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Tuesday, August 27, 2024

Bringing Home the Fleet

In a recent post, a reader, referencing the current ‘3 ships to keep one deployed (3:1)’ model, asked this, 
Can we alter or change the maintenance, training, and deployable cycle we have into something better? Obviously with the shipyard logjam, we couldn't have all ships "up" at once, but could we somehow tinker, and maybe flip that to 2/3 ready, or more?[1]

My initial reaction was slight irritation and disbelief that after all the time I’ve spent advocating ending deployments and bringing the fleet home, people still didn’t understand the concept.  A few more seconds thought and I realized that the question was perfectly apropos because I’d failed to adequately explain the concept.  Yes, I’d talked endlessly about bringing the fleet home and some of the gross benefits that would derive from that (improved readiness, enhanced training, better maintenance, etc.) but I’d never bothered to explain exactly how all these benefits would come about.  What procedures would change to allow this?  What circumstances would change?  How, exactly, would these benefits occur?
 
I’d like to apologize to that reader and rectify my oversight, now, and explain how and why this would work.
 
 
Circumstances
 
Let’s look, first, at the change in circumstances that would result from a switch to home basing the fleet.
 
Miles – The most obvious change in circumstance would be that the ships wouldn’t deploy.  They’d be home based.  Okay, so how does this help?  Well, the home basing means that the ships wouldn’t be racking up endless miles which is another way of saying wear and tear.  A ship at home simply doesn’t wear out as fast as one on a 6-12 month deployment.
 
Support – Being home based means that every ship is within arm’s length of ready maintenance support.  That support takes the form of a ready supply of parts, repair technicians, machine shops, skilled trades, cranes, etc.  There would be no more delayed/deferred maintenance that piles up during an extended, many-month deployment.
 
It’s embarrassing for the Navy to even have to say this but the support would include corrosion control so that our ships don’t look like rusted out garbage scows.
 
Training – Did you know that a deploying group loses capability and readiness as the cruise goes on?  That’s because they don’t do what they’re trained to do while on a cruise.  They aren’t attacking or defending.  Instead, they’re just showing the flag and dozens of other utterly useless tasks.  A deployed group is less combat capable when they return from deployment than when they started.  How backward and unproductive – indeed, counterproductive! – is that!  A group that goes out should come back more combat capable than when they began.  After all, they were at sea and sea time should be all about high intensity, realistic training, not scut work (to borrow a medical term for pointless tasks).
 
The home base circumstance eliminates deployments and the associated, unavoidable degradation of readiness and, instead, allows continuous training.
 

Method
 
This is the key part.  Unless executing an actual mission, every home based ship is constantly doing one of only two things:
 
  • Training
  • Maintaining
 
That’s it.  Just those two things.  There are no other activities. 
 
In fact, even during maintenance, the bulk of the crew will still be training.  While a ship is in dry dock or tied up pier side for maintenance, the crew is still training (simulators, walkthroughs, courses, etc.)
 
So, what does this mean?  This is what I’ve failed to convey.  Every ship is always ready to surge to a real mission because there is no maintenance backlog because every maintenance item is attended to immediately.  If you haven’t deployed and developed a backlog of hundreds of maintenance items, there won’t be dry dock and pier side maintenance scheduling issues.  Every issue is addressed immediately.  Thus, at any given moment, no ship can have more than a single open maintenance item because every maintenance item is dealt with immediately.  That makes every ship continuously ‘ready’ and readiness is always 100% of the fleet.
 
Relax.  I know there are scheduled – and occasionally unscheduled! – major repairs or overhauls that are required and that results in a certain percentage of the fleet being hard down and unavailable.  We have something like twenty dry docks of various types so say twenty ships are always unavailable.  As of this writing, there are 296 ships in the Navy (includes various logistic and support ships that are active but not commissioned).  So, that leaves around 276 ships that should always be classified as ready and available.   That’s 93% of the fleet in a constant state of readiness. 
 
