There has recently been speculation that the AUKUS submarine
project may be cancelled. The
speculation is likely fueled by the fact that the current administration is
reviewing the program, as it’s doing with all major defense programs. At the moment, the project is not cancelled
and, I suspect, is unlikely to be though it may well be altered.
Let’s take this opportunity to review and reassess the
program.
To review, the program calls for Australia to receive eight
nuclear powered submarines (SSN).
Construction would be in the UK and Australia although plans have varied
with time so this is probably not locked in yet. The first delivery would not be until at
least 2040. The US has committed to
providing Australia with up to five Virginia class subs as interim replacements.
My take is that the deal makes no strategic or operational
sense, whatsoever. Here are a few
issues:
Strategic Situation
- A few more submarines in Australia won't appreciably change the strategic
situation. The US already has enough
submarines to cover monitoring the E/S China Seas and trail any Chinese subs
that enter the open ocean. Of course,
this assumes that the US can get their subs to sea instead of sitting for years
pierside waiting for maintenance.
The delivery date of 2040 or beyond also renders any
discussion of near to moderate term strategic relevance nearly moot. If Australia could, magically, operate a
fleet of SSNs today, that would potentially benefit the US as we grapple with
our own (long recognized and yet ignored!) submarine shortfall. Of course, that can’t happen and by 2040+,
the US plans (hopes!) to have its submarine numbers on the upswing again which
makes a few more AUKUS subs much less impactful.
Support - I
assume Australia will have a very difficult time maintaining and crewing the
subs given their well documented difficulties with the Collins class submarines.
As of November of last year, only one of
the six Collins class subs was operational.[1] Manning and maintaining nuclear subs will be even more challenging.
Australia will also come to find out that establishing and
maintaining a nuclear industry to support the subs will be costly beyond their
imagining and prove highly unpopular with the citizenry. Establishing a nuclear technology base will
be much harder than simply sending a few officers to a US/UK training
course. Nuclear technology, technicians,
scientists, and support staff are not conjured out of thin air. It would take decades to establish.
As has happened in the US, the Australian government will
likely pass comprehensive and onerous nuclear regulations that will create
significant costs.
 |
| Collins Class Submarine - It will only get harder with SSNs |
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/australia-has-only-1-collins-class-submarine-service-213563
Would a more valuable program then be to create a coordinated effort amount all three countries involved - Australia, the UK and us to build SSK's together? Say starting with a dozen for each country at a more affordable cost, and with the added flexibility where an SSN might not even be the right tool for the problem being solved?
ReplyDelete"a more valuable program then be"
DeleteThat's appealing on paper but both the UK and US lack an existing conventional submarine logistics and support system. That would impose great costs for a marginal, if any, gain in capabilities. For Australia, a new generation of SSKs makes perfect sense and is what they should be doing instead of pursuing SSNs that they can't maintain, man, or support and for which the lack the support infrastructure.
You are right, a new generation of SSKs would be more appropriate, that was exactly the deal with Naval Group before it was torpedoed by B.Johnson and S.Morrison (and to a lesser extent boy J.Biden).
DeleteHaving Australia as the SSK partner is appealing, but the problem is that Australian SSKs are range and endurance limited, because the Australian sub base is at Darwin, on the east coast of Australia. In order to get to their patrol zone in the SCS, the subs have to sail past the entire continent, leaving them with significantly reduced endurance and time on station by the time they actually arrive to the patrol zone.
ReplyDeleteThis is a problem that could have been alleviated by basing the subs in Perth, on the western coast, which would significantly shorten the wasted transit time, but the RAN believes that leaves their subs significantly more vulnerable to Chinese surveillance and observation.
Sorry, but all of Australias submarines are based at HMAS Stirling on Garden Island near Perth. Darwin is smallish base that supports mostly patrol crafts.
