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Thursday, April 13, 2023

What Have Our Carriers Done For Us? – Follow Up

Well, that post certainly didn’t go well.  Few people were able to grasp the ‘what if’ nature of the premise.  So, instead, I’ll offer my take on it.
 
 
Mission
 
Beginning around 1950, we would have recognized that the Air Force (AF) was the guarantor of our national security and sovereign existence. 
 
 
Budget
 
The untold billions that have gone towards carriers, carrier aviation, maintenance, nuclear operations, annual operating costs, etc. would, instead, have gone to the AF.  Plenty of money!  With that recognition of the AF’s core mission, would have come the realization that we needed a worldwide network of bases.
 
 
Bases
 
So many people started the basing question from today’s reality.  We don’t have bases.  We have no territories.  No host country is going to allow us to operate freely.  Well, in this alternate reality, recall that we started with possession of most of the bases, post WWII, and didn’t give them up so today’s reality is null and void (that’s what a ‘what if’ is, right?).  Perhaps this might have consisted of retaining ownership of a single island from amongst a group for basing purposes and allowing the remainder of the territories to revert to self-governship.  We could have established wholly owned, sovereign US bases across the breadth of the Pacific.
 
The process of base acquisition would have continued throughout the world.  Methods of acquisition would have covered the gamut of soft, friendly, mutually beneficial arrangements to hard core threats and coups.  We have done all the above at various times in our history.  It would have just been more of the same.
 
One of the conditions for forming and joining NATO might have been inclusion of independent bases in each member country?  Don’t like it?  Don’t join.  Fight Russia on your own.  That’s hardball but that’s the way the game is played, if necessary.
 
For any specific potential base location, ask yourself, what was the status of that location immediately after WWII?  Odds are we either had control of it or could have with little effort.
 
Finally, for those who extoll the virtues of the mobile, sovereign airfield that is an aircraft carrier, note that we have only about nine functioning, combat-capable carriers right now.  Surely, in our alternate reality, we could have had many dozens/hundreds of bases (we already do and could have had many more!).  Doesn’t that seem significant?
 
In short, basing doesn’t seem like it would have been a problem.  It’s become a problem in our reality because we never prioritized it like we would have if the AF were the only source of aircraft.
 
By the way, one astute reader noted that an base can be repaired easier than a carrier.  If a carrier is sunk, it takes us 5-7 years (optimistically) to get a replacement.  We can repair a base in hours or days, depending on the type of damage (fuel being the biggest vulnerability).
 
 
Aircraft
 
With a hugely increased budget, the AF would have developed many more types of aircraft and acquired many more of them.  For example, instead of a fleet of just 180 F-22 stealth fighters, we might have acquired several hundred.  Instead of a fleet of 21 B-2 bombers we might have acquired two or three hundred.  Larger aircraft numbers would have required a greatly expanded fleet of tankers, AWACS, ISR, and cargo aircraft.
 
Imagine fleets of B-2 bombers sitting at bases around the world instead of just 15 or so flyable B-2’s sitting in one location back in the continental US.
 
Imagine squadrons of F-22 fighters based all around the globe.
 
In addition to numbers, the AF would have developed additional types of aircraft to carry out its mission.  Imagine fleets of arsenal bombers or converted commercial airliners carrying 70 anti-ship cruise missiles, each!  There’s your ‘naval’ battle!
 
Imagine squadrons of gunships of various sizes and capacities supporting our low end endeavors.
 
Imagine a follow on F-22 fighter with truly epic range to cover the Pacific area.
 
 
Operations
 
Now, imagine swarms of AF aircraft operating from a global network of bases, each base being capable of air defense, short range strike, and very long range strike.  There would be no areas of the world where we couldn’t bring major firepower to bear.
 
Imagine multiple divisions of Army troops operating in conjunction with local AF bases.  We already have Army airborne units but imagine many more such units, dispersed around the world so that combat response is always just a matter of hours away instead of a Marine Corps MEU being, likely, days or weeks away.
 