In contrast, currently, the Navy is attempting to achieve a state of around 75 deployable ships.  Out of a fleet of 296, that’s just 25% readiness and despite having been trying to achieve that for some time now, they’ve failed.  Fifty ships is the current readiness level and that doesn’t look to be changing anytime soon.  Fifty ships represents just 17% readiness of the fleet.  No wonder Lincoln only got three escorts!
 
Even ships that are undergoing some kind of pier side maintenance (tear down of a piece of equipment, for example) can be made ready almost instantly with a quick restoration of the affected equipment.  At most, the ship would have a single item in a degraded state which would still classify the ship as ready.
 
Today, ships routinely sail with long laundry lists of down or degraded equipment.  The Port Royal grounding, for example, saw that the ship’s navigation systems and many other systems were down or degraded despite having just come out of maintenance!  Every deployed ship has a long list of down or degraded equipment (casualties, as the Navy calls them).  A deployment is the worst possible thing you can do to a ship as regards readiness and maintenance and the longer the deployment, the worse the situation becomes.
 
With home basing, here’s what a typical ship’s month might look like:
 
  • A week spent training for an upcoming exercise and/or general training.
  • A week at sea in an exercise which includes 24 hour, intensive training leaving the crew exhausted each night and with no desire or energy to even think about video games, lounges, haircuts, weight lifting, movies, or any other crew comfort activity.
  • A week spent debriefing and re-training the just completed exercise.
  • A week spent performing preventive/routine maintenance.
  • An occasional day sprinkled in addressing any emergent, unscheduled maintenance need.
 
Individual crew members might be sent to a shore training course at any time, subject to instant recall, if needed.
 
 
We see, then, that the keys to making this work are:
 
  • Address maintenance issues instantly, as they arise.  No deferred maintenance.
  • Constant training.
  • Regular, short episodes of sea time conducting realistic exercises.  The short time frames eliminate the need for all but the most basic and necessary crew comforts.  Toilets? – squat over the stern!  Berthing? – hang a hammock somewhere!
 
 
Maintenance

Hand in hand with home basing is the requirement to return to ship-supplied maintenance instead of depending on contractors and shore support.  Yes, there will always be things that require a contractor (Aegis software or hardware support, for example) or shore support (specialized repair equipment, for example) but we need to return the majority of the maintenance responsibility back to the ship’s crew.  What better training is there for a crew than to maintain and repair their own equipment?
 
We need to include much more extensive machine shop facilities, electronic shop facilities, welding shops and equipment, etc. in our ship designs.  Let’s remove the now unneeded crew comfort spaces and replace them with ship maintenance and repair shops.  The crew can collect their mail, get a haircut, visit the bank, and watch a movie on shore since they’ll only typically be at sea for a few days or a week at a time.
 
Returning ship maintenance to the ship will also alleviate the burden on the shore maintenance support resources.  We shouldn’t need shore support to rebuild a pump, tear down a valve, replace seals, etc.  Those skills and capabilities should be inherent within the ship.
 
 
Benefits
 
So, to sum up, what do we gain from home basing the fleet?
 
  • Constant training instead of just occasional pre-deployment training every year or so
  • Constant maintenance instead of delayed/deferred maintenance at the end of a deployment
  • 93% fleet readiness instead of 17% readiness
  • No forward exposure offering an enemy a free ‘Pearl Harbor’ opportunity
  • Maximum flexibility;  if all the ships are ready and available, our mission options are unlimited
 
 
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Tuesday, August 20, 2024

Lincoln Escorts

In a previous post noting the deployment of the Lincoln strike group (can you really call a carrier and three destroyers a strike group?), reader ‘BA 1959’ posted a comment asking where all our destroyers are since they certainly aren’t escorting our carriers.  This is an excellent question and it illustrates one of ConNavOps’ overarching themes which is that the Navy should be home based, training and maintaining, instead of on deployment or, worse, trapped in the useless phases of the interminable deployment cycle.
 
How come the Lincoln is deploying with just three escorts?  Well, partly it’s the fault of a hopelessly lost Navy leadership that either foolishly thinks carriers don’t need more escorts or believes that destroyers are better employed on worthless tasks like show-the-flag, pirate chasing, freedom of navigation exercises, forward presence, trading one-at-a-time shots with the Houthis and praying that a stray missile doesn’t get through, etc.
 
