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Thursday, February 8, 2024

Burke, Zumwalt, and Deck Space

Let me ask you a question    Where do you put weapons on a ship?  It’s not a trick question.  The answer is simple and obvious:  you put them on some open area of the deck.  Guns, VLS, RAM/SeaRAM, triple torpedo tube launchers, Mk141 (Harpoon) rack launchers, Naval Strike Missile rack launchers    whatever.  They’re all mounted on decks.
 
The concept also applies to most sensors, decoy launchers, electronic warfare emitters, communications antennae, etc.  In some cases the deck space takes the form of a sponson or platform jutting off the side of the superstructure but we realize that the sponson/platform is simply a small section of horizontal deck welded to the side of the superstructure.
 
Here’s another blindingly obvious question (though a seeming mystery to the Navy!):  we want WARships to have as many weapons (and sensors and …) as possible, right?  Therefore, since weapons require deck space to mount and we want as many weapons as possible, it logically follows that we want as much open, available deck space as possible, right? 
 
A good WARship design should maximize deck space in order to maximize its installed firepower and to allow for future weapon additions such as inevitably happens during war when weapons that should have been installed from the start are frantically retrofitted.  Those magnificent Burkes with their single CIWS are going to quickly become loaded with additional CIWS/SeaRAM when war comes.  After all, you don’t want to protect a $2B ship with a single CIWS with a limited field of fire that only covers half the ship, right?  Where are those extra CIWS/SeaRAM going to be mounted?  Any open deck space, of course!
 
Further, the best deck space is the lower, main deck because it minimizes top-heaviness and stability issues.
 
So, a good WARship design should maximize deck space and, in particular, lower/main deck space.
 
We’ve covered this in a previous post where we noted that ship superstructures have grown enormously since WWII and the ‘cost’ has been usable deck space for weapon mounts (see, “ShipSuperstructures”).
 
 
So, having established that a good WARship design emphasizes and maximizes open deck space, let’s take a look at two specific examples:  the Burke and the Zumwalt classes.  How much deck space do they have?
 
 
Burke
 
Displacement = 9,700 tons
Nominal dimensions = 509 ft x 66 ft
 
For calculation purposes, let’s call the dimensions 509 ft x 60 ft to allow for narrowing at the bow and stern.  Thus, Burke = 30,540 sq.ft. of deck space
 
The flight deck which is around 92 ft x 60 ft = 5,520 sq.ft.  Subtracting this from the nominal total deck space leaves 25,020 sq.ft nominally available for weapons.
 
Zumwalt
 
Displacement = 15,907 tons
Nominal dimensions = 610 ft x 80 ft
 
The main deck section extends 325 ft from the stern to the forward edge of superstructure where the deck begins to sharply angle in towards the bow.  Allowing for the tumblehome of the hull which narrows the available deck space, we have around 70 ft of width on the deck.  Thus the main deck section is approximately 325 ft x 70 ft = 22,750 sq.ft.
 
The forward, angled section is a triangular shape about 255 ft to the bow and 70 ft wide at the base of the triangular shape.  Using the formula for the area of a triangle (1/2 x base x length) = 8,025 sq.ft.
 
Note that the extreme narrowing of the Zumwalt’s bow makes a significant portion of that area useless for weapon installations.  I would estimate that 10% is too narrow to be useful, making the effective forward deck area closer to 7,945 sq.ft.
 
Thus the nominal, usable total deck area = 22,750 sq.ft. + 7,945 sq.ft. = 30,695 sq.ft.
 
The flight deck which is around 141 ft x 70 ft = 9,870 sq.ft.  Subtracting this from the nominal total deck space leaves 20,825 sq.ft nominally available for weapons.
 
 
 
Note that these calculations are for the apparent footprint of the deck area.  In reality, some portion of the apparent deck footprint consists of the slanted sides of the superstructures so all the deck area calculations are overstated by, perhaps, 5%-10%.  However, not wanting to be bothered with that exact of a determination, we’ll ignore the slanted sides reduction on the deck area and assume that it’s a wash across both ships.
 
 
We see, then, that the Zumwalt’s displacement is 64% (1.6 times larger) greater than the Burke while the deck space is 17% less.
 
 
We built a cruiser size Zumwalt 64% larger than a Burke with 17% less space for mounting weapons.
 
 
When war comes and we start looking to install additional weapons, we’re going to find that the Zumwalt was a poor design that could not readily accept additional weapons … such as close in weapons of which the ship currently has none.
 
 
Just for fun, let’s take a look at a WWII ship with a displacement similar to the Burke:  the Northampton class cruiser at 9,200 tons versus the Burke at 9,700 tons.  The Northampton is actually 500 tons lighter but that’s close enough. 
 
Northampton
 
Displacement = 9,200 tons
Nominal dimensions = 600 ft x 66 ft
 
For calculation purposes, let’s call the dimensions 600 ft x 60 ft to allow for narrowing at the bow and stern.  Thus, Northampton = 36,000 sq.ft. of deck space
 
We see, then, that the Northampton, while slightly lighter, has 10,980 sq.ft. more deck space for weapons! 
 
 
 
 
We’ve lost our way in WARship design.
 
 
 
Caveat:  All of this ignores weight margins and stability.  Available deck space is useless if the ship can’t support the added weight and remain stable.  Of course, when war comes, we’ll strip out tons of crew comforts thus freeing up weight and stability for weapons.

70 comments:

  1. i dunno hoss. How much can crew comfort really add up to? And does that really matter? a SeaRAM or CWIS installation is only 6 tons. Adding an additional 10 point defense weapons to a warship is only an increase in weight of 60 tons. That's a 0.6% increase in weight, which I'd think would be well within margins.

    Something to consider is that we have a lot of deck space in the aft for the flight deck on all our ships. If we're abandoning the idea of flight ops, we can now turn the flight deck into a missile farm for containered missiles.

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    1. "How much can crew comfort really add up to?"

      Current ships have purpose built lounges, game rooms, complete gymnasiums, barber shops, tile floors, miles of cabling supporting crew electronics, ship retail stores and inventories, and so on. It does add up.

      That aside, I made no claim about the magnitude of the crew comfort weight - merely that it would be removed and free up some amount of weight. In an entire post of thought provoking discussion, that single, undefined statement is what you focused on? That's disappointing. Try for something more substantial if you choose to comment further.

      "And does that really matter?"

      The LCS and Burkes have no weight margins left and many (all?) are over their weight allowances already. Every pound does matter. For example, the various LCS modules, in addition to failing their functional and reliability specs, have been curtailed or drastically pared down due to weight concerns so, yes, every pound matters.

      Another interesting example is the LCS module swapping. Swap tests on a Freedom class demonstrated that moving a single conex container off centerline resulted in exceeding the ship's inclination limits. This, along with other factors, caused the Navy to abandon the module swapping concept which was the single, key characteristic of the LCS. So, yes, every pound matters.

      "we can now turn the flight deck into a missile farm for containered missiles."

