the description of the HIMARS sited a few hundred meters to the rear of the defensive line (Maginot, anyone?). I know if I had a weapon with a range of 20-300 miles, depending on the munition, I'd be sure to site it right up close to the enemy!
How did they simulate the missile and aircraft attacks that would most likely proceed an amphibious assault?
ReplyDeleteArticle says they fired 6 real missiles which is a significant part of the inventory given that they just started production.
ReplyDeleteHow many hundreds of missiles are an amazing overwhelming torrent of fires?
Also, how many missiles does it take to sink a PLAN amphib. How many missiles do you have to fore to get 1 missile through given that Chinese ships have CIWS, electronic jamming defenses and short range HQ10 ship defense missiles.
The article says "rockets". Given that they cite six launches at a time, I assume it was one of the standard MLRS or GMLRS rocket variants which have been in production for quite a while and should be plentiful.
DeleteThe targets were the simulated amphibious tanks not amphibious ships.
Simulated amphibious tanks? Has to be a misprint because a ZBD-05 is too small to target with HIMARS. ZBD-05 sits too low on the water for PrSMs radar guidance. Appropriate weaponeering for ZBD are direct fire weapons or Javelins or Hellfires from helicopters / Reapers, not HIMARS / PrSMs.
DeleteSeems even the scripting of the exercise left much to be desired.
"Has to be a misprint"
DeleteIf you note in the article, it states that there were two "notional amphibious landing vehicles" which were the simulated ZBD's. The HIMARS rockets were NOT aimed at the targets but were stated as splashing into the water which, I assume, means they were launched at some offset area of empty water. Thus, for the egos of the participants, it didn't matter whether the HIMARS could actually target the ZBD surrogates.
Also, there is no indication in the article that the HIMARS munition was PrSM. The note that six were fired at a time suggests that they were of the more common rocket variety munitions. That's odd, though, since I didn't think they had moving target capability which may explain why they were fired at empty water.
HIMARS did sink an Iranian sub in dock, but the chance of HIMARS ever sinking a moving ship is 1 in a million and there are not 1 million HIMARS ever made. Wishful thinking is not a plan.
ReplyDeleteI don't follow land combat matters that closely so I'm not completely sure of the details but the Army was developing an anti-ship HIMARS rocket which, presumably, would be moving target capable. I have no idea what the status of that effort is.
DeleteTWZ reported in March that an ATACMs fired from a HIMARS launcher sank an Iranian submarine, likely one that was in port at the time. But, the PSRM Increment 2, which is HIMARS compatible, will be able to hit a moving target.
DeletePrSM is a fair step above HIMARS - it's a 300 mile weapon, a full tactical ballistic missile. PrSM Increment 2 has demonstrated the ability to hit a moving target, striking the the ex USS Cleveland in a live fire test.
DeletePrSM Increment 3 is expected to extend the range of the missile to 600 miles, albeit at that range this is more for attacking the enemy backline.
I'm glad that the "Creative Writing" class that we paid for is finally being put to use.
ReplyDeleteLutefisk
Our four-star Admirals scare me. The first lesson learned from the Iran war was that it was idiotic to have the US Navy’s regional headquarters and logistics base at Bahrain inside the Persian Gulf where it was blasted and useless days after the shooting began. Even crazier, the Navy deployed military families to the base, so their first priority was evacuating them. Meanwhile, the headquarters was barely functional and personnel fled to hotels then out of the region.
ReplyDeleteThey should be thinking about reestablishing that base at distant Perth, Australia with new small logistics bases in southern Oman and Kenya. Yet at a May 4, 2026 news conference, the four-star in charge stated his goal was to return families to Bahrain as soon as possible.
