Focusing on the equipment side of things as opposed to
policy debacles such as minimal manning, here are the worst modern naval
developments. I’m defining ‘worst’ as
something that initiates a harmful trend and whose negative impact is felt
across decades and multiple ship classes.
Thus, the LCS, for example, does not qualify. It was an unmitigated disaster but it did not
propagate across time and classes.
All of these will be surprising to the reader and most will
be controversial. Nonetheless, they are
true.
Mk32 Triple Torpedo Launcher – deprived surface ships of
heavy torpedo, ship-killing capability and ended any effort towards a ship launched heavy
torpedo
Aegis – ushered in the era of electronic systems that are
too complex to be maintainable and, almost by definition, are perpetually
degraded
Spruance – initiated the practice of industry design of
ships and resulted in the elimination of in-house ship design expertise in the
Navy
Surface Ship Nuclear Power – offers no overall tactical or
operational benefits, imposes a severe battle damage risk, and initiated (or
significantly contributed to) the spiraling runaway costs of ship construction
VLS – significantly reduced ship’s ability to stay in a
fight due to the extreme risk of clustering all weapons in one or two tightly
packed, unarmored locations
Burke Class – has frozen naval surface ship development and
instituted a decades long slide into obsolescence (see, “Burke – The Anchor Around the Navy’s Neck”); impact includes the Constellation class which
was obsolete from the moment it was conceived as an attempt to produce a safe mini-Burke
GPS – ushered in a culture of technology dependency which
has cost lives, caused collisions and groundings, rendered a generation of
weapons suspect, and neutered the basic seamanship skills of the Navy
Your point is solid, but they are all symptoms of a system no longer able to adapt either quickly or slowly. This is one are where we could actually pick a point in time to rewind back to and restart with a system that worked. Some symptoms precede the date, but I sort of picked 1975 as the year a long time ago. Nimitz, Tarawa, Spruance all joined the fleet. Los Angeles class slots right about there. Vietnam ended and we were drawing down while this was happening.
ReplyDeleteI contemplated including the Nimitz in the list. The Nimitz initiated the era of runaway carrier construction costs. As I've documented, the Nimitz class costs increased well above the rate of inflation while offering no significant improvement in carrier combat capability over the preceding carrier classes.
Delete
ReplyDelete> Thus, the LCS, for example, does not qualify. It was an unmitigated disaster but it did not propagate across time and classes.
It definitely propagates across time by virtue of being a huge opportunity cost. All the time and money that was (and continues to be) sunk into it and the Zumwalt are where the blame lies that you're attributing to the Burke class.
Cause and effect.
The cause wasn't the Burke class being so great that the Navy just stopped any new development. The Burke being the obsolete foundation for everything that came after is a direct effect of the LCS and Zumwalt programs (which were subsequent development efforts to the Burke) being such dumpster fires. That's the true cause
Is there ANY Navy program/policy that you do like??
ReplyDeleteI'm hard pressed to think of any. Given the documented problems, is there any you like?
Delete1. It is funny now that everyone wants the suicide drones and is realizing that they'll be more effective if they travel underwater. It is just another version of a torpedo. Similar how many flying drones are just cheaper cruise missiles and we'd probably be better off making cheaper cruise missiles than these drones. But they will evolve to the same place, regardless.
ReplyDelete2. I agree heavily with AEGIS and probably more systems should be like the Phalanx where it takes advantage of what computers can do but is distributed across the ship rather than centralized.
3. In what detail do you think the Navy should be designing ships? I agree that the Navy absolutely needs more expertise and involvement in all stages of ship building. But the experience from modern ship building is pretty clear that the detailed design like exact assembly steps, piping layout, or cuts of steel needs to be done by the yard because each yard has its own nuances that can make a huge difference in the optimal design/construction schedule.
Good list!
"In what detail do you think the Navy should be designing ships?"
DeleteSimply put ... extensive detail.
Conceptual design should be 100% Navy and should include completed CONOPS, Analysis of Alternatives, and detailed conceptual design (meaning, layout, equipment lists, specifications, etc.).