Think about it … if the Navy were home ported and engaged in continual training and maintenance, every ship that wasn’t in dry dock would have been available to surge as an escort for the Lincoln.  That, in a nutshell, is the justification for home basing the fleet.
 
 
Home Basing
 
Let’s consider the example of Pearl Harbor.  Many of you think the Pacific fleet has always been based in Pearl Harbor but that’s not the case.  Pearl Harbor did not become a functioning naval base until 1919 and, even then, did not have any permanently based ships.  Instead, the fleet was home based in San Pedro, California.
 
It wasn’t until 1940 that the Pacific fleet, under Admiral James Richardson, Commander in Chief US Fleet, was ordered (by President Roosevelt)  to make Pearl Harbor its home port.  Richardson was vehemently opposed.  When he queried Admiral Stark about why the fleet was being moved to Pearl Harbor, Stark replied, 
You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs (sic) going into the East Indies.[1]
Even then, the President and Admiral Stark, among many others, believed that forward presence would provide deterrence.  We know how that turned out.  The result was WWII in the Pacific and a disastrous defeat for the Navy.  Deterrence has never succeeded. 
 
Richardson believed the fleet could not begin hostilities from Pearl Harbor. 
Richardson wrote to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark, cautioning him that should the fleet need to move west, “it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.”[1]
Richardson testified to Congress that, in his opinion, 
… the presence of the fleet in Hawaii might influence a civilian political government, but that Japan had a military government which knew that the fleet was undermanned, unprepared for war, and had no training or auxiliary ships without which it could not undertake active operations. I further stated that we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations.”[1]
What came of Richardson’s concerns?  
In January 1941, Roosevelt prematurely relieved Richardson of command and replaced him with Admiral Husband Kimmel.[1]
Richardson understood what Roosevelt and others did not:  that deterrence doesn’t work and that the fleet needs to be home ported where it can train, maintain, and prepare for war.  In fact, there is a very good case to be made that forward presence increases the likelihood of conflict rather than acting as a deterrent (see, “ForwardPresence – Deterrent or Provocation?”).
 
Our ship utilization priorities are badly misguided. We desperately need to return to a home basing concept and get the fleet back into shape in terms of maintenance and training, the product of which is readiness.  The Lincoln example is just the latest example that hammers home the wisdom of that approach.
 
 
 
_______________________________
 
[1]The National WWII Museum website, “Solely a Bluff: Relocating the US Fleet to Pearl Harbor”, Kali Martin,
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/fdr-bluff-relocating-us-fleet-to-pearl-harbor

Sunday, August 18, 2024

The Jolly Roger

 
USS Kidd flies the Jolly Roger.
 
USS Kidd Flying the Jolly Roger


USS Kidd Flying the Jolly Roger


Those are not photoshop’ed pictures.  The USS Kidd is authorized to fly the Jolly Roger.[1]  The tradition began with the Fletcher class destroyer, USS Kidd, in 1943 and the tradition has passed down the line of ships named Kidd. 
 
The tradition is associated with Medal of Honor winner  Admiral Isaac Kidd and a nickname related to privateer/pirate Captain William Kidd.  The usage of the Jolly Roger was blessed by Admiral Kidd’s widow.
 
In addition to the flag, paintings of the Jolly Roger appear around the ship.
 
Jolly Roger on the rear of the Kidd's 5" gun.


Enjoy it.  I’m sure some woke idiot in the Navy will be coming for it soon.


 
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Thursday, August 15, 2024

The Mighty Carrier Strike Group 3

The USS Abraham Lincoln and escorts, comprising Carrier Strike Group 3 (CSG-3), are headed to the Middle East in reaction to a potential attack on Israel by Iran.  The mighty CSG-3 consists of,
 
Ships
  • USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
  • USS O'Kane (DDG-77)
  • USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG-121)
  • USS Spruance (DDG-111)
 
Air Wing
  • Strike Fighter Squadron 14 F/A-18E
  • Strike Fighter Squadron 41 F/A-18F
  • Strike Fighter Squadron 151 F/A-18E
  • Strike Fighter Squadron 314 F-35C
  • Electronic Attack Squadron 133 EA-18G
  • Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117 E-2D
  • Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 14 MH-60S
  • Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 71  MH-60R
 
There you have it … CSG-3;  one carrier and three destroyers.  The carrier’s air wing (Carrier Air Wing 9) consists of three Hornet squadrons, one F-35 Marine squadron, and the usual mix of AEW, EW, and helos.
 
