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Sunday, November 26, 2023

Industry Design

The recent book review post about Electronic Greyhounds noted that the Spruance class was the first ship designed wholly by industry instead of the Navy/BuShips.[1]  This was a radical departure from previous practice and has since become the Navy’s standard practice for ship design.  The subsequent evidence would seem to demonstrate that this is a very bad practice.
 
In theory, there are some potential benefits to an industry-design approach.  The primary advantage would be that industry might have a greater concentration of expertise.  Of course, until it was eliminated, BuShips had a concentration of expertise.  Expertise is simply a matter of ‘doing it’ on a regular basis.  There is no reason to believe that an in-house Navy design group would not be every bit as capable as industry and, indeed, BuShips proved that for decades.  In fact, since every ship would pass through the in-house group, they would accumulate more experience and expertise than industry which would only get to work on an occasional Navy project.  In fact, this ‘occasionality’ manifested itself in the LCS designs which saw not one but (if you can believe it!) two companies design and build warships despite never having done so previously.  Not exactly a concentration of expertise, was it?
 
On the flip side, a highly likely potential drawback is that there is no guarantee that industry will produce a good design (hi, again, LCS!), leaving the Navy to choose between a bad design or cancellation of the project which, given the budget implications, is assuredly never going to happen.  The Navy would much rather [irresponsibly] accept a bad design than risk losing budget money as would happen if the project were terminated.
 
There is also no guarantee that the design will be useful.  Admittedly, this is a shared responsibility between industry and the Navy with, perhaps, the bulk of the blame lying with the Navy which refuses to develop viable CONOPS prior to design in order to ensure usefulness.
 
In addition to risking a poor industry ship design, the loss of in-house expertise has resulted in the loss of institutional knowledge within the Navy about what makes a good ship.  This has resulted in NavSea having no ability to recognize flaws in a design, despite being tasked with exactly that responsibility.  Blindingly simple and obvious examples include the failure to provide cathodic corrosion protection (known and understood since the age of sail) and the omission of bridge wings (standard since … well … forever) in the LCS.  Slightly more advanced failures include inadequate stability and weight growth margins.  The Navy no longer possesses the ability to even recognize a good or bad ship design.
 
 
Examples
 
Let’s briefly consider a few examples of industry designs.
 
LCS.  The sheer number and severity of the changes made to both LCS variants attests to the lack of design expertise resident in both the Navy and the manufacturer.[2]
 
Ford.  The Ford catapult, arresting gear, elevators, weapons, toilets, dual band radar, etc. should never have gotten past the napkin stage of design.
 
Montford Point.  The Mobile Landing Platform is an example of a [apparently] technically decent design that is utterly useless with the ships having already been retired for all practical purposes.
 
Zumwalt.  The Zumwalt is a poor design (seakeeping, electrical system, hull design, non-existent close in weapons, etc.) which is also useless (no main weapon and no viable mission).
 
Burke.  The Early Burkes were barely adequate designs (insufficient close in weapons, no hangar, weak structure, etc.) that were improved somewhat in the Flt IIa and are now sub-par with the Flt III (inadequate margins, stability/weight challenges, sub-optimal radar, etc.).
 
Since some of you are already pounding out replies trying to put all the blame on poor Navy requirements, let me repeat, the poor designs are a shared failing and, depending on the specific case, the fault may lie more with the Navy than industry.
 
 
Spruance
 
In contrast to the preceding designs, the Spruance, as it turned out, was an outstanding design but there was no guarantee that would be the case.  It could just have easily been a poor design and the Navy would have had little choice but to accept it, having ceded all responsibility to the manufacturer.  The Navy gambled and got lucky.  However, depending on luck is not the way to design ships.  Unfortunately, the Spruance was the last good industry design and the Navy has had to accept a string of poor designs ever since. 
 