DeleteRight, I'd mentally gotten the two locations swapped around. Anyway, it just illustrates my point. Let's say we're trying to do a patrol in the Banda Sea. That's 3100 kilometers, in a straight line as the crow flies. Even if you sail hugging the Australian coastline, that's still a route of 4000 kilometers. Going flat out constantly at a submerged speed of 20 knots is still going to take 5 days of transit time, not counting the time you spend on the surface to recharge the batteries. The math gets exponentially worse if you're trying to do a patrol in the South China Sea in support of American operations against China.
DeleteWorse! Just look map, Australia ships need to go through Indonesia territorial sea to get to the South China Sea. Google the web, you can find tensions between Australia and Indonesia for a long time. Avoid Indonesia territorial sea? such a big circle would exhaust supplies of subs so they cannot stay long.
DeleteFrom Australians' point - China is its biggest export market, larger than next 4 combined. It makes no sense for China to destroy one of its largest suppliers. Occupy Australia is a stupid idea for China.
Now, Australia's best choice is Japanese subs. They are larger, equipped with AIP, and quiet. UK's Astute Class have heaps of problem (google the web you can easily find). Pentagon cannot spare any Virginia Class for them.
"Avoid Indonesia territorial sea?"
DeleteI don't think this is an issue. All countries have a 12 mile territorial ownership of the seas around their land. A map of Indonesia shows hundreds of passages through Indonesia that are completely international waters.
"illustrates my point."
DeleteNot really. The straight line distance from Darwin to, say, Manila in the Philippines is right about 2000 miles. Any likely operational area in and around the South China Sea is on the order of 2000 miles depending on the exact location. By comparison, the distance from Hawaii to the coast of China and Japan, where the US submarines in WWII routinely operated, is on the order of 3000 miles and yet they did that routinely.
A sub operating from Darwin to the South China Sea would travel some 1700 nm. At 15 kts, that's a passage of 4.7 days. Completely reasonable. Again, refer to WWII US sub operations for a comparison.
A Collins class sub has a nominal range of some 10000 nm and an endurance of 70 days.
Operating from Darwin is quite reasonable. You might want to recheck your reasoning on this. I think you're seeing a problem where none exists.
Range issue. I read that but it didn’t make a lot of sense to me. During WW2 the Gatos and Balaus —11000 mile range —operated against the IJN and merchant fleet out of bases on the east and west coasts of Australia and decimated them.
DeleteI reckon the mistake the Aussies made was choosing a French boat apparently was a redesigned SSN equipped with diesel engines instead of German or Japanese.
French military gear hasn’t been getting a good press lately.
"I don't think this is an issue."
DeleteIndonesia has lots of islands, many of them are less than 24 nautical miles apart. Following includes a map of Indonesia territorial water:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_waters_of_Indonesia
"operated against the IJN and merchant fleet out of bases on the east and west coasts of Australia"
DeleteFar and away, the main submarine base was Pearl Harbor until later in the war when some Marianas bases for subs were utilized. The remnants of the pre-war Asiatic Fleet submarines used Freemantle to patrol the South China Sea and approaches while the Pearl Harbor subs patrolled the East China Sea and Japan areas.
About 51 boats operating out of Pearl Harbor and up to 46 out of Brisbane & Fremantle. But the British and Dutch navies also based their submarines in Australia. Point was that for Australia the range of a modern SSK should be adequate.
DeleteOf course australian SSKs could have fulfilled the mission inc. against Chian. I'm glad you set the record staight about the "unsuitability" of SSKs given the distances involved. There was a lot of bullshit written when the deal with Naval Group was torpedoed in favour of Ankus. On top of that submarine tenders can be added to the equation to support SSks far from home.
DeleteYeah the deal with GN was a dud though. I was amazed when the Aussies went for the French boat over the German and Japanese competition.
DeleteSome kind of skullduggery I think.
In the entire history of warfare I’m not sure if a French submarine has ever sunk an enemy warship except for a couple of sloops in WW1.
"Operating from Darwin is quite reasonable. You might want to recheck your reasoning on this. I think you're seeing a problem where none exists."
