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Friday, December 8, 2023

Ukraine-Russia Naval War

So many people want to read miraculous changes in the future of naval warfare into Ukraine’s success with surface drones and anti-ship missiles.  Is this the case?  Is the future of naval warfare being rewritten as we speak?  Or, are false conclusions being drawn and propagated?  Let’s examine the situation and see what conclusions we can draw.
 
We’re going to focus on the Ukrainian attacks against the Russian fleet but it should be noted that, in terms of a Ukraine-Russia naval war, the Ukraine navy, such as it was, was completely eliminated at the opening of the war.  Thus, the war has not been as one-sided as media portrays it.
 
Following are some factors, characteristics, and considerations of the naval war.
 
Russian Ineptitude.  It cannot even be questioned that Russia has been stunningly inept in their operations, putting vessels in dangerous situations, and failing to protect their harbors or ships with any degree of competence.  The Moskva, for example, assuming it was actually sunk by Ukrainian actions, appeared from photos to have its air defense radars in fore/aft standby positions rather than actively scanning.
 
It is also clear that Russia did not grasp the magnitude of the threat until somewhat recently and did not, therefore, have proper and effective defensive weapons or tactics.  This is also a condemnation of modern warship design with its lack of short range defensive weapons.
 
 
Geography.  The Ukraine-Russia conflict is somewhat unique in that the naval incidents are taking place in a relatively very small, constrained area.  This geography permits Ukraine the fantastic good fortune of not having to search very far for targets and not having to transport their weapons very far.  Contrast this with the prospect of a naval war between China and the US which would be spread across unimaginable distances extending at least a thousand miles beyond the first island chain and, quite likely, encompassing far away areas of conflict in Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and elsewhere.  Short range drone surface vessels would be nearly useless across those kind of distances.
 
The unique geography also allows Ukraine to wage the naval war without actually having any ships!  The constrained area of conflict allows Ukraine to stage and launch weapons from nearby land sites.  Again, in a China-US war, this would rarely, if ever, be the case for either side although the Marines seem to think they’ll dominate the Chinese navy from a few hidden bases.  I won’t bother ridiculing that wishful, fantasy notion any further. 
 
In an open ocean naval war, lacking land based drone launch points, some type of drone transport ship would be required to closely approach the target and no one is going to allow an enemy (or unidentified) ship to approach without being sunk.  Thus, ship launched surface drones seem an impossibility.
 
 
Effectiveness.  The Ukraine surface drones get a lot of frenzied hype in the general press but how effective have they actually been?  While solid information is difficult to come by, it appears that only one major ship, the guided missile cruiser Moskva, has been sunk along with, possibly, a couple small patrol boats.
 
As best I can determine, here is the list of sunk or damaged Russian ships:
 





















The obvious conclusion is that for all the attacks and effort by Ukraine, very little actual damage has been done.  The one notable success, the sinking of the Moskva, is actually not a confirmed attack by Ukraine.  I’ve read theories that the sinking was the result of a drone surface vessel, anti-ship missiles, or a shipboard mishap on the Russian’s part.
 
The remaining couple of sinkings were minor tugs or patrol boats with the remainder of attacks producing unknown degrees of damage.  In terms of overall damage to the Russian fleet and resulting impact on the conduct of the war, the Ukraine efforts have been nearly insignificant.  Compare these meager results to the hundreds/thousands of vessels sunk in WWII.
 
It is also noteworthy that most of the Russian ships sunk or damaged were unarmed and defenseless which, again, speaks to Russian operational failures in putting defenseless vessels in harm’s way.
 
The Russians clearly either do not grasp the concept of defensive escorts or are unable to execute the concept properly and effectively.
 
A final question regarding effectiveness is what the success rate has been?  How many hits have been achieved compared to the number of attempts?  The media generally only reports a successful hit on a Russian ship.  We have no idea how many attacks have been unsuccessful.  Of course, given the minuscule cost of drones or small anti-ship missiles, if one can occasionally sink a major warship, the number of unsuccessful attacks is almost irrelevant.  Still, it would be informative to know the success rate.
 