 
Conclusion
 
History and logic clearly demonstrate that ceding ship design responsibility to industry is a poor practice.  While the possibility of producing a good design exists, the long line of failures makes it clear that the odds of success are very poor.  To be fair, the Navy does everything they can to ensure a poor outcome with constant design changes, idiotic and conflicting requirements, absence of CONOPS, and utter lack of expertise with which to spot and correct problems at the design stage.  To be additionally fair, industry is responsible for basic failures such as inadequate structural strength, overly complex machinery (does anyone know how to design a functional combining gear????), unrepairable machinery (EMALS, for example), missing cathodic protection, stability issues, inadequate margins and allowances, incorrectly calculated weights and metacentric heights, toilets that don’t work, poorly located sensors, rampant stress cracks, and so on.
 
As we discussed, the inability of industry to produce a good design is just half the problem with industry being tasked with design.  The other half is the loss of the Navy’s in-house expertise to the point that they can no longer even spot a flaw in a design.  By ceding design responsibility, the Navy has rendered themselves deaf, dumb, and blind regarding designs.  The Navy has created a fatal dependency (addiction) on industry and are now trapped into accepting whatever garbage industry pukes out.
 
Finally, let me once again repeat, the Navy contributes heavily to poor designs with their idiotic requirements and constant change orders.
 
We absolutely must reconstitute BuShips and return ship design expertise to the Navy.  We cannot afford to keep producing failure after failure.  The Navy has become so gun shy about new ship designs that they would rather continue building obsolete Burkes and Constellation mini-Burkes than risk a new design.
 
Bring back BuShips!
 
 
 
______________________________
 
[1]Capt. Michael C. Potter, USNR, Electronic Greyhounds, The Spruance-Class Destroyers, Naval Institute Press, 1995, ISBN 1-55750-682-5
 
[2]Military.com website, “Navy Engineers LCS Changes”, 27-Jun-2014,
https://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2014/06/27/navy-engineers-lcs-changes

36 comments:

  1. Yes, bring back Buships.
    I'd also say we need to speed up the process of getting to the next iteration as we can see where a breed of ships is going. Not so much the bad design choices of LCS, but just being on top of primarily commercial production changes/improvements. I'd use EPF as the example. I think they are finally going to use a more modern hull form with better sea keeping for the 3 Emergency Medical Ships.

    I'd also disagree on Montford Point. We just moved away from seabasing as a concept and won't be unloading an LMSR to an LCAC. The ships is already good as the sea base and those 2 hulls will be seen in a revised form down the road.

    I'd also disagree on Zumwalt. It has only come up short on the NGFS role forced upon it along with the dead end radar and combat system. That makes a bad program. The ship is solid.

    Ford will also prove to be solid, but yes, much more was needed on shore up front.

    Burke started without the helo hangar with purpose. The Hangar got added when it became apparent the ship wasn't always going to in a large battle group with plenty of other assets with hangars.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. "The ship is solid."

      The ship has a host of poor design issues. For starters, you might read this post:"Zumwalt Status Update"

      Zumwalt has sea keeping issues with the Navy having issued sailing restrictions related to certain speeds and quartering seas. This was demonstrated in basin tests and proved out in actual trials.

      You may recall that the Zumwalt suffered serious electrical failures during trials. The ship was designed EXACTLY to prevent and deal with electrical problems and yet not only had a failure but was unable to continue trial tests due to the severity.

      "I'd also disagree on Montford Point. "

      What is it you'd disagree with? Here's what I said:

      "... technically decent design that is utterly useless with the ships having already been retired for all practical purposes."

      What part of that do you disagree with especially given that it's a simple statement of fact?

      "Ford will also prove to be solid"

      Only you and the Navy believe that one! Ford is so far away from the EMALS and AAG reliability requirements that no one believes they can be achieved. EMALS is a damage control nightmare (shut down all cats to repair one!) and an emissions beacon. And the list of problems goes on and on.

      Delete

  2. Let me offer two relevant examples outside the military:
    1) Public transit infrastructure costs 5-10x in the US than in continental Europe or Asia. A major driver is the outsourcing of civil servant technical expertise to consultants.
    2) While most of the manufacturing in the Apollo program was contracted out, NASA had significant in-house technical expertise overseeing the contracts. That expertise atrophied in the post-Apollo budget. The present-day NASA has had no in-house launcher or spacecraft development experience for decades and is unable to effectively manage their development contracts.