DeleteOperating from Darwin is indeed reasonable; the problem is that the Australian SSKs are operating from PERTH, which is at the southwestern tip of the continent. Taking even a coast-hugging route, sticking to Australian waters, is a journey of 3300 kilometers from Perth to Darwin. Traveling from Perth to the South China Sea for a combat patrol is a distance of 8000 kilometers, or 5000 miles. Having to go to and fro, the return journey is 10,000 miles, which leaves you with just 6800 miles of combat patrol. This is not nothing, but it's a LOT less endurance than you'd get operating from Darwin - Original Poster may have gotten his details wrong, but the concern isn't unfounded. As your own math shows, staging in Perth means a trip four times the distance versus staging in Darwin.
Now yes, we did operate long patrols with submarines in WW2, but we also had something that no modern navy has: submarine tenders. Submarine tenders are useful ships to be able to come forward and do forward refuelling, resupply and rearm of submarines. It may well be fiction, but Tom Clancy's novel SSN shows how useful submarine tenders can be in supporting a persistent presence by the submarine force. Additionally, the Chinese atoll airbases in the Spratlys and Paracels are well positioned to support MPAs and other ASW assets, which is a constraint that we didn't have to deal with in WW2 - we were a lot more serious about hunting Japanese subs than the Japanese were about hunting our subs and protecting their merchant shipping.
Tides too high in Darwin - so not ideal. Point is that if USN Fleet boats could operate effectively in WW2 they should be able to do so 80 years later.
DeleteEvery officer on a SSN needs a degree in nuclear physics - I doubt if Australian colleges even offer those qualifications.
Whole thing’s nuts.
We had submarine tenders, and our WW2 submarines could spend the bulk of their transit time surfaced. That's not really an option for our modern submarines these days.
Delete"Submarine tenders are useful ships to be able to come forward "
DeleteThis comes with some enormous caveats! In WWII, sub tenders could operate reasonably forward because of the limited range of the sensors (eyeball, essentially). Thus, staying just back of the forward operating areas was sufficient to remain undetected and service a sub. Today, with all manner of very long range sensors and weapons, a large, slow, non-stealthy, high value target like a sub tender cannot survivably operate forward enough to do much good. For example, Guam would be out as it would likely be under constant attack. Other Pacific islands are also susceptible to detection and attack. A sub tender would have to operate so far back as to be not much help over just returning to a main base like Pearl Harbor.
The idea that a sub could pull back for one day, meet a sub tender, get replenished and rearmed, and be back in the fight the next day is pure fantasy.
Don't think there will be enough Virginia's to supply Australia, as build is way behind schedule, GAO reported in 2024 build rate fell to 1.15 p.a, an optimistic Navy plan is to increase build rate to 2.3 in the early '30s. Currently moving on to build the Block V which is 30% larger at ~10,200 tons as it includes the mid-hull VPM so as to fire a few of the very expensive hypersonic CPS missiles.
ReplyDeleteThe US Army and USN joint hypersonic missile, LRHW (Dark Eagle) and CPS development spend so far since 2020 plus FY budget is $11 billion and test results to date mixed. To me the spend is out all proportion to the limited number of missiles that can be produced or fired.
You are correct. The US can supply Australia with Virginias but only by losing an equal amount of US subs. In other words, no net gain and the US would lose operational control of the subs. Not a good deal for the US.
Delete"mid-hull VPM so as to fire a few of the very expensive hypersonic CPS missiles"
The purpose of the VPM is to increase Tomahawk cruise missile capacity as the Ohio SSGNs are retired. If and when a functional CPS missile exists, I'm sure someone will look at putting them in the VPM, depending on dimensions and whatnot.
I hadn't heard the 2040 delivery date. That's a looking ways away. Yet oddly, I read that the first batch of Australian sailors recently graduated from USN Nuclear Power School. I suppose you'd like to grow the knowledge base early, but how many of then will still be in uniform when/if they get their first sub??
ReplyDelete"how many of then will still be in uniform when/if they get their first sub??"
