We’ve previously noted that intellectual property (IP)
rights have become an obstacle to maintenance and development, as well as
contracts and costs. An example is the
manufacturer’s data and IP for the LCS radars without which the Navy cannot
develop simulation models. Whether
simulation models are a wise idea or not (they’re not!) is a topic for another
time.
Some readers have expressed doubts that IP is really an
issue. Well, here’s yet another example,
straight from the Army horse’s mouth.
Regarding the Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS)
for cruise missile defense, Brig. Gen. Frank Lozano had this to say about
difficulties in implementing the Norwegian system,
There’s no particular point to this post other than
documenting yet another example of IP issues impacting maintenance and
development.
… the Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) … The cost of supporting a foreign system that the US does not hold intellectual property rights to, he added, is also a hindrance.[1]
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/06/switching-course-unhappy-with-options-us-army-considers-developing-new-ifpc-interceptor/
The part that's curious and would like more clarification, none in the article or CNO maybe can explain is why a foreign system so difficult when the missile is American AIM120D. So what is so propriety? The interface? the radar? the general operation of the entire weapon system?
ReplyDeleteAlso, looks like US Army looking for less range so why not create a smaller, tighter fit AIM 120 with less range, sounds like it should be right up RTX alley....probably could have a lot of marketability especially if picked up by US Army, I think it would sell overseas, market could be pretty big for a small derated range AIM120 for G2A ops......
"So what is so propriety?"
DeleteI don't know but, depending on the version, the system comes with Fire Distribution Center station, an "ADX" console that has ergonomic control surfaces and three 30" flat-panel displays, EO/IR, GhostEye MR (S-band AESA), etc. All of that requires extensive, sophisticated software which, I assume, the manufacturer retains IP/data rights to and which would be necessary for the Army to have for modelling and simulation purposes.
There is also the issue of any performance data the manufacturer may have developed on their own.
I've noted in the past that the US military has a huge and unexplained gap between the tiny shoulder fired Stinger and large air defense systems. Why not put a 200lbs Sidewinder missile on an unpowered rotating pedestal mount that can be aimed and fired by one guy?
Delete"put a 200lbs Sidewinder missile on an unpowered rotating pedestal mount that can be aimed and fired by one guy?"
DeleteDo you know what the Sidewinder's sensor range is? Not the flight range but the sensor range?
Does being ground level have any impact on the EFFECTIVE sensor range?
Been there, done that - See Chaparral MIM-72
DeleteI remember now where I got this idea. The Swedes have something like this. These could be mounted on small ships like LCUs and patrol ships too.
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RBS_70
The French have one too.
Deletehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mistral_(missile)
"Chaparral MIM-72"
DeleteI'm not a land combat person so why was the Chaparral abandoned rather than just continually upgrading with newer versions of the Sidewinder, as appropriate?
Becase the only people who hated short range air defense platforms more than the USAF were all US army generals.
Delete"I'm not a land combat person so why was the Chaparral abandoned rather than just continually upgrading with newer versions of the Sidewinder, as appropriate?"
DeleteChapparal with Sidewinder had the same problem you've identified with 1000 mile antiship missiles: the additional range of the missile is operationally useless because it outranges the sensor.
While on paper the Sidewinder-armed Chapparal has a range advantage over the Stinger-armed Avenger and Bradley Linebacker, in practice this range advantage was useless because Chapparal had NO sensors at all. There was a small offboard radar that could link with it, but this was a seperate unit that was towed on trailer by a Gama Goat, which could not keep up with the Chapparal offroad, and was never deployed to frontline use.
So there's no way to get advance warningof an enemy air threat, and Sidewinder takes longer to lock on than Stinger. The lock-on time of Sidewinder isn't an issue when you're in a fighter that can force the terms of an aerial engagement; it's very much an issue when you're an AD vic that's being ambushed by fast-moving enemy helicopters.
Effectively, there was no real advantage to Chapparal over the Bradley Linebacker (which was also a more robust and more reliable tracked vehicle than the M113, which would throw its tracks and break down if you looked at it funny), or the Avenger Hummvee (which had 4 wheel drive and was cheaper to run and easier to maintain vs the M113).
Also, it didn't really help that the Army had no real interest in SHORAD, and only invested into Patriot as the medium range air defense option (plus, doctrinally according to AirLand Battle, the Air Force's fighters are supposed to clear the air so the Army can operate).
Yet, NASAMs have been protecting Washington, D.C. for the last two decades.
ReplyDeleteYour point being?
DeleteThat is someone that has probably never written a contract or understood what is required to support and maintain a weapon system. Given it is a General Officer (I hate to be this cynical) he is merely looking for a politically safe shift the blame move to protect his own incompetence in getting his acquisition team to do their jobs. But he probably has never done it himself so how can he be expected to know what they should do? IP only becomes an issue if you do not address it up front and understand what the potential impacts are. You can pay to have the IP put in escrow in case they go out of business, you can negotiate support terms up front when you have leverage (rather than later when they have it), you can quite simply say If you won't accommodate my IP needs do not bother to bid.