 
Conclusion
 
One obvious conclusion is that the naval war is not really a naval war, at all.  It’s more closely akin to a navy versus land war with the Russian navy operating near and against the land and Ukraine trying to repel or neutralize the Russian maritime forces.  In essence, it’s the age old ‘ship fighting a fort’ scenario!  Russia is attacking Fort Ukraine from the sea.  That bit of near semantics aside …
 
Due to geographical considerations, if nothing else, it is impossible to imagine a Ukraine style drone war being even slightly successful in a China-US war.  Given a largely open ocean campaign, neither side would have recourse to land launched drones.  Anti-ship missiles are, of course, another story but that takes us to targeting which is an undeniable and, thus far, unsolved problem for both sides.
 
It is also difficult to imagine that either the US or China would be as inept as the Russians have been.  US naval doctrine heavily emphasizes layered defenses and escorts.
 
In short, it is difficult to imagine that the Ukraine-Russia naval war heralds any earth-shaking change in the future of naval warfare.
 
 
 
______________________________
 
[1]USNI News website, “A Brief Summary of the Battle of the Black Sea”, Heather Mongilio, 15-Nov-2023,
https://news.usni.org/2023/11/15/a-brief-summary-of-the-battle-of-the-black-sea

28 comments:

  1. You need to use ORYX, your list is off.

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    1. No thanks. My list is plenty accurate for my purpose.

      Delete
  2. "In essence, it’s the age old ‘ship fighting a fort’ scenario!"

    This is the best description of the situation! The country that should be paying attention is Taiwan. Still a very different situation (Russia isn't as capable as China, and hasn't tried a real amphibious assault) but there might be some things that Fort Taiwan could learn from the conflict.

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    1. "The country that should be paying attention is Taiwan."

      Now that's an astute observation. It does, however, raise the question as to just how applicable this set of circumstances is to Taiwan-China. For example, Ukraine seems to have pretty unimpeded operation of its drones and missiles. Would Taiwan, presumably subjected to a massively heavy, constant attack, have that same freedom of movement and operation? I suspect not so that would have to factored into any lesson Taiwan might want to draw from this conflict.

      Delete
  3. The Ukrainians are re-enacting the siege of Port Arthur,
    but using drone boats and cruise missiles instead of mines.
    Note: Attacking tugs is important, defeat the Russian tugboats
    and you have defeated the Russian Navy. ;-)

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  4. There was a recent article with the claim that the next generation of Ukrainian sea drone would be reusable, with the strategy of dropping mines in front of Russian ships. So there is an implicit admission that the current style drone isn’t very effective in cost or damage. The article also confirms they are reliant on satellite comms for control.

    Related, do you think the Houthis/Iranians will sink many ships? Performance is pretty poor compared to the 1980s tanker wars. But commercial ships are a lot bigger now and the Iranians don’t have access to Western weapons like Exocet.

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    1. "strategy of dropping mines in front of Russian ships"

      I'm not sure how effective that would be. Ships in war would frequently change course on a semi-random basis. Unless you're dropping a hundred meters in front, it would be a real challenge to get mines sufficiently in the ship's path to be effective.

      Each drone could carry, what, one or two mines? Again, that's not how mines are effective. They're used in groups of thousands.

      If you're close enough to drop a mine in the path with a good chance of success, you're close enough to, alternatively, launch a torpedo (PT drone boats). That would seem a better tactic.

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    2. I have no idea if the new idea will work, just thought it was interesting that they are moving past the kamikaze style.

      Also, I’m sure they’d love to fire torpedoes at them but I imagine mines are what they have on the shelf.

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    3. "I imagine mines are what they have on the shelf."

      I have no idea what their mine inventory is, if any. Since there has been no reports of mine use before, I'm inclined to think they don't have any/many. Also, if they can construct or acquire hundreds of surface drones, I would think they could equally well construct/acquire torpedoes.

      Since you didn't offer a link to the article, I can't analyze it but it sounds more like one person's pet idea than any kind of official operational thinking.

      I'll offer one more thought on Ukraine's use of drones against naval vessels. While the occasional success makes for good PR/propaganda, it does little or nothing to help the overall war effort. If I were Ukraine, I'd go after cargo ships that supply Russia with war material rather than naval vessels which can't really impact the land war (or, at least, the Russian's are showing no interest in trying to use their ships to impact the land war). This is analogous to Japan striking our battleships at Pear Harbor. It was a big propaganda victory but the smart thing would have been to hit the oil tank farms and dry docks. That would have really hurt us. Frankly, drones against navy ships is an amateur move. Logistics wins wars so they should be hitting the logistics vessels. I just don't have enough detailed information to say for sure but it seems like they're wasting an opportunity.