Construction design should be 100% Navy (the old BuShips) with consulting input from industry, if occasionally needed. This should include the production of construction blueprints so that they can be handed to ANY shipyard for production (no shipyard -specific tweaks or nuances). It is the task of the yard to manufacture to the blueprint not the blueprint to adapt to the yard. The dog wags the tail not the tail wags the dog. We've been doing this backward for so long that we now think it's right! Your comment confirms that you've fallen prey to this incorrect belief:
"pretty clear that the detailed design like exact assembly steps, piping layout, or cuts of steel needs to be done by the yard"
The yard builds to the blueprint. The blueprint doesn't build to the yard.
Note that the blueprint says WHAT to build, not HOW to build it. The blueprint doesn't care HOW as long as the product exactly matches the blueprint. If one yard wants to use a supercrane to move a section and another yard wants to use a thousand workers to lift and move the section, the blueprint doesn't care as long as the final product exactly matches the blueprint. In reality, two yards, working from identical blueprints will almost assuredly wind up using identical methods. There's pretty much only one best way to build something, however, that's up to the individual yards. What we don't do is modify a blueprint to accommodate a yard. It's the yard who accommodates us, the paying customer.
I'm willing to entertain that in the world of military procurement this might end up being better. But to my understanding this is not how any of the yards work in Japan and Korea that crank out ships (including a few Aegis destroyers) at very low cost. They do a lot of detailed design in house and they couldn't organize their production schedule between all the ships otherwise.
Delete"Japan and Korea"
DeleteI have no knowledge of the processes those countries use. I strongly suspect that neither do you. I don't say that in a mean way just a statement of fact. If you do understand their process, I'd love to hear a description of it along with the political, legal, govt subsidies, labor laws, and everything else that goes into it in order to understand the process. I'd also love to hear how it works for them. We hear about the problems because we have a very open society. We know how bad the LCS, Zumwalt, and Ford turned out because we read authoritative reports (DOT&E, for example). Japan and Korea have no such open source reports that I'm aware of. They could, and likely do, have their own sets of severe problems but we just don't hear about them. Think about it ... if we didn't have open source reports and heard only the Navy's PR claims, we'd think our process was working flawlessly and producing the finest ships the world has ever seen!
I’ve been working on a shipbuilding post for several months. So I’ll have that eventually. It is slow going because of the amount of sources and books I’ve had to read for it.
DeleteSounds like a book rather than a post! Good luck!
Delete"There's pretty much only one best way to build something"
ReplyDeleteDuring WW2, much of the manufacturing sequence was figured out as they went.
When Manitowoc Shipbuilding started building Gato class subs (which was completely new to them), they built a wooden mock up of the boat so that electricians and steamfitters and the like could take a look and derive a sequence and get pipes bent correctly, etc.
That eliminated a lot of ripping stuff out and reworking because pieces couldn't be installed with another piece in the way.
With CAD types of programs, I would think that they could provide a ready-to-go sequence as part of the blueprints.
Lutefisk
For the last few decades, every new construction program has claimed to utilize various CAD and virtual software to revolutionize construction thereby substantially lowering costs and eliminating construction problems. The realilty, however, is that every program has suffered huge cost overruns, schedule slippages, and enormous numbers of construction problems. Grandiose promises ... abject failures. To be fair, not all of the problems can be directly attributed to software issues but the fact remains that the claimed benefits have yet to materialize.
DeleteHaving a little experience on CAD and talking to people in the industry, there's a lot of blame put on software but really, it's the people!
DeleteToo many now really aren't very good at the whole designing thing compared to the older generation that learned on the drafting table and trust the software to find the mistakes, not enough experience cutting metal (very important!) and last but not least, too many damn requirement changes asked by the military!
I wonder if they are assuming all of those efficiencies (and then some) and build that into the quote?
ReplyDeleteWhen those efficiencies don't materialize, they become cost overruns.
Just a thought.
Lutefisk
While I absolutely agree in principle to the Navy creating designs, down to the blueprints- at this point where do we find anyone in the DON that would have a clue about doing it??
