The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released a
report on the Constellation class frigate construction program delays and it’s
an eye opener even for ComNavOps who predicted exactly these kinds of problems
long ago.
To review, the contract delivery date is April 2026. Current estimates by the Navy put delivery
sometime in 2029, three years late and seven years after the Aug 2022 start of
construction (seven years to build a frigate?!), and you know that date is
going to continue to be pushed further out with more delays.
As with all sizable ships, the Constellation is being built
in sections, called blocks (although the Navy now calls them ‘Grand Modules’ in
their typically PowerPoint-ish, pointless churn style; someone undoubtedly got a promotion for
coming up with the phrase, ‘Grand Module’) and, according to a diagram in the
report, the Constellation has 31 blocks.
Of the 31 blocks, 11 are currently being manufactured despite not having
completed design documents. GAO lists
the percentage design completion of the blocks under construction:
3x 56-75% complete
2x 76-90% complete
6x >91% complete
None of the block designs are complete despite being under
construction. How you build blocks (or
anything!) with incomplete designs is a complete mystery and, as the report
details, is a major reason why the Constellation is running around three years
late already.
Worse, GAO cautions that the Navy’s method for estimating
the degree of design completion guarantees that even these woeful achievements
are overestimated and the designs are not really to the stated level of
completeness.[1] The designs have been
‘pencil whipped’ for reporting purposes.
GAO notes,
The Navy has committed to fraudulent reporting to cover their failure to use best shipbuilding practices that are standard throughout the commercial shipbuilding industry.
In addition to design deficiencies, other problems are
beginning to emerge.
As of Oct 2023, the builder was reporting a 10% increase in
weight growth over the June 2020 calculated weight. Weight growth has both short and long term
negative impacts, as GAO notes,
So, we can expect reductions in the ship’s specifications and performance requirements. This is exactly what happened with the LCS. Its specifications and requirements were continually reduced in response to weight increases and other problems that cropped up during construction.
I thought the parent design concept was supposed to
eliminate these kinds of problems? Well,
it might have if the Navy had actually used the parent design instead of
hoodwinking Congress and designing, essentially, a brand new ship under the
guise of a ‘parent’ vessel.
The Navy has learned absolutely nothing about ship design,
acquisition, and program management from the lessos of the LCS, Zumwalt, and
Ford fiascos.
Well done, Navy. Make
us proud.
________________________
2x 76-90% complete
6x >91% complete
Now, over 18 months after lead ship construction start, the functional design remains unstable, which has undermined confidence in the accuracy and maturity of detail design products needed to construct grand modules—and construction progress has effectively stalled. The Navy and shipbuilder have resorted to correcting deficient drawings previously credited toward design progress, but the program continues to credit design progress based largely on quantity of deliverables rather than on the underlying quality of the document itself.[1][emphasis added]
The Navy has committed to fraudulent reporting to cover their failure to use best shipbuilding practices that are standard throughout the commercial shipbuilding industry.
Further, as we previously found in a July 2014 report evaluating the LCS program, unplanned weight growth during ship construction can compromise ship capabilities in the short term (i.e., upon delivery of the ship to the fleet) and in the long term, as the fleet seeks to alter and improve initial capabilities over the planned decades-long service life of the ship.[1]And,
The Navy disclosed to us in April 2024 that it is considering a reduction in the frigate’s speed requirement as one potential way, among others, to resolve the weight growth affecting the ship’s design.[1]
So, we can expect reductions in the ship’s specifications and performance requirements. This is exactly what happened with the LCS. Its specifications and requirements were continually reduced in response to weight increases and other problems that cropped up during construction.
While we expected this to happen, its unacceptable. Congress should step in and stop the program right now, before we end up with another overly expensive, dysfunctional ship. The Navys learned nothing, and in fact it appears as if theyre playing games and being deceitful with Congress yet again.
ReplyDeleteAt this.point we'd be better off if Congress decided requirements and capabilities for new ships, we'd be more likely to get a properly equipped and budgeted ship.
Consider those aspects Congress has done to also contribute to the current situation.
Deletehttps://news.usni.org/2024/05/29/constellation-frigate-unplanned-weight-growth-could-limit-service-life-says-gao
ReplyDelete“GAO is making five recommendations, including that the Navy restructure its design stability metric to measure progress based more on the quality than quantity of design documents; use the improved metric to assess the design stability before beginning construction of the second frigate; incorporate additional land-based testing into the frigate test plan; and identify opportunities to further incorporate leading practices for product development into the frigate acquisition strategy,” the report reads.
“The Navy agreed with four recommendations and partially agreed with the recommendation related to updating the test plan. GAO maintains that all five recommendations should be fully implemented.”
Also in this article :
"Navy officials have repeatedly cited workforce challenges at the yard in Marinette when discussing the frigate program’s delays, but the GAO report cites an “unstable” design as the reason for the delays."