      Yes, flight decks could, theoretically be used to mount weapons if weight and stability margins allow. Of course, there is more to such mountings than just the weight of the weapon. Distribution of the weight is important and, often, a limiting factor. Weight has to be evenly distributed fore and aft as well as laterally. Even if the flight deck has the square footage, the fore/aft balance may allow only a limited weight of mountings.

      I look forward to a more substantial comment if you choose to comment further.

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    2. "Yes, flight decks could, theoretically be used to mount weapons if weight and stability margins allow."

      I'm not the one who suggested installing missiles on flight decks, but the Navy did that with the Virginia-class cruisers when the elevator landing pad did not work as well as hoped. Admittedly, I'm not sure that eight Tomahawks in two armored box launchers really constitutes a missile farm.

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  2. Agree with above. My experience with crew comfort was whatever free weights could be stashed in an unused corner and maybe a stationary bike. If I was lucky, someone had a PlayStation. Toss all that if you want, it won’t buy you a single additional weapon

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    1. "My experience with crew comfort was whatever free weights could be stashed in an unused corner and maybe a stationary bike. "

      Crew comforts have come a long way since you, apparently, last encountered them. Ships are now built with dedicated, full featured gyms, barber shops, dentist offices, mail handling spaces, crew lounges, video game lounges, TVs, retail stores and store inventories, more spacious berthing, and so on, depending on the particular ship. It's a significant weight although I can't put an exact number on it.

      Delete
  3. When talking about usable space, this is slightly related. Elsewhere online I just had a bit of a convo about ships internal space usage- and the differences between VLS and the old arm launchers. Anyone thats been around here a while has seen there isnt much advantage, if any to using VLS. One downside to the arm launchers that hadn't been really talked about here though, was the large amount of additional space and machinery needed to load, stage, assemble and get the missiles to the launcher. BUT- heres the perk to the arm launcher and magazine setup that at least I didnt think about: You can UNREP and reload your magazine while underway!!! Thats somthing that as of now we cant seem to manage with VLS. So it seems our "step forward" with VLS...really wasnt!!

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    1. As I recall, the Reload At Sea strikedown cranes need the ship to be in calm waters and moving no faster than 5 knots. Not much benefit over parking in a port and reloading there!

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    2. "One downside to the arm launchers"

      As a general statement, while arm launchers require supporting equipment to handle the missiles, they also require less space to store the missiles compared to VLS. The missiles were stored 'bare', inches from each other as opposed to the VLS which stores the missiles in containerized form which is volume-inefficient. An arm launcher could store more missiles in a given space. For example, look at the space requirements for the Perry which could store 40 missiles in what appears to be less space than a 32-cell VLS.

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    3. The launchers the 61/64 cell replaced only held 44 rounds. I think there may be some design scenarios where more could be stashed if the missile were horizontal and the magazine under some other part of the ships structure and then penetrating further down in the ship. I am thinking of some of the cruiser mods with Terrier and Talos.

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    4. "The launchers the 61/64 cell replaced only held 44 rounds."

      The 8-cell and 32-cell VLS hold less missiles than the Perry launchers. The 64-cell VLS holds more missiles because it's bigger. The storage density and deck space usage of the launchers was much better than the VLS. What point are you trying to make?

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    5. It also appears that the VLS cells go much deeper into the hull than the arm launchers' storage.

      Lutefisk

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    6. "I am thinking of some of the cruiser mods with Terrier and Talos."

      While Im unsure of the Perrys magazine layout, as I couldn't find any kind of diagram on a quick search, I did find a fascinating old video of Talos strike down, handling, loading etc. And from what I could tell, it seemed as if the magazine spaces for 44 missiles took up the whole width of the hull below the main deck, as well as superstructure space behind the launcher. So to me it does appear as if the system consumes at least as much volume as a VLS.
      But regardless of the extra space consumed, the fact that the whole system is reloadable at sea makes another point in favor of that system/style rather than VLS.
      Heres a link to the neat old Talos video- gadget lovers will like it!
      https://youtu.be/1Ep7yebWq4s?si=P_5uKskGEu_u5oZd

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    7. The arm launcher vs vls debate is interesting.

      The vls is mechanically simple, but takes up a lot of deck space and penetrates deep into the ship, 22 feet for the tactical length and 25 feet for the strike length.

      The missile also needs to launch vertically before it tips over towards the target, not necessarily all that attractive when time's-a-wastin' with incoming missiles to intercept.

      https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/naval-launchers-and-munitions/MK41-VLS-product-card.pdf

      The Mk26 twin-arm launcher is mechanically complicated with all of the associated maintenance and reliability issues.
      It also affords a single point of failure.

      But it takes up less deck space and, although I can't find any measurements of hull penetration, it appears to use a lot less internal vertical space.

      It also can be trained so that the outgoing missile can be aimed directly at the incoming target.

      http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-JURz6GjKAE0/UlWwJcGaLQI/AAAAAAAACfI/pCBr7Z_eVdU/s1600/A0114565912110412901.jpg

      Pick your poison, I suppose.

      Lutefisk

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  4. The driving factor for the fitment of weapons is not space per say but center line space which is in turn is driven by the total length of a vessel. The centerline is where you get the maximum training out of a weapons mount with minimum impact on stability. Unfortunately the center line has also been coopted for a lot of other stuff.

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    1. This is somewhat true for the larger weapons (large naval guns being the outstanding example) but ships historically have had extensive off-center line weapon mounts. Off-center line often means mounting duplicate weapon fits port and starboard but that's actually an advantage in terms of redundancy and combat resilience. It also allows simultaneous firing to port and starboard as opposed to a single center line mount which can fire to either side but not both simultaneously.

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  5. In your calcs of sq.ft. for the flight deck did you include the hanger?

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    1. Yes, the hangar is included as it offers 'deck' space for mounting on the roof of the hangar.

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  6. How many weapons could be launched from the submerged part of the hull rather than the deck? Mines? Torpedos? Anything else?

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    1. As commonly practiced today, no weapons are launched from below sea level. In theory, anything but a naval gun could be launched from under the water but it presents a host of practical engineering challenges that make it, generally, not worth the effort.

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    2. "How many weapons could be launched from the submerged part of the hull rather than the deck?"

      A weapon that I would consider launching from below deck level would be a MK48 torpedo. I would assume that you could mount it below deck and have it launch from a porthole type opening above the water line.

      If that could be made to work, then you would have the torpedoes and launching equipment at a lower level than the main deck.

      Lutefisk

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    3. The Knox class was originally designed with a mk 48 torpedo room in the hull fantail along with the VDS room. The equipment was never installed to save money. It was a fairly good size space. Our ship turned ours into a crews lounge with couchs, chairs, tables, two video games, a soda machine and weight machine.