    #1 is interesting because the US hasn't accepted the fact that we have been a rail backwater since the 1930s, and that the first step is to imitate the rest of the world. No heads roll after one procurement failure after another and nothing changes. Similarly, the US Navy as an institution hasn't been able to swallow its pride and look externally to imitate lesser navies that have more effective shipbuilding programs.

    #2 is interesting because despite ongoing failures like SLS, the opening of commercial space in the 2010s created a totally new NASA procurement relationship that is vastly more effective. This wasn't just SpaceX, it involved decades of advocacy, commercial failures, and dead ends.

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  3. #ComNavOps
    What should be the ideal life-span in years of the ship categories that you mentioned in Fleet Structure
    1) Supercarrier
    2) Small Carrier
    3) Battleship
    4) Independent Cruiser
    5) AAW Escort
    6) Destroyer
    7) Destroyer (ASW) Escort
    8) ASW Corvette
    9) UAV Carrier
    10) ASW Carrier
    11) Large Deck Amphibious
    12) Assault Support Ship
    13) Attack Transport
    14) Attack Submarine
    15) Ballistic Missile Sub
    16) Guided Missile Sub

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Eg: a Destroyer should be relevant for 20 years, SuperCarrier for around 40 years, etc

      Delete
  4. #ComNavOps have posted 1 comment and a reply to my comment however, I am unable to see my comment

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I trust you can see it now. Some small percentage of reader comments sometimes go to the site's spam folder, for reasons unknown. I check the folder several times a day and reroute the errant comments as I find them. Unfortunately, this can result in a delay of some hours before I find them and they appear. Have patience and rest assured that they will, eventually, appear!

      I have been unable to find any reason for this or any viable corrective action on either the reader's part or myself. Still, I apologize and will continue to check the spam folder frequently.

      Delete
    2. Oh no problem, Thanks for a quick reply
      please reply to my above question
      "What should be the ideal life-span in years of the ship categories that you mentioned in Fleet Structure"

      Delete
  5. I mostly agree with this. The really high productivity commercial yards design the details of the ship but the expertise and involvement from the customer is extensive. Instead of paperwork they functionally test almost everything before it goes to block assembly and the customers plus the class society witness every test. Often this means traveling to different vendors at offsite locations, etc. And as you point out if you wait until the end to find problems then its a real problem. And you've previously pointed out the Navy doesn't take pre-assembly testing seriously at all.

    The commercial yards don't build ships until the design is finished, unlike what we see with Navy ships because they are operating on fixed price contracts and there are enough yards that the shipping companies can switch if the yard tries to pull something.

    Then there are also many design phases and the customer is extremely involved in the portion that is equivalent to the ships CONOPS and agreeing on standards/schedule. The are only involved in the detailed portions like how individual pieces of steel are going to be cut in how they ensure its being done as agreed.

    So it can work if the Navy gets involved early. And they absolutely need to rebuild something like Buships level expertise manage the proper testing.

    So we've established that the best commercial yards build ships very close to the way you advocate. It'd be great if we could also do that in the US, but the issue is most of the yards basically have the US government as their main customer. And they can lobby the Navy's bosses if contracts go south. If the government cuts them off then they just go broke instead of taking a small hit, reforming, and finding new customers. That can kill any expertise they might gain.

    Your proposal of the Navy designing the ship down to the last bolt is more conservative in the sense that the design may not be built for ease of manufacturing or towards a certain yard but it should eliminate the worst defects over time. Industry doing detailed design has a higher ceiling but the US government often being a sole customer complicates how that works vs. big commercial yards. The Navy can't currently take advantage of any benefits this method might offer until they add in house expertise, simplify the ship designs, and increase purchase cadence. You could argue that forcing the Navy to design the ships completely would provide more a forcing function for change.