ReplyDeleteAcquisition incompetence should not be allowed to hide behind false issues. Just as operationally if you don't have a CONOPS you should not be buying anything.
This is also a painful issue for other countries buying American defence equipment. If you want to use different missiles on an American aircraft, you need to be able to add them to the fire-control system's software. That means IP access. The US DoD has a poor record on co-operation about this, even with close allies, so other countries tend not to always do what the US wants.
ReplyDeleteIn the end it's a decision of the Pentagon and the lawmakers to acquire the technical data package for a product. With the TDP you basically own it, search for a second source and so on plus you can develop it further on your own.
ReplyDeleteIt's not just a TDP issue. It's also a testing issue. The Navy has abandoned thorough, realistic testing and is trying to substitute modeling and simulation - hence, the need for the TDP. If they would conduct extensive, realistic testing they could map out the operating parameters, actual performance envelope, etc. No, that wouldn't get source code but it would eliminate the need for modeling and simulation.
DeleteSimulation, by the way, is the Navy's attempt to substitute for real world training.
All of this stems from the Navy's laziness and misguided attempt to squeeze a few extra dollars out of the budget for new ships instead of training and testing.
The issue, which is incredibly annoying to other allies. Is if they give you any IP the NASSMS become subject to American ITAR regulations.
DeleteNo-one can sell you anything because US extraterritorial laws apply to it.
ITAR is an own goal.
To give you an idea about how bizzare it is. If the US sends a ship or aircraft to Australia for repairs we have to spend months begging for spare parts for your ship or plane due to ITAR.
DeleteOn May 1, 2024, the State Department’s Directorate of “Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) published a proposed rule to amend the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to reduce export authorization requirements for defense articles, defense services and brokering activities when sent or provided to authorized users in Australia and the United Kingdom (U.K.). “
DeleteI don’t know what, if anything, came of this.
Here is an article about it. It is above my pay grade.
Deletehttps://www.aspistrategist.org.au/even-with-intended-reforms-us-defence-trade-rules-threaten-aukus-cooperation/
I'm aware of ITAR but the nuances of ITAR implementation challenges are far beyond my understanding. The underlying goal - to secure technology and data - is laudable; the implementation appears less so. That's the end of my knowledge on the subject!
DeleteRegarding the AUKUS Pillar 1 acquisition of SSNs for Australia, I'm at a loss to understand the desire on Australia's part. Australia has a demonstrated history of difficulty crewing, operating, and maintaining just a couple of conventional subs. I don't see how they'll man several more nuclear subs that require much more advanced training.
Regarding manning, Australia has struggled to provide full crews (42; currently 58) for its subs. A Virginia class sub (assuming that's the AUKUS choice) has a crew of 135. That seems extremely problematic for Australia to find that many highly trained crew.
That aside, Australia appears to lack the industrial and technological base infrastructure to support and maintain nuclear subs.
Finally, the ultimate goal (confronting China via submarines?) would seem to be far more easily achieved by simply leasing submarine basing rights to the US Navy and allowing the US to deal with China.
From Australia's perspective, I could imagine they might have a hesitancy about trusting the US to be aligned with their political goals which could result in US subs not being made available when needed although that seems highly unlikely to me. If a scenario arises that Australia believes warrants actions by a nuclear sub, it's hard to imagine that scenario not motivating the US to the desired action. Still, I could imagine it might be perceived as a concern by Australia.
I just don't know the Australian perspective enough to fully understand the desire for their own nuclear subs. Perhaps a reader can explain it?
Along the same vein, perhaps a reader can point to a description of how Australia intends to address the issues I've noted: crew size and manning, training, nuclear support infrastructure, spent fuel disposal, nuclear decommissioning, etc.?
DeleteAbout as stupid as Canada operating SSNs, but at least Canada has a fairly robust nuclear power program so many of your questions have been at least asked if not answered properly.
ReplyDeleteI looked at the Australian acquisition program from day one and wondered what the heck were they thinking?
IP control is part of the reason for over-reliance on contractors.
ReplyDeleteThat over reliance also has an affect some may not have thought of: Recruitment and Retention. Part of the selling point to potential recruits for the Navy and Air Force is learning to work on hi-tech systems and bringing that knowledge with them when they leave for a civilian career. But with more and more new systems being under tight reign of foreign and some US corporations, that work is going to the builders instead of Naval personnel. So now more and more of the "advanced" systems enlisted personnel are taught on are legacy systems, some so old they are still part analog.
If you were a high school graduate would you want to commit to 4 years of your life repairing stuff that was designed on a Windows 95 computer?
"Recruitment and Retention"
DeleteThat's a fascinating theory and I'll have to give it some thought!
I loved Win95!