Imagine joint Army/AF units operating in an integrated fashion with armor, troop, heavy transport, fighter cover, and strike support, all available from the same base.  There’s your truly effective MAGTF!
 
Imagine swarms of bombers able to launch several hundred anti-ship missiles against any naval force anywhere in the world and doing so with fighter and EW support.
 
Imagine base defense with layers of very long range interceptors and short/medium range fighters.
 
Imagine being able to put hundreds of fighters into the air over, say, Taiwan.
 
 
Conclusion
 
We opted to go the carrier route but consider the alternate reality that I’ve described above and ask yourself whether carriers have accomplished the same or more, in our reality?  It’s far from a sure thing that they have.  Had we fully (and intelligently!) committed to AF aviation instead of carriers, could we have accomplished more than we have with carriers? 
 
Aside from fun, one of the practical uses of this thought experiment is to highlight potential beneficial changes to our current reality, going forward.  Should we be emphasizing the AF more?  Should we be expanding our carrier fleet instead of shrinking it?  Should we be far more aggressively acquiring bases?  Should we be altering our operations and doctrine one way or the other?  Should we be developing some of the aircraft types that were mentioned?  Should the AF have a bigger role in a naval battle?  And so on.
 
The potential is certainly there although the devil is in the execution.  We could easily have screwed up the alternate reality just as much as our current reality.  Still, it’s intriguing to think about.

37 comments:

  1. Not sure with which post to put this response, but I have to slightly disagree with the idea that SSGN would be the primary offensive weapon system in the original scenario.
    It's a really good thought, but I don't think that the progression quite works.

    After WW2 the trajectory of the navy would go away from carriers, but to where?

    I believe that battleships and heavy cruisers, with their heavy guns for coastal bombardment, would have been the navy's offensive punch, post-war.
    They might have kept all the Iowas and South Dakotas active in that scenario along with large numbers of heavy cruisers.

    The limited number of aircraft carriers would likely be used for CAP over the top of the surface strike groups to protect them from enemy aircraft.

    The navy probably would have pushed the development of extended range rockets to give themselves the ability to reach inland farther than the naval artillery could reach.

    As the technology of missiles progressed, they likely would have been first put on surface ships as a supplement to the aging big-gun ships.

    When the technology reached sufficient maturity, somebody possibly would have conceived the idea to marry them to submarines, which would have been a significant leap forward in capability for the navy.

    But it would also have threatened the role, and budget slice, of the big ships and may have gotten substantial pushback from the establishment navy brass and congress.

    The aging carriers would need to slowly be replaced and the navy likely would have gotten navalized versions of air force fighters to fly off of them to continue to protect the surface fleets.

    Lutefisk

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  2. CNO, you make a compelling (and interesting) alternative with the air force emphasis.

    It is very plausible.

    I could see the cold war battle being over the Soviets and their aligned countries trying to negate our sprawling network of air bases.

    People would probably be pining over the great WW2 navy that we had, and wondering why we didn't just keep updating the great aircraft carrier fleets and have mobile airbases instead of 'all those exposed and vulnerable airbases spread out everywhere'.

    The grass is always greener syndrome.

    Lutefisk

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  3. OK, you've solved the problem that I was concerned about in the previous post, with this suggestion that, I admit, never occurred to me:

    "Perhaps this might have consisted of retaining ownership of a single island from amongst a group for basing purposes and allowing the remainder of the territories to revert to self-governship. We could have established wholly owned, sovereign US bases across the breadth of the Pacific."

    I really did try the imagination thing, but my imagination kept running into the sticking point that, whenever you place critical fixed assets (like air bases) in someone else's territory, there is always political risk involved. You can do things to reduce it, but you can't eliminate it entirely. This concern is not unique to me, but has been stated many times by others.

    Your earlier suggestion of a 99 year lease with full autonomy would eliminate some of the risk, but not all. Remember, a lease is a contract, or maybe a treaty, which is fundamentally a piece of paper that relies on trust that all future leaders on both sides will act in good faith to abide by the treaty. Treaties do get torn up from time to time.