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    4. Agreed on the logistics but I wonder if it’s because they find it hard to operate in the areas the logistics ships are in.

      On the torpedoes - they have been pretty bad at developing new weapons with more advanced fusing sensors and propulsion, even if that’s easy for the US or another industrial country. A speed boat with no onboard intelligence and just a satellite link is a lot easier. Then contact mines are pretty basic in comparison to a torpedo.

      Here is the link:
      https://archive.li/1cKfo

      Delete
    5. "but I wonder if it’s because they find it hard to operate in the areas the logistics ships are in."

      That's a very insightful question! Ukraine has a limited number of areas they can launch from and those areas may or may not be in range of Russian supply ships.

      If we consider this as a sort of ship (the Russian navy) attacking a fort (Ukraine land mass), the fort has only a few launch/counter-attack points whereas the ship can move anywhere. On the other hand, in order for the Russian ship (navy) to accomplish anything operationally meaningful (like an amphibious assault), they have to move to fairly predictable locations.

      I wish I had more information (or any information!) on Ukraine launch points.

      One of the points that is becoming obvious is that Ukraine, lacking any naval component, cannot move its launch points to the Russian navy. In other words, they can't go hunting. They have to wait for a Russian ship to approach one of their few launch points and, presumably, the Russians would be aware of those points and avoid them. On the other hand, if those points are strategically located, avoiding them may be an operational mission kill against the Russians - assuming they even wanted to conduct any missions near the launch points.

      See how this discussion keeps going back and forth due to the lack of information?

      Regardless, you raised an absolutely key question that impacts all the lessons we're trying to draw. This further illustrates why I keep saying that we have to be cautious in the extreme in trying to draw conclusions. Regrettably, the US govt and military seem to be leaping to conclusions as fast as they can imagine them.

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  5. I think there is one conclusion we can draw, although many folks probably already knew it. That is, we should disabuse ourselves immediately of the notion of a "72 hour war". Unless, of course, WE lose quickly and then give up.

    If China decides to roll the dice and try to conquer Taiwan, I suspect that it's important enough to them, and the consequences of failure are significant enough to them, that Mr. Xi will be at least as stubborn about believing "just a little more escalation and the other side will give up" as Mr. Putin has been.

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    1. "disabuse ourselves immediately of the notion of a "72 hour war".

      Absolutely correct and a frequent theme on this blog. Any war with China will be a very long, very drawn out conflict. Both sides have more than enough internal resources to fight for a very long time.

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  6. "Due to geographical considerations, if nothing else, it is impossible to imagine a Ukraine style drone war being even slightly successful in a China-US war."

    An additional advantage that Ukraine probably has easier access than we would is HUMINT. They have larger number of russian speakers that can blend into the environment. We would have a greater struggle to insert and retrieve information from chinese harbors and facilities. Overhead imagery is useful but having eyeballs on the ground, particularly if they give near realtime data, is priceless.

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  7. I agree that there may not be a lot of useful lessons about tactics that we can learn from the Russia-Ukraine war. However, there may be a few things we can learn.
    First, there is more than one way to achieve your wartime goals. Just because you can't sink all your enemies ships does not mean you can't make them do what you want. Even without a navy Ukraine has forced the Russian Navy to withdraw from occupied Crimea, give up close blockade of the Ukrainian coast and loose most ability to influence the ground war.
    Second, if in the ‘ship fighting a fort’ scenario, fort is winning maybe it tells us that, right now, defence is in the ascendency in warfare and we need to adjust our own plans accordingly.

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    1. "Just because you can't sink all your enemies ships does not mean you can't make them do what you want. "

      An excellent point. Of course, not knowing exactly what Ukraine's strategy is, we can't determine whether they've achieved something significant or not. For example, Russia still controls the sea and shipping, has sea-borne freedom of movement, could (if they wished) launch sea-borne attacks/assaults, and has wiped out the Ukraine navy. So, while Russia has, perhaps, had to make some adjustments in their operations or ship dispositions, it may be that those are minor compared to their overall naval achievements. I'm not actually disagreeing with you, just presenting an alternate interpretation of the same set of facts as a caution before we draw conclusions.

