In the Ukraine-Russia war, the Russian navy has been
rendered nearly irrelevant through a combination of factors, not the least of
which is their sheer incompetence which has allowed Ukraine to dominate the
seas. However, there is another, larger
factor at play, here, and that is that the Russian navy has no useful role ...
or at least none that they’re capable of executing.
Consider the traditional roles of a navy in a war and how
they relate to Russia.
Blockade/Interdict Shipping – There is no shipping moving
to or from Ukraine with the exception of the so-called ‘grain corridor’ which
operates under an agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
Destroy the Enemy’s Navy – Ukraine has no navy.
Conduct Land Strikes – The Russian navy has almost no
land strike capability. Early in the
conflict, Russia did attempt some small degree of land strike during the
attempt to seize Snake Island, however, Russia did not follow that up with any
serious attempt to seize and hold the island.
Amphibious Assaults – Aside from the short lived
attempt to seize Snake Island, the Russians have not attempted any amphibious
assault because they largely control all the land that borders the sea. The one exception is the 70-some mile strip
of land centered around Odesa. This
would seem to be a candidate for assault except that Russia lacks both the
amphibious transport and sufficient available land forces for such an attempt.
Logistics – Russia’s logistics are largely satisfied
by overland supply routes. Some degree
of maritime resupply has been conducted via the ‘backdoor’ of Crimea.
Aerial Supremacy – Carrier based air power is capable
of establishing localized aerial supremacy and supporting land operations. Of course, the Russians possess no carriers
so this is a moot consideration.
Discussion
Consideration of the above naval roles makes it obvious that
there is little significant role for the Russian navy or, at least, little
significant role that the Russian naval force structure is capable of
successfully executing.
The inescapable conclusion is that Russia built an incorrect
naval force structure. The Russian navy
lacks land strike, anti-air , amphibious assault capability, broad area
maritime surveillance, and effective small boat / USV defensive capability.
Putin didn’t wake up one morning and suddenly say, “Let’s
invade Ukraine today”. The Russian navy
knew this was coming for quite some time, dating back at least to the 2014
Crimea annexation and, obviously, that didn’t happen spontaneously. It had to be in the planning stage for
years. So, the Russian navy had ten to
twenty years advance notice and yet they failed to plan for the war with
Ukraine or, if they did attempt to tailor the navy to the planned war, they
badly failed to anticipate the form of the war.
The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that the Russian ship
designs have been found incapable of conducting effective surveillance or self-defense. Indeed, various Russian ships have been
pulled out of the war zone and production of some classes has been halted as
the Russian navy has come to recognize that their ships are inappropriately
designed and fitted.
Conclusion/Warning
Considering all of the above, it’s apparent that the Russian hasn’t been defeated as much as they simply have no relevant, vital role. The proof of this is the fact that, having ‘defeated’ the Russian navy, Ukraine is in no better position, overall. This is a land war, pure and simple. Lacking a role, the navy has, wisely, pulled back to a relatively safe distance to preserve their forces.
Regardless of Russian planning, their force structure is still designed to create defensive bastions for their nuclear deterrent. They still have some bigger pride ships just because. Their investments are probably playing good money ball in that they rely on light manning and focus on delivering missiles. They obviously shorted air defense and have been paying for it. Like others, they also did not adjust well to unmanned or the need of modern ISR at all levels.
ReplyDelete"their force structure is still designed to create defensive bastions for their nuclear deterrent. "
DeleteNo. You're repeating an out of date belief about their Cold War plans if, indeed, that was ever true. Hmm ... I may have to do a post on that. The Sovremennys, Kirovs, Slavas, and Udaloys were an anti-carrier force rather than a nuclear bastion defense force. For the last few decades, they've been building smaller frigates, corvettes, and patrol vessels which are clearly not bastion defense assets. They're territorial protection vessels.
With imminent foreign invasions on the to-do list, those vessels' designs failed to meet the invasion requirements.
The Soviet nuclear bastion defense force, if there was any, was the attack submarine (SSN) force.
Their force now as it was then is extremely corvette SSK heavy. They aimed for the blue water in the 70s and 80s. Their tiny ships with strike missiles approach is primarily defensive. Their amphibious platforms are designed for their near abroad. Their post soviet doctrine does not seem to have yielded any desirable impact as an offensive force. They are almost unable to defend either. https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia%202015print.pdf?ver=2015-12-14-082038-923
DeleteRussia is a huge land mass- they have always had a longing to have access to the seas but their strategists appear to want to defend the borders of Mother Russia. they have little concept of how vast the oceans really are and struggle to encompass this. Without a total redesign of strategy and 30 years to build to a purpose they are just flailing in the shallow sea .