    Consider the case of Country X, located within range of a bunch of Chinese weapons. If China gets into a war with the US, and the US desperately needs that base to prosecute the war, I can easily envision the Chinese ambassador telling the leader of country X that, if they allow the US to attack China from their territory, then China will regard country X as being at war with China, and China will respond with vicious attacks. Maybe even an invasion. President X will then have to decide who can hurt him more, China or the US? And given that he's under enormous (and perhaps existential) pressure, he'll make whatever decision he regards as in HIS country's best interest, treaty or no treaty.

    Your suggestion solves that concern, so I'm happy now.

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  4. Hi CNO,

    Imagination is a weak point of mine but I'll have a go.

    With superior aircraft development and numbers, will come enemy R&D. Russia built their navy to defeat usa carriers , so with less carriers, they'll focus on defeating aircraft and missiles instead. How? I don't know. But they will.

    The usa will have more overseas bases, possibly with improvements like runway durability, armoured hangers, and fuel containers.

    It's possible the usa might actually build aircraft carriers, but specialized to handle larger aircraft, to refuel fuel tankers, large bombers, the Hercules transports eg wider flight deck. Might not be nuclear.

    A pseudo navy might still arise though, in the form of the Marine Corp . No idea what form because I really know little about them. Though a fantasy carrier, carrying 4 or 5 Zubr's would be mind blowingly awesome.

    Andrew

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  5. "We could have established wholly owned, sovereign US bases across the breadth of the Pacific."

    IMHO The USAF would have continued to develop intercontinetal range bombers and aerial refueling to avoid this. Especially diring the cold war when everyone thought nukes made conventional war obsolete. Later, ICBMs would not have needed foreign bases either. We would have a few foreign bases for GLCMs and SRBMs like pershing and thor, but no need for smaller fields for fighters and tactical aircraft would be recognized until Vietnam, maybe. Interceptor bases in Europe would probably be ruled obsolete due to advances in soviet missiles. The AF would just stick to developing a few big bomber and tanker bases mostly in CONUS.

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  6. During WW2 escort carriers played a vital role as aircraft ferries and to replenish planes on land bases. What would a modern escort carrier look like ? The ship would be larger having some tanker aircraft for refueling Air Force planes and with planes having AWACS capability. Some ships could be designed with a ASW function or that of a mother ship design for MIW. Others could be designed as long range missile carriers. At one time the NAVY considered the arsenal ship concept. Of course a ship like this would need some durability built in..

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    1. Forgot to mention EW as a capability in some ships

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  7. We need tio remember why/when the Carrier rose to dominance. In WWII aircraft could not reach from land bases in the Central Pacific. Nor could their weapons reach very far from the airplane. So the USN needed tha carrier to bring airpower to the enemy strongholds. Note that McArthur did not need carriers as he hopped from island to island using forward bases established at the edge of aircover.

    Now with standoff weapons and aircraft that can fly extreme ranges with refueling, as CNO points out it is time to look at what the Carrier brings us. Other than higher attack cycle rates due to reduced range to target (don't get me started on the FORD sortie rate) there isn't much gained. Meanwhile the Aircraft, crews, and carrier are at extreme risk if they do come in close.

    From a tactics perspective how many Tomahaxks can you buy one one Ford and here Air complement? I would hazard to guess enough to take out every port, airfeild, and infrastructure in the Pacific, even if the success rate is only 50%. Also remember the Germans in WWII switched to rockets becuase they were the only effective way to strike. It was more cost effective to build an expendable rocket and shoot it than lose aircrews and aircraft.

    to futher this I always thought putting Carriers in teh Med with all fo those airbases was a waste. They were there only to provide organic Fleet cover for other ships and maybe for limited (not many Russian ships would survive in the that pond either) anti shipping strikes.

    Time to do a true analysis as CNO has started and look at what/why the Carrier brings us. Much cheaper fleet assets can carry Tomahawks and launch from beyond enemy strike ranges.

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    1. Just a note of caution ... I'm NOT advocating eliminating carriers. This was just a fun 'what if' thought exercise that might allow us to evaluate what the carrier does (or does not ) bring to the table and how alternatives might benefit us in the future.

