You’re probably heard, recently, that the attack submarine
(SSN) force is declining in numbers and is projected to reach a low of around
40 (versus the publicly stated, desired target of 60-70) over the next decade and
naval observers and Congress are suddenly worried. However, this is not a new development. The shortfall was predicted at least two
decades ago. For example, the 2014 Navy
30-year shipbuilding plan noted that the SSN level would fall from the 2014
level of 55 to less than 50 in 2020 and ultimately down to a low of 42 in 2029
and would not recover to 50 subs until 2038 and would stay at that level
through 2043.
The looming shortfall was not only anticipated but embraced
by the Navy in 2005.
In fact, given that we just noted that 18 subs are sitting
in extended idle status awaiting maintenance (see, “SSNMaintenance Backlog”), the predicted low point could be closer to 30
deployable subs!
How did this happen? It’s
not a trick question. For the last
couple of decades we’ve been retiring subs faster than we’re building
them. For example, the 2014 30-year
shipbuilding plan called for 52 retirements versus 47 launches. That’s a net decrease of 5 subs over that
time period … hence, a decrease and a shortfall.
Despite anticipating the shortfall decades ago, the Navy
allowed a several year gap in submarine construction between the last Los
Angeles and the first Virginia. The last
Los Angeles class submarine was launched in 1995. The first Virginia class submarine was
launched in 2003. That’s an 8 year gap. Yes, there were two Seawolf class subs mixed
in there but it was an 8 year gap between major submarine classes.
Even when the Virginia class began production, construction
was limited to 5 launches, less than one per year, from 2003-2008,
inclusive.
So, facing a known shortfall, the Navy’s response was to program
in an 8 year gap in production and build less than one per year for the 6 years
subsequent to the gap. Clearly, the Navy
was unconcerned about the looming shortfall.
Now, however, the Navy is attempting to deflect by placing the blame and
responsibility on industry for somehow failing to have adequate production
capacity.
And still the Navy is not serious about mitigating the
shortfall. For example, the current
5-year plan calls for 10 retirements which is two per year. Compared to the build rate of 1.2 subs per
year, it’s obvious why we have a worsening shortfall.
According to industry, US submarine production capacity is currently
limited to a theoretical maximum of two subs per year, however, the actual
production rate is barely more than one per year. The entire Virginia class has, thus far, seen
25 launches in the 21 years from 2003-2023, inclusive. That’s a sustained production rate of only
1.2 subs per year.
In comparison, the Los Angeles class saw 62 subs built in
the 22 year period from 1974-1995, inclusive.
That’s a build rate of 2.8 subs per year, nearly three per
year! Now, we’re down to barely one per
year.
The Navy talks publicly about building three subs per year
but that’s clearly a fantasy that’s entirely disconnected from reality.
The Navy had two decades to address the shortfall and
consciously chose not to address it.
They are only now attempting to address it because a panicking Congress is
beginning to ask questions and, even so, the only real effort the Navy is
making is to try to place blame on industry instead of themselves. That’s not addressing the shortfall, that’s
addressing the public relations.
Options
So, what could have been done over the preceding two decades
and what can we currently do to mitigate the shortfall?
Retirements - The obvious, immediate, short term
solution is to stop retiring subs. We
early retired a dozen Los Angeles class subs with less than 20 years service
(see, “Los Angeles Class Overhauls and Retirements”)! Many more have been retired with less than 30
years. Even subs nearing the end of
their scheduled service life can be retained in an idled status against the
advent of war.
Operational Patterns – We could have, and still
should, stop deploying subs on extended cruises. Going to a home-port maintenance and training
concept, as we’ve frequently discussed, would reduce the ‘dive cycles’ and full
power nuclear use which depletes the nuclear fuel and would extend the life of
the subs.
There is value in submarine missions that map out the
underwater battlefield, determine water conditions (salinity, density,
currents, thermoclines, etc.), monitor and collect intel on foreign submarines,
monitor enemy ASW capabilities, etc. but they do not require full combat
submarines. A much reduced capability
submarine could be built for the specific purpose of monitoring, as just
described. Non-combat SSKs would be a
cheap and highly effective platform for the types of data collection just listed
while the bulk of the SSNs remain in a home-port training/maintenance
condition, preserving and extending their life spans.
