USS Stark Lessons

We have often examined battles to glean lessons learned.  Along a slightly different line, let’s take a look, now, at a single incident, as opposed to a full battle.  The incident is the attack on the USS Stark which saw an Iraqi aircraft launch two Exocet missiles, both of which hit the Stark, one exploding and the other may not have exploded but did spew hundreds of gallons of flaming fuel.
 
The information that follows is taken mainly from the excellent book, Missile Inbound [1].
 
Here are some points of interest to keep in mind as you review the timeline presented further down the page:
 

• The electronic warfare (EW) SLQ-32 unit on the Stark was a passive-only signal detection device.  It could detect signals and identify them by comparing to a signals library.  The ultimate output of the SLQ-32 to the operator was a signal source/type and bearing.[1, p.67]  It did not provide range.
• The CIWS on the Stark was capable of detecting, tracking, and notifying the operator that it was tracking a target.[1, p.68]  The Stark’s CIWS was in ‘Standby’ mode at the time of the attack.
• Stark had both the SPS-55 and SPS-49 operating.  The SPS-49 operator was inexperienced and did not have the proper range setting on the radar and failed to see the attacking aircraft.  In fact, the Stark’s radar never detected the aircraft but were aware of the aircraft’s movements via data link from an AWACS.
• Ship was in Battle Condition III (BC III) which required a third of the crew to be on duty and all weapon stations manned.[1, p.69]

 
As a brief review, here is the timeline of the event.  I’ve used generic descriptions of a person’s position, listed in block parentheses [xxx], instead of names to avoid confusion.
 
2050 hr – One of the two required fire controlmen was allowed to leave CIC, in violation of BC III, for a bathroom break and never returned before the missiles hit.
 
2055 hr – Stark establishes its first radar contact when an officer changes the radar range mode to the correct setting.
 
2102 hr – SLQ-32 operator detects the aircraft’s search radar emissions.
 
2104 hr – Aircraft is 39 nm from Stark.
 
2105 hr – At 32.5 nm, Mirage turns directly towards Stark but no one in CIC notices.
 
2107 hr – At 22.5 nm, F-1 Mirage launches first missile.
 
2108 hr – Stark CIC notices Mirage has changed course directly towards them and decides to issue standard radio warning to aircraft.  At 15.5 nm, Mirage launches second missile.  SLQ-32 detects a momentary radar fire control lock from what the CIC crew believes is the Mirage.  The signal reverts to routine search mode in a couple of seconds.
 
2109 hr – Crew is dispatched to arm the port and starboard chaff launchers and launchers are switched from ‘safe’ to ‘on’.  Lookout spots first missile but verbal warning is not relayed to CIC in time.  SLQ-32 operator reports second radar lock signal.  CIC officer orders the Mk92 STIR (fire control radar) to track the Mirage but is told that the Mirage is in the STIR blind zone.
 
2110 hr – First missile impacts.
 
2111 hr – Second missile impacts.
 
 
Discussion
 
The Stark incident has been reported and analyzed many times so I won’t belabor the more obvious points.  There are, however, a few points that are particularly pertinent.
 
1. Officers later testified that they never detected a ‘terminal homing’ signal from the Mirage.  This indicates a glaring lack of knowledge about the Mirage which had a track-while-scan radar and did not generate anything approximating a ‘terminal homing’ signal.  What the SLQ-32 operator momentarily noticed was likely the first missile’s seeker signal.  Had CIC recognized what the SLQ-32 actually detected, they would have had time to switch the CIWS into automatic mode.
 
This reveals that the crew was poorly trained.  They should have been well versed in both the capabilities of the SLQ-32 and the characteristics of all the aircraft in the region.  This is just elementary logic.  The failure to learn about the aircraft and weapons in the region would suggest that either the captain and crew were negligent in the extreme (fatally so) or were too busy with ancillary work to make time for the study of regional aircraft and weapons.  Indeed, the book points out that the crew's top priority leading up to the moment of attack was an upcoming high speed engineering test (OPPE).  Crews in a war zone should never have a higher priority than combat.  This is a failure of leadership at higher levels than the ship and crew.
 
2. The CIWS was never placed in automatic mode which would have allowed it to fire at the incoming missiles.  The officers testified that they left the CIWS in manual mode because they didn’t want to risk an accidental shoot down of the aircraft, believing it not to be a threat.  How they thought a CIWS with a range of some 1500 yds would shoot down an aircraft 15-20+ nm away was never explained.  Again, this demonstrates the officer's lack of familiarity with their own equipment.
 
The default mindset in a war zone should have been the opposite:  CIWS should always be in automatic mode in a war zone and switched to manual only when a verified friendly aircraft receives permission to approach.  If the price of saving a billion dollar ship is the occasional loss of a friendly pilot and aircraft due to the pilot’s stupidity, so be it.  I think such an approach would see a very rapid increase in pilot awareness and discipline – which is a good thing!
 
3. Allowing crew to leave their stations during BC III reveals the lackadaisical approach of the ship’s leadership and the absence of a combat mentality.  The ship’s captain, Capt. Glenn Brindel, testified that the absence of the fire controlman was a major contributing factor.  Regarding the inability of the STIR to track the Mirage due to the blind zone, Brindel said, 

[The CIC officer] did not know of the blind zone, Brindel said it was because [the fire controlman] had left the CIC for a head call without [the CIC officer’s] knowledge.  That fact, Brindel said, was key to the CIC’s inability to defend the ship.[1, p.80]

Brindel claimed not to know that leaving CIC without qualified replacement was a common practice by his crew.  If true, that speaks poorly about Brindel’s awareness of his crew’s behavior and his own failure to properly train his crew.
 
 
Lessons
 
Mindset.  The preceding points offer an overall lesson for us, today, about combat and combat mindsets.  Ultimately, the Stark tragedy can be traced back to the lack of a combat mindset by both the captain/crew and higher level fleet leadership.  No one in the entire chain of command was mentally prepared for combat.  They were lulled into complacency by the multitude of previous attacks that were directed against Iranian shipping.  In today’s world, where terrorism can strike anywhere and anytime, combat must be the default mindset.
 
Technology versus Knowledge.  Technology is not the answer to combat;  knowledge is.  Highly advanced equipment that is not fully understood (looking at you, Aegis) is worse than useless as it leads to incorrect assumptions (recall the training drone strike on the Tico cruiser), misinterpretations, and failure to grasp the reality of a situation.  Better to have simpler equipment that is completely understood.
 
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History keeps telling us exactly what we should be doing and we keep ignoring it.
 

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(1) Missile Inbound, Jeffrey Levinson and Randy Edwards, Naval Institute Press, 1997, ISBN 1-55750-517-9