      I happen to believe that carriers offer great benefits, IF OPERATED CORRECTLY AND IF THEY HAVE THE PROPER AIR WINGS FOR THOSE OPERATIONS. However, neither case seems in evidence, currently. We are not operating carriers correctly, we do not train for proper carrier combat operations, and we most certainly do not have the proper air wing composition or size for effective carrier ops.

      I hope that cleared things up? :)

      Delete
    2. "Much cheaper fleet assets can carry Tomahawks and launch from beyond enemy strike ranges."

      And there's the heart of the matter. It doesn't matter whether we operate Navy air wings ashore, go all Air Force, or continue as we are, they all suffer from the same central problem: targeting. We have a thousand mile missile (Tomahawk or whatever) but no EFFECTIVE, SURVIVABLE thousand mile targeting capability.

      Sure, we can send aircraft (carrier or land based) out several hundred miles to then launch a thousand mile missile (near 2000 mile total strike range) but where'd the 2000 mile targeting come from? It didn't come from a slow, non-stealthy, large, easily detected UAV. It didn't come from a small, semi-stealthy UAV. It didn't come from satellites. It didn't come from the Navy's much-hyped Triton/Poseidon Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) concept. It didn't come from F-35s. It didn't come from a submarine. It didn't come from a distributed lethality LCS. Who/what's providing the targeting? We don't have an answer and yet we're laser focused on developing longer and longer range missiles. There's a disconnect there.

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    3. "It doesn't matter whether we operate Navy air wings ashore, go all Air Force, or continue as we are, they all suffer from the same central problem: targeting"

      This is why I believe that we should have developed, instead of the drone tanker, a stealthy "as autonomous as possible" reconnaissance drone. We already had the X-47B prototype, which had a range of 2100 nm and was integrated into carrier flight decks. And looked fairly stealthy. A production version could be made with longer range and greater stealth.

      I won't say more because I mentioned this in a comment on a previous post and don't want to bore people TOO much.

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    4. "autonomous as possible" reconnaissance drone."

      Expand a bit, if you would, on the type of sensor you think would be appropriate. An E-2 Hawkeye has great sensor range, sensitivity, and field of view because the sensor (radar) is so big. Of course, on a much smaller, stealth UAV we wouldn't be able to mount a giant radar dome or wedge so what type of sensor should we use?

      On a smaller UAV, the sensor is correspondingly small and the range, sensitivity, and field of view are much smaller. Simply sending a UAV out to an area doesn't ensure that we'll see what's there. Our field of view may (will) be too small (the soda straw phenomenon). Thus, we run the risk of missing what's there. We can mitigate this risk by increasing the loiter/search time to cover more area or sending more recon aircraft. Of course, the longer we take to search, the greater the likelihood of our aircraft being detected or our host platform being found before we find the enemy.

      As with most things in combat, every choice is a trade off of capabilities and risk.

      So many people just casually throw out 'recon drones' , thinking that solves the problem but it doesn't - or maybe it does but it requires a careful consideration of capability and risk.

      Any thoughts?

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    5. Well, the X-47B is not a tiny aircraft. According to Wikipedia, it's 38 feet long, has a 62 foot wingspan, and an empty weight of 14,000 pounds and a maximum takeoff weight of 44,000 pounds. It also has weapons bays holding about 4,000 pounds of weapons that could be repurposed for reconnaissance equipment. I think a production model could be somewhat larger and still use the carrier.

      Obviously, you can't put a giant radome on top like on the E-2 and still be stealthy. Plus, a radiating radar signal is a giant "come kill me" sign. So it can't be constantly radiating.

      I think various passive sensors should be the primary tool. Infrared, EM signals collection. Maybe visual. A smaller radar integrated into the structure, like you proposed in your post on the B-21 AWACS, would probably be useful for occasional sweeps but not constant. After a radar sweep, I think the craft should do a radical course change since even "low probability of intercept" radar is not the same thing as zero probability of intercept.