    The direction (more expertise, simpler designs, more testing) is clear but the hard part seems to be convincing the Navy to take the first steps.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. "they can lobby the Navy's bosses if contracts go south"

      To expand on your thoughts ... one of the primary culprits is the complete absence of responsibility, accountability, or consequences for BOTH the Navy and the shipyard. When things go wrong, all parties simply smile and shovel more money to the shipyard.

      The Navy needs to return to absolute fixed price contracts. Of course, this also means that the Navy has to 100% enforce set and unchanging requirements PRIOR to contract award and during construction. Give the manufacturer absolute, unchanging specifications and they'll get the price right. All parties benefit.

      Currently, there is a perverse incentive for the shipyard to deliver a flawed product since they then get to double charge the Navy to fix the flaws! In no other industry would this be acceptable.

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    2. Agree 100%.

      Delete
  6. There's really no way of knowing but I'm sure some of the issue is US civilian ships construction isn't doing great and the military contractors only work on Navy ships, there's little to no cross over....wonder if the Chinese, Japanese and South Koreans Navy ships are better because they have stronger civilian ship builders?!?

    Im guessing having a bigger base of qualified ship workers should benefit their military construction. If nothing else, their worker pool is bigger, probably younger and have more experience overall?

    Just my 2 cents.....

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    1. I wonder how the Chinese are managing the 052 and 055 programs? I'm guessing its centralized design but don't really know. Regardless the rapid iterative progression of the 052s looks pretty good, and I'm guessing the 055s will go the same way.

      Even the carrier program makes a lot of sense for a Navy that has no institutional experience operating carriers.

      The Chinese appear to be doing a lot of things right that we are getting wrong. Having a huge shipbuilding industry (both military and civilian) is undoubtedly helping.

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    2. Just thought about another big advantage is in war, just think about the capacity for repairs that they will have at their disposal....all the extra welders, techs, extra yards and piers, dry docks, etcetera

      Delete
  7. Yes bring the design exp[ertise back in house. HOWEVER, make them talk to the builders before they lock inthe design. Engineers seldom know what it takes to build or make a part and when the builder says can I do it this way? It will save us a bunch of labor, material, etc. Then have the USERS look at the design and bless it for their use. This triumverate approach is what gets you a great affordable, effective and useful ship.

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  8. One question is how many engineers from BuShips did industry hire away to make the Spruance? My guess is a lot, as by that time you had many a former BuShips man looking for a better pay but with enough time in service to get a gov't and a corporate retirement.

    If you agree with that supposition may be correct, let's now flip it for a new BuShips. The good engineers will already be in the corporate pipeline for good pay and retirement benefits...will they really switch to a gov't job. Let's be honest here, the quality of gov employees has dropped and the number of middle level bureaucrats tripled, so how will we guarentee a well run BuShips? Moreover, what is to stop Congress from instituting a BuShips then contracting that out?

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    Replies
    1. BuShips was eliminated in 1966, before the Spruance was designed.

      Delete
  9. Bring back BUSHIPS? In what form? Do you (all?) imagine BUSHIPS in 2030 is staffed by uniformed personnel? That can't work given we rotate our military people every 3 years or so.

    If you spend the first 14 months learning your job you're 60% effective overall before you move to next PCS. You think Apple or Oracle tolerate 60% effectiveness? Use whatever numbers you want; it's clear BUSHIPS needs to be staffed with career civil service (engineers) who have longevity and remember lessons-learned.

    Staffing is broken.

    Institutional knowledge, what there is of it, now resides entirely with the vendors. Who work with US Gov who fundamentally hates them because of all-encompassing distrust of profit motive.

    Know what else is broken? Process. Elon (PBUH) notes regulations NEVER get reviewed. Much less rolled back. Defense Industry is crippled by regulation and procurement processes. And buyers who hate the industry. USGov hates its suppliers.

    Separately, but not necessarily entirely- NASA can't build a rocket. Which sucks, but what's worse is that Boeing/Lockheed can't either. Financialization collapsed defense industries (and every other industry; this happens everywhere) to the Big 4: Boeing, Lockheed, Northrop and British Aerospace. Others are arguable and I'm open to enlarging the club.