Capacity – The Navy had two decades to promote and
develop additional production capacity and, perhaps, an additional shipyard but
opted not to. Programming in an 8 year
production gap followed by 6 years of one sub per year is the opposite of
building production capacity. Instead,
the Navy allowed industry’s production capacity to decrease as shipyards
adjusted to lower production demands and allowed skilled workers to retire
without replacement. As industry noted,
Conclusion
The incompetence and willful disregard by the Navy in
addressing the shortfall has been nothing short of stunning and constitutes dereliction
of duty by a succession of CNOs, each of whom should be recalled to active duty
and court-martialed.
Finally, let’s close this out with an hysterical lie by the
Navy. Referring to production capacity,
Rear Admiral David Goggins had this to say,
_______________________________
The Navy announced in late March 2005 that it planned to reduce its attack submarine fleet to 41 from its current level of 55.[1]Thus, the SSN shortfall was not a surprise event. In fact, it was long anticipated and intentionally inflicted. The Navy actually planned the shortfall !
The presidents of both shipyards [General Dynamics and Newport News] recently said they believed they could handle three SSNs a year but that they and their suppliers would only invest in the additional infrastructure, machinery and people if the Navy sent a clear demand signal and committed to higher shipbuilding rates for a long duration.[2]The Navy’s haphazard production program does not give industry the confidence to increase production capacity. You may recall the 29-boat Seawolf class that was truncated to just three? Not exactly confidence-inspiring.
He said the Navy would not build the ships if they couldn’t properly maintain them … [2]That’s hilarious! Hey, Admiral … I’ve got some bad news for you. The Navy isn’t properly maintaining any of their ships!
https://news.usni.org/2020/11/18/navy-confident-it-could-build-3-virginia-ssns-a-year-though-more-study-needed-on-shipyard-capacity#:~:text=The%20Navy%20has%20just%2050%20SSNs%20today%2C%20is,goal%20of%20as%20many%20as%2080%20by%202045.
"In comparison, the Los Angeles class saw 62 subs built in the 22 year period from 1974-1995, inclusive."
ReplyDeleteNote that not only did we build 62 LA boats, but we also built 18 Ohio's during the same period. (Well, maybe the last one was a year or two later). And the Ohio's were bigger and more complicated than the LA's !!
“There is value in submarine missions that map out the underwater battlefield, determine water conditions (salinity, density, currents, thermoclines, etc.), monitor and collect intel on foreign submarines, monitor enemy ASW capabilities, etc. but they do not require full combat submarines”
ReplyDeleteThis may be the only truly useful thing for drone subs to do. Research ROV’s have been doing yeoman work in oceanography for years in the private and academic sector. A drone-sub that pops up to a non-combat tender wouldn’t really need to break new ground in technology, simply perform tasks in a predetermined pattern. If we just have to spend money on drones, this would be useful task.
A manned diesel-electric research sub like you suggested should actually be a relatively easy sell to Congress. Sell it to the doves on the research, maybe throwing in “studying the effects of climate change on ocean temperatures” to get an extra billion or two in funding over what is required.. Among the hawks, you’re prepping for war with China. It could be sold as a replacement for the now long-retired NR-1. We might even get away with buying an AIP engine or hull design from a NATO ally. These would also make a good sub for naughty things like tapping communication cables, or inserting SEAL teams.
“studying the effects of climate change on ocean temperatures”
DeleteOutstanding!
“studying the effects of climate change on ocean temperatures”
DeleteDon't forget studying the effects of climate change on human behavior underwater. That's might be among the more important data we can collect.
Do you think the intelligence gathering sub should be broken down further? Sea gliders are already capable of gathering lots of oceanographic data at very low cost. But they aren't good at finding enemy subs.