ReplyDeleteIt almost seems like we'd need to create a pipeline that grows engineering officers with the goal of them manning a future BuShips... And even then, who teaches them to not be horrible at the job when they get there??? Do we have to pull ppl from the shipyards and industry to teach their replacements?? I think anyone with the knowledge of proper design is long dead or at least in a retirement home and of no use now. It just seems we've been doing it wrong for so long, that itll be tough to put together a bureau that could do it right, and we will need to grow it from scratch...
"where do we find anyone in the DON that would have a clue about doing it?"
DeleteIn the DoN? There is no one. This is a capability that would have to be built slowly over decades. You poach people from industry and then hire kids out of college and slowly gain experience and learn by first designing small vessels and then, over the years, working up to larger ships.
It sounds like a lot of trouble to go to. Why should we do it? Well, now we're trapped into using whatever a couple of companies decide to give us. Take the LCS, for example, Lockheed/Austal designed what would be profitable for them not what would be combat effective and, because we had no in-house expertise, we had no choice but to accept what they wanted to give us. We need to get to a point where WE (the Navy) designs the ships and we merely contract out the physical construction. That way, we get what WE want, not what Lockheed (or whoever) wants.
Not debating. Just a question. No one (at least no one I've ever heard of) suggests that combat aircraft should be designed by the Navy. There was a "Naval Aircraft Factory" for awhile, but I don't believe it ever produced particularly useful combat planes. Most of those came from private companies like Grumman or Lockheed.
ReplyDeleteSo what is different about ships, which also are complicated things with lots of advanced technology in them?
"Not debating."
DeleteWhy not? Do you think you're right? Then fight for it! I may criticize your ideas but that's what a debate is and, if you're right, you'll persuade me. Of course, I've never been wrong yet but, theoretically, there's always a first time.
By the way, this is one of those things that IS debatable, even in my mind!
"So what is different about ships,"
That is a great question and I'll give you my answer. There is no reason the military couldn't design their own aircraft. In the (not recent) past, industry did such a good job that there was no need for the military to get into combat aircraft design. Of late, that is no longer a valid statement. Consider the F-35. One would hope a military design bureau could have done better (certainly not worse!). Consider the KC-46 tanker. A simple tanker. One would certainly hope the military could have taken an existing commercial aircraft and modified it to pass gas for a fraction of the cost and time that the manufacturer has. Moving on ...
Why did industry do a good job in the past and why was the military satisfied? It's because there were many companies designing aircraft and that gave the military, literally, dozens of different aircraft to choose from. That almost guaranteed that the military could always find a design that they liked. Now, however, there are, what, two companies that design aircraft and the choices are non-existent. If the design is flawed - like the F-35 - there is no alternative to turn to.
Now, let's consider ships. Like the current situation with aircraft, there are only one or two ship builders for any given type of ship so the military has no choices. For example, we had no choice but to accept the Ford design because there were no alternatives.
Unlike aircraft where, in theory, we can quickly build new models (but we don't!) if the existing ones are found to be unacceptable, ships take 5-15 years to build and commission. We can't afford to get it wrong and the best way to ensure that is to generate the design in-house. Of course, that assumes competent people in-house.
I would also suggest that it's easier to design a ship than an aircraft. Let's face it, a hull is a hull and we've understood the basic design considerations for many decades. Not much has changed. The rest of ship design is just selecting the current crop of weapons and electronics and packaging them in the design.
I don't want to turn this into a thesis so I'll stop here. Feel free to ask if you have questions. Feel free to debate if you think you're right. All I ask is that you use data and logic to support your position.
"Why not? Do you think you're right? "
DeleteWell, in this case I just didn't know. I did notice an apparent inconsistency, so I asked.
"I did notice an apparent inconsistency, so I asked."
DeleteRe-reading my answer, I was a bit rambly(?). Let try again, much more succinctly.
Until the F-18 Hornet, aircraft design by industry was successful. In contrast, ship design by industry has been an unmitigated failure, exacerbated by the fact that the Navy has no in-house expertise that could spot a flawed design before it reached the fleet.
One works, one doesn't.
That's why we need an in-house ship design capability.
Hopefully, that simplifies and clarifies the issue.
"exacerbated by the fact that the Navy has no in-house expertise that could spot a flawed design before it reached the fleet."