    But.

    Are we better off without North American and Vault? Grumman? Ling-Temco? Maybe. Maybe not. What I know is I don't like what I'm seeing now.

    Fixed price contracts? OK, I suppose, in a mature industry- But if that's the case you remove risk-taking which could enable future leverage. Why bother exploring tanks because we understand perfectly well costs associated with horse cavalry. To the nth degree.

    Two of my favorite movie scenes are Howard Hughes taking on the Senate in 'The Aviator' and Tony Stark doing likewise in 'Iron Man 2'. EMALS and AAG on Ford are the future. They'll get there. Teething pains suck. But iterative improvement is how everything works.

    Everything.

    Experimentation requires a certain amount of tolerance for failure. Want to paralyze any organization? Make it zero-defect. I saw it in high-school soccer and, finally, understood it in the USN.

    Guys. We have cultural problems.

    We're doomed.

    But until then, light a single candle in the dark.

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    1. "you remove risk-taking"

      No. You fail to grasp the distinction between production and prototyping. Production requires fixed price contracts. Prototypes can be essentially T&M or any other contractual arrangement that satisfies both parties.

      "can't work given we rotate our military people every 3 years or so."

      Gee, if only there were a way to not rotate people. You know, by simply saying we're not going to rotate people. It's not as if it's an immutable law of physics. We had BuShips before. There's no reason we couldn't again.

      This would be akin to the British system whereby engineering and command split at an early point in careers and you stick with one or the other. Those who would be engineers and design ships STAY in that group. Simple. I also have no objection to hiring civilian contract engineers if that would help (especially early on).

      You're treating this as if it's impossible despite the fact that we actually did it for decades and quite successfully, too!

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    2. "remove risk-taking"

      Ironically, you're arguing that we must embrace risk-taking while simultaneously arguing that we can't even consider taking the "risk" of re-establishing BuShips and must, instead, keep hold of the status quo! I got a chuckle out of that.

      Delete
    3. You fail to grasp the semi-non-correlation relationship between prototyping and production. TODAYS Wall Street Journal has a article about the difficulties TESLA will have putting their truck in to production. Building the proof of concept first (show) vehicle is one thing. Building multiple thousands at scale is proving problematic.

      "Chief Executive Elon Musk warned on an earnings call in October that Tesla would have “enormous challenges” both in increasing factory output of the Cybertruck and making money on it, saying the new technology involved would make building it more difficult. He didn’t elaborate on what specifically is creating problems.

      “We dug our own grave with Cybertruck,” Musk said at the time. Tesla didn’t respond to requests for comment for this article. "

      I confess I don't know what BUSHIPS looked like in WW2. I don't understand, however, you're going to tell any Ensign or PO4 they'll work at BUSHIPS for 5 or 6 years; wherever BUSHIPS is located. And tell them there's a career track vs. men and women who have spent years separated from their families while at-sea. The world has changed. Brit model notwithstanding. Because they're Brits. Subjects. And all that.

      Regarding risk-taking. My example of NASA stands. What does NASA do? 87%+ of their time is spent managing Elon and some small fraction is unmanned exploration. Which of those two fractions is moving us forward? Unmanned is what's good. And I'm not sure how much of that NASA drives other than funding.

      Let us compare Zumwalt/LCS/Ford with any other service. USAF? Are they doing anything well? B-21 and F-15EX look good. F-35 looks like it might be getting its act together via incremental improvement a la M-16 (this is the way everything works). My point is USAF hasn't had any major program failures over the last 25 years I can see (F-35 can't be scored YET). I also acknowledge F-15EX is/was unsolicited. Boeing pulled that one out of their ass. And it's a good idea/platform.

      What is USAF doing right? What is USN doing wrong?

      And finally. I think you and ALL OF US GOV

      Delete
    4. is stuck in a WW2 mindset. Arsenal of democracy and all that.