ReplyDeleteI know you've discussed before with the XLUUV that its intelligence gathering capability is hampered by the diesel-electric powertrain. It will always be snorkeling and vulnerable. Do the speed limitations and snorkeling time worry you in this case?
This is another case where the speed of the vessel plays a large part in how much going nuclear would cost. Going 15 knots instead of 10 knots requires a power plant 3x-4x bigger. So a nuclear scout sub might be faster underwater, maybe 10 knots instead of 3-5 knots, but would probably get more capability improvement from avoiding charging.
"Do the speed limitations and snorkeling time worry you in this case?"
DeleteNot at all ! In this case, we're talking about data collection DURING PEACETIME. As such, it doesn't matter how fast/slow we do it or whether we do it on the surface, subsurface, or snorkeling every ten minutes. In international waters, we can do whatever we want, any way we want.
Now, trailing Chinese subs and collecting data on them does demand an underwater platform at least as capable as the target being trailed which, for practical purposes, means we need an actual, manned sub for the job. Still, such a manned data collection sub can be a non-combat sub since we're not going to shoot anything during peacetime. A non-combat SSK would fit most of the need in this role. If we happen to need to trail a high speed, nuclear Chinese sub and an SSK can't do it then we send a nuclear sub of our own.
Does that answer your question?
Yes, thanks.
DeleteDo you think a war time intelligence gathering sub would be useful? Or is it redundant because we’d want the sun to have weapons to prosecute the target itself?
"we’d want the [sub] to have weapons to prosecute the target itself?"
DeleteYes. If you're fortunate enough to get close enough to an enemy target to gather data on it, you're close enough to shoot! Of course you'd want to be able to take the shot!
Now, there might be occasional opportunities for pure surveillance (clandestine scouting of an amphibious assault location, for example) but, even then, you'd want to be able to fight your way out of a jam if you get spotted.
The non-combat subs I've described are purely a peacetime asset.
Imagine yourself as the wartime commander of the Pacific fleet. You're not going to send non-combat subs into enemy waters are you?
In case it's not obvious, the reason I describe a non-combat, cheap, possible SSK type sub for peacetime data collection is so that the nuclear SSNs can stay home-ported, conducting intensive training and maintenance instead of sailing around in circles on some pointless peacetime deployment that can be better handled by some other asset.
Makes sense. So it seems the useful divisions from previous posts and the fleet page are:
Delete1. Virginia class without payload module/land attack missiles
2. Guided missile submarine specializing in land attack
3. SSK peacetime scout
"SSK peacetime scout"
DeleteTo be clear, a non-combat, scaled down, cheap underwater data collection platform. The term, 'SSK', implies a combat sub and that's not at all what I have in mind. I use the term SSK just to convey that it's more akin to that than an SSN.
As a practical matter, does adding a few torpedo tubes (and storing/handling equipment) drive up the cost?
DeleteIf anything, I'd think it would drive up the cost to REMOVE them and make a non-combat capable sub. The Japanese have been designing really good submarines for a while now. The Germans and South Koreans too, although with slightly different operational goals and markets. Maybe we'd be better off not reinventing the wheel and just going with existing designs?
"As a practical matter, does adding a few torpedo tubes (and storing/handling equipment) drive up the cost?"
DeleteWell, you tell me. You'd have to add an entire torpedo compartment with space for reloads. I don't have a dimensioned drawing of a sub in front of me but a single Mk48 torpedo is 19 ft long and you'd need the torpedo tube length plus that aMount again for the reloads plus room to move around the torpedoes so that's got to be somewhere around 50 ft of extra length added to the sub to accommodate torpedoes (likely more!). Don't believe me? Look at an SSK cutaway drawing and you'll see that the torpedo room occupies most of the forward third of the sub.
You'll need additional crew to operate and maintain the torpedoes so you'll need additional berthing, food storage, heads, potable water storage, oxygen capacity, laundry, etc.
Of course, all of that will make the sub larger and heavier so you'll need larger engines.
You'll need larger fuel storage and ballast tank capacity.
You also need to add a combat control software system, additional computers, control interfaces, and more operators.