DeleteThe intent is/was for the US Navy to supply several Virginia class subs as an interim until the first AUKUS subs arrive. If the US actually supplies subs, they'd need the crews soon. The Trump admin is reviewing the AUKUS program (they're reviewing all major defense programs) and given the US submarine shortfall and production issues, the interim subs may or may not materialize.
If someone doesn't supply interim nuclear subs then you're correct that their training is wasted, in a sense.
"recently graduated from USN Nuclear Power School."
Note that NPS is just one step in the overall training. The next step is 24? week Nuclear Power Training Unit school. After that, unless someone is going to cut corners, they would embark on a several month to a year-plus on board training and qualifications tour. In addition, there are normally various officer training courses included which may or may not apply to Australian sailors.
In summation, the entire nuclear training process takes something on the order of a couple of years.
We're already struggling to meet our own Navy's SSN short fall. Robbing Peter to pay Paul is not going to help. What should have happened in my opinion is that Japan and South Korea should have been made a part of AUKUS. They are much closer to Australia than either the UK, the U.S. and even France.
ReplyDeleteJapan: Taigei-class diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK)
South Korea: KSS-III Batch-II submarine
You would think it would be financially more feasible for Australia as well as supply chain that would be much closer, the bonus is the potential for viable defense cooperation/alliance. Call it JASK: Japan-Australia-South Korea.
"A better approach would be to assist Australia in building a significant SSK force for use in the China/Pacific region, something the US totally lacks."
ReplyDeleteThat makes total sense, and while it would require some commitment from the Aussies, it would seem to be orders of magnitude easier than starting a nuke sub program.
Our CNO needs to be at the top of the navy somewhere to be, if nothing else, a voice of common sense to an organization that doesn't really seem to have that gene.
Lutefisk
You cannot help others to build something which you don't have ability to make for yourself.
DeleteHi CNO,
ReplyDeleteEverything you've said is true. It pains me to know that I won't see a fully revamped RAN until I'm over 70. But the situation is what it is, and they want to get it right, with building a continuous military shipbuilding industry, avoiding valleys of death and bulking up the navy.
As for the subs, Australia has enough crew for about 4.5 subs.
On Australian defence forums, I've mentioned crewing and the industry pro's think crewing will be less of a problem as the newer larger ships and subs will be more enticing to people as they are not controversial 25 year old subs/ships, but the latest gear.
As for these subs not being well suited for Australia, well, it's really a choice between bad and horrible, and it's the same problem every 20 years or so. There is simply no long range non nuclear sub available. They decided to bite the bullet and get something better. Can Australia afford it? I'd argue yes it can. One reason is the long term demographics of Australia. the subs won't really be all built until about 2050. By then, we'll reach the peak of the number of elderly in Australia, and the amount spent of the pension will start to decrease. The Aust Govt spends about 40% of it's total expenditure on social security so there's tons of money there. Of course, I understand the expenditure will be increasing between now and then, but demographics matter.
Andrew
China isn't the threat Indonesia is. A patrol line of SSK's would make more sense.
ReplyDeleteWho is Indonesia a threat to????
DeleteRE: Tenders
ReplyDeleteI get that any large, slow, non-stealthy ship, especially a high value one like a submarine tender, is basically a "dead man walking" (or in this case floating, and not for very long) anywhere near a combat zone.
But, let's try to be creative and see if these risks can be alleviated. Let's take them in order: Large, Slow, Non-stealthy. And remember we'd be talking about NEW tenders, not existing ones.
(1) Large: Keep in mind that submarine tenders do many things in addition to transferring fuel at sea. They have lots of specialized machine shops and highly skilled machinists and other maintenance workers, intended to do relatively heavy maintenance that cannot be done by the crew of the submarine. But we've already demonstrated the ability of our current submarines to operate for two or three months without maintenance support beyond what the crew can handle. The CRITICAL need in this type of mission would be to transfer fuel during the mission. So suppose we back off the requirements and delete the other capabilities beyond transferring fuel. In other words, what we really need isn't a TENDER but an OILER. Tenders are useful for expeditionary maintenance in a forward base where there isn't a shipyard, but that's actually a different mission.