      We'll just convert GM/Ford/Chrysler plants in to building F-18s. Those days are gone.

      And so is waterfront property you can use for shipyards.

      Times have changed. No going back. Even if it's existential. Don't have the money, means, workforce or culture.

      Delete
    5. "I also acknowledge F-15EX is/was unsolicited. Boeing pulled that one out of their ass. And it's a good idea/platform."

      F-15EX was essentially paid for by all the foreign customers wanting Advanced Strike Eagles who ponied up the money for further development - it's essentially an American F-15SA with USAF-specific EW and avionics, which is a Saudi F-15QA, which is a Qatari Advanced Strike Eagle. It's a mature product that's an offshoot of an ongoing production, with very minimal modifications (namely EPAWSS). It genuinely does make sense as a low risk program for an interim CONUS air defense interceptor, given the F-15C is averaging 40 years old and has literally had wings fall off planes while in flight. I still think Guardian Eagle or Noble Eagle would have been better names than Eagle II, given this is going to Guard squadrons tasked to Operation Noble Eagle.

      Delete
    6. "tell any Ensign or PO4 they'll work at BUSHIPS for 5 or 6 years; wherever BUSHIPS is located. "

      BuShips would be a destination, an end result, a culmination of a career, just as working at a HII or Lockheed is. You enter as a new worker and spend your career working up the ladder to top engineering positions. Same as industry. I'm not sure what part of making a career out of BuShips you don't grasp.

      BuShips would not be an assignment handed out randomly to new recruits. It would be a career path that would be consciously selected by the person at the start of their career. Just as a doctor or lawyer or bricklayer or whoever chooses a career path at the start of their career. Some small percentage will eventually opt to change careers just as happens in any field but the majority will stay and work at BuShips for a career. It's a choice, not a random assignment. Surely, you grasp how career paths work?

      You still seem not to grasp the difference between prototypes and production. All I can say is, do some research if you're still confused. You might also want to read this post: "USS Albacore and Submarine Development" which describes the Navy's use of prototypes to develop the modern submarine BEFORE they went into production.

      Delete
    7. "Boeing pulled that one out of their ass. "

      I don't follow AF matters that closely but I would point out that manufacturers building their own prototype aircraft is a long standing tradition which has only been abandoned in more modern times.

      Delete
    8. "I don't follow AF matters that closely but I would point out that manufacturers building their own prototype aircraft is a long standing tradition which has only been abandoned in more modern times."

      The F-15EX success is down to it being a mature product that's a minor variant of an in-progress production line. To simplify the last 20 years: Boeing has been building Strike Eagles for foreign customers, which each variant being progressively improved over the previous variant. The Qataris then approached Boeing for an advanced Strike Eagle, which would be a refresh of the design and its systems, bringing it as close as possible to the F-35s capabilities (as the Qataris were denied purchase of the F-35). The Saudis, with an aging F-15C fleet of their own, looked at the Qatari F-15QA program and liked what they saw, so they also poured in their money to bankroll the development.

      Around this time, the Air Force began looking for an interim CONUS air defense interceptor to replace the F-15C fleet, as Next Generation Air Dominance, the F-22 sucessor, is still at least 10-15 years away from IOC. With the F-15QA and F-15SA in production and being delivered to the Qataris and Saudis, Boeing sees an opportunity and makes the reasonable offer to the Air Force that they have an open line for Advanced Strike Eagles, so they could fulfill this option. The Air Force is already aware of the progress of the F-15QA and F-15SA programs, and thinks that this is a swell idea. And so, here we are.

      Ironically the F-15EX costs more than an F-35A, but that's the economies of scale issue of an airframe ordered in the thousands vs an order of 100 plus. I expect it likely that F-15EX procurement may rise if the Air Force decides to use it as an interim replacement for the Strike Eagle - the oldest Strike Eagle is 36 years old, the youngest is 19 years old.

      Delete
    9. To clarify, I mean success in the sense of a quick and speedy procurement program - because all the R&D had been performed and paid for by foreign customers, and the American-specific variant has minimal changes to the systems (versus Constellation, which is almost a complete redesign of the FREMM design).