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    6. Continued from previous comment. I'm not sure the radar needs to be that huge. After all, the radar on the F-35 isn't. Obviously in this case the radar would be mounted differently to get 360 degree coverage (primarily of the ground) without having to constantly maneuver the aircraft. The radar should probably (like I assume the F-35 radar does) have a couple of modes - one mode with a broader beam and less resolution for area search, and another mode with a narrower beam and greater resolution for looking at details. Maybe some sort of synthetic aperture mode might make sense, although I'm not sure how big that would need to be.

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    7. One more thought. Let me re-emphasize that the radar on this aircraft would NOT constantly radiate. Only occasionally. In addition, of course communications would not be continuous but only sporadic as absolutely necessary. Perhaps directional communications could be used to reduce probability of intercept.

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    8. CNO - Not advocating getting rid of Carriers.

      I agree, in some circumstances the flexibility and closeness is a fantastic advantage. BUT should we continue them as the centerpiece of ALL of our combat power projection?

      Use a hammer for a nail and a screwdriver for a screw.

      If we need to take out the enemies Naval power and infrastructure (remember Enterprise refuled in Pearl shortly after the attack because infrastructure was not destroyed), there maybe better ways to do it than relying on a charge of the air brigade on their MOST expensive horses.

      Delete
  8. Ironically, I think we would be having the same conversations about a Taiwan conflict if history had taken an "Air Force not carriers" route: bombers, subs and munitions to defeat the invasion fleet and potentially blockade China.

    I've read and understood (I think?) ComNavOps carrier tactics of sortieing to create local air superiority for specific tomahawk strikes (then leaving to rearm before getting attacked themselves). But outside of that, most of what I read is about how many carriers would be lost. And very little is about what carriers could actually contribute to the defense of Taiwan. As I recall, recent private wargames showed subs and long ranged bombers having the biggest impact? Maybe we would be in a better position in this alternate universe - more of the subs, bombers and munitions that matter.

    In either world, targeting is a challenge. Being close enough to find a target means being close enough to be in danger. How close are we to munitions that can search for their own targets within a reasonable amount of space?

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    1. "ComNavOps carrier tactics of sortieing to create local air superiority for specific tomahawk strikes"

      Well, that would be one example of how to use carrier aviation but, more generally, carrier air's primary task is escort/protection of the actual Tomahawk-shooting ships (Burkes) rather than the Burkes escorting the carrier. The secondary task is to establish local air superiority wherever it's needed to support an operation. It might be to support an amphibious assault or a Tomahawk strike or a raid/attack on an enemy base or whatever. Just a bit of additional clarity. Hope that helps.

      "most of what I read is about how many carriers would be lost."

      Used CORRECTLY (and that's the big if in today's navy), there would be few carrier losses. A properly operated carrier group is a very tough nut to crack. If there's a specific scenario you think (or have read) that seems highly likely to result in a sunk carrier, tell me and I'll explain how it should be done to minimize risk to the carrier. We had this figured out in WWII and the basic principles still apply.

      "wargames showed subs and long ranged bombers having the biggest impact?"

      Wargames show what they're 'programmed' to show. I've never seen a wargame in modern times that wasn't biased toward a pre-determined result(s), rendering it useless, at best, or misleading, at worst.

      "How close are we to munitions that can search for their own targets"

      We already have that. Most missiles have a target search and recognition capability. The more relevant question is how close are we to munitions that can EFFECTIVELY search for their own targets? Do you grasp what that really means? It means networked munitions (which is what the LCS NLOS was intended to be) because if they aren't networked they'll all go after the same target because none will know (or care) what the other is doing. Once you begin trying to network munitions the cost and complexity skyrocket beyond comprehension and then the problem is what happens if they don't find a target? Then, they all crash into the sea and at a gazillion dollars each, we can't afford/allow that.

      We've concluded that to be effective you need SATURATION numbers (hundreds) of missiles and saturation numbers of gazillion dollar missiles can't be risked on a blind fire, hope-they-find-a-target mission. That brings us right back to having to know the target's location BEFORE launch. And now we're right back to the same targeting challenge we face today. Did that clear anything up?

