The Next Secretary of Defense

Fox’s TV commentary show, ‘Outnumbered’, had a discussion about President-elect Trump’s cabinet picks and had a brief discussion about the Secretary of Defense position and the type of person needed to fill the role.  Fox News contributor, Steve Hilton, offered some very interesting perspective, saying,
 

… at the Defense Department, you need a really good manager there who will sort out the corrupt mess of our defense procurement.  I think Elon Musk would be brilliant in that role, actually.[1]

 
Asked for more specifics about the type of person needed, Mr. Hilton offered this:
 

Someone who knows how to run things.  I mean, it’s no good putting in some General, right?  That place is a absolute cesspit of corruption.  You’ve got to have someone who can deal with that and get the modernization of our defense forces going.  It’s a management role we need there.[1]

Mr. Hilton could not be more correct.  We have a badly broken defense department that appears to be irredeemably corrupt.  The procurement process, in particular, stands out as an example of fraud, corruption, and incompetence.  Hilton’s suggestion that a strong businessman is required, as opposed to a former military officer, is worth serious consideration.
 
Without offering an opinion one way or the other, the suggestion that Elon Musk would make a good Secretary of Defense merits serious contemplation not so much for the idea of Musk, personally, but for the idea of a strong, successful businessman.
 
President-elect Trump has an opportunity to make a good start at reforming the Defense Department.  No one can completely fix it in just four years but a good start could be made by selecting the right SecDef and, if I might add a personal suggestion, firing every flag officer and starting over with the uniformed leadership.  Trump had an opportunity to do this his first term and failed by failing to recognize the depth of corruption and taking ruthless action.  Hopefully, he’s learned lessons and will do better this time around.
 
 
Update:
 
As of this moment, it’s being reported that Trump has selected Pete Hegseth as his nominee for Secretary of Defense.  If so, and if confirmed, Mr. Hegseth would be the polar opposite of the type of person described by Mr. Hilton.  Hegseth is a former National Guard officer who has served in Guantanamo, Iraq, and Afghanistan while rising to the rank of Major.  He has been heavily involved in politics and veteran’s affairs.
 
He has demonstrated a dedication to the welfare of veterans and the good of the service.  What he lacks is any experience running a massive organization like the DoD.  The key will be whether he recognizes this and can surround himself with people who can run an organization.  If so, his job will be to steer them in the right direction.
 
I have to be honest, this is a disappointing pick although the potential for success is certainly present.  Firing every flag officer would be a good start for him!
 
 
 
Note:  This is a military leadership discussion.  I will not allow political comments.  Fair warning.


 
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[1]Steve Hilton speaking on Fox Outnumbered, 12-Nov-2024, transcribed by ComNavOps

Chinese Prototype

Naval News website has an article about a Chinese experimental (prototype) unmanned, or optionally manned, small combatant surface vessel.  Here’s a description of the vessel:
 

The new imagery confirms a substantial vessel in trimaran configuration. The ship is armed with at least four vertical launch cells, equipped with multiple sensor panels likely for an electronically scanned array and additional sensors, and a sizeable aviation pad at the rear supporting a VTOL UAV. An organic UAV capability could support the USV particularly in over the horizon (OTH) -targeting for maritime and land attack-roles.
 
If previously shown models of a slightly different configuration are indicative, the design may contain further weapons in recessed bays, including an autocannon on the bow, and torpedo launchers at the sides. Forward of the four missile cells is a notable square area which may incorporate further missile cells.[1]

The vessel is an evolution or refinement of a previous version built in 2019. 
 
The article indicates that the manufacturer currently retains ownership of the craft and that the Chinese navy has not yet expressed any interest in procuring the design.
 
It is possible that the main purpose of the prototype is to assist in international marketing but, regardless, there is no better way to persuade your own government to buy your product than by building a prototype.
 

Chinese Prototype Combat USV

 

I’m not going to discuss the actual combat capabilities because that’s pointless without a CONOPS to reference against.  Still, there are a few noteworthy aspects to this.
 
