In the Ukraine-Russia war, the Russian navy has been
rendered nearly irrelevant through a combination of factors, not the least of
which is their sheer incompetence which has allowed Ukraine to dominate the
seas. However, there is another, larger
factor at play, here, and that is that the Russian navy has no useful role ...
or at least none that they’re capable of executing.
Consider the traditional roles of a navy in a war and how
they relate to Russia.
Blockade/Interdict Shipping – There is no shipping moving
to or from Ukraine with the exception of the so-called ‘grain corridor’ which
operates under an agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
Destroy the Enemy’s Navy – Ukraine has no navy.
Conduct Land Strikes – The Russian navy has almost no
land strike capability. Early in the
conflict, Russia did attempt some small degree of land strike during the
attempt to seize Snake Island, however, Russia did not follow that up with any
serious attempt to seize and hold the island.
Amphibious Assaults – Aside from the short lived
attempt to seize Snake Island, the Russians have not attempted any amphibious
assault because they largely control all the land that borders the sea. The one exception is the 70-some mile strip
of land centered around Odesa. This
would seem to be a candidate for assault except that Russia lacks both the
amphibious transport and sufficient available land forces for such an attempt.
Logistics – Russia’s logistics are largely satisfied
by overland supply routes. Some degree
of maritime resupply has been conducted via the ‘backdoor’ of Crimea.
Aerial Supremacy – Carrier based air power is capable
of establishing localized aerial supremacy and supporting land operations. Of course, the Russians possess no carriers
so this is a moot consideration.
Discussion
Consideration of the above naval roles makes it obvious that
there is little significant role for the Russian navy or, at least, little
significant role that the Russian naval force structure is capable of
successfully executing.
The inescapable conclusion is that Russia built an incorrect
naval force structure. The Russian navy
lacks land strike, anti-air , amphibious assault capability, broad area
maritime surveillance, and effective small boat / USV defensive capability.
Putin didn’t wake up one morning and suddenly say, “Let’s
invade Ukraine today”. The Russian navy
knew this was coming for quite some time, dating back at least to the 2014
Crimea annexation and, obviously, that didn’t happen spontaneously. It had to be in the planning stage for
years. So, the Russian navy had ten to
twenty years advance notice and yet they failed to plan for the war with
Ukraine or, if they did attempt to tailor the navy to the planned war, they
badly failed to anticipate the form of the war.
The Ukraine conflict has demonstrated that the Russian ship
designs have been found incapable of conducting effective surveillance or self-defense. Indeed, various Russian ships have been
pulled out of the war zone and production of some classes has been halted as
the Russian navy has come to recognize that their ships are inappropriately
designed and fitted.
Conclusion/Warning
Considering all of the above, it’s apparent that the Russian
hasn’t been defeated as much as they simply have no relevant, vital role. The proof of this is the fact that, having
‘defeated’ the Russian navy, Ukraine is in no better position, overall. This is a land war, pure and simple. Lacking a role, the navy has, wisely, pulled
back to a relatively safe distance to preserve their forces.
What this tells us is that you had better know your enemy
and your own strategy against that enemy as you build your force
structure. Failure to do so will
guarantee that you have an inappropriate and ineffective naval force. We need to keep this lesson firmly in mind as
we build toward the inevitable war with China.
Currently, we have substituted technology for strategy and, as a result,
have produced ships with no useful purpose in a China war (Zumwalt, LCS, AFSB,
MLP, every amphibious ship, etc.).