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    2. "We've concluded that to be effective you need SATURATION numbers (hundreds) of missiles and saturation numbers of gazillion dollar missiles can't be risked on a blind fire, hope-they-find-a-target mission. That brings us right back to having to know the target's location BEFORE launch. And now we're right back to the same targeting challenge we face today. Did that clear anything up?"

      Don't understand. Previously CNO criticise air force focus on PGM, say aircraft need dumb bombs and navy need iowa gun for cheap area bombardment - firepower not info. (russia method)

      your opinion change? how so?

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    3. "Don't understand."

      It's not a one-or-the-other choice between missiles and dumb munitions. We need both. For heavily defended, moving targets like surface ship groups, nothing will work except missiles and lots of them.

      What I've pointed out is that because of their cost, missiles are limited in quantity and our inventory will run out in just a few weeks of combat. We need massive quantities of dumb bombs, rockets, artillery, mortars, etc. that can provide area bombardment when our precision weapons run out.

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    4. I confuse, becasue before you used to say no need info, just bombard area and eventually enemy will hit. But Russia show this no work in Ukren. Must know where target first, then fire.

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  9. I think where we were at by the end of WWII is what we need to go back to in concept. The carriers and naval air are there first and foremost for fleet air defense and reconnaissance. Their secondary role is long range strike and anti-shipping. The heavy cruisers and battleships (if you have them) are the hammer, their job is to punch out enough defenses with guns and missiles in support of the Marines capturing ports and airfields (Pacific theater WWII). Once the Marines have a solid beachhead you start moving in the Army and Air Force to support the ground war. At this point the navy transitions into support roles and protecting convoys (USN in European theater WWII). SSGNs are honestly a tool that I would hold in reserve because they require a trip home once the magazines are dry.

    Off topic but one of the biggest things that pushes me towards a new mixed battery heavy cruiser is the need for an actual warship that can stay on the line providing fire support while being rearmed from supply ships. This might mean entirely new design on VLS cells or a return to twin-arm launchers. On the gun side of things I suspect that we could get a lot more life out of modern tubes.

    We need to grow past this idea that the Navy and Marines are the ocean-going Air Force & Army. Different tools for a different job.

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  10. Global Security, on carrier operations during Desert Storm, "Of more than 94,000 sorties flown by U..S. aircraft during the war, Navy and Marine aircraft flew close to 30,000. Sea-service pilots flew around 35 percent of the sorties, which was in dlrect proportion to their numbers in the U.S. air inventory."

    I'd say the Navy and Marines carried their weight in this instance.

    Also, carriers have been useful in conducting antiterrorist and hostage rescue missions.

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  11. Fixed bases in the Pacific would be vulnerable to attack. So why not scatter these bases or disperse aircraft, similar to what some European countries do.( mobile refueling / replenishing stations on select highways for aircraft ) Or in the Pacific change bases to select islands periodically. Carriers are still relevant but we need aircraft with ,longer range as well. The Navy would need ships to supply these bases and to relocate planes to another prepared island base.

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  12. I quite like this kind of post, was too busy to comment on the original one so I'll do it now.

    - If carrier aviation is determined to be a bad idea, then USN goes on another path.
    Subs, of course (subs are great), and I'm sure the navy would just be less relevant budget-wise, but they'd still be competing for funding, or at least trying.
    And since this alternative path begins in the fifties, it's easy to envision some kind of massive nuclear-armed missile "battleship" (BBGN?) being proposed and perhaps built.
    Great to intimidate countries into giving you bases, among other things.

    - This scenario essentially imagines the USA developing a new major doctrine: after the Monroe Doctrine, there would be a Foreign Basing Doctrine as the new compass.
    The geopolitical implications would be enormous and I'm not going to reimagine seventy years of world history, but it seems logical to envision countries like Japan or Philippines, maybe Israel and UK, etc. hosting a lot of essentially sovereign US bases/enclaves.
    Large amounts of bribes and threats would be required to make that work, and even so it's likely that in some countries the local population would be so opposed to such an invasive presence that the governments would cancel the base deals.
    Still, enough countries could likely be persuaded, particularly in the third world where problem areas actually are.
    I can also see the USSR copying this sort of strategy and trying to establish Soviet bases in Cuba, China, NK, etc.