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    4. I remember the deck plans in DC central showed it as it would have been installed. two angled fixed tubes P/S with firing ports in the hull that opened to expose the tube ends. You could probably get 8-10 reloads in there. The VDS compartment was totally watertight, when the fish was in the water the rear doors in the stern stayed open. you could look thru a porthole and see all the water pouring in when the weather was rough. Inside you had a small (4x4) watertight control booth that the operator was in. ( the VDS was steerable)

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  7. US Navy Ships vs Kamikazes 1944-45 by Mark Stille provides some detail about ships being up-gunned in wartime. A couple of excerpts:

    "Essex-class carriers were provided with extensive antiaircraft suites. For long-range protection, 12 5in./38 guns were fitted - eight in twin mounts fore and aft of the island and four single mounts along the port side. Originally, eight 40mm quadruple mounts were also installed, and this number rose to a total of 19 on selected ships. Short-range protection was provided by 46 20 mm single mounts placed on galleries just below the flightdeck level. Some ships received as many as 58 of these guns. In 1945, in response to the kamikaze threat, a twin mount was introduced in place of the single mounts."

    As for the Fletcher-class destroyers:

    "All ships carried a standard battery of five 5in./38 guns in single mounts. The light antiaircraft gun fit was continually upgraded throughout the war. The standard 1942-43 fit was a twin 40mm mount and six single 20mm mounts. By 1943 and into early 1945, most ships carried five twin 40mm mounts and seven 20mm single guns. In response to the kamikaze threat and the imperative to mount more 40mm guns, in 1945 some ships carried 14 40mm guns in two quadruple and three twin mounts and 12 20mm guns in six twin mounts."

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    1. For comparison's sake, I don't think that it is a stretch to equate modern AAW systems vs WW2 systems.

      The Phalanx is equivalent to the 20mm Oerlikons, the SeaRAM to the 40mm Bofors twins/quads, the ESSM to the 5"/38 guns, and the Standard missiles to the CAPs of F4Us and F6Fs.

      Our density of modern AAW should be comparable to the WW2 density since even though our modern weapons are superior than those of the past...so are the threats they face.

      Lutefisk

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    2. "even though our modern weapons are superior than those of the past...so are the threats they face."

      This is what so few people grasp. BOTH the attacking and defending weapons have improved so that the net improvements are a wash.

      Delete
  8. Will the next war be long enough for us to refit ships with additional weapon systems? Probably not.

    Why? Because the next war be long enough to outstrip our current weapon production capabilities. We’re not even making enough missiles to sustain low level deployment against the Houthis.

    If we fight China, I dont see how we sustain a fight. We have, essentially, one salvo of whatever is actually loaded into the ships we have on hand. Once depleted…. Which will probably be within a couple days of heavy fighting, we have no choice but to retreat thousands of miles to reload. And we dont have any reloads.

    This seems like a no win scenario. All China has to do is throw a massed attack at us. If Aegis works and we shoot down a couple hundred missiles or drones or planes, then we still lose, because we cant replace the missiles.

    What am i missing here?

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    1. You’re not missing anything - unfortunately. These days we’re a one-shot military. We could hit an enemy with a couple thousand 1980s vintage LAMS, and that would be an end of it. Maybe we’d get a result and maybe not - either way the locker would be empty and we’d have no chance at all of refilling it before the war was over one way or another.

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    2. "we’d have no chance at all of refilling it before the war was over one way or another."

      You're ignoring the opposite side of the issue. China (or any enemy) will have no great amount more of weapons than we do and will be expend the bulk of their inventory in short order, too. China's missiles are equally as expensive and time consuming to produce as ours. It's not as if they can make hundred dollar cruise missiles in 24 hours.

      What will happen in a war is that both sides will quickly expend the bulk of their ready inventories and then the war will settle into a protracted industrial conversion/production effort ... exactly as WWII did. The question for the US is will we have the desire to engage in a protracted war? The answer depends on the reason for the war and how it's presented to the public.

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    3. "China (or any enemy) will have no great amount more of weapons than we do and will be expend the bulk of their inventory in short order, too."

      But they do. Various reports over the last couple years say they're producing 500+ DF-21s/year. This puts their inventory well over 1,000. And that's just the long-range stuff. Plus all the YJ-12s and YJ-18s they're building. Conservatively, they can probably put 2-3,000 in the air in short order.

      Against this, let's do some rough math. The 7th fleet has 9 Burkes and one Tico. Total load out of missiles is 932. And some of those are going to be loaded with something besides SAMs.And definitely not the Anti-ABM capable ones. But never mind... even with optimal loadouts, the first salvos are going to overwhelm our defense capacity by 2 or 3 to 1. Maybe more.

      "China's missiles are equally as expensive and time consuming to produce as ours. It's not as if they can make hundred dollar cruise missiles in 24 hours."

      Unfortunately I don't think they have to. But, here's a question? Why do we use million dollar missiles that hundreds of times what the thousand dollar drones they shoot down cost? Because that's the only tool we have. Why wouldn't an enemy precede an actual mass attack using their expensive, top of the line missiles with a spoiling attack of lots of cheap flying lawnmowers? Would our ships, seeing lots of incoming tracks, have the ability to distinguish them and discipline not to use our fires against them? Even if these kinds of drones can't destroy a ship, can we tell that when they're incoming?

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    4. I almost don't know where to start on this. As gently as I can I say this ... you seem to have no idea how a war would be fought. Let me give some examples from your comment.

      "DF-21"

      We've covered this. China could have a billion of these and they'd be useless because they don't have targeting. Enough said.

      "YJ-12/18"

      Targeting.

      "can probably put 2-3,000 in the air in short order"

      No, they can't. That would require one or two thousand delivery aircraft and China can no more assemble that many suitable aircraft in 'short order' than we can. You understand that only some aircraft can carry those missiles and those aircraft are scattered across the expanse of China.

      We have well over 1,000 various cruise missiles.

      " 7th fleet"

      You do understand that 7th Fleet won't be fighting China all by itself, right? We'll probably send an extra couple of destroyers to help out.

      "the first salvos are going to overwhelm our defense capacity"

      How stupid do you think we are? Admittedly, this blog points out lots of stupid things we do so you can be forgiven for thinking we'll fight stupid but no one is going to line 7th fleet up to see how long they can stand against a few thousand missiles, even setting aside the impossibility of that occurring.

      "a spoiling attack of lots of cheap flying lawnmowers"

      Do you have any idea how short the range (both flight and comm/control) is of 'cheap flying lawnmowers'? Some sort of large carrier ship would have to approach quite closely to get small drones within range of our ships. Does it seem likely to you that we'd allow that?

      "Why do we use million dollar missiles that hundreds of times what the thousand dollar drones they shoot down cost?"

      That's the one legitimate point in your comment and even that's suspect. Thousand dollar drones can't get anywhere near a fleet at sea due to flight and comm/control range limitations. It's more of a land concern unless one is stupid enough to park a ship just off an enemy's coast and see how long it can survive.

      Honestly, I nearly deleted your comment as being simply unrealistic in the extreme but I thought I'd offer a reply, instead, to help you realize the unreality of your thinking. Think hard before commenting again.

      I don't mean my reply in a mean way although it can't help but be seen that way. Try to think through the REALISTIC application of the various combat concepts you're touching on.