The mighty CSG-3.  Awesome combat power.
 
 
As you know, CSG-3 has existed for many years.  Purely as a point of historical interest, Wikipedia describes the group’s composition in 1992 as the Lincoln, five cruisers, four destroyers, and two frigates. 
 
The carrier’s air wing consisted of two Tomcat squadrons, two Hornet squadrons, one Intruder squadron, one Viking squadron, and the usual mix of AEW, EW, and helos.
 
Ships
  • USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
  • USS Shiloh (CG-67)
  • USS Princeton (CG-59)
  • USS Texas (CGN-39)
  • USS California (CGN-36)
  • USS Sterett (CG-31)
  • USS Ingersoll (DD-990)
  • USS John Young (DD-973)
  • USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62)
  • USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53)
  • USS Ingraham (FFG-61)
  • USS Gary (FFG-51)                  
 
Air Wing
  • Fighter Squadron 213: F-14A    
  • Fighter Squadron 114: F-14A    
  • Strike Fighter Squadron 94: F/A-18C     
  • Strike Fighter Squadron 22: F/A-18C
  • Attack Squadron 95: A-6E, KA-6D
  • Electronic Warfare Squadron 135: EA-6B
  • Airborne Early Warning Squadron 117: E-2C
  • Sea Control Squadron 29: S-3B
  • Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 6: SH-60F, HH-60H
 
 
Does this really need any discussion?  The decreased in numbers, firepower, and capability is self-evident.  We are on the wrong path.
 
 
 
_____________________________
 
[1]Wikipedia, “Carrier Strike Group 3”, retrieved 12-Aug-2024,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_Strike_Group_3

Monday, August 12, 2024

Ford Class Notes

Here’s some tidbits pertaining to the Ford class, as noted in the recent CRS report.[1]
 
 
Carriers – The Navy is statutorily (10 U.S.C. 8062(b)) required to maintain 11 operational carriers.  Note that one (now, two due to chronic maintenance delays) carrier is always in long term overhaul so we only have 10 (now 9) operational carriers.  Note that the Navy’s own 30 year plan indicates that the Navy would operate less than the mandated 11 carriers for over half of the 30 year period of the plan.  This is blatant disregard for Congressional mandates.
 
Air Wings – The Navy is statutorily (10 U.S.C. 8062(e)) required to maintain 9 air wings.  The original statute required 10 air wings but Congress acceded to the Navy’s request for 9.
 
Early Retirement – The Navy is statutorily (10 U.S.C. 8062(g)) prohibited from retiring a nuclear carrier prior to its first refueling.  This was implemented in response to the Navy’s attempt to early retire Nimitz class carriers prior to their refueling.
 
CVN-79 John F. Kennedy – CVN-79 has already exceeded its cost cap and the Navy has revised the cap upward.
 
CVN-80 Enterprise – The Navy now estimates that CVN-80 delivery will be delayed 18-26 months.
 
CVN-81 Doris Miller – The Navy estimates the cost of CVN-81 to be $14B.
 
Cost Cap – The provisions that established and later amended the cost caps are listed below.  Note the continual increases in cap levels.  It’s not really a cap if it’s continually increased, is it?
 
Section 122 of the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) established a procurement cost cap for CVN-78 of $10.5 billion … and a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class carriers of $8.1 billion each …
 
Section 121 of the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3304/P.L. 113-66 of December 26, 2013) amended the procurement cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,887.0 million for CVN-78 and a revised cap of $11,498.0 million for each follow-on ship
 
Section 122 of the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $11,398.0 million for each follow-on ship in the program
 
Section 121(a) of the FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115-91 of December 12, 2017) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide a revised cap of $12,568.0 million for CVN-80 and subsequent ships in the program … The cap for CVN-79 was kept at $11,398.0 million … The provision also amended the basis for adjusting the caps for inflation, and excluded certain costs from being counted against the caps.
 