So the navy casts some blame on the lead contractor but the GAO states what what has been observed here. So we expect a cost overrun and obviously no CONOPS was established.
"Navy officials have repeatedly cited workforce challenges at the yard..."
DeleteThe challenge is that the workforce doesnt know what to do next because there arent any complete $&£@% plans to follow!!!
Workforce challenges because the US and Canada both trashed shop classes in grades 8 through 12. Blue collar became a dirty word, so as a result a plumber or electrician can make $250K per year as they are so scarce. I pay $140 per hour to get one into my house. Oilfield welders can easily make $500K +.
DeleteMeanwhile, the Chinese are pumping out Burke-style Type 052Ds, five at a time from a single dry-dock. And their Type 054A frigate production run is now complete and they are building 054Bs.
Not sure what its going to take to get some attention to these really serious acquisition problems, but I guess congress really needs to get off their backsides. But frankly Congress seems at least as dysfunctional as Navy leadership, if not more so, so good luck with that.
Congress recently passed, out of committee, what is essentially this : Get the ship design 100% complete b/4 starting construction of the ship ! (Breaking Defense ). But it appears that a CONOPS was not established...my take.
DeleteThe Telegraph carried a column on this yesterday. It puts the problem in context by referring to British procurement cock-ups too. https://archive.ph/DZBnu
ReplyDeleteUSNI News reported Navy officials said at one point the Constellation design shared about 85 percent commonality with the original Italian FREMM but that commonality is now down to under 15 percent, no doubt due to the Navy changing almost 70 percent of the requirements since the contract was signed back in April 2020 and the resultant unplanned weight growth leading to over 10 percent above the shipbuilder’s June 2020 weight estimate. Navy only requested 5% for FFG(X) SLA whereas for Navy surface combatants OPNAV specifies 10%, think possibility the actual service life might be shorter than LCS as all warships increase in weight over lifetime, Burke is a classic example.
ReplyDeleteGAO reported the result as Fincantieri had completed the construction of only 3.6 percent of the lead ship as compared to the 35.5 percent it was scheduled to have completed at that point and delivery has slipped 3 years, hints it might be more.
It appears Fincantieri did not know how to game the system and in their naivety signed a type of fixed price contract with the Navy and expect will be able to claw back some of the additional spend but would not be surprised if they incur losses on the contract, already Navy asking for extra funding for the GFE. Who would want to sign a contract with the Navy in light of their long track record of incompetence and mismanagement which continues after LCS, Ford, and Zumwalt and now with Constellation, its sadly depressing the Navy have not learned the lessons from the past.
The House lawmakers in the draft FY25 NDAA are proposing to force the Navy to complete its ships’ design “100 percent” prior to lead vessel construction, complete design was actually in the law back in 2020 but the Navy ignored it.
Court marshals are in order. At this point, I think we can almost assume such failure is willful.... They need to identify the Chinese mole in our shipbuilding system immediately.
ReplyDeleteThe Navy is superb at it's job, it just that no on
Deletethis blog can figure what Navy CONOPS is.
The Navy CONOPS isn't anything I can find
in my Mahan.
Taking a look at the (recurring) situations with weapons procurement in the US, there is no incentive whatsoever for weapons manufacturers (whether it is warship, aircraft, land systems, etc.) to design, build, test and deliver their products on specs, on cost and on time. They know that the Pentagon has an (essentially) unlimited budget, members of Congress are keen to vote for programs that will bring pork to their districts/states and help them reelect. Unless there is a big change in the system, the Pentagon -- with help from Congress -- will wreck the budget, again and again for no (real) good reason! B. Clark pointed out Japanese shipyards could design a new multi-mission frigate, build and test it, and deliver 2 units a year, with no fuss; same thing with South Korean shipyards.
ReplyDeleteYou're simply stating what's common knowledge. That's fine but even better would be to offer a solution. It doesn't have to be a total solution. That will require a war in order to reorient our priorities. What we could use are small, partial solutions that are achievable. What would you suggest?
DeleteNavy Secretary Del Toro recently visited South Korean naval shipyards and expressed his amazement at their capabilities for high construction rate for medium to large warships (frigates and destroyers). If the main issue is size of the fleet (especially in the Indo-Pacific theatre) is the concern that everyone seems to believe, then expanding the shipbuilding capacity is the logical answer. Given that South Korean Navy (and Japanese Navy) ships have many American sensors, and gun (such as the 5-inch), as well as close cooperation in terms of doctrine & supports, I think it would do more good than harm -- in the next 10-year time frame -- to get several frigate hulls, for example (once designed and tested) along with propulsion & power systems to be built there, and then brought to the US for weapons installations. In return, the US would negotiate offset deals, such as for South Korean and Japanese companies to invest & build new shipyards in the US. Actually, Fincantieri had invested and now expanded its Wisconsin shipyard to manufacture some of the Constellation frigates. Such investments will bring jobs to the US and strengthen the ties between the countries. Protecting union jobs & pork projects for US Congress members must not endanger national security!