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    5. ‘Ignoring the opposite side of the issue’
      Maybe - no way we can be sure but it’s likely imo that in an emergency China’s very large state owned MIC operating within the parameters of a command economy would be able to ramp up production of missiles etc more quickly than we could.
      No need to negotiate profitable long term contracts with suppliers, no shareholders to keep onside, no problems in recruiting labor in any quantity necessary, no Peaceniks to worry about, no NIMBY-ism about location of production facilities, etc.
      These are all big pluses in wartime.

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    6. "likely imo that in an emergency China’s very large state owned MIC operating within the parameters of a command economy would be able to ramp up production"

      Possibly. That's not the point, though. The point is that BOTH sides will rapidly expend their ready inventories and then ramp up production which is not a rapid process no matter which side is ultimately better at it.

      You may not be aware but the US has some pretty extensive executive powers in the case of war ... the powers rival those of a dictatorial China. Biden has implemented a couple of them (illegally and incorrectly but that's a separate issue).

      You're also assuming that China has everything it needs for increased production and that's simply not the case. Just as the US has certain raw material vulnerabilities, so too does China and the US is in a much better position to mitigate those vulnerabilities via global trading partners than China. One of China's major vulnerabilities is the lack of advanced technology trading partners when war comes. In war, the US will have still have trade with all of Europe, Australia, Japan, SKorea, etc. In contrast, China will have a handful of poor, low tech countries separated by extremely vulnerable trade routes.

      The point is that after the initial surge of weapons usage, both sides will settle in for the long haul where industry and raw materials will determine the victor. It won't be a short war.

      Interestingly, one likely scenario for a short war would have China invading Taiwan and the Philippines and then immediately declaring a true and submitting to peace negotiations during which they'd magnanimously offer to return the Philippines while maintaining jurisdictional control over Taiwan. Thus, they'd achieve their original goal of seizing Taiwan at relatively little cost and there would be nothing the US could do about it without looking like a war-mongering, rogue nation.

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    7. In that case, doesn’t the eventual outcome largely depend upon the level of materiel ‘stock on hand’ at the time of the outbreak of the conflict? In a sensible world we’d probably be ramping up production now, but there’s little sign of that happening - we seem to be running into all sorts of problems just trying to boost the supply of 155mm arty rounds which isn’t exactly hi-tech manufacturing.

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    8. "DF-21"
      We've covered this. China could have a billion of these and they'd be useless because they don't have targeting. "

      OK. So you're saying they're total fakes, and the reports that they do have functional targeting capable of hitting moving targets is so non-credible as to not be worth considering?

      I don't assume they'll work as advertised, but I don't assume they're going to be useless either. The Chinese seem to think they've solved the targeting problems and the US Navy seems to take seriously the possibility that they have.

      What targeting do they have? Satellites and terminal phase active radars. Obviously we can shoot down satellites, and will once the war starts, but China gets the first shot.

      Feel free to correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding of how these things work is that they don't necessarily require continuous updates. At least that's the theory. Even if the target is only located for a moment (by satellite, a sacrificial set of recon planes, a sub that radios back triangulation of likely position from our emissions, a bunch of "fishing trawlers" the way the Soviets did it, etc), the missiles are launched against that area. Then they turn on their own radars and try to find the target.

      Will it work? I dunno.

      How many missiles can China coordinate in an attack against us? Perhaps I was unclear, but my point was that if they position themselves properly, it's feasible that they can time attacks to fire their ballistics and launch their shorter range stuff against us to reach us simultaneously or nearly so.

      https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-8-chinas-anti-ship-firepower-and-mass-firing-schemes/

      Is stuff like this just totally out to lunch? So... you have a 1000+ ABMs, and a thousand plus ALCMs. There's plenty of photos of H-6's carrying around 6 YF-12s a piece. It's not unrealistic based on the numbers alone that the Chinese could initiate hostilities with a saturation attack against whatever forces we have in the area.

      "drones have short range"

      Yeah. I do understand this. But there are hundreds of not obviously military ships around at a time. I'd fight dirty and have some of them start launching drones. I wouldn't expect them to succeed, but I'd expect them to cause us to waste some of our missiles. Which, again, will improve the odds of their subsequent saturation attack's success.

      "You do understand that 7th Fleet won't be fighting China all by itself, right? We'll probably send an extra couple of destroyers to help out."

      You do understand that the Chinese likely won't politely wait for us to assemble all of our forces? If you were them, how would you fight the US?

      You're right. You're the expert. But in my non-expert but somewhat well-read opinion, I'd strike first if I were them.

      And as to "how dumb are we?" we're pretty dumb. If it were dumbass me, I wouldn't fight a battle I thought I would lose. So I'd either pre-emptively establish a defensible position by bringing in almost every additional military resource we have, or I'd not fight. Because right now, the numbers suggest our positions can be overwhelmed before help can arrive.

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    9. "Then they turn on their own radars and try to find the target."

      Gotta get quite close to the target for a missile to do that (and even then), unless you're willing to waste most of them, and those things are pricey.

      Also, preparations for a large-scale attack are not exactly easy to spot nowadays.
      Would they US military see that a first strike is coming and do nothing, not even getting out of range?
      That'd be a new record in retardation even for them, although...

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    10. " not exactly easy "

      I meant not exactly HARD, of course.

      Delete
    11. "doesn’t the eventual outcome largely depend upon the level of materiel ‘stock on hand’ "

      It does. I've got a post coming on exactly this.

      "In a sensible world we’d probably be ramping up production now"

      Quite right ... but, as you note, we're not.

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    12. "the reports that they do have functional targeting capable of hitting moving targets is so non-credible as to not be worth considering?"

      That's correct. We know this for a certainty because not only can we not do it, the technology to theoretically do it doesn't even exist. I'm not going to belabor this but think about it yourself. How is it even possible to target something a couple thousand miles away IF THAT TARGET IS TRYING TO PREVENT IT?

      That prevention effort would eliminate UAVs, aircraft, ships, and any other sensor platform before they could get remotely close enough to find the target. This was all gamed out during the Cold War with the Russian bomber threat. You need to study up on history, operational theory, and tactics.

      "The Chinese seem to think they've solved the targeting problems and the US Navy seems to take seriously the possibility that they have."

      The US seems to think they can operate a regional (nearly global!), all-seeing, omnipotent sensor and data network during a war. That's delusional but that's the current thinking. China can think/claim anything they want but it doesn't change reality. Anything China claims is mostly propaganda. Anything they can actually do, they'll keep secret.

      "missiles are launched against that area."

      You need to study up on sensor fields of view, data and decision making inertia, etc. A 'momentary' contact is nowhere near enough to launch on.

      Also, have you considered that 90% of contact reports in war are incorrect/false? Even if they could instantaneously launch on a contact report, they'd have a 90% chance of launching on a false target. Then they'd have nothing left. Oops!

      "feasible that they can time attacks to fire their ballistics and launch their shorter range stuff against us to reach us simultaneously or nearly so."

      Not even remotely possible. Ballistic missiles are multiple thousand mile ranges. Short range weapons are ... well ... short range. It would be impossible to get a significant supply of short range weapons into position without being detected. You absolutely must learn to think operationally and tactically FROM BOTH SIDES.

