Let’s take a look at the latest (FY2024) Navy 30-year plan (30YP).[1]
Submarine Cruise Missiles - The main weapon of the
Navy is the Tomahawk cruise missile.
It’s not even really debatable.
It’s been the weapon of choice for decades. The 30YP shows that the imminent retirement
of the four SSGN submarines with their 154 missiles each will result in a dip
from the current 1100 submarine missiles to 500 missiles – a 54% drop in
capacity. The capacity will not recover
to current levels until 2037 according to the Navy’s plan. With a Taiwan invasion and a war with China
looming, according to the Navy, does this seem wise?
Nuclear Construction Shipyards – The 30YP points out
that there are only two nuclear shipbuilders.
One can’t help but think that a Pearl Harbor-ish sabotage strike on one or both of these facilities would effectively eliminate future shipbuilding of all US carriers and submarines – essentially ending the future US Navy for all practical purposes and eliminating any chance of building replacement ships in a war with China.
Shipyards – The Navy offers a mea-culpa of sorts related to
the woeful state of the shipbuilding industry.
Five Year Shipbuilding Plan - The following table shows the planned new ship construction for the next five years.
Nuclear powered ship production, a unique capability with little to no opportunity for commercial or dual use production, is provided by two private shipyards that are currently facilitized and certified to construct nuclear powered ships and will be at capacity for the next 15-plus years building Columbia class SSBNs, Virginia class SSNs, next generation SSNs, and Ford class CVNs.[1]
One can’t help but think that a Pearl Harbor-ish sabotage strike on one or both of these facilities would effectively eliminate future shipbuilding of all US carriers and submarines – essentially ending the future US Navy for all practical purposes and eliminating any chance of building replacement ships in a war with China.
The Navy recognizes the “boom and bust” profiles of the last 60-plus years resulted in
sharp peaks followed by significant valleys, and sometimes breaks, in production. Today’s shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base is at a level of fragility in the supplier and labor force, amplified by COVID and inflationary impacts, such that without consistent and continuous commitment to steady and executable acquisition profiles the industrial base will continue to struggle and some elements may not recover from another “boom/bust” cycle.[1]
The table shows that in the next five years the Navy plans
to retire 45 combatants and build 29 … with a war with China looming. Does that seem wise?
When you're almost excited to see a steady 2-a-year production of somthing, you realize how far we've fallen!! Previous generations of ships were built significantly faster- the Spruances for example, had production that reached 6-8 per year, and they all came from a single yard! The Ticos even made their appearance at 3 a year, which is slightly impressive considering their technological advancement for the time, and the fact that the successor Burke program was miving at the same time. Somehow we've lost our sense of urgency, and priced ourselves out of a fleet with proper numbers.
ReplyDeleteEven worse, is the retirement to build ratio. With a clearly looming threat in WestPac, the concept of massively reducing the VLS count by shedding Ticos and, more importantly, the early Ohios is absurd. While im sure theyre all slated for scrapping, prudence would suggest they all are retained in a fairly high level of reserve. Frankly, to preserve whatever reactor life is left (if thats the main reason for their retirement) I wouldnt be against the Ohio SSGNs being retired now, but retained as ready reserve. Having them on hand with enough life left for "one good war" seems like a no-brainer. I guess we will see, but Im not optimistic that such an intelligent move will be made by the Admiralty.
It would certainly be nice to see Congress make bold moves and start witholding funding until the Navy starts getting its house in order, but unfortunately, I dont think that our builder yards and supply base would survive it. The amount of panic incurred by the delayed procurement of the next Ford(s) speaks volumes about how truly fragile our remaining industry is, and how procurement mismanagement has made it that way...
As an additional note, the Los Angeles boats were built at a significantly faster pace as well, although admittedly the year-by-year production had some significant peaks and valleys. Also of note is that a dozen of them were retired halfway through their lifespan. Knowing how much "divest to invest" has been at work, and how much capability has been shed by misguided management is anger-inducing...