DeleteAbsolutely. Even if the Navy doesn't actually design the ship, there ought to at least be enough competent people to review industry's design for problems. The most egregious case I can think of is the Ford's catapults where all four must be shut down to repair one. Given how important redundancy is, even I know that's problematic. How could the Navy's experts have missed it?
"The most egregious case I can think of "
DeleteThere's lots of candidates for the title of 'most egregious'! From the LCS alone,
The LCS that was designed without cathodic protection - something we've thoroughly understood since the age of sail.
The LCS designed without bridge wings.
The LCS combining gear that was too complex for sailors to operate.
The LCS with less than standard Navy stability and weight margins.
And so on.
I recall that eons ago, aircraft designs were actually built to flying prototypes, and partly, if not all, on the companies dime. Returning to that sounds like a great way to foster competition, plus, companies might have a sense of urgency to get their design finished, rather than just milking the R&D funds til they're gone and then saying..."oops, overrun!!"
DeleteNow we can't really do that with ships, although maybe(??)... But if we arent seeing various companies building their designs and competing with them...maybe at a system level, it seems like we should be.
"... ships ... if we arent seeing various companies building their designs and competing with them"
DeleteA company can build a prototype aircraft on their own dime but a ship is beyond any company's means. If we can't foster competition among shipbuilders then the only logical alternative is to provide the desired design from in-house and just let the shipbuilders compete for the construction instead of the design. You don't need competition if you provide the design. Of course, that assumes that the Navy knows how to design a good ship and that's where a re-constituted BuShips comes in.
As an additional item, I'd nominate concurrent design and construction, especially where you start building a platform that contains a whole bunch of unproven technologies.
ReplyDeleteThis has affected LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, and probably others, not to mention, of course, aircraft like the F35.
" I'd nominate concurrent design and construction"
DeleteAt the start of the post, I limited it to equipment developments as opposed to policy developments. From the first sentence in the post:
"Focusing on the equipment side of things as opposed to policy debacles such as minimal manning,"
If one wants to consider policy developments there are many highly negative policies that have impacted the Navy: minimal manning, concurrency (as you note), deferred maintenance, and so on.
Is there any specific reason why Western navies moved exclusively towards light torpedoes on their ships.
ReplyDeleteAlmost all other navies retain heavy torpedoes.
In my country, Indian Navy design which are influenced by both Soviet and Western design philosophies, has gone for heavy torpedoes on ships. The light torpedoes are for the helicopters. Even our smaller ASW Corvettes have heavy torpedoes.
Realistic Sonar capability I presume would be more or less similar for all navies.
-BM
Isn't this because doctrinally, the heavy torpedo was replaced by the Antiship missile?
DeleteMeanwhile, the light ASW torpedo can be either fired from the self defense triple tube or carried by the helicopter - a submarine does not need as big of a torpedo as a warship.
But are torpedoes really that viable as an antiship weapon? I recall this blog talking about the myth of torpedo lethality.
"Is there any specific reason why Western navies moved exclusively towards light torpedoes on their ships."
DeleteAn excellent question for which I have no answer.
"I recall this blog talking about the myth of torpedo lethality."
DeleteWe addressed the myth that a single torpedo could break the back of any ship and instantly sink it. We never stated that torpedoes were not serious threats!
As one example, almost no amount of anti-ship missiles will sink a modern, large cargo ship in any useful time frame. However, a spread of heavy torpedoes will do the job in fairly short order.
There's a recent article on The Warzone that argues that during the post-Vietnam military budget cuts, Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes, initially planned for both surface ships and submarines, were prioritized for submarines to save money.
Deletehttps://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/cold-war-u-s-navy-nearly-armed-its-frigates-with-mk-48-heavyweight-torpedoes
As designed the Knox class was supposed to have a heavy weight torpedo room in the fantail along with the VDS control room. They were never installed ( already building half complete ships then.) The Knox I was on (Fanning), used ours as a crew lounge, complete with weight machine, couches, tv and a packman video game. Not a big fan of VLS either, much prefer twin armed launchers, where you can keep everything in armored magazine. (good luck getting it armored).
ReplyDelete"where you can keep everything in armored magazine"
DeleteAn excellent point.