      "It's not unrealistic based on the numbers alone that the Chinese could initiate hostilities with a saturation attack against whatever forces we have in the area."

      The initiating side always gets the first, 'free' shot. Now, think through the implications of that. China's number one objective is Taiwan. They're not going to expend weapons on minor US ships as their one 'free' shot. Yes, they might take a shot at a carrier. Of course, that would likely force Japan into the war and China desperately would like to avoid that.

      It is also not possible to assemble an overwhelming force without providing us plenty of detection and warning. At that point, one hopes we'd disperse/withdraw before hostilities began.

      Delete

    13. "hundreds of not obviously military ships around at a time."

      How many freaking times do I have to disabuse people of this notion?! There won't be any commercial ships in a war zone and any that are will be sunk instantly without a second thought. We sank EVERY Japanese ship we found, commercial or military, big or small, regardless of its purpose. We'd do the same in a war with China. No commercial ship will survive in a war zone. You seem to think we'll conduct an existential war with China like we do our peacetime actions where we value avoidance of collateral damage more than achieving military objectives. Actual war is an all-out, destroy everything, brutal endeavor. Read some history!

      "right now, the numbers suggest our positions can be overwhelmed"

      Of course they can, just as various Chinese bases around the world can be overwhelmed by us. We're in a peacetime stance where we (delusionally) think we're deterring China. As the run up to war intensifies, we'll shift to war preparations and consolidate/reinforce/withdraw forces, as appropriate. Could we do something as stupid as lining our ships and aircraft up for the enemy as we did at Pearl Harbor? Sure, but I'd hope we've learned our lesson on that. Also, what actual effect did Pearl Harbor and the loss of our battleships have on the war? None! In fact, it was an operational and tactical blessing in disguise as it forced us to develop carrier ops faster and better than we would have if we'd have our (antiquated) battleships available for operations. Sinking a few scattered ships isn't going to significantly help the Chinese.

      Your grasp of war and combat operations is ... lacking. I urge you to read up on war AND LEARN THE CORRECT LESSONS. You claim to have read history but, like our military, it's clear that you aren't drawing the right conclusions. History is screaming at us but we're not listening. Think operationally!

      Delete
    14. "You seem to think we'll conduct an existential war with China like we do our peacetime actions where we value avoidance of collateral damage more than achieving military objectives. Actual war is an all-out, destroy everything, brutal endeavor"

      "We're in a peacetime stance where we (delusionally) think we're deterring China. As the run up to war intensifies, we'll shift to war preparations and consolidate/reinforce/withdraw forces, as appropriate."

      That's a critical assumption.

      At what point are we going to stop being delusional? I do read your posts, and comment because I think you're right that "our military... aren't drawing the right conclusions".

      But... I strongly question this assumption that we'll suddenly snap out of it. You've said over and over that we're already in a war and we're delusional about it.

      Hence, I think it's a bad assumption to think we'll suddenly snap out of it. What snaps a country out of a mass delusion?

      Well, a massive Pearl Harbor style surprise attack would do it. But again, assuming that such an attack turns out to be a "blessing in disguise" is another huge and questionable assumption.

      There's no underlying evidence to support favorable assumptions to our side. If anything, we should plan for the opposite.

      Delete
    15. "I strongly question this assumption that we'll suddenly snap out of it."

      You're right to be concerned since we continually demonstrate an inability to face reality and act accordingly. However, I simply have to believe that if we observe China massing aircraft, ships, and weapons in a first strike posture that we'll react at least somewhat correctly, if not ideally.

      Again, though, even in the absolute worst case where we do nothing to prepare, there are only a handful of ships within range of China at any given time. There is one carrier and half a dozen Burkes forward based in Japan. Guam has five SSNs and ?a dozen? surface ships. Of course, various ships rotate in and out of the region.

      "a massive Pearl Harbor style surprise attack"

      I've posted on this. There are many Pearl Harbor candidates whose destruction would severely hurt the US (knocking out the huge lift cranes, for example, would permanently cripple US shipbuilding and repair - see, "The Next Pearl Harbor - Shipyards"). Sinking a handful of ships would be near the bottom of the list from China's perspective although they'd be happy to knock off a carrier if we were stupid enough to leave one laying around.

      "If anything, we should plan for the opposite."

      Within REASON. Assuming the Chinese could assemble an attack with thousands of missiles is utterly absurd and attempting to defend against an absurd scenario would cause us to spend absurd amounts of money. We already spend absurd amounts on normal things. We don't want to spend money trying to counter absurd situations. Take a lesson from the Soviets attempt to counter Reagan's largely mythical Star Wars effort.

      It is good to be aware of enemy capabilities but not to inflate them to ridiculous proportions. One of the best ways to evaluate enemy capabilities is to reverse the scenario. For example, could we, without being detected, assemble a strike of thousands of missiles and sink the entire Chinese navy? Of course not! So, why would we think China could do that to us?

      Delete
    16. Anything’s possible of course but I don’t think it’s likely that China would attempt to takeover Taiwan using an attack on the Philippines as some sort of lever. Far more probable I think is that at some point in the not too distant future the Chinese will simply tell all those western companies that currently trade with Taiwan that if they continue to do so they’ll be permanently excluded from the Chinese market. If companies were forced to choose between China and Taiwan they would overwhelmingly opt for doing business with the former, and that would pretty much be the end of the things (unfortunately).

      Delete
    17. "an attack on the Philippines"

      Attacking the Philippines is mandatory to secure the southern flank for a Taiwan invasion. Speculatively, it would be perfect as a bargaining chip in subsequent peace negotiations, as I described.

      " permanently excluded from the Chinese market."

      That's possible. Warfare in the non-kinetic realm. China is excelling at that, currently, so no reason for them to not try it. The downside is that it would trigger a global economic and financial blockade against China and China would lose much more than they could gain.

      Delete
    18. "The initiating side always gets the first, 'free' shot. Now, think through the implications of that. China's number one objective is Taiwan. They're not going to expend weapons on minor US ships as their one 'free' shot. Yes, they might take a shot at a carrier. Of course, that would likely force Japan into the war and China desperately would like to avoid that."

      Question about that. It all seems to fall under the question of whether anti-ship ballistic missiles actually work.
      1. China has built a bunch of missiles dedicated to this purpose. The DF-21Ds are dedicated anti-ship with a terminal phase active radar. The only logical target for them is US Carriers.

      The DF-26s are harder to pin down. Supposedly, the Chinese can swap the warheads on these, so out of whatever total number they have, we don't know how many are guided anti-ship vs. conventional land attack vs. nuclear.

      But anyway, the point is they certainly seem to be planning to expend some of these weapons against us.

      If they do that while they're at sea with dedicated anti-ship versions, maybe they can avoid firing missiles directly onto Japan, and maybe keep them out of the war.

      Unlikely, but again, I don't think it's right to say it's an unrealistic assumption when the only purpose the missiles serve is anti-ship. Maybe they won't work and we can safely ignore them, but I don't want to be my life on that.