      Which leads me to the next, similar point.

      "defence is in the ascendency in warfare and we need to adjust our own plans accordingly."

      Or, alternatively, Russia has achieved all its naval goals and has now pulled their ships back out of harm's way and it was their offense that was ascendant, not Ukraine's defense. Again, just a caution before we draw conclusions.

      Again, before we conclude that defense is ascendant, let's note that a far more likely and relevant explanation is that Russian ineptitude makes it look like defense is ascendant and, unless we or China plan to be equally inept, we should NOT draw the conclusion that defense is supreme and alter our plans accordingly.

      Yet again, not disagreeing. Just demonstrating why ANY conclusion from this highly unique conflict is fraught with peril and uncertainty.

      All that said, I very much like your line of thought and would encourage you to expand on it. What do you think of the alternate views and do they modify your assessment? Regarding defense, I can think of dozens of ways to neutralize everything Ukraine has done and, indeed, described some of the issues in the post (geography, for example). Perhaps you'd like to give some thought to Russian navy defensive counters and offer some thoughts?

      Good comment. Thought provoking!

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  8. I certainly agree that Russian ineptitude can not be underestimated and that it does make it difficult to find lessons in the current conflict.
    It would appear that Ukraine's Black Sea offensive has a number of objectives. They want to end Russia's naval blockade of Ukraine's ports and to disrupt the resupply of the Russian army in Southern Ukraine. In the short term they want to make the Russian occupation of Crimea untenable. Given that the Russian Navy has reportedly withdrawn from Crimea and that the Ukrainians are finding ways to continue to ship grain through the Black Sea it can be argued that they are achieving many of their goals.
    As in so many aspects of this war it would appear that the Russians are not 'all in'. It is hard to believe that a more determined offence using more of their naval resources could not completely change the situation. But they don't do it! Perhaps it shows us the difference between a war being fought on one side for political reasons, but that is viewed by the opponent as existential, and why we should think twice about getting involved in such a contest.
    I do think that the growth of capability verses cost of all sorts of precision guided munitions could lead to situations favouring the defence. Inevitably the pendulum will swing back but for now it may be that armies, air forces and even navies are going to have to take these factors into account.
    Thanks for the kind words, your blog always gives me something to think about.
    J.G.Murray

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    1. The Russians are going for a long war of attrition,
      Verdun on Dnipro. It takes the Russian a few years to remember how to run a war. No sense risking the Navy, before the final offensive, in say 2025.

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  9. Just curious, assuming Russian Navy was capable and competently lead, what would be some good offensive/defensive actions and how could the Ru Navy influence the war?

    - more missile strikes/different direction forcing UK to cover more ground
    - ground raids/SF strikes from the sea
    - amphibious assaults? not sure the size

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  10. You overlook that under the Montreaux Treaty, Russia is limited in terms of bringing naval reinforcements into the Black Sea. Damaged ships are a pretty big deal...

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    1. Yes, Russia is noted for scrupulously adhering to its treaties.

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    2. In this case, Turkey has been enforcing it fairly strictly whe it comes to Russian ships entering or leaving the Bosphorous.

      Which essentially makes the Ukraine War a "closed" maritime war.

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    3. Russia has invaded multiple countries. Do you really think they'd abide by a treaty if they really wanted additional ships present? That would be like a bank robber obeying stop signs.

      Once you've invaded countries, it pretty much demonstrates that international laws and treaties mean nothing to you.

      Delete
  11. The Gatling gun, invented in 1861, was used OCCASIONALLY in The Civil War. Slaughter (FOLLOW ME! Over the trenches-) in WW1 50 or so years later. Concepts perfected 30 years after that (80 years total elapsed since Gatling) with mass deployment of submachine guns.

    And so it it with drones. We're early. Civil War era in relative terms, I suspect. Introduction phase.

    Drones (MORE/SIMPLER/CHEAPER) are going to beat the snot out of the US paradigm of FEWER/COMPLEX/EXPENSIVE. What did WW2 teach us? Economics rules.

    So I don't agree this 'unique conflict' has nothing to teach us.