Stop me when you think we've 'driven up the cost'.
"If anything, I'd think it would drive up the cost to REMOVE them and make a non-combat capable sub."
????????? We're not talking about taking an existing combat sub and removing compartments and functions. We're talking about designing a purpose-built sub for the peacetime surveillance and data collection tasks. That's going to be a fraction of the cost of a combat SSK.
Question: in wartime, aren't our subs supposed to be hunter killers, stalking enemy subs? I recall that in the Cold War we would have SSNs on patrol shadowing Soviet SSNs and SSBNs.
DeleteIt seems to me that the only way to get good at that is to do it for real. Exercising with American subs isn't the same as shadowing a Chinese boomer.
"We're not talking about taking an existing combat sub and removing compartments and functions. We're talking about designing a purpose-built sub for the peacetime surveillance and data collection tasks. That's going to be a fraction of the cost of a combat SSK."
DeleteI am talking about it because you're assuming away the massive costs of designing a purpose-built sub (of very limited utility) when you (rightly) spend a lot of words on this blog pointing out that most new ship we've built for 30 years has been overrun by runaway redesigns, failures of untested ideas, and mission creep.
So yeah, I think when all the costs are considered, using an existing and proven general purpose SSK design would be much more effective than building the submarine version of LCS.
If we can't build a new-design, non-combat, minimal function, conventional sub for a very minimal cost then all hope is lost. I refuse to accept that we can't do better. I refuse to accept that our current disaster of ship design and funding is normal. We've seen from past ship and aircraft programs that our current performance is, indeed, horrendously abnormal.
DeletePart of doing better means recognizing what the real cost drivers are. It's not the extra hunks of steel for torpedo tubes. It's all the design and endless redesign, and designing stuff from the ground up when perfectly good designs already exist.
DeleteI'd add to this that our current performance is in no way unique. The British built an aircraft carrier that doesn't work. The Germans built the world's largest frigate with a built in list and no discernible armament.
I agree we shouldn't accept this kind of nonsense, but to get around it, we have to start doing things differently, not doing the same thing (and design from scratch is the same thing) and expecting a different result.
We really need to get serious with UUVs. At some point an XLUUV might have a mission load that makes it optionally manned. Finally deliver the advanced SEAL delivery system and potentially create a useful midget sub that we could insert into theatre via a mothership or by air..
ReplyDelete"useful midget sub"
DeleteTo do what? People get enamored with ideas like this but inevitably fail to sketch out any realistic use. What specific kind of mission would a midget sub be capable of?
"We really need to get serious with UUVs."
To do what?
To do what an SSN can't or won't have time to do. Also, to do things it shouldn't be doing at 3+ billion a pop.
Delete"To do what an SSN can't"
DeleteThis is a non-informative platitude. What is it, specifically, that a SSN can't do that a UUV can?
"or won't have time to do"
Again, what, specifically, needs to be done that a SSN doesn't have the time to do? We have a couple dozen SSNs sitting idle, awaiting maintenance, so the Navy doesn't seem to be too concerned about SSN time.
I despise vague generalities because they're usually (always?) false. Please, offer some concrete examples to back up your statements!
This is just like the claims that we need frigates to free up the Burkes. Free them up do to what? Currently, they're sailing in circles on endless, pointless deployments. What is it that they need to be freed up to do?
The entire 'free them up' argument appears to be an unfounded, uninformed platitude.
Robert Conquest's Second Law: the behaviour of an organisation can best be predicted by assuming it to be controlled by a secret cabal of its enemies.
ReplyDeleteThis is why the US Navy needs at least 2 to 4 squadron worth of SSK Submarines. SSK submarines can supplement Virginia class SSN's by freeing up their workload. The SSN's would still do long range escort and strike missions. The SSK's can be used to guard our EEZ's, especially guard Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, Alaska and Northern Marina's. Support Special operations in the littorals including infil and exfil special ops teams. At the same time, SSK's can be used to provide adversarial training like Top gun and Red flag. On top of that, SSK's can operate as ISR outpost for the SSN's who would be the quarterbacking them.