      Delete
    19. One thing that sets this blog apart is the insistence on facts and logic. As gently as I can say this, your premise lacks both.

      One of the tenets of naval warfare (and warfare in general) is, "To know tactics, know technology". It is clear that you have not studied the technology of ballistic missiles (for example, you're ignoring the plasma effect on sensors, the field of view, the sensor limitations, the predictability of travel, etc.). Unfortunately, I simply don't have the time to lead you through a study of the technology.

      You also are completely ignoring the opposite side of the issue which is ballistic missile defense. The Navy has a fleet of BMD ships which they believe capable of intercepting ballistic missiles? Will they work? We don't know although it is a fact that there have been more ballistic missile defense tests (dozens that I know about) than there have been ballistic missile strike tests against moving targets thousands of miles away under realistic conditions (zero, as far as I know). Despite this, you seem to be choosing to believe that Chinese ballistic missiles will perform flawlessly and Navy defensive efforts don't even exist (since you haven't mentioned or factored them into your thinking). This is illogical.

      The short of it is that I can't allow ridiculously unrealistic claims and opinions to appear and I don't have the time to educate you. You also seem disinclined to accept anything I've said so I'm completely wasting my time.

      You're welcome to your view but the quality of the blog requires that I minimize utterly incorrect information. I'll bend over backwards and leave the discussion to this point up as an educational exercise for others but I can't allow this to continue.

      Delete
  9. The Burkes seem to have some open deck space available for close in weapons. Why could we not just mount the M167 towed VADS ( with out trailer) in gun tubs P/S for additional CIWS. The whole system takes up an circular area of 12 ft., weights around 3500 lbs. (this includes the trailer).A lot of nations still use it with updated day/night sights and fire control radar. Some of these also have quad Stinger attached. Same gun and ammo as CIWS. Might be a cheap and quick add on during war. I would think you could get 2 units per side for back up when CIWS runs out of ammo.

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    1. We already have CIWS. What would be the advantage of the M167 given that it no longer is in service, isn't marinized, and has no fire control in US service, that I'm aware of? Wouldn't it be a LOT easier just to add more CIWS and SeaRAM?

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  10. One point I haven't seen yet. If you start bolting CIWS and SeaRAM onto the deck of a Zumwalt, that will affect the stealth of the ship, and not in a good way. While I have no figures, I imagine it's similar to hanging weapons and fuel tanks off the wings of a stealth fighter, which of course is a no-no in a contested environment.

    Given that we've made massive investments, both financial and in the form of design compromises, to achieve stealth in the Zumwalt, how would you balance this?

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    1. "that will affect the stealth of the ship"

      Yes, it will. However, given the non-stealthy designs of our carriers, amphibs, Burkes, Constellations, etc. a few more CIWS won't appreciably alter the chances of detection and it would be better to have more weapons than a marginally lower radar signature.

      Zumwalt is the only stealthy ship we have (and I'm far from convinced that it's actually all that stealthy - I may have to do a post on that?) and we only have three of them so it's not a big concern. By the way, the Navy has started tacking on platforms to the sides of the Zumwalts along with aerials, masts, and other gear. Compare recent photos to early photos.

      Delete
  11. "We built a cruiser size Zumwalt 64% larger than a Burke with 17% less space for mounting weapons."

    Yet, on the Zumwalt, half of her 80 VLS are located along the outer edge of her flight deck. One can argue about the practicality of that arrangement, but it is a way of making maximum use of the available deck space.

    And, if it came to it, I'm sure the Navy could fit a CWIS or SeaRAM at the two outer corners of the Zumwalt's flight deck without significantly limiting helicopter operations.

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    1. I didn't say that no additional weapons could be added to a Zumwalt. I said that a major desirable design characteristic of a WARship is deck space and that, proportionally, the Zumwalt has far less than a Burke (which, itself, doesn't have a lot!).

      Are you really suggesting that the total close in protection for a $9B cruiser size ship should be the two corners of the flight deck? I hope no one attacks with more than one missile at a time or attacks for forward!

      Do you have any idea how many weapons were mounted on Zumwalt size ships in WWII?

      Delete
    2. But, you did discount the flight deck as space available for mounting weapons, which for the Zumwalt, is where half of her 80 VLS cells are located. For good or bad, mounting VLS cells along the periphery of the flight deck is one way utilize make use of available deckspace.

      And, I hope you're not suggesting not utilizing that space. Heaven to Betsy, how in the world would a Zumwalt protect herself from attacks from rear?

      I do believe making comparisons to WW2 weapons is irrelevant as those weapons were far bulkier and less capable than today's weapons. How many 20mm AA guns would it take to provide the same capability of a single Phalanx? A Phalanx can shoot faster, slew faster, and is far more accurate than any 20mm or 40mm mount we had in WW2.

      Delete
    3. The Zumwalt has 8 of the 20 VLS modules along the edge of the flight deck, not half. That quibble aside, the deck space consumed by the VLS is minimal and doesn't alter the premise at all.

      "A Phalanx can shoot faster, slew faster, and is far more accurate than any 20mm or 40mm mount we had in WW2."

      And the attacking missiles are faster, stealthier, more maneuverable, have penetration aids, and are far more lethal than any aircraft in WWII. Thus, we need the same density of weapons in order to survive. Failure to recognize the advances by BOTH the attacking and defending weapons is one of the common mistakes made by amateur naval observers.

      Delete
    4. The Phalanx is limited to the following:
      Type Fire: ASM & Aircraft: 4,500 rounds/min, Asymmetric Threats: 3,000 rounds/min.
      Magazine Capacity: 1,550 rounds

      Then crewmen have to go on deck and reload it. So it empties fast. I'm not sure if/where the "ready service ammunition" is kept. The same happened during WWII but the ships were festooned with antiaircraft weapons, not one, or two, and unlike the Phalanx they would not run out of ammunition in literally less than a minute. As the cycle of defense vs offense is a vicious circle, the offense right now has the upper hand if you are armed with only one CWIS after you expend all your antiaircraft missiles, assuming you are a ship that is equipped with them.

      Delete
    5. "the offense right now has the upper hand"

      The available evidence of historical missile attacks suggests otherwise.

      What common sense suggests is that we arm ships with more than a single CIWS (or no close in weapon in the case of the Zumwalt). ANY offense has the upper hand against an unarmed, or very minimally armed, target.

      You might want to examine Hughes missile attack data success rates and the subsequent data and analysis I've provided throughout this blog.

      Delete
  12. ‘Ramping up production…’
    The difficulty here is that while there’s a limited ability to increase the production of artillery shells - owing to the fact that the factory itself is owned by the US Army, which uncharacteristically seems to have planned ahead - missiles are produced by private enterprise, where the objective is profit maximization not national defense.
    These companies (eg Raytheon) have exactly zero surge capacity and all the Executive Orders in the would can’t and won’t change that - quite apart from anything else they would have to build the same surge capability into all of their downstream suppliers.
    Interesting recent interview with Under Secretary Bush (Army procurement honcho) ‘surge capacity represents an inefficient use of capital…’
    Apparently we no longer have the capability within the U.S. to produce the explosives needed for bombs, shells or missile payloads but have to rely on overseas suppliers, a situation with which he seemed quite comfortable.
    None of this augurs well for a future conflict with China which is unlikely to have left itself in such a vulnerable situation.