Section 121 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 1790/P.L. 116-92 of December 20, 2019) further amended the cost cap for the CVN-78 program to provide revised caps of $13,224.0 million for CVN-78, $11,398.0 million for CVN–79, $12,202.0 million for CVN–80, and $12,451.0 million for CVN–81. The provision directs the Navy to exclude from these figures costs for CVN–78 class battle spares, interim spares, and increases attributable to economic inflation after December 1, 2018.
 
 
Discussion
 
What these notes demonstrate is the blatant disregard the Navy has for Congress’ wishes (and laws!).  Most of these legal mandates are the result of the Navy ignoring Congress’ directives.  The problem is that there are no consequences for the Navy’s disregard of Congress.  New laws need to have statutory criminal penalties associated with them.  Currently, the Navy can ignore Congress and there is no criminal penalty.  A minimum penalty for failure to meet Congress’ mandates should be termination from service, forfeiture of pay and pension, and a year in jail for everyone associated with a particular failing, beginning with the CNO and moving down the line.  Perhaps that would encourage compliance with Congress’ wishes.
 
To be fair, Congress is not blameless in this, by any means.  Congress keeps appeasing the Navy by raising cost caps, approving flag positions, and increasing the Navy’s budget.  Congress needs to institute a moratorium on approval of flag positions until the Navy begins obeying Congress, hold firm on cost caps, and begin decreasing the Navy’s budget 10% per year until the Navy begins obeying Congress.
 
The Navy has forgotten that it serves Congress and the people, not the other way around.
 
 
 
[1]Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress”, 12-Jul-2024, RS20643

Thursday, August 8, 2024

LCS Program Cost and Opportunity Cost

Austal (USA) just launched the final LCS, the USS Pierre (LCS 38).  Now would seem an especially appropriate time to assess the financial and opportunity cost of the program.  Did we get value for our taxpayer money (the program cost)?  Was there something else we could have better spent our taxpayer funds on (the opportunity cost)?  Let’s see.
 
A cursory review reveals that we acquired
 
16x Freedom class ships (5 retired)
 
19x Independence class ships (2 retired)
 
Total LCS Ships  = 35 (7 retired)
Total Active LCS Ships = 28
 
Note:  Depending on which plan you look at, the Navy intends to retire several more Freedom class vessels over the next few years.  Essentially, the entire Freedom class is being terminated as quickly as the Navy can.
 
What did this acquisition program cost? 
 
Ship
GAO reports R&D and acquisition costs = $20.5B [2]
Unit cost = $650M [2]
 
Module
GAO reports module R&D and acquisition costs = $7B[1]
Total modules = 40 [1]
Unit cost = $175M per module.[1]
 
Total Program Cost
Total cost module and ship = $27.5B
 
 
Discussion
 
Value – The LCS has almost no combat capability.  Hence, the value for the money is near zero.
 
Opportunity Cost – The opportunity cost = $27.5B.  What could we have done with $27.5B if we had not spent it on the LCS program?  Well, the alternative opportunities are nearly endless:  munitions, mines, a dedicated minesweeper, ASW destroyer/corvette, air wings, dry docks, etc.  At this point, it’s not even debatable that almost any alternative choice would have been a better use of the funds.  In other words, the opportunity cost-value far exceeded the actual cost-value.
 
Bear in mind that this is not a case of hindsight.  Almost everyone except the Navy pointed out massive problems with the program from day one:  concurrency, lack of CONOPS, a multitude of design issues, insufficient weight and stability margins, a badly flawed manning model, a badly flawed maintenance model, lack of armament, complete absence of modules, etc.  There was no hindsight involved or required.  The problems were painfully obvious and predictable.  In fact, the term ‘predictable’ implies a small degree of uncertainty.  Regarding the LCS problems, there was no uncertainty.  The problems were 100% certain to occur, as was pointed out by … well … everyone.
 