    But before I get to that- Pushing the Russian navy away HAS been beneficial. Russian surface ships were not only launching missile attacks (which couldn't be targeted with counter-battery fire) they were also providing radar coverage of overland area(s). Don't know if Russian surface ships are tied in to land-based IADS; but even a lashup via voice comm is better than nothing. Voice is easy, right?

    Regarding geography. Ukraine doesn't compare to China because Ukraine has no navy. More importantly, Ukraine has no commercial maritime component. Did I say 'component'? Why yes. Yes I did-

    Every Chinese freighter every Chinese fishing boat every Chinese ferry is a component of the PLAN(avy). EVERY Chinese surface vessel not only has a radio, but when the time comes, will also have 2 or more drones with a 16KM range and a ChiComm officer who can launch a mission-kill attack on every SPY antenna any Burke is carrying. Oh. Wait. The USA will announce a 100KM exclusionary zone from any and every USN vessel?

    Not in this world.

    Escorts don't count. We have no weapons that can shoot down a $3K drone (CIWS? Show me-). And in the early stages, we don't have the will to even point a shotgun (see San Diego destroyer surrounded by drones; true story).

    Targeting? Even IF Chinese drones aren't carrying RPGs to shoot SPY antennas it's not hard to imagine some fraction of 16KM range being used to extend radar horizon (vertically). Recall our prior discussion regarding tethered-balloons leveraging radar horizon (detection distance).

    Sink ships with drones. Maybe not now- But mission kills are easy. Take out Burke sensor hardware and the hull is done for anti-air. Surface to surface? Maybe. Maybe not. Think I'll just dedicate another dozen to blowing out bridge windows with the second batch flying in to the holes. Then exploding. Let's hit the helo hangar same way. Drop on the VLS covers? Sure. Several dozen drones will explode every aircraft sitting on a carrier flight deck.

    This drone stuff IS earth-shaking. Economically because of bang for the buck. Humanly because... No humans. Perfect kamikazes. Total coverage via (ALL-) commercial platforms subordinated to The State.

    Ukraine may not be the perfect example. But it points the way of future warfare. We better pay attention.

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    1. "So I don't agree this 'unique conflict' has nothing to teach us."

      Who told you this conflict has nothing to teach us? You shouldn't listen to bad advice like that.

      "Russian surface ships were not only launching missile attacks"

      Reports indicate they launched a few. Compared to the vast number of artillery strikes, cruise missiles, aircraft strikes, and drone strikes, the number of ship launched missiles was insignificantly minuscule.

      " providing radar coverage of overland area(s)"

      I don't know that for a fact, at all. Do you have some evidence of that?

      "Don't know if Russian surface ships are tied in to land-based IADS"

      I don't know, either. This would amount to pure speculation on your part and, given the Russian's other means, would actually seem unlikely but that, too, is pure speculation on my part.

      "The USA will announce a 100KM exclusionary zone from any and every USN vessel? Not in this world."

      Of course they will. That's what every belligerent in every war does. It would be operationally and tactically foolish not to do so. You seem to be disagreeing with all of history and military logic.

      "We have no weapons that can shoot down a $3K drone"

      That's simply an incorrect statement. We have Standard missiles, ESSM, RAM/SeaRAM, 5" guns, 57 mm guns, 30 mm guns, CIWS, 20/25 mm guns, early version lasers, EW countermeasures, etc. to name just a few ways.

      "mission kills are easy. Take out Burke sensor hardware"

      You seem to be suggesting that a 16 km drone can approach a warship without either itself or its 'carrier' being seen and destroyed. That's simply make believe. No one is going to allow an enemy (or unidentified) vessel to approach within 16 km during a war. You need to study naval operations of previous wars to understand how naval warfare is conducted.

      "This drone stuff IS earth-shaking."

      Not now or anytime in the reasonable future. Someday, when they're capable of invisibility, infinite range, and massive payloads they'll be a threat but that won't happen in the foreseeable future.

      I've got to be honest, yours was a very low quality comment full of speculation and fantasy. Please improve your quality if you choose to comment again. You might wish to review the Comment Policy page of the blog.

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    2. "Is the future of naval warfare being rewritten as we speak? Or, are false conclusions being drawn and propagated? "

      Your words not mine.

      I submit what little we've seen indicates clearly we are being taught observed lessons-learned. And we ignore same at our peril.