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  13. "We’ve covered this in a previous post where we noted that ship superstructures have grown enormously"

    A big part of this is the increasing room being taken up by habitability spaces. Looking at the Navy's Ship Habitability Improvement Program (SHIP), it looks like the goal is to have everybody in 6-person, or fewer, berthing compartments. That seems to take up an awful lot of room. I think an arrangement as follows would allow plenty of habitability:
    CO/XO/Dept Heads - 1 person staterooms
    Junior officers - 2 persom staterooms
    CPO - 4-6 person pods
    Petty officers - 18 person pods
    Non-rated - 48 person compartments
    That sould cut down on space. There also seems to be a lot of space in crew lounges. I would think mess decks could double as lounges, saving a lot of space. I am not inclined to give up gyms/workout facilities, as sailord don't seem to stay fit enough as is, and in any event improved fitness should improve readiness.

    With the room saved, I would move some things out of the superdtructure. CIC could be on the main deck, as in RN ships.

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    1. "There also seems to be a lot of space in crew lounges"

      And barber shops, ship's retail stores and inventory storage, game rooms, mail rooms, disbursing offices, dentist offices, lawyers offices. Supporting those are additional HVAC, miles of computer/network cabling, WiFi systems and servers, support personnel, etc. It all adds up.

      "I am not inclined to give up gyms/workout facilities"

      You just can't give up the deployment mentality, can you? Oh well.

      Delete
    2. "You just can't give up the deployment mentality, can you? Oh well."

      Has nothing to do with deployments. I would expect sailors to use them inport and on local ops.

      Delete
    3. "And barber shops, ship's retail stores and inventory storage, game rooms, mail rooms, disbursing offices, dentist offices, lawyers offices. Supporting those are additional HVAC, miles of computer/network cabling, WiFi systems and servers, support personnel, etc. It all adds up."

      I would expect crew lounges and game rooms to be combined with mess decks. You need a barber shop, but it doesn't have to be huge; we didn't have them on sweeps, and it was always a hassle dealing with the shore folks when we got back from a two-week MinEx. Ship's stores also do not need to be huge walk-in affairs; small Japanese 7-11s would be a useful model. Mail rooms were never huge on any ship where I was stationed, and do not need to be. Same for disbursing offices. Let everybody learn to operate in small spaces. Unless you are a carrier or a battlewagon, I see no need for dentists or lawyers, or their offices. So I'm looking at saving a lot of room.

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    4. "I would expect sailors to use them inport and on local ops."

      Wouldn't you expect them to use barber shops, lawyers offices, and all the other crew amenities I listed?

      You're missing a few key points:

      1. We're supposedly building WARships, not cruise ships. ANYTHING that can't pass the filter of, 'is this going to directly improve combat?', should be eliminated.

      2. EVERYTHING that gets added to a design INCREASES the size and cost of the ship. Given that our ships are already unaffordable and the fleet is steadily shrinking because of spiraling costs, anything that gets added MUST INCREASE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS (see #1).

      3. EVERYTHING that is added in the way of crew comforts requires adding crew members and tasks to already overloaded crews. Extra crew are required to maintain and service the game/WiFi networks, cut hair, sell retail products, stock the store shelves, perform lawyer services and maintain case paperwork, clean and maintain gym equipment, perform dental services, and so on. All of this increases the crew size and takes away from the combat focus of the crew.

      Our ships are literally rusting away under our feet and you want to focus on comforts and conveniences.

      Going to the store, getting a haircut, and playing video games is what you do AFTER you return to port from a MISSION and finish scraping and painting the ship.

      WARships not cruise ships.

      Delete
    5. Agree with the ‘warships not cruise ships’ in theory, but how are we going to recruit men/women to serve aboard these - to put it mildly - ‘uncomfortable work environments’, especially if we stop doing the pointless overseas deployments (to interesting places) and instead the crews spend most of their service in port, working hard and training like crazy. I mean, we’ve already got a recruitment crisis - so what’s the plan to deal with the likelihood that nobody is going to want to sign up for that?
      Facetious note; I expect that 150 years ago a bunch of old admirals were saying much the same sort of thing when people suggested getting rid of hammocks and giving the crew actual bunks (like they had at home).

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    6. "how are we going to recruit men/women to serve ... I mean, we’ve already got a recruitment crisis"

      To answer your question we first have to understand WHY we have a recruitment crisis. We have one because we've implemented endless deployments with limited liberty opportunities and strict restrictions on in-port enjoyment. We've eliminated all worthwhile missions (like confronting the Chinese). We've emphasized gender, diversity, environmental issues over combat training. And so on. You know the list as well as I do. In short, we've removed all the reasons people traditionally signed up for service.

      So, how do we recruit for WARships? That's easy. We follow the model the Marines used to use in recruiting (but have now abandoned). We implement worthwhile missions and then tell people we don't want them because they aren't good enough and tough enough for us. We'll have people lined up trying to join just as the SEALS and other special forces have more people applying than they can possibly use. This is why athletes put up with what anyone else would call physical and mental abuse. They have worthwhile goals and inherently want to face and overcome challenges.

      Facing and overcoming challenges is an inherent human characteristic. The military, failing to recognize that, has removed all challenges so, naturally, nobody wants to join just to float around on a year long deployment listening to lectures about diversity and inclusiveness.

      You're not good enough or tough enough for my Navy. Hang on ... Gotta go. There's people lining up outside my door trying to join up.

      Delete
    7. "Our ships are literally rusting away under our feet and you want to focus on comforts and conveniences."

      No, not at all. If anything I want ships that are faster, better armed, and more heavily armored. I just think there are some things that contribute positively to combat effectiveness and some things that could be accomplished with much smaller space requirements:

      Gym/workout facility--physical fitness does contribute to combat effectiveness, sailors are frequently in poor shape, and ships provide precious little opportunity; a gym/workout area is a net positive, whether deployed, in port, or on local ops.
      Berthing--we can't go back to 1950s standards without negatively impacting recruiting and retention, particularly for highly technical ratings that are essential to keeping critical gear in order, but putting every sailor in a 6-person "stateroom" is excessive; we can save a lot of space by doing something like I recommended above.
      Lawyers offices--Lawyers have no business at sea, so no need for lawyers offices.
      Dentists offices--maybe one dentist on each ship with over, say, 1000 crew; could also take care of dental needs on escorts.
      Post office, barber shop, and ship's store--no need for either to be very big; don't need walk-in ship's store, Japanese kiosk 7-11s could be model; post office could be a cubbyhole; neither ship's stores nor barber shops nor post offices on ships I was on in 1970s were big enough to have a material impact on ship size.
      Crews lounges and game rooms--could just be incorporated into mess decks; video games actually have some significant training benefit for pilots and drone operators, but could just be put around perimeter of mess deck.