Manufacturer’s Dime.  All indications are that the vessel was built by the manufacturer, at their cost.  This was once routine in the aviation industry and should be revived as standard practice.  Of course, there’s a limit to how much prototype cost a manufacturer can absorb.  A $20B prototype aircraft carrier, for example, is simply not feasible.  However, producing aspects of a $20B prototype carrier is perfectly reasonable.  For example, that new gravimetric warp launch catapult that is planned to replace the non-functional EMALS should be built and installed on a second hand cargo ship for at sea testing under realistic operating conditions.  That gravity-nullifying, instantaneous, matter transporter that will replace the finicky Ford weapon elevators should be installed on a used, throwaway cargo ship to prove it works before including it in a production design.  Those kinds of prototype costs are within the financial capacity of a builder who is steadily producing $20B+ carriers and, if they aren’t, that alone should be a giant red flag about cost, reliability, and scheduling. 
 
Testing.  It should go without saying but I’ll say it anyway since the Navy seems oblivious: prototypes are invaluable for both demonstration purposes and as a developmental aid.  Build, test, and feed the results back into the design before you commit to production.  China gets to see what works and what doesn’t without committing to something like a massive 55 LCS program before the first ship was even designed.  If/when the Chinese navy wants to build the vessel, both they and the builder will know what the strengths and weaknesses of the design are and can incorporate modifications into the design, as needed.  The LCS, by comparison, was already deep into the production run before the first lessons learned had a chance to feed back into the design process and the result is half a dozen or so LCSes have already been retired and several more are on the chopping block.
 
Cost Estimates.  A prototype hugely reduces the uncertainty about the cost of a new ship.  It should!  You just built it!  You now know exactly what it costs.  Now you can realistically work on cost reductions.
 
 
Conclusion
 
Again, it seems blindingly obvious but I’ll say it anyway.  There is nothing but good that can come from the routine construction of prototypes.  As noted, the use of prototypes provides the ability to wring out the problems from a design and develop very accurate cost estimates.  The manufacturer benefits from an increased likelihood of obtaining a production contract for an existing vessel.  The mere fact that the vessel already exists is a major selling point.  Manufacturers should be eager to build prototypes.
 
Of course, as noted, there is a limit to the amount of money a manufacturer can spend on a prototype with no guarantee of a production contract.  When a prototype gets too big and too expensive for the manufacturer to absorb the total cost, the government can provide partial payment (not full payment!).  The key is to force the manufacturer to put skin in the game.  This encourages higher quality to increase the likelihood of sales and reduce the cost of quality related reworks.  It also motivates the manufacturer to engage in ruthlessly efficient cost cutting and eliminates the practice of continuous change orders.  When you’re building a ship on your own dime, you suddenly become intensely interested in minimizing costs and getting the most bang for your buck as opposed to the perverse, reverse incentives we now have where the manufacturer gets paid more money for poor quality (via reworks) than they do for good quality (no reworks).
 
We should do this for every new ship class.  Build a single prototype, test it thoroughly, and then, and only then, consider a production contract.  The Navy will never do this so Congress should mandate this approach by law.with criminal penalties associated for failure to comply.
 
 
 
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[1]Naval News website, “Chinese Experimental Aviation Platform And Combat USV Emerge In Detailed New Imagery”, Alex Luck, 7-Nov-2024,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/11/chinese-experimental-aviation-platform-and-combat-usv-emerge-in-detailed-new-imagery/

Philippines Strategy

You’ve probably noticed that several of ComNavOps’ fictional stories revolve around the Philippines.  This is not by random chance.  The strategic value of the Philippines cannot be overstated.  The country, along with Taiwan, forms two gigantic ‘forts’ that China must deal with in any war.
 
From China’s perspective, those two countries act as forward enemy bases that dominate the surrounding seas and impact any operations the Chinese would attempt.  Their removal from the strategic equations is imperative.  Ideally, China would turn the tables by seizing both countries and using them as forts against any American response.
 
Taiwan’s seizure (or ‘reunification’ as the Chinese would euphemistically put it) is absolutely mandatory for both strategic and cultural reasons.  Wisely or foolishly, China’s leadership has linked themselves to the seizure of Taiwan as a national and cultural imperative.  For those reasons, Taiwan will be the first operation in any war.
 