The LCS is the poster child for a program that should never have left the back-of-the-napkin stage.  It produced no value and a staggering $27.5B wasted opportunity cost.
 
  
 
_______________________________ 
[1]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Jun 2023, GAO-23-106059, p.149
 
[2]Government Accountability Office, “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment”, Apr 2018, GAO-18-360SP, p.92

Monday, August 5, 2024

Train Like You Fight

The Captain set the message down after reading it to the officers assembled in the wardroom.  Setting aside all the navalese language, it directed him and his Burke class destroyer to divert from their current assignment, take aboard some observers, which they had already done, and transit to the Navy’s new live fire training area located well off the west coast of the United States and engage with live weapons – he had read that part to his officers with an incredulous voice - any valid target detected.  The Captain and his ship were about to be subjected to the Navy’s newest training exercise.  His would be only the second ship to undergo the training and he knew nothing about it;  scuttlebutt was non-existent.  Still, one Navy training exercise was like the next, he was sure.  He assumed he would be given detailed instructions – Navy training exercises were nothing if not highly scripted.  Oddly, though, he had been directed to choose his own course, time and speed to enter the training area and been told only to enter the area by a certain date/time and remain in the area until specifically notified that training was over.  He had no idea how long the training would last.  He assumed that it would be a few hours based on previous exercises.
 
“All right, gentlemen, here’s what we’re going to do.  We’ll be entering the training area in about one hour.  I want to complete this exercise in a timely fashion and set the standard for the ships that follow.  We’ll go to General Quarters when we enter the area.  I expect we’ll receive detailed instructions at that point.  Let’s make sure all our systems are ready and let’s have our best people in place. Questions?”
 
“Captain, that’s not a lot of time to run system checks,” the XO pointed out.
 
“I know it, XO.  Make it happen anyway!”
 
Acknowledging the Captain, the XO grimaced inwardly.  No amount of desire or enthusiasm was going to get some of those Aegis computer system spare parts installed that the ship didn’t have on board and had been on order for almost six months.  Similarly, the CIWS which had been spontaneously resetting on occasion during checks wasn’t going to be miraculously fixed in the next hour.  Still, he’d do everything he could.
 
Unnoticed, or rather ignored, the observer in the back of the room made a quick note on his clipboard of documents.  The Captain thought the training exercise wouldn’t begin for another hour but it had actually begun the moment he had received the notification message and, so far, the Captain wasn’t doing well.
 
An hour later, the ship entered the training area.  The ship was at GQ and the best sailors were in place at each critical post.  The Captain waited impatiently in CIC for his instructions.  The observer simply stood quietly in the background, making an occasional note.  As time passed with no additional instructions forthcoming, the Captain’s impatience grew.  After an hour, the Captain radioed for instructions.  The reply was short and succinct – “continue training”.  What training, the Captain wondered sarcastically?
 
All right, the Captain thought, someone is trying to screw with the normal training procedures.  Well, he wasn’t about to be caught flatfooted.
 
“Listen up, people.  We’re going to stay at GQ until whoever’s running this exercise gets their act together.  We’re not going to relax and get caught by surprise.  Let’s stay on top of things.”
 
Nine hours later, the Captain and crew were exhausted and frustrated by the complete lack of activity.  Nothing had happened.  True, sonar had generated their usual litany of non-specific contacts that had been aggressively pursued only to vanish – biologics, probably.  The ship’s helo was now down for maintenance after spending the last several hours chasing spurious contact reports.  Utterly disgusted at the wasted time, the Captain finally decided to call it quits for the day.  Whoever was running this exercise had obviously screwed up badly and he’d attempt to sort things out tomorrow.  With that, the ship secured from General Quarters. 
 
“XO”, the Captain called out, “get that CIWS torn down tonight and figure out what’s wrong before we try this exercise again tomorrow.”
 
Again, unseen, the observer’s mouth twitched in what might have been a small grin.
 
Three hours later, with most of the crew having just settled in for some much needed rest and with the ‘third string’ manning the watch stations, the ship was ripped awake by the sound of the General Quarters call.  Staggering to his feet, the Captain ran to CIC.
 