"Admiral Cooper: Yeah, thanks for asking the question. I mean, taking care of our people is priority number one for me. Our team here, as well as, our Navy team and our joint team has paid very close attention to the groups that are in both Italy and Germany. We’ve had daily contact and have had teams on the ground. They’ve been well taken care of, most moved to our folks in Germany. They have kids who are in school, and that schooling was able to continue. And of course, now we’re approaching the end of the school year. We’ll see what the future looks like. It’s my goal to get them back to Bahrain as soon as possible. We did a little survey and 90% of them want to get back, as quickly as they can. So I think that says a lot both about, what their family life is like in Bahrain, as well as their motivation, as well as how well the team there in Germany is taking care of them. Thanks so much."
https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Transcripts/Article/4477143/adm-brad-cooper-centcom-commander-conducts-a-media-conference-call/
Cooper's answer should have been, my number one priority is killing the enemy and, in order to do that, we need our personnel totally focused on killing and no worrying about families. Those families will not be coming back to a war zone. Now, if you'll excuse me, I'm wasting time here when I should be planning the next round of destruction.
Delete"They should be thinking about reestablishing that base at distant Perth, Australia..."
DeleteI think that is a great idea.
In my opinion, they should also base an Indian Ocean fleet there whose purpose is to interdict shipping routes, and be a constant threat to do so.
Lutefisk
"should be thinking about reestablishing that base at distant Perth, Australia"
DeleteWhy? I ask that sincerely. Given modern communications capabilities and data sharing, what purpose would a major base in Perth serve as regards the Middle East? It wouldn't be close enough to provide any physical/logistical support. Could we not get by with Washington DC or Norfolk or wherever and just establish some small logistic support bases in the Middle East?
Pearl Harbor can continue to support the Pacific operations. We ran the entire WWII Pacific campaign from Pearl Harbor. Do we need a major command and control base in Australia? I'm open to the idea but tell me why it's a good idea.
Another option is to merge into the Navy Command at Naples Italy that is half the distance compared to Perth. Operations in Persian Gulf are heavily supported via the Med anyway.
Delete"Do we need a major command and control base in Australia?"
DeleteWell, it's completely possible that I don't know what I'm talking about, as I'm not really sure what a major command and control base entails.
What I would like to see, however, is an Indian Ocean interdiction fleet.
My vision would be to have a pair of modern 8" gun cruisers with escorts.
Probably a drone carrier for situational awareness. Possibly one of the Midway-sized carriers for support.
Their job would be to control the trade routes in the Indian Ocean.
They could also take actions in the Persian Gulf area when needed.
Not sure if that is what everyone else was talking about.
Lutefisk
"What I would like to see, however, is an Indian Ocean interdiction fleet."
DeleteI assume you're talking about a peacetime force. In war, of course, the force would be determined by specific operational needs. For example, blockades are best accomplished in ports of loading rather than at sea so no standing sea force would be needed. Standing forces are just targets waiting to be serviced.
You're calling for a standing naval force in India's "home" waters. Have you given any thought to what your reaction would be if someone established a standing naval force in the Gulf of Mexico and off our east and west coasts? From a public relations and political point of view, we would be intruding in India's waters (sphere of influence, not territorial). It's not as if we're close allies. India views us as a non-threatening neutral with a tendency to clash with Indian views.
The preceding aside, I'm adamantly opposed to standing forces (that's another name for extended deployments). You're well aware of my calls for a return to home porting. If there's a mission that requires a naval force ... send them, execute the mission, and RTB. I wouldn't want 8" cruisers sailing aimlessly around on some kind of endless deterrence patrol on the off chance that a specific need might arise. I want them home, training every day and undergoing constant maintenance. It's so easy to fall into the deployment trap but deployments are counterproductive and hurt readiness, training, and maintenance.
" I want them home, training every day and undergoing constant maintenance."
DeleteThere are a lot of good ideas that are central to this blog, but I think that a strong argument can be made that this is the most important, to include performing training missions rather than deployments.
Keeping the above in my mind, and assuming we want to have a presence in the Indian Ocean, it's a bit of a problem getting there.
A task force could sail from the West Coast across the Pacific to get there, but realistically we're probably talking a couple of weeks of transit time.
The other choice would be to leave from the East Coast and either navigate the multiple choke points through the Mediterranean and Suez Canal, or sail all the way around the African continent.
Either choice is a lot of training time consumed simply 'commuting to work', so to speak.
In wartime, we would want to have the option of interdicting the shipping lanes across the Indian Ocean, specifically the oil shipments moving from the Middle East to eastern and northeastern Asia.