Delete"until every flag officer has been fired": it's not enough to change the men you have to change the incentive structure. The case of Admiral Byng comes to mind.
ReplyDeleteSo the mightiest, fanciest, most hypergalactic navy ever can build a whole six ships in one year, if they're lucky AND if they get about sixty bajillion dollars in funding.
ReplyDeleteI don't expect a peer war to happen anytime soon, and neither do they, but that's no excuse for not doing your job, Navy.
We are getting closer and closer to FYXX where the USN will ask for $100s of billions of dollars and not even bother to actually buy a ship!!!! How long from there where USN leaders will be like:"you know, we didn't buy any ships this year, maybe we'll skip buying missiles too and we will just pocket the money....I MEAN, INVEST IN THE FUTURE!"
Delete29 new ships in 5 years is an average of 5.8 per year. Call it 6 for round numbers. If you assume a 30-year average service life, building 6 ships a year will support a fleet of 180. What are they thinking?
ReplyDeleteThey're thinking the wonders of small, unmanned vessels and networks.
DeleteThey are thinking about the budget cap imposed by a Congress who just fully funded this year half a year late.
Deletehttps://news.usni.org/2024/02/23/navy-awards-attack-sub-uss-boise-1-2b-repair-contract-more-than-7-years-late
ReplyDelete" Naval analyst Bryan Clark told USNI News on Friday that the story of Boise is “tragic.”
“It’s tragic that you have one of the newest 688s that has been out of action for almost a decade because of a lack of industrial capacity,” he said.
“This is all on the Navy. This wasn’t something that private industry does … 688is were all coming in for their last major overall. It wasn’t sneaking up on the Navy. They knew it was coming.”
So how many late model LA class boats still have life in them if maintained ? In a post you pointed out a shortfall of attack subs due to retirements and 18 Virginia boats waiting for refits
PB
Here is some of the late model LA boats repaired over the past few years...mentioned in the article.
Delete"HII delivered its first repaired boat, USS Helena (SSN-725), in January of 2022. The second boat, USS Columbus (SSN-762), is set to complete its maintenance period in 2025. "
""HII delivered its first repaired boat, USS Helena (SSN-725), in January of 2022. The second boat, USS Columbus (SSN-762), is set to complete its maintenance period in 2025. "
DeleteA three year maintenance period????? Thank God we aren't at war. Three years for maintenance?? That's pathetic.
If we agree the Navy is incapable of managing an effective ship building program and if we agree that as a nation we can't afford to stop building ships for industrial base and national security reasons.....then we must therefore agree that we need a new org to build the ships which can then be given to the navy to operate. BG.
ReplyDeleteYour reasoning is not quite correct.
Delete"we can't afford to stop building ships for industrial base"
Not quite right. We could stop building ships for nearly a decade if we'd focus on maintenance and upgrades of EXISTING ships. That would keep our shipyards gainfully employed for many years. This is exactly what I'd like to see us do. Put a moratorium on new construction and focus strictly on maintenance and upgrades to get our existing fleet back into fighting shape.
"we must therefore agree that we need a new org to build the ships"
Not quite sure what you mean by a new organization. Our existing shipbuilders are perfectly capable of building acceptable ships IF WE APPLY THE PROPER CONTRACTS AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT. What we need is new Navy management and I've described how to do that in previous posts.
I see your points. I'm certainly no expert on any of this, just a reasonably logical observer. I wasn't thinking of the shipbuilders, but the govement contracting authority. A U.S. Naval Shipbuilding Directorate outside the Navy. To some of your past points it should be an org that would start with a conops and not change design requirements repeatded throught the design and build phases.
ReplyDelete"the govement contracting authority. A U.S. Naval Shipbuilding Directorate outside the Navy."
DeleteYou're conflating two separate functions: ship design/construction and contracting. As I understand it, there is already a Navy-independent contract management organization, the Defense Contract Management Agency. From their website,
"The agency provides contract administration services for the Defense Department, other federal organizations and international partners, and is an essential part of the acquisition process from pre-award to sustainment."