ReplyDeleteNever fear, the Navy has now issued a report calling for the fleet to grow to 381 combat ships!
ReplyDelete... which was classified, probably to keep the lack of any plan to get there out of sight.
If we're not going to send our subs on extended deployments, then why do we need the greatly increased costs and hassles of operating nuclear reactors?
ReplyDeleteWe're sure as hell not saving enough money for maintenance, nor any availability time since so many of our nuclear powered fast attack boats are awaiting repairs.
If routine deployments will be 60 days or less, then AIP can supply sufficient power. Reactors aren't particularly small or light. How much range per deployment is enough? What percentage of the time do nuclear powered subs spend at 20kts or greater? Are they home ported far away from their patrol areas specifically because they're nuclear powered?
Suppose a sub needs about 2MWe continuous power to sail at 10kts.
1440hrs (60 days) * 2MW = 2.88GWh
DFM-76 = 40,000Wh/gallon
2,880,000,000Wh / 40,000Wh/gal = 72,000gal
72,000 * 8lbs/gal = 576,000lbs = 288 tons
Nothing is 100% efficient, though, so let's assert our fuel cell is about 70% efficient, even though 80% is closer to the truth after the excess heat from the high temperature fuel cell is used to flash evaporate water for the crew and provide CO2 re-compression power using thermal power transfer loops. Some combined cycle high temperature fuel cells achieve 85% efficiency, but ours will be lower because we're storing the CO2 to avoid making bubbles.
288 / 0.7 = 411.43 tons of fuel, implying 1,398.9t of LOX. That's about 1,228m^3 in volume at 1,140kg/m^3, so a 10.71m by 10.71m by 10.71m cube if our LOX storage tank was cube-shaped, though it's obviously not.
Since the LOX will fit inside the hull of a Los Angeles class boat, the DFM will definitely fit.
SOFCs (Solid Oxide Fuel Cell, so Yttria-Stabilized Zirconia) that burn diesel without Hydrogen reforming can provide around 2.5kW/kg gravimetric power density (also demonstrated by multiple other companies across the world). NASA developed this technology for the American military and space program, so it shouldn't be subjected to NIH Syndrome. If I need 20MWe for flank speed, then my SOFC weighs in at 8,000kg and at 2.5kW/L, it will occupy about 8m^3. At that size and weight, we may as well include 4 fuel cells, for a maximum output of 80MW. Sea Wolf has 26MW, so with 3X more power we could comfortably outrun a Seawolf over a short distance.
The Ohio class S8G reactor compartment weighs 2,750t for comparison purposes and can provide 26MW of propulsive power. The S6W can provide 43MW of propulsive power. The Los Angeles class reactor compartment supposedly weighs 1,680t, or 1,852 tons in freedom units, so we're at 1,810t of oxidizer and fuel for our 60 day patrol. If the patrol is any longer or we have to go substantially faster all the time, then we can't compete with the reactor. If the goal is to be really quiet and to patrol around for a month or two, we can do that.
kbd512
"If we're not going to send our subs on extended deployments, then why do we need the greatly increased costs and hassles of operating nuclear reactors?"
DeleteI don't know if you're serious or kidding. If you're asking a serious question then you need to go study remedial submarine warfare before you comment again.
I'll give you hint: In your long comment, the one word you didn't mention even once was, 'combat'. Peacetime activities are the LAST reason you design something.
CNO,
DeleteI assume the Navy sent their subs on extended patrols, burning through reactor life faster than anticipated, because that was required to meet the needs of the Navy. Meeting needs is perfectly understandable, but failing to plan to replace those boats earlier than anticipated is not.
I never mentioned the word "combat", because we clearly won't be doing nearly as much of that with our dwindling fleet of fast attack boats, when we're either forced to retire them early or can't afford to deploy them for fear of using up the remaining reactor life.
kbd512
"burning through reactor life faster than anticipated"
DeleteWhere are you getting your information? No subs have been retired because they 'burned through' reactor life.
You really need to come up to speed on naval matters.