Could you perhaps put in how you might fix some of these since they do have some merits? Nuke power for instance reduces the tanker needs if more warships had them, and we can't maintain ships nor buy them as is. Ditto Aegis, it does have some good concepts, and VLS, how would you improve/fix them? Would VLS spread out over a hull make it more sensible, armored box in some way (impossible also over the launcher itself if it is to have true needed thickness)? I see your points though, these concepts led to no armoring, cost over-runs, maintenance heavy situations and excessive pricing in general.
ReplyDelete"since they do have some merits"
DeleteSome do, indeed.
" how you might fix some of these"
It would require a post (or book!) to describe the 'fixes'. I'll offer one brief example from which you can probably surmise the answer to others.
"Aegis"
The lesson from Aegis is that beyond a certain point, complexity equals degradation. Stated another way, Keep It Simple, Stupid (K.I.S.S. principle). Aegis should have been implemented from day one with no more complexity THAN COULD BE MAINTAINED BY A SAILOR WHO'S BEEN THROUGH A TRAINING SCHOOL. It's no good having a system that is so complex that only a team of Ph.D scientists can maintain it. A scaled down (in terms of complexity) Aegis would have been useful. An example of a scaled down Aegis is the TRS-3D/4D. Smaller, simpler, maintainable and with 80% of the performance but 100% availability. Yes, you sacrifice three hundred mile, mosquito size resolution but, realistically, how many mosquito threats are there at three hundred miles?
This simplification applies not just to radar systems but to all electronic systems. For example, we've made our navigation software so complex that the sailors are unable to effectively use it.
You can probably figure out pretty good fixes to the rest. For example, you offered a good start on VLS by suggesting that it would be better if it was spread out over the entire ship instead of clustered in one or two spots.
I can share an example of something closer to the right balance of useful technology vs. stupid complexity. A boomer on patrol in the 1970's had two very important computers (primary and backup) go down at the same time, making the boat unable to launch if needed. The crew (unaided) was able to mix and match enough parts to create one effective computer out of two defective machines. 18 hours after the initial problem they were launch capable again.
DeleteUnreliable computers are bad, but at least there was a backup, and when that failed, the crew could address the problem on their own. As I understand it, a lot of current tech can only be repaired or maintained by contractors and/or in port. That's a stupid level of complexity.
Just curious but what would you in place of Aegis? The initial projects that eventually led to Aegis started in the 1950s because it was realized that massed Russian missile would overwhelm standard radar systems. They almost went with the Typhon combat system went was actually more advance design then Aegis but it was huge and just didn't work most of the time cuz it beyond state of the art. All the modern radar used around the world are like Aegis in that they are complex and they work.
Delete"what would you in place of Aegis?"
DeleteI answered this in the comment above: October 31, 2023 at 11:38 AM
"Nuke power for instance reduces the tanker needs"
DeleteIt also increases initial construction costs, requires very expensive mid-life refueling, requires a vast support system to deal with spent fuel and used reactor disposal, requires extensive security measures for all nuclear related sites (manufacturing, storage, and disposal), results in very expensive decommissioning procedures, requires extensive and very expensive enrichment and fuel manufacturing facilities, and so on. On top of that, it risks minor battle damage producing a radiation 'kill' of an entire ship.
Anyone who cites one factor as a justification for or against nuclear power is willfully ignoring the counter arguments. When ALL factors are considered, the arguments for against nuclear or conventional power amount to a wash.
A thought just occurred regarding the Navy designing the ships itself.
ReplyDeleteAny idea how much the problems we've been experiencing are due to incompetence and greed by the shipbuilders as opposed to the shipbuilders giving the Navy what it said it wanted, but what it said it wanted was flawed?
Obviously the latter problem would not be solved by the Navy designing the ships.
Without a doubt, the Navy contributes heavily to screwing up ship designs with missing CONOPS, unfocused designs, constant change orders, focus on cruising rather than fighting, etc. One would hope that an in-house design group (BuShips) would prevent much of this. Of course, if they didn't, then we'd be no better off.
DeleteAt what point was armor eliminated from warship design ? Did the Spruance design show better protection than the Burkes ?
ReplyDeleteIt makes sense that the lack of armor protection in modern warships creates fragile ships unable to take hits.