The Philippines present a somewhat different situation for China.  The Philippines cannot be allowed to become a US forward base but it is not necessarily a requirement that the country be physically seized and occupied.  Forcing Philippines to declare neutrality is almost as good as seizing it.  A declaration of neutrality would eliminate Philippines as a forward base for the US and would have the added benefit of not tying up any Chinese forces in an occupation. 
 
Ideally, of course, China would like the Philippines to enter a war as an ally of China, thereby allowing China to use it as a base without the difficulties of an invasion and occupation.
 
By far, the most likely course of action is that Philippines would declare neutrality rather than place themselves as a target between the US and China.
 
Neutrality, however, will not prevent China, which cares nothing for international laws, from occupying areas of the Philippines that it finds advantageous in its war efforts against the US.  This, of course, leaves Philippines in a bit of a no-win situation.
 
All of this is fairly obvious so where is this going?  Let’s consider scenarios in which the US has access to the use of the Philippines, either because the Philippines enters the war as an ally of the US or because Philippines declares neutrality and China ignores that and attempts to seize or operate from the country, thereby negating Philippines’ neutrality. 
 
In this case, the US would attempt to set up bases and, perhaps more importantly, surveillance assets (radar, elevated optical sensors, etc.).   Obviously, China is not going to sit back and allow that to occur without hindrance. This raises the scenario of the US having to fight to establish and operate a base – something that we haven’t had to do since Guadalcanal.  Do we have the capability to seize suitable land, set up a base while under fire, and defend that base well enough to keep it operational?
 
The answer is no and certainly not with the equipment, units, and training we have currently.  This strongly suggests that we should be developing – quickly! – the capability to seize, set up, and defend a major base.  I’ve often suggested that the Marine’s core mission should be port seizure and this type of operation would be a logical extension of that.  Note that the Army does have existing units dedicated to the seizure of existing airbases.
 
Seizure of land for a not yet existing base could range from ‘walk in unopposed’ to a full fledged, contested, amphibious assault depending on how extensively the Chinese manage to get established.  As we’ve thoroughly discussed, our ability to conduct an opposed landing is extremely limited as we lack naval gun support, sufficient ship-to-shore connectors to allow for attrition, armor, logistic support, sea bases (if we don’t seize a port), mines to protect our sea flanks, and mobile anti-air defenses to protect forces ashore.  In addition, our ability to establish local air superiority is highly suspect and would be largely limited to the understrength air wings of our carriers which would be hard pressed to conduct simultaneous air-to-air and ground support operations with just thirty or so combat aircraft per air wing.
 
 
As we contemplate seizing land and establishing a base, consider these questions:
 

• Do we have the ability to transport and very quickly (instantly!) set up anti-cruise and anti-ballistic missile defenses to protect a base?
• Do we have ground forces who have been trained for base defense?
• Can we transport armor to the Philippines for base defense.  Yes, we’ll certainly be facing Chinese armored forces.
• Do we have sufficient numbers of C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery, and mortar) weapons to defend a base against constant, high volume attacks?
• Do we have sufficient portable, mobile sensors to establish effective surveillance and early warning systems?
• Are we doctrinally willing, and trained, to move our Aegis ships in close to land to provide anti-air protection for the ground forces until they can establish their own defenses?
• Are we capable of quickly constructing hardened and/or underground hangars and fuel/weapons storage?
• Do we sufficient airbase repair equipment that can be transported to the site?
• Do we have sufficient engineering units to build a base under fire, continuously repair it, and keep it operational under fire?
• Can we operate modern, finicky aircraft under primitive conditions with few spare parts, computers, and no modern state of the art repair facilities?  That’s what a forward, contested base would be, after all.  Our abysmal aircraft readiness rates during peacetime suggest that this, alone, almost rules out establishing an airbase in the Philippines.  If you can’t keep aircraft operational, there’s little point having an airbase.  If you recall, we were only able to sporadically operate F4F Wildcats from Guadalcanal and they were robust, easy to maintain aircraft by comparison, requiring only a wrench and duct tape to repair!

 
This kind of thought exercise is exactly what the US military should be doing all day, every day and yet we’re not.  Not even a little bit.  Instead we’re engaged in all manner of social programs, diversity, gender issues, environmental issues, climate concerns, etc.
 
We must start planning for the China war.  If the war never comes, that’s fine but failure to plan for it is dereliction of duty at its most extreme.