Now, the flip side of being independent from the Navy is that they have no authority over the Navy. They simply service the contracts. Whether the contracted products (like ships) are good ideas or not is not for them to say. Similarly, whether the Navy has performed an Analysis of Alternatives, developed a CONOPS, or done any of the other things they're supposed to do is outside the agency's concern.
"A U.S. Naval Shipbuilding Directorate outside the Navy"
DeleteThrough WWII, the Navy had an internal shipbuilding 'directorate' in the form of the General Board and BuShips. See, General Board and BuShips
" With a Taiwan invasion and a war with China looming"
ReplyDeleteWorst nightmare is not China attacks Taiwan but Taiwan voluntarily gives up and unite with China peacefully. That would only happen while Taiwanese see US' inability (not unwilling) to help so it is time to give up western civilization and join their cousins.
To make China behave according to US' wills, Pentagon needs to have weapons can beat best Chinese ones, not just mere number. 30 year plan is unrealistic as change hand of White House means another 30 year plan. What the nation needs to do is to make sure always lead on high tech fronts.
Giving civilian techs are bases for military equipment (where to get key components), less and less bright high school graduates choose STEM is a warning sign.
Are we now seeing a final shipbuilding budget for 2 Burkes, 2 Constitutions, 2 Virginias and a Columbia? A bit better at the final + plus a oiler.
ReplyDeleteWe talk about establishing a solid CONOP for ships and systems, or rather the seeming lack thereof today. I wonder what the historical BuShips and General Board did exactly to create them? Where did the ideas and design characteristics originally come from? Not to diminish the work done back then, but it seems to me that in the past, it may have been easier, since everything we built was in long (and treaty) defined ship types- BB, CA, CL, DD, etc, and for decades, ships were quite evolutionary, with very little revolutionary. Im curious how much info from the Fleet Problems became part of General Board and BuShips discussions??
ReplyDeleteHow could/would a modern version do so? Would it start with (proper, realistic) wargames? Identifying holes and problems from Captain or Commodore level wargamers? From where do we source the opinions that would eventually solidify into a set of requirements and a set of blueprints? And who decides what opinions are valid and which arent? How do we focus on Navy needs and warfighting, and keep Joint influences out of the process? I think there are lots of answers in the past, we just need to learn, understand, and apply them...
The General Board solicited opinions from the Board members, who had a wide variety of backgrounds, field commanders, who had the up-to-the-date combat experience, naval architects who knew what could and could not be done, and others. This produced a blend of experience, combat knowledge and wisdom, and technical expertise.
DeleteOne of the self-inflicted problems we have now is that even if we had a General Board, there's no one to call on with any relevant experience or expertise to contribute. No naval officer has ever fought in combat. No naval architect has ever participated in designing a successful WARship design. The Navy has abandoned realistic exercises (like the old Fleet Problems) from which we might draw relevant conclusions about ship design. The only relevant people left are those such as ComNavOps who have studied naval history and, at least, know the lessons of the past though still lacking the realistic exercises today that would validate and modify those lessons as needed.
We're well and truly screwed and it's a situation of our own making.
Well sir, after theres a hostile but well-intentioned Naval coup, and you preside over a reconstituted Board, I certainly volunteer my knowledge and experience.
Delete(We cant possibly do worse!!)
An easy comparison of how sad US warship buiding is, is to compare to Australia's. When Australia get's up and running, they will have about 1 ship every 2 years coming off the production line, though it's possible to "surge" and make it every 18 months. The USA, pro rata, given the economy is about 12-15 times larger, as is population, should be churning out 12-15 ships every 2 years, not 7.
ReplyDeleteIn fact, if the proposed Tier1/2 ship building plan released last month becomes reality, Australia might be churning out 1 every year, or 2 every 2 years. The USA is really falling behind .
Meanwhile, China continues unabated.
Andrew