    - While this would likely fly in 1950 or so, but it's easy to see the Foreign Basing Doctrine eventually being called imperialist, colonialist, racist, white supremacist and whatever.
    And all it would take to ruin the system is an apology-minded administration to withdraw from the bases and cancel the deals.
    On the other hand, if a government is not willing to use military force when needed then we end up in the same place.

    - This would also have a major impact on non-US naval development.
    In 1950 the USN was essentially the only game in town, and if they decided that aircraft carriers aren't worth it, why would anyone else build them, given the major expenses?
    Would Russia and later China even bother?
    Maybe, in an attempt to catch America off guard, but most likely they'll just follow through.
    Why is China not building battleships now, for example? Because the USN essentially decided they weren't worth new construction, and China never bothered questioning that.
    So, in an alternative scenario, America giving up on big carriers might sink naval aviation worldwide.

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    1. "governments would cancel the base deals."

      You - and almost everyone else - are missing the key aspect of this alternate history. WE WOULD HAVE OWNED MOST OF THE BASES, FREE AND CLEAR, AFTER WWII. THERE WOULD BE NO LOCAL GOVERNMENT WITH THE AUTHORITY TO TELL/ASK US TO LEAVE. THERE WOULD BE NO 'DEALS' FOR US TO ABIDE BY. WE'D OWN THE BASE.

      "it's easy to see the Foreign Basing Doctrine eventually being called imperialist, colonialist, racist, white supremacist and whatever."

      Who cares? We'd own the bases. Foreign countries call us all sorts of things today and we don't abandon US territory. Why would we in an alternate history?

      "carriers aren't worth it, why would anyone else build them"

      When any potential enemy would know, with absolute certainty, that we have total domination of the air and could send waves of attack aircraft to obliterate an enemy carrier. The AF would be everywhere and any enemy carrier would be living at the whim of the AF.

      "So, in an alternative scenario, America giving up on big carriers might sink naval aviation worldwide."

      Now that's a fascinating and plausible re-imagining of history. Excellent !

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    2. Back in 1776 or so, some annoying people kicked the British Army out of the then current Crown Colonies in North America, precipitating the decline of the British Empire. If it weren't for that misguided event, we the Citizens of the Greatest Empire on which the Sun would never set, would have bases around the world.
      Rule Britannia, British Airship-Carriers would rule the skies.

      Delete
  13. It seems to me that had the us never developed a carrier centric fleet in the 1950s and later, that, as you have pointed out, we would have had, or chosen to develop a network of global bases, never leaving and further developing those we had. Midway, Guam, Saipan, True, the Philippines, iwo Jamaica, Okinawa would, along with Taiwan itself, which we could have occupied shortly after the war, serve as our front line airbases to support our aviation centric projection of power. To me, the navy would have been well to build a force to support resupply and local patrol and protection of the string of bases. This would have necessitated convoy support, Asw, and increasingly aaw vessels. Presumably cruiser and battleship derivatives, with strong gun armament would have been retained with new classes following. Without carrier aviation dominating, I imagine submarines and ship launched recon and target rockets would have evolved to provide targeting solutions for increasing ranged missiles. A pacific strategy combining heavy airpower projected from the us, and refueled escorted and supplemented by tactical planes based on the islands would require a navy prepared to supply, defend in depth and destroy emerging threats to the bases would have been logical. A navy that could have escorted a strong force of seabees, logistics and tankers could be in a position to repair such bases quickly if damaged. A wide range of bases would enable all this.


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    1. A very plausible alternate scenario! Congratulations on grasping the basing issue; few have.

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  14. "Imagine a follow on F-22 fighter with truly epic range to cover the Pacific area."

    Air Force wants to retire F-22. Congress blocked them in 2023 but they have announced to push for 2024 budget.

    There are more troubles on F-22 than general public know.

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    1. "There are more troubles on F-22 than general public know."