ReplyDelete'The Russian navy has almost no land strike capability' - I don't think this is correct.
ReplyDeleteRussian conventional submarines, destroyers, frigates and corvettes have played a significant and effective role in the missile strikes launched against Ukrainian land targets using Kalibr (SS-N-30A) and - more recently - Tsirkon LAMs.
Quote from US ONI
“Russia plans to deploy KALIBR (family) capability on all new design construction nuclear and non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, frigates, and larger surface ships. KALIBR provides even modest platforms, such as corvettes, with significant offensive capability and, with the use of the land attack missile, all platforms have a significant ability to hold distant fixed ground targets at risk using conventional warheads. The proliferation of this capability within the new Russian Navy is profoundly changing its ability to deter, threaten or destroy adversary targets. It can be logically assumed that KALIBR capability will be retrofitted on those larger Soviet legacy ships and submarines that undergo major overhauls and/or modernization.”
These Kalibr strikes have also been used quite effectively by the Russian navy in support of its operations in support of the Syrian government, so I think that the Russian navy's land strike capability is proportionately equivalent, or possibly superior, to that of the USN.
"The Russian navy knew this was coming .....dating back at least to the 2014 Crimea annexation ...It had to be in the planning stage for years. So, the Russian navy had ten to twenty years advance notice and yet they failed to plan for the war with Ukraine"
Seemingly true that the Russian navy failed to plan for this war, but I've seen no evidence at all that Russia has been 'planning to invade Ukraine for a decade or more', and I haven't even seen anyone but you claiming that this is the case. If you have a credible reference for this claim I would be interested, but otherwise, afaik, the evidence is that Russia did all it could to resolve its issues with Ukraine peacefully, eg through Minsk1 and 2 and that war was as unwelcome to Russia as it was to everyone else.
Agree that the navy seems to be the least efficient of the four branches of the Russian armed forces, but tbf it must be challenging to defend your ships against advanced western cruise missiles with the very precise targeting data provided by western ISR, and satellite/Rivet Joint flights over the Black Sea.
Agree also that this is very much a land war and that - aside from the missile strikes noted above - the Russian navy has had little role to play.
Thanks for your blog.
"have played a significant and effective role in the missile strikes launched against Ukrainian land targets using Kalibr (SS-N-30A) and - more recently - Tsirkon LAMs."
DeleteTo the best of my knowledge (from the various news reports), the Russian navy has only launched something on the order of a dozen or so missiles and they've had absolutely no impact on the overall situation. If you have authoritative reports suggesting otherwise, please give me a link. I'd love to see it.
"Russia plans to deploy"
That's all in the future.
"strikes have also been used quite effectively by the Russian navy in support of its operations in support of the Syrian government"
Irrelevant for the Ukraine war.
"seen no evidence at all that Russia has been 'planning to invade Ukraine for a decade or more"
As I laid out, the Crimea invasion was a decade ago and we knew then that was just a first step so planning has to have been in the works for a few years prior to that so, yes, a decade or more.
"Russia did all it could to resolve its issues with Ukraine peacefully"
Riiiight.
"war was as unwelcome to Russia as it was to everyone else."
That's hilarious!
'the Russian navy has only launched something on the order of a dozen or so missiles and they've had absolutely no impact on the overall situation.'
DeleteOfficial Ukrainian government reports from May 2024 state that up to that date the Russian had launched approximately 800 Calibre missiles from the Black and Azov Seas. Since then many more have been launched. All widely quoted in mainstream western media including eg Newsweek.
"that's all in the future.." No: The ONI report dates from 2011.
"irrelevant for the Ukraine war" Relevant because it demonstrates land attack capability.
'the Crimea invasion was a decade ago and we knew then that was just a first step so planning has to have been in the works for a few years prior to that so, yes, a decade
or more' The invasion of Crimea in 2014 was a response to the unexpected Maidan coup in that same year. General consensus around that, but perhaps you have better information?
'Riiight...' The Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 agreements were an effort to resolve the issue peacefully (obviously). As were the peace talks in Minsk and Istanbul a couple months after the start of the conflict. The Istanbul agreement was initialled by both sides, and the text has been published by the NYT - worth a read.
'that's hilarious...' Well, I'm glad I've amused you !