      Everything I've said is arguable and worth considering. I confess I'm more and more steeped in OSINT via X and less so than by what I see on Good Morning America. You can legitimately question my sources (because I do).

      Everything I posted can be backed up; your mention of a viable exclusionary zone is arguable IF you discount hits taken before hostilities formally start- And even so, I question the optics of harpooning 'innocent' ChiComm RO-ROs or fishing boats because, after all, who can prove the drones came from some specific ship?

      The most disconcerting thing of all, however, is you rating my comment as 'low quality.'

      Does that mean you won't testify in my behalf at my Senate confirmation hearing? Because I was counting on that. Still am.

      Unconventional? Yep. Am I what the Navy needs or do we want more of the same? I've done some good work here and backed almost all of it up with numbers. The problem with this particular post is that it's too heavy on doctrine and that leads to politics and that's trouble right here in River City.

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    3. " IF you discount hits taken before hostilities formally start-"

      Of course. The side that starts a war ALWAYS gets one free shot. That's what Pearl Harbor was, as an example.

      "I question the optics of harpooning 'innocent' ChiComm RO-ROs or fishing boats"

      This statement, beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt, proves that you understand nothing about what real war is. A war with China will be an existential war. Optics will be utterly irrelevant.

      Do you know what a war is called where optics are more important than military objectives? It's called a loss (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Desert Storm termination, ISIS, GWOT, etc.).

      Seriously, have you read any military history, whatsoever? During the Doolittle raid of WWII, we sank Japanese fishing boats rather than run the risk, however slight, that they might communicate our presence. Our submarines sand EVERY Japanese vessel they could find. THAT'S how you starve an enemy of food and resources. During WWII land combat, we routinely destroyed homes, shops, churches, etc. if necessary to accomplish the objective. Optics be damned! You desperately need to study what real war is. It would appear that you've grown up on the silly little partial conflicts that we've engaged in where optics and avoidance of collateral damage ARE more important than military objectives and you've come to believe that's what war is. Nothing could be further from the truth.

      "Unconventional?"

      There's a difference between unconventional and ... hmm ... what word do I use? Let's be mild and say, foolish.

      "that leads to politics"

      There's not the slightest hint of politics in this post. I note only the military aspects of each side. This again demonstrates that you're not grasping what you're reading.

      "The most disconcerting thing of all, however, is you rating my comment as 'low quality.'"

      This comment didn't raise my opinion.

      Delete
    4. My impression is that you and I struggle (viewpoints; perspective) because you don't understand my knowledge of history, and the military, is equal to your own IMHO. I can be as condescending as you so THERE. Rather than urging you to take caution in your tone... Incoming.

      1. 'one free shot' doesn't count. Despite irreplaceable lives and platforms. You don't acknowledge every single PLAN surface platform has a potential offensive capability. There, demonstrated, doctrine. Drones are a multiplier. It's only going to get worse and Ukraine is the first peek.

      2. 'do you know what a war is called where optics are more important than military objectives?' I do know. Cronkite/Tet, 100s, 1,000s of people in the streets on campuses. US and EU; and therefore Western Civ which is my abiding concern and priority. Biden Admin/DNC worried about Michigan voters.

      3. Doolittle 80+ years back? Red coats provide excellent deconfliction, right? Same rules today given lack of political/military will? Don't think so.

      4. Foolish? Moi? Alternatively you're very conventional and want more of the same with tweaks. More armor (agree), platforms dedicated to purpose (totally agree; no more one size fits all and in THIS you're radical and I love it), BUSHIPS (given 3-year military rotations this has to be a necessarily civilian org; I'm not happy with how the FBI has turned out (against-)). Mines not workable for Taiwan; I documented 60-mile standoff range). There are others.

      Which is not to say I'm right and you're wrong. But I was thinking you wanted a discussion. I've brought up alternatives which are relatively well-researched. And perhaps worthy of discussion. But I acknowledge it's your forum and therefore your rules. You are intellectually consistent. Conventional. But consistent. Told you I could be condescending.

      Nonetheless. Your NEXT post regarding AEGIS is scholarly and has given me much to ponder. Great work. Not something I would have come up with on my own and so I congratulate you, sir.

      Scope's under.

      For a bit.

      Delete

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