      Delete
  10. Did I say 'finally'? No way, man, I'm on a roll.

    Let me pull back to your original premise as I understand it. The Navy needs centralized expertise. I'm ok with that UNTIL you mention DESIGN. The Navy can't get in to design work because they have no expertise AND they couldn't staff any such organization even if they wanted to.

    USN can't design shit. They're not current on what's possible. Can't pay for the talent.

    What USN should concentrate on is REQUIREMENTS. What do you want the platform to do? Let Litton take it from there. I'm advocating the Navy concentrate all its efforts on requirements. Concept of Naval Operations being primo. Function dictates form. Leave form to industry. Keep your requirements FROZEN between 'Flights' and that way you optimize cost.

    Yep. Navy needs expertise to review Litton design and say, "You don't have a redundant fire main. Single point of failure on catapults. Fix your design."

    Navy focus on REQUIREMENTS. Not DESIGN. Name me an effective design bureau run by the government. Done at scale sounds like... McNamara whiz-kids?

    I eagerly await your endorsement.

    ReplyDelete
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    1. "The Navy can't get in to design work because they have no expertise AND they couldn't staff any such organization even if they wanted to."

      I flat out stated that they've lost their in-house expertise. HOWEVER, it is child's play to recover it. You simply recruited trained people. It would take many years to assemble the required extent of expertise but it's an easy process. It's just a hiring exercise. Did someone suggest this would be an instantaneous solution? No, they didn't. You're the only one even hinting at that.

      As stated in the post and throughout the blog, of course the Navy needs to get better at defining requirements (starting with viable CONOPS). That, however, is a separate issue from BuShips.

      We had BuShips. Why you think it's impossible to re-establish it is beyond me.

      Delete
    2. Perhaps a good starting point towards a new BuShips would be engineering majors in college ROTC (new brain trust) paired with senior enlisted rates and officers of all shipboard systems (expertise and experience) as well as off the shelf civilian engineer types. (Shipyards, marine trades). Although a department within the Navy, it might need some strong oversight from congress to keep it from being ingrained with the corruption we see today. (good luck with that).

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    3. I would add that any new candidates for this department should have to have some time at sea, just as practical experience to see how things really work. (Theory vs. Fact).

      Delete
  11. Couldn’t agree more with you on bringing back BuShips. I would only add that reconvening the Navy’s General Board to generate Conops & design requirements is needed also.

    Of course that would require competent senior admirals that aren’t eager to start suckling on the defense industry teet; so it may be a moot point!

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  12. Naval ships designers need thorough understanding:

    Mission of ship designed
    Engineering means to achieve above goals
    Capability of manufacturers

    You cannot have heaps of wishful thinking but low engineering competency plus very poor manufacturing capability.

    LCS and DDG-1000 were started with wrong mission statements derived from Bush Jr. Era wrong strategy - US would not face a competent navy but only insurgent regional powers.

    Second, the nation's engineering competency has been dropping even today. Less and less bright high school graduates choose STEM. Military industry needs to buy parts from big civilian pools.

    Manufacturing capability is another problem. Just take a civilian industry example -- these days, Intel lost CPU leadership to AMD because AMD use TSMC which can provide more advanced manufacturing technology than American owned Intel. Intel can design but cannot manufacture.

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    1. Yup. Big problems with low STEM enrollment, plus the disaster in skilled trades training. I am not a fan of a centrally managed economy, but the direction the west is heading is a recipe for economic collapse.

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  13. I think the secret to the success of the SPRUANCE class is that, as built, there was plenty of empty space. Room for EW equipment, NATO Seasparrow, HARPOON, ASW tail, and a helo traversing winch room. All added after construction. With the margin to go with it. There was room to remove the ASROC launcher and replace it with VLS. The forward 5’54 gun could have been replaced with the 8” MCLWG. There were engineering issues, most solved, but some like the waste heat boilers were chronic.

    ReplyDelete

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