Delete“I thought the parent design concept was supposed to eliminate these kinds of problems?”
ReplyDeleteThe FREMM, as is, was probably a better platform for ASW and SUW, two areas where the USN has severe deficiencies, than the Constellation. What the USN did is to take a decent GP frigate and turn it into an AEGIS platform without enough missile slots to be effective against the kind of intense air strike that AEGIS is supposed to handle.
Decent GP frigate, not an outstanding one. I would have made some changes for USN use.
- Damage control/integrity. I would have added 4-7 armored internal bulkheads. One impression I’ve gotten from boarding a number of foreign navy ships throughout my career is that they do not appear to be built with the same emphasis on damage control and watertight integrity as USN ships. Upgrading this area would help from a damage control standpoint and also add some low weight to offset high weight.
- Habitability. The Constellations are being fitted with 4-to-6-person, officer quality, staterooms for all hands (1). While I do not believe we can go back to the huge berthing bays on WWII-era ships without negatively impacting recruiting and retention, that seems overkill. What about:
Senior officers (CO/XO/Department Heads) – Individual staterooms
Junior officers – 2-person staterooms
CPO – 4-6 person staterooms
Petty officers – 12-person compartments
Non-rated – 30-person compartments
Reduce habitability space in other areas. ComNavOps and I disagree about gymnasium/workout facilities, but there are plenty of other areas like crew lounges where we need to build warships instead of cruise ships. Reducing space allocated to habitability allows increased space for workshops and spares, this improving readiness and reducing superstructure.
- Reducing superstructure. Stealth is a major criterion, and reducing superstructure should help in that area. Move things down from superstructure to the space created by reducing habitability. Copy the British model and move CIC down to the main deck or lower. With CIC next to the bridge, one lucky (or unlucky, depending on your viewpoint) hit can knock them both out, leaving it difficult to control the ship. The RN has the CO in CIC (action centre) and the XO (1st Lieutenant) on the bridge for GQ.
- Weapons/sensors. Upgrade from FREMM. Go with the for but not with (FBNW) option of 32 launch cells instead of 16. Go with a mix something like 12 ASROC, 12 Standard, and 32 quad-packed ESSM, plus 16 canister-launched NSM. Include 2 SeaRAM (1 forward, 1 aft) and 4 Phalanx (2 port, 2 starboard). Keep the 76mm STRALES/DART and VULCANO gun (or 127mm if weight would work) instead of the 57mm popgun. Keep the bow sonar (which probably rules out building them at Marinette, but that’s a problem for the builder not USN). Add two RBU-ish anti-submarine mortars/rocket launchers, moving the bridge aft as needed. In place of the triple torpedo launchers, have something like the Knox class fixed torpedo tubes coming out from a submarine-like torpedo room with reloads; I would stack a 12-inch tube on top of a 21-inch tube to both port and starboard so both sizes of torpedoes could be used. I would keep the Italian FREMM 2-helicopter capability and hangar. What I would put on top of the hangar would depend on how much weight I could save elsewhere. I would like to add an S1850 radar antenna along with the after SeaRAM, if the weight would work. Keep either the French Herakles or the Italian Leonardo Kronos radar, instead of AEGIS. The combination of S1850 and Herakles/Kronos radar provides a useful alternative to AEGIS, and that it is better to vary sensor types than to depend entirely on AEGIS with its reliability issues.
IMO that ship would fit the USN’s needs better than the Constellation. And the time and cost to redesign should be reduced significantly.
Notes:
1)https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/07/05/fincantieris-fremm-frigate-design-bulks-up-for-the-us-ffgx-competition/
"I would have added 4-7 armored internal bulkheads."
DeleteThe Navy did add internal structure and compartments. I've seen no details on exactly what that entails and whether any actual armor was added (I doubt it).
"without negatively impacting recruiting and retention"
There is zero evidence to support your contention and quite a bit of circumstantial evidence to refute it. In addition, recruiting is in the toilet, now, and that's with every creature comfort we can fit on our ships so, again, that would seem to refute your contention that crew comforts have an actual impact on recruiting.
"space created by reducing habitability."
You're contradicting your own contention that recruiting will suffer if we reduce crew comforts. If your contention was true, shouldn't we be seeing a boom in recruiting given the new, luxurious accommodations being fitted to all new ships? But we're not ...
Why do people flock to try to become SEALS? It isn't because they have the best comforts! Once you realize the answer to that, you'll be on track to understand what really matters in recruiting. Hint: I've explicitly provided the answer in many posts and comments. It's not a secret.