“Report,” he yelled as he entered.
 
“We’ve got an unidentified contact inbound bearing 265 relative, 20 miles out, speed Mach 1.3.  It’s right down on the waves.  Collision course.  Impact in just over 1 minute.”
 
“ESM indicates it’s a Russian SS-N-22 Sunburn.”
 
A target drone, the Captain assumed.  “Put the CIWS on it,” he shouted.
 
“CIWS is down for repairs per your orders, sir.”
 
“Well, get it back up”, the Captain yelled, frantically!
 
Unfortunately, there was no time.  The missile was approaching at over 16 miles per minute and impact was now less than 30 seconds.
 
“What’s going on?”, the Captain yelled to no one in particular.  “This is supposed to be training but that thing is going to hit us!”
 
At that moment, 1 mile out, the drone missile pulled up, angled just over the top of the destroyer, and passed overhead with a shattering boom.  The CIC watchstanders were shaken while cups, papers, tools, and other items were knocked onto the deck.
 
“What the hell was that?”, the Captain again asked of no one.  “That wasn’t training.  That was a reckless safety violation!  Someone’s going to pay for that.”
 
The Captain immediately sent out an urgent message demanding to know who had screwed up a simple training exercise.  The instant reply was, “Continue training.”
 
The Captain had no time to wonder before his thoughts were again rudely interrupted.
 
“Multiple airborne contacts bearing 135 relative, 78 miles, speed 480 kts.  They’ll pass about 10 miles off our starboard side if they continue on course.  No emissions but they’re squawking civilian.”
 
“Let ‘em come”, the Captain replied.  “This is a test and I’m not going to Vincennes them.”
 
The Captain was all too aware of the Vincennes incident where an Aegis cruiser had badly misinterpreted its sensor data and shot down a civilian airliner in the belief that it was an attacking aircraft.  That incident had become part of Navy institutional memory and it was ingrained in every Captain never to repeat that event.
 
In the background, the observer frowned slightly and made more notes.
 
Minutes passed as the aircraft got closer and then came the half-expected announcement.
 
“Surface contact, bearing 334 relative, 21 miles, speed 24 kts.  Contact is coming straight at us.”
 
“There”, the Captain said, a note of triumph in his voice, “That’s the real target.  They were hoping we’d focus on the aircraft and miss the real threat coming from the surface.”
 
“Weapons, put a couple SM-6 missiles on that surface ship.”
 
Lacking Harpoons or the recently canceled LRASM, Standard missiles were the only anti-ship weapon available.
 
“Captain, we don’t have a positive ID on the target, yet.  There are no emissions and we don’t have a visual.”
 
“It’s the real threat”, the Captain answered. “They tried to fool us.  Designate and launch.”
 
Unprepared for the command, inexperienced, and inadequately trained, the ‘third string’ operators took over two minutes to designate the target, prep the launch cycle, and execute the launch.  Moments after the two missiles launched, the EO sensor operator announced that he had a visual on the target.
 
“Sir, it appears to be a civilian yacht of some sort!”
 
The Captain blanched.  Had he just executed a Vincennes on a civilian yacht that had wandered into the training area?
 
“Direct hit.  The target is gone.”
 
“Stand down”, the Captain frantically yelled.  “Secure all weapons.”
 
The observer shook his head minutely and made another note.
 
Suddenly, the Captain heard another announcement. 
 
“New targets inbound.  Bearing 110 degrees relative, speed Mach 0.8, altitude 20 meters.  They appear to be missiles launched from the civilian aircraft.”
 
The Captain was dumbfounded and froze.  He had been certain the aircraft were civilian, trying to fool him into doing a Vincennes.  Instead, it appeared that they were the real threat and had been from the start.  All the ship’s weapons were in standby and there was nothing available to defend.
 
Even more stunning, the incoming missiles (target drones, he assumed) did not turn away.  Instead, at the last moment, each elevated slightly, separated a small, inert, frangible ‘warhead’, and passed closely directly over the ship.  As they did, he felt several thuds as the inert ‘warheads’ impacted the ship. 
 