I would think that there is value in training in the Indian Ocean, but it is pretty much on the other side of the world.
When I look at the map, I see that one of the 'Five Eyes' has a coast on the Indian Ocean.
Western Australia could give us access to the shipping lanes. It would also afford access to the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Arabian Sea without the aforementioned transit issues.
Ships and support could be located at Perth, or Adelaide if necessary (although it is an added distance to the Indian Ocean shipping lanes).
They would need to be PCS'd there, with families et al. It would seem to be a pretty good duty station for the families.
Having the ships there allows them to train in the area where they would fight and still follow the mission vs. deployment concept.
The geopolitical points that you made are a serious consideration.
Perth is far enough away from India and Indonesia that it might not feel overly threatening to those countries. And the Indian Ocean can be accessed without sailing close to either
Also, the lack of CVNs might ease the concerns of the locals that it would be a power projection force to be used against them.
Lutefisk
"assuming we want to have a presence in the Indian Ocean, it's a bit of a problem"
DeleteYou - and the US geopolitical team - are overlooking one obvious and preferred solution ... ... ... ... enlist India's military to do the job for us!!! Haven't we learned a lesson from NATO about spreading ourselves too thin and trying to do everything alone? We should be making every effort to make an ally out of India. An easy task? No, but we should have been working on this for decades. Currently, India views us with benign suspicion, at best. We need to change that to get them to the point of at least having some common defense goals, if not outright friendship.
"assuming we want to have a presence in the Indian Ocean"
DeleteWhy do we want a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean? I ask this sincerely. In a similar vein, I often hear that we must have an Arctic Circle presence but no one ever offers a reason why. What would we gain on a daily, peacetime basis if we have ships there? We won't allow local commanders to use force or even be a little bit aggressive (like "herding" Chinese ships out of the way or aggressively cutting them off) so why have ships there? We can do diplomatic, port of call type "show the flag" actions but that doesn't require high end warships nor a continuous presence. Give me some benefits that we gain from a presence in the Indian Ocean.
Would a better approach be to cultivate India as an ally and let them patrol their own backyard?
"Why do we want a continuous presence in the Indian Ocean?"
ReplyDeleteMy thoughts on this:
I think that there is a value to training in the area where you intend to fight.
And it's too far to regularly train there if coming from bases in the US, if the intention is to end deployments and train with missions.
I don't know if we would be able to get the Indian Navy to do what we want them to do, the way we want them to do it, and when we want it done.
Even if they move into the ally column, they still are another country with their own agendas and priorities.
Lutefisk
"I don't know if we would be able to get the Indian Navy to do what we want them to do"
DeleteCurrently? No. That's an objective we should be working towards for the future. We all forget that our State Dept should be an active part of our geopolitical-military operations. The State Dept should be waging war against China via cultivation of India as an ally. As with a military operation, the State Dept should identify key objectives, formulate a plan of attack, and "seize" its objectives.
"I think that there is a value to training in the area where you intend to fight."
There is, to an extent. We don't need to "live" in the area in order to exercise in it. We can rotate naval forces through the area on specific training missions, as needed. Part of the training could/should be the surge from home ports to the training area. The surge, alone, is excellent training for responding to real hostilities or crises and every minute spent sailing to the training area is a golden opportunity for training: UNREP, UNREP coordination on the fly, sailing as a task force against air and submarine threats as you sail to the training area, fighting your way into an area, basic navigation!!!, stealth movement (how to sail under the threat of satellite, SOSUS, air, and other surveillance threats, countering enemy surveillance and targeting attempts, etc. Half or more the training value might well lie in the movement to and from the training area.
We also need to be extremely cognizant of the dangers of maintaining an insufficient forward force (remember Force Z or the Asiatic Fleet fates).
Training is a legitimate reason to operate in the Indian Ocean but does not, and should not, require a standing force. So, aside from training, what benefits are there from a presence in the Indian Ocean during peacetime? We've demonstrated that we won't act aggressively toward China. We've proven that the Chinese aren't deterred by the mere presence of US forces. So what is it, specifically, that you envision us doing with naval forces in the Indian Ocean other than training?