"Go with the for but not with (FBNW) option"
That is fantasy level wishful thinking. The FBNW option is almost never executed. In fact, I can't, offhand, think of any time it's ever been done although I'm sure it has somewhere, somewhen. FBNW is just mental masturbation to make a poor design seem better. Pardon the crudity.
"but that’s a problem for the builder"
Aside from the blindingly obvious solution of building/buying/leasing a coastal facility, the ships could also be built with the sonar dome temporarily omitted, sail to a coastal drydock, and have the dome installed. We did exactly this with the Zumwalt weapons, sensors, and combat system.
"so both sizes of torpedoes could be used."
If you're including the large torpedo, what purpose does the smaller one serve?
"AEGIS with its reliability issues."
And how do we know that foreign radars are any more reliable? There is zero information, good or bad, about foreign radar maintainability and reliability that I'm aware of. Do you have a source that leads you to believe foreign radars are more reliable? Please share your source!
"frigate"
Recall what the role, size, cost, and numbers of frigates traditionally are. Now, review your own proposal and see if it fits that role, size, cost, and numbers or if you've done what the Navy does and try to make a do-everything ship.
“The Navy did add internal structure and compartments. I've seen no details on exactly what that entails and whether any actual armor was added (I doubt it).”
DeleteNor have I. Just stating what I would want to see as a minimum. I agree with your prior comments re: armor, and in that vein would also argue that internal armor is vastly underrated. Remember the USS McKeesport.
“There is zero evidence to support your contention and quite a bit of circumstantial evidence to refute it. … You're contradicting your own contention that recruiting will suffer if we reduce crew comforts.”
No, what I am saying is that some level of habitability is useful for retention (particularly for skilled technicians who can make big bucks on the outside) but not to the extremes that the USN has gone. I don’t think you need 4-person staterooms for all hands, or multiple crew lounges, or several gelato machines.
“The FBNW option is almost never executed”
That’s almost always for cost reasons. I mentioned the FBNW option only to indicate that a design to incorporate 32 VLS currently exists. I would spend the money to include it.
“Aside from the blindingly obvious solution of building/buying/leasing a coastal facility, the ships could also be built with the sonar dome temporarily omitted, sail to a coastal drydock, and have the dome installed.”
Agree totally. That’s why I said this one is on the builder, not the USN.
“If you're including the large torpedo, what purpose does the smaller one serve?”
The same purpose it serves in navies that use only the 12-inch torpedoes. A cheaper shot, that you can have room and weight to carry more of them.
“And how do we know that foreign radars are any more reliable?”
We don’t, or at least I don’t, except that it would be hard for them not to be. One reason why I like adding the S1850 or Sampson in addition to the EMPAR is that it would have some limited redundancy, although they do have different purposes.
"Recall what the role, size, cost, and numbers of frigates traditionally are. Now, review your own proposal and see if it fits that role, size, cost, and numbers or if you've done what the Navy does and try to make a do-everything ship.”
I would have a class of single-purpose ASW frigates like you have proposed. This is intended to be something between a frigate and destroyer, call it an escort if you like. It doesn’t have the AAW missile slots of a Burke, or the pure ASW power of the ASW frigate, but it fills the gap between the two.
"some level of habitability is useful for retention"
DeleteHabitability is steadily increasing and retention and recruiting is steadily declining. How do you explain that?
"That’s almost always for cost reasons. "
Does it matter why? The reality is that FBNW is a fool's feature that is never completed. Designing it into a ship gains nothing and costs money and space.
"The same purpose it serves in navies that use only the 12-inch torpedoes."
Most reports suggest that the small torpedo is next to useless and is not a killing shot against any but the smallest, weakest subs. Given the incredibly small number of torpedo shots any surface vessel could expect to fire in a war, the cost savings is utterly irrelevant whereas the decrease in lethality is quite relevant.
"One reason why I like adding the S1850 or Sampson"
Now, what about the negatives such as fragile supply trains? You saw during COVID what happened to overseas shipments to the US (there weren't any!). What do you think will happen in a war? How will we support the radars in terms of parts and technical support? Where will we get radars for new construction? Where will we get replacement radars for battle losses?
"fills the gap"
You've proposed a ASW/ASuW/AAW do-everything ship, just like the Navy does. Just like the Navy, this would be unaffordable. The stripped down Constellation is around $1.2B each. This would likely be around $2B ... for a frigate! You've lost sight of what a frigate is supposed to be!
Same mistake made AGAIN. First LCS had started before design completed. Results were disaster.
ReplyDelete"The Navy has learned absolutely nothing about ship design, acquisition, and program management from the lessons of the LCS, Zumwalt, and Ford fiascos."
ReplyDeleteI'm pretty sure nobody has been held accountable so they probably think they performed just smashingly. On to the next failure!