I think it went back further to the initial post WW2 ships. Remember the cruiser USS Bainbridge after a scrape against a carrier dumped thousands of gallows of jet fuel on the cruiser that ignited. The superstructure essentially melted because of the aluminum in it.
DeleteWrong ship. USS Bainbridge (CGN25) did not have a collision with a carrier. I believe you are referring to USS Belknap (CG26) which had a collision and fire in 1975
Delete"Did the Spruance design show better protection than the Burkes ?"
DeleteFrom what I can gather, I believe so, however, I've only come across very brief and vague descriptions of either's armor so it's not definitive.
surface ship nuclear power. I can see it for subs, not surface vessels. as an ex steam engineer, any kind of damage to the reactor or pressure vessel (heat exchanger) is going to contaminate the whole steam system through out the ship. all the heating coils, water heaters, cat system and of course the entire engineering plant. the ship may stay afloat, buts its a technical sinking, you're never going to be able to repair all the damage, and I would refuse to even serve aboard a ship that suffered nuclear contamination.
ReplyDeletethe nuclear power for surface ships argument is a bit iffy, for one only one class of surface ships actively uses nuke power and that is carriers and there is some merit to the argument because a carrier is distinctly different from other surface combatants in that it's value is not it's missils but rather it's planes. So there is the certain merit to exchange volume meant for ship fuel for munitions and jet fuel.
ReplyDelete" there is the certain merit to exchange volume meant for ship fuel for munitions and jet fuel."
DeleteThere is. On the other hand, one can argue that the extra billion(s)(? no one knows exactly what a nuclear installation costs) of cost incurred due to nuclear installations could better go towards procuring and maintaining larger, more robust air wings which, after all, are the reason the carrier exists and represent the value of the carrier.
As with every aspect of the nuclear vs. conventional debate, there are pros and cons. The net result, when evaluated evenly, is a wash.
"GPS – ushered in a culture of technology dependency which has cost lives, caused collisions and groundings, rendered a generation of weapons suspect, and neutered the basic seamanship skills of the Navy"
ReplyDeleteI a more than a bit unconvinced on this assertion. GPS guided US/NATO weapons seem to be doing fine in the face of Russian jamming in Ukraine. Are you really suggesting there were no collisions or grounding before GPS? Have you any data on comparative rates before and after.
"GPS guided US/NATO weapons seem to be doing fine in the face of Russian jamming in Ukraine."
DeleteUnless you are privy to, undoubtedly, classified information, you have no idea how any weapons are actually performing in the Ukraine conflict. So, let's dispense with that unfounded claim.
The US military has, for some time, noted the vulnerability of GPS guided weapons and is desperately trying to develop alternative guidance methods so, clearly, the US military shares the same GPS concerns I do.
In a peer war - meaning, China - GPS satellites will, presumably, be severely compromised via a combination of cyber attacks, satellite destruction, localized jamming and false signal injection, etc. Depending on a technology that is certain to be severely degraded in combat is folly, to say the least.
The Army has documented that its soldiers have lost their ability to navigate (map, compass, inertial, dead reckoning) without GPS.
The Navy investigative reports of the various ship groundings and collisions uniformly note a blind dependence on GPS and inability to navigate when deprived of the technology due to instrument failure.
"Are you really suggesting there were no collisions or grounding before GPS? "
Are you really asking a question that stupid?
" GPS guided US/NATO weapons seem to be doing fine in the face of Russian jamming in Ukraine."
DeleteThis comment is inaccurate in face of available evidence. Here are 2 articles that I could dug up regarding the performance of JDAMs in face of Russian EW.
http://www.ocnus.net/article.php?Electronic-Weapons-Russian-GPS-INS-Disruption-in-Ukraine-66596
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/jamming-jdam-threat-us-munitions-russian-electronic-warfare
Both clearly summarize the failure of the JDAM and the GPS system within no matter how upgraded they are in face of the sheer jamming power of the Russian EW system. There are also NYT and WSJ articles that discuss the classified Ukraine leak regarding the performance of other GPS-precision weapons delivered by the US in the Ukraine conflict but I don't know what is CNO policy against articles discussing classified information leak by a major news article.