In addition, you're refueling a submarine (or maybe a small number of submarines), not an entire carrier battle group, so you could probably carry less fuel than our current oilers.
As a result, the new oiler could be SMALLER than our current oilers and tenders. This alone reduces the signature. Is it enough? Probably not, so let's continue with (2).
(2) Slow. Current tenders (and oilers) have speeds on the order or 18 or 20 knots. Current diesel submarines can't really go any faster than this (especially on the surface). If the oiler could go 10 knots faster, would it really affect survivability? My guess is no, given that this is 10 knots difference when considering aircraft and missiles, which fly at least an order of magnitude faster. So, still a problem regardless of speed.
(3) Non-stealthy. Clearly, current tenders ARE non-stealthy. I see 3 possible ways of addressing this problem:
(a) Provide escorts for the tender. Is this enough? Maybe not, so move on to ( b)
(b) Since we're designing a new tender anyway, is there any particular reason that we cannot design it using the same principles (shaping and materials) that the Swedes used to design the Visby? I can't think of one. But if there is such a problem, consider (c)
(c) Do what the Germans did during World War 2, which was to make the oiler another submarine. Transferring fuel at sea is of course a solved problem. Transferring it underwater is NOT a solved problem to my knowledge. It would certainly be useful in this situation so is perhaps worth studying, but obviously we can't count on it right now. But even on the surface, a submarine isn't all that easy to see compared to a surface ship. It's smaller, and much lower to the water than surface ships, for example. And remember, it's not actually at the pointiest end of the spear. If necessary, we could investigate making the part of the submarine exposed above the surface stealthier. For example, the sail is probably the part with the biggest radar cross section, but it doesn't have the same structural constraints as the main hull, since it doesn't need to resist water pressure. Perhaps we could design the sail with a lower observability shape, and perhaps with lower observability materials. While we probably can't change the material that the upper hull is made of, we might be able to put a radar absorbing coating on it.
Using one of these approaches, could we make it feasible to provide an "oiler" for the new diesel submarines? What do you think?
Does there have to be a sail at all?
DeleteI think the most sensible course of action for the Aussies would be to buy Japanese boats and have the entire fleet built in Japan; Australia doesn’t have the skills, resources or successful track record in managing a project like this.
ReplyDeleteSome sort of joint allied submarine base in Australia for submarine repairs and refits would be a good idea and building and developing this could be part of the offset arrangements with the Japanese government. I don’t know how practical it would be to have this base serving British and American SSNs - maybe a step too far in terms of technology, but worth looking at anyway.
Garden Island would continue to be the main base for the new Aussie SSKs, but Darwin could be developed as a pitstop base for refueling and resupply purposes.
I don’t believe that the milchcow or surface tender concepts are viable options.
It is a attempted political wedge. Joe Biden asked our conservative prime minister if it was bi-partisan. He lied yes, but no-one on his side or the opposition had any idea of it.
ReplyDeleteSo everyone gritted their teeth and agreed, while crossing their fingers
It is stupid. SSNs hunt SSBNs and protect one's own SSBNs. Plus they are the only sub that keep up with aircraft carriers. Australia doesn't have SSBNs and should not hunt SSBNs.
This is an article about alliance capture. https://www
.aspistrategist.org.au/ditch-aukus-pillar-one-it-involves-australia-too-much-in-us-strategy/
Note US-Australia planning (and all other planning with allies) about a China conflict has been cancelled, in case it is woke. People with bayonets are not woke but do care.
Looks all here focus on how Australia can do for their version of US strategy. No one thinks how Australians should do for their own country. Do you buy expensive car only to pick up %^$#@!
ReplyDelete"No one thinks how Australians should do for their own country."
DeleteIncorrect. The best agreements benefit BOTH parties and the arrangement we're suggesting for Australia is best for both Aus and the US.