"state that up to that date the Russian had launched approximately 800 Calibre missiles"
DeleteThis is almost certainly false if for no other reason than Russia does not have enough Kalibr-capable ships in the area. From Wiki, here are the Kalibr-capable classes:
Gremyashchy Project 20385 class (1 in service, 1x8 VLS)
Buyan-M class (11 in service, 2x4 VLS)
Karakurt class (5 in service, 2x4 VLS)
Admiral Grigorovich class (3 in service, 2x4 VLS)
Also capable but not serving in the Black Sea fleet:
Gepard class frigates
Admiral Gorshkov class
That's a grand total of 20 Kalibr-capable ships with a maximum theoretical total of 160 Kalibr cells.
Given that the ships are scattered among the various Russian fleets and that a few of the possible ships are damaged and undergoing long term repair and that not all the possible cells are loaded with Kalibr missiles, the number of ships and possible missile cells in the Ukraine theater is on the order of perhaps 3-5 ships and 24-40 cells.
Some submarines are also reportedly capable but I've seen no reports of sub launched missiles in the Ukraine war.
So, with those kinds of launch platform constraints, it is exceedingly unlikely that there have been 800 Kalibr launches from naval vessels. There are air and land launched Kalibr missiles and perhaps those are counted to come up with a figure of 800. I have seen reports of air and land launched missiles that seem much more numerous than any reported sea launched missiles.
From Wiki,
"Ukraine's military command reported widespread usage of Kalibr cruise missiles in strikes against strategic and non-combat targets across Ukraine.[43][44] Most notable incidents were:
On 14 July 2022, three Kalibr cruise missiles hit the city center of Vinnytsia, Ukraine, killing at least 20 people, including at least three children. Ukraine claimed two other missiles were shot down.
On 23 July 2022, at least two Kalibr cruise missiles hit the port of Odesa, other two were reportedly shot down.
On 11 September 2022, Kalibr cruise missiles were again fired from the Black Sea on targets in Ukraine.
During 2022 Russian strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure in October, November and December 2022, number of Kalibr cruise missiles fired from the Black Sea targeted various Ukrainian energy facilities across the country. This led to destruction of at least 50% of Ukraine's energy sector by mid-November 2022.
On 10 October 2022, three Kalibr cruise missiles violated the airspace of the Republic of Moldova.
On 20 March 2023, Ukraine claimed Russian Kalibr cruise missiles had been involved in an explosion in the north of annexed Crimea. Ukraine announced the explosions but, as is normal, did not explicitly say it was behind the attack."
The summary of notable attacks indicates that missiles were fired in very small batches of a few at a time and the total doesn't even begin to approach 800. It is also likely that the number reported is overestimated as most things in war are.
I am also highly suspicious that Russia even had 800 Kalibr missiles in their inventory but I have no data on this.
So, your comment is almost certainly incorrect.
Well 800 is a pretty round number so yeah, probably wrong, but more than 12 certainly…I don’t believe Ukrainian reports about shoot-down rates, but their estimates of salvo numbers and breakdowns between missile types and UAVs seem to be widely accepted as being reasonably accurate - I mean, they’re the guys on the receiving end so they’re probably keeping close count.
DeleteThere’s plenty of footage out there showing sub-launched missiles being fired off - even from the Caspian. I guess they could all be faked, but I doubt it.
There’s a container-based version of the Kalibr that can be used for truck or rail launches - maybe you’re referring to that. I don’t think it’s in widespread use - at least, I haven’t seen many reports about it - can’t see it as adding much functionality in the current conflict. A bit like the land-based Tomahawks maybe - too big - too slow - too vulnerable.
Russian missile production and inventory figures would be very closely held data and I don’t have any particular insight into that, although I note that western intelligence reports have consistently underestimated - deliberately or otherwise - the size and capacity of the Russian MIC, and its ability to ramp up production volumes.
The Ukrainians reckon current Kalibr inventory at around 400, but who knows?
You gotta be a bit skeptical about the media coverage of this conflict. I’m old enough to remember the Viet Nam war, when journalists went out there and reported the real state of things on the battlefield, and the papers actually printed their reports; those days are long gone (sadly), and you’re best advised to DYOR.
I'll call it a day on this one....
Thank you.
DeleteLook map, I think that purely fight with Ukraine, Russian navy's roles are limited. Putin thinks that his enemy is US led NATO thus his goal is to exhaust major EU nations than occupy Ukraine quickly as he has no resource to support a poppy government. He lets the West to support one. He only occupies lands where ethnic Russians dominate.
ReplyDeleteBase on this strategy, Russian troops focus on kill Ukrainian fighting men while keep his loss at minimum. Large scale amphitheater assaults are thus ruled out. He also needs to prepare a possible NATO intervention. You can see that many advanced Russian weapons have been put in reserve than use to fight current war.
For deterring NATO, Russian navy then has roles to play, especially their attack submarines.