“What was that?”, he called frantically.  “Did we just get hit by a target drone?”
 
Before he could get an answer, another contact report came.
 
“Torpedoes inbound.  Range one mile.  Speed 55 kts.”
 
“What?!  How did torpedoes get so close without being detected?”, he yelled.
 
The third string sonar operator, who was still trying to get qualified, was unable to answer before more reports started flooding in.
 
“Damage Control reports several fires.  Smoke spreading throughout the ship.”
 
The various observers scattered throughout the ship had designated areas as hit and on fire and, in addition, had ignited multiple smoke bombs.  They couldn’t start actual fires but they could replicate the smoke that would be filling the ship if this had been real.
 
“Aircraft are turning and re-engaging.”
 
“Turn to unmask the CIWS”, the Captain yelled, forgetting that the CIWS was down and coughing as smoke from an adjoining compartment began filling the space.
 
The ship began to turn to bring the single CIWS to bear on the aircraft’s threat vector but part way through the turn the Captain corrected himself.
 
“No, wait.  We need to run from the torpedoes.  They’re the bigger threat!  Put us on the same course as the torpedoes.”
 
Part way through the turn, the Captain again corrected himself.  “Wait, it’s too late.  We can’t outrun the torpedoes.  They’re already too close.  Unmask the CIWS!”, he yelled, his voice rising in pitch.  It was too much.  He was being overwhelmed with information and threats.
 
Moments later he felt the impact as four inert torpedoes slammed into the hull.
 
“Radar is down.”  An observer had directed the operator to shut down the radar to simulate damage.
 
“Damage Control reports at least four underwater impacts and one leak from a cracked hull plate.”
 
The leak was substantial and real.  The torpedo warheads were inert but the lightly built Burkes could not absorb even an inert warhead impacting at 55 kts.  The damage control reports were confused, panicked, inaccurate, and real.
 
With that, the power flickered and cut out.  One emergency light came on and two others did not.  An observer had disabled them prior to the exercise to see if anyone could repair them.  As it turned out, no one even tried.
 
And so the exercise continued with the ship’s condition and the crew’s performance rapidly deteriorating.  The scheduled debrief was going to be brutal.  The Admiral in charge of this training program had directed the observers to be unfailingly objective and to spare no feelings.  No one had expected the exercise to go well but this was poor even by that standard.  Still, considering that the Navy had not conducted realistic training for decades, it wasn’t surprising. 
 
The ship now had several dents from the various inert ‘warhead’ impacts and a handful of minor damage to repair but that was an acceptable part of achieving combat readiness and the forced drydocking would be used to accomplish various equipment undates and long deferred maintenance.
 
Painful as it might be, this was the first step in returning the Navy to an actual warfighting organization.
 
Forty eight hours later, after a continuing series of very realistic events and with an exhausted crew staggering through actual damage control efforts, the exercise concluded and the lead observer completed his final on-board paperwork;  a full report would come later.  The last two questions on his checklist were the most important.  The first concerned the ship’s combat readiness, which the observer unhesitatingly checked as ‘Not Ready’.  The second asked for his recommendation on the Captain’s fitness for continued command.  The observer sadly shook his head slightly and checked ‘Unfit’.  The current Captain would take the ship into drydock but someone else would be taking it back out.  As much as this exercise had been a training and readiness test, it had also been a combat mentality assessment of the Captain and he had failed, badly.
 
 
 
Discussion Points
 
-We need to allow a mild degree of risk and physical damage In our training through the use of inert or frangible warheads.  Military service does not come with a guarantee of safety.  As a point of historical interest, pre-WWII training saw the use of bags of flour dropped on ships as surrogates for bombs.  Once upon a time, Infantry training used live machine gun fire as an incentive to keep one’s head down.
 
-Training needs to be unscripted.
 
-Training needs to be continuous and prolonged.
 
-Training needs to be realistic.
 
-There needs to be negative consequences for poor performance in training while recognizing that training is the time to make mistakes and must be consequence free.  In other words, we need to distinguish between correctable mistakes and uncorrectable poor performance (lack of combat mentality).