      I think my approach would result in significantly reduced space requirements, while also providing an envirnment conducive to recruiting and retention.

      Delete
    8. Your approach is the problem not the solution. I'll leave it at that.

      Delete
  14. If our ships will be subjected to a barrage of kamikaze drones and small subsonic missiles, then it would be helpful to have equally low-cost guided point defense weapons to engage them. APKWS might be adaptable to that role. It's been tested and proven effective at downing small drones. If we had a dozen mounts aboard each ship, the total cost of all 228 APKWS missiles is $6.8M, at $30K per weapon. A drone capable of inflicting serious damage will likely cost at least that much. The mounts and 19-shot launchers might add another $5M, and 1t of top weight per launcher. That's not much additional money spent per ship for guided weapons that can pick up targets at almost 9 miles and engage within 3 miles. We're making 20,000 of these guidance kits per year. I doubt China can make enough equally low-cost drones to effectively attack our warships for less money. Targeting and attack coordination will be their primary problems, even if they can.

    For offensive weapons to replace our depleted Harpoons and Tomahawks, I think Mk83 or Mk84 glide bombs strapped to Mk72 boosters could substitute as reloads. They wouldn't have the range of cruise missiles, but after all of the expensive long range weapons are expended, and neither side can wave a wand to make many more appear, a large warhead with a bolt-on guidance system will still be more effective than trading 5 inch shells and lightweight torpedoes. Such weapons would have a range of 30 to 40 miles and be capable of engaging ground or naval targets with appropriate guidance kits. A direct hit from a Mk84 on any modern warship is an instant mission kill.

    kbd512

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  15. If China were to use military force to physically invade Taiwan then it’s highly likely that, as you say, the United States’ western allies would deploy some of the financial sanctions that you mention (asset freezes, SWIFT exclusion, etc.) although I doubt they would be any more effective than they’ve been against Russia. (And obviously ex post facto sanctions of this nature would by definition be too late to achieve their objective - the purpose of sanctions being to deter rather than to punish).
    But if China were simply to continue doing what it routinely does anyway, pressuring western businesses not to enter trade agreements with Taiwan, or buy or sell strategic goods such as weapons, but ratcheting it up several notches as I described, I very much doubt that there would be much in the way of western retaliation, except maybe from the United States.
    The reality is that, semi-conductors aside, China is hugely important to western businesses, and Taiwan isn’t, and private enterprise is always going to be more concerned about short-term management and shareholder interests than long-term national interests.
    Impossible to predict outcomes with any level of confidence, but as the saying goes ‘it doesn’t matter how many horses are running, best put your money on the one called Self-Interest - at least you’ll know he’s trying’.

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    1. "doubt they would be any more effective than they’ve been against Russia."

      I didn't call for a few symbolic sanction gestures. I called for a total financial blockade; total war in the economic arena, not a few meaningless sanctions. Cut off all trade, outlaw all economic and business dealings with China, freeze and seize all assets and funds, and so on. Completely and utterly isolate China economically and financially. The West is large enough and diverse enough to get along. China would suffer far worse. Unable to acquire raw materials, unable to sell products, unable to move money, no incoming investments, businesses would collapse and China's economy would quickly follow suit. There's a reason why China has not yet done as you suggest. They know that they'd lose that game.

      BUT ... and this is the big 'but' ... it has to be all or nothing. Half-measures, as we're doing with Russia, won't work. Total financial war or nothing. Anything else is pointless.

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  16. "1. We're supposedly building WARships, not cruise ships. ANYTHING that can't pass the filter of, 'is this going to directly improve combat?', should be eliminated."

    As I've said many times, I think physical fitness improves combat readiness, and the Navy is not the most physically fit of services. So I think gyms/workout facilities pass your filter. I think the lounges/game rooms are superfluous, and could easily be incorporated into mess decks and save a bunch of space. I can't imagine a need for lawyers on ship, as that can be easily handled ashore, and pretty much the same for dentists. I do see the utility of having a dentist on large combatants--carriers, battlewagons, cruisers, but nothing smaller--to serve their large crews and escorts. Probably the biggest space saver is going away from 6-person "staterooms" for all crew, with berthing compartments with something like the numbers I posted above. And for God's sake, put in some urinals--all flushing toilets is a huge waste.

    "2. EVERYTHING that gets added to a design INCREASES the size and cost of the ship. Given that our ships are already unaffordable and the fleet is steadily shrinking because of spiraling costs, anything that gets added MUST INCREASE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS."

    As far as the game rooms, it is my understanding that video games are all over our bases in the MidEast, because video game skills are very useful for pilots and especially drone drivers. That sounds like combat effectiveness to me, but I don't see why they need special rooms, just make room around the perimeter of the mess decks for them.

    A big part of the reason why our ships are becoming unaffordable is the Navy’s desire to put too many bells and whistles on them, particularly state-of-the-art ones that have not been proved in combat conditions. It’s not the fanciest tool, but the one that works best in combat. Remember, an elephant is a mouse designed by a committee. I can see a need for some top-of-the-line multipurpose ships, like the Navy wants, but we need to fill out numbers with cheaper single-purpose ships. We would never have been able to approach a 600-ship Navy in the 1980s if they all had to be Ticonderogas. We criticized the Knoxes and Perrys for being too slow and undergunned. But they turned out to be pretty good ASW platforms, and as such played a significant role in bringing about the end of the Cold War. We don’t need Fords when we can build both a Nimitz and a Kitty Hawk for the cost of a Ford (and they work). Same for LHAs/LHDs and LPD-17s and Burkes and mini-Burkes (when the need is ASW platforms). We also need things like NGFS ships, mine countermeasures, and UNREP ships.

    "3. EVERYTHING that is added in the way of crew comforts requires adding crew members and tasks to already overloaded crews."

    I think you have to consider cost (in terms of money and manpower and space) versus benefits. I think my approach does a pretty good job of getting rid of the big space eaters that contribute little or nothing to combat readiness. You can say what you will about barber shops and ship's stores, but the ones we had on my ships in the 1970s hardly took up enough space to have a material impact.

    I do think there is a need to provide some crew comforts. WARships have a lot of complex systems that require sophisticated maintenance, so retaining sailors to maintain them becomes a major part of combat readiness. And 1950-ish crew accommodations are not going to convince those people to stay, no matter how gung is their ho.

    I’m not sure how much of the habitability space and cost is because of women on ship, but that strikes me as something that should be minimized.

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    1. "I think physical fitness improves combat readiness"

      In a mission focused navy, fitness occurs on land, not aboard ship. On a mission, you should be working so hard that you don't have the time or energy to workout. If you're not working that hard then you're not executing the mission properly. In WWII, a ship began drills as it was pulling away from the dock and didn't stop until they tied up again. THAT'S how you execute a mission. You don't sit around playing video games or leisurely lifting weights.

      Missions are short term. You're not going to get out of shape in a matter of days for even a few weeks. You get out of shape by laying around on year long deployments.

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