      And you know what these non-public troubles are? Please tell us.

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  15. As I see it, the USA is an aerospace and naval power, with borders that face no 'military' invasion (those borders are not 'secure', but that is another issue), and we have the ability to incinerate the world several times over.

    That said, our borders are not secure, our public debt/GDP-to-debt is at crisis level, our financial institutions are reeling, our manufacturing base is gone, our energy network is old and crumbling, our transportation network is old and inefficient, the country is deeply divided politically, we have rampant crime and mob violence in our cities, and our public education system (future) is in shambles. Reality calls for a major strategic self-assessment and re-alignment.

    I would shut down 90% of our overseas bases, eliminate all of the Unified combat commands and especially their service component commands, fire 3/4s of the flag officers, stop the ridiculous six-month carrier and amphib deployments and replace many of those ‘engagements’ with USCG deployments, redeploy the USA to our borders (a traditional army mission), take much of the ‘land military’ to support federal and local law enforcement (where appropriate). Then comes a clear national strategy, a major realignment of DoD force structure (USAF lead, a healthy USN – particularly a submarine force expansion, the USMC and Army face major a draw down).

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  16. As I see it, the USA is an aerospace and naval power, with borders that face no 'military' invasion (those borders are not 'secure', but that is another issue), and we have the ability to incinerate the world several times over.

    That said, our borders are not secure, our public debt/GDP-to-debt is at crisis level, our financial institutions are reeling, our manufacturing base is gone, our energy network is old and crumbling, our transportation network is old and inefficient, the country is deeply divided politically, we have rampant crime and mob violence in our cities, and our public education system (future) is in shambles. Reality calls for a major strategic self-assessment and re-alignment.

    I would shut down 90% of our overseas bases, eliminate all of the Unified combat commands and especially their service component commands, fire 3/4s of the flag officers, stop the ridiculous six-month carrier and amphib deployments and replace many of those ‘engagements’ with USCG deployments, redeploy the USA to our borders (a traditional army mission), take much of the ‘land military’ to support federal and local law enforcement (where appropriate). Then comes a clear national strategy, a major realignment of DoD force structure (USAF lead, a healthy USN – particularly a submarine force expansion, the USMC and Army face major a draw down).

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  17. I think replicating the same capabilities that the Air Force has is questionable at best. Every service branch seems to want to play in someone else's pond, rather than focusing on doing a few things exceptionally well. The Air Force should focus on nuclear deterrence, bombing our enemies back to the Stone Age, providing tankers, and air logistical support. Any fighters that the Air Force fields should be there to protect their own air fields, bombers, tankers, and transports. I want them to focus on neutralizing high-end strategic threats and targets to cripple an enemy's ability to fight, while the Army / Navy / Marine Corps focus on moving target interdiction and close air support (missions the Air Force brass really isn't interested in). They can finally retire their A-10s or hand them over to the Army for permissive environment CAS, not that doing so will buy many F-35s.

    Our carrier fleet has too few ships, specifically because we made them cost too much by trying to turn them into something they're not. A carrier should be a low-cost mobile air base with point defenses only and a frigate escort to defend against missiles, otherwise geared towards naval aviation only. Instead of that core mission focus, the Navy blew mad money on every "wunderwaffe" that looked interesting (F-14 / F-18 / A-12 / LCS / Zumwalt / Ford - all of these projects suffered from trying to fulfill too many roles and had serious developmental issues). F-18 turned out okay, but it's the exception here, and now over-priced for what it provides. Any good idea fairy not actively adding to our inventory of usable ships / weapons / sensors / properly trained sailors should be shot on sight for aiding the enemy. We don't need to make a meal out of every problem.

    The Navy lobs cruise missiles or drops bombs or delivers Marines to shore. Our job is to kill anything that gets in the way of delivering Marines to shore. That's all we should be doing, and we should do it well. If the Marines were honest enough to admit that the Army is supposed to supply the tanks, the Navy should take a cue from them and follow suit. We bought into electric-everything (very cool but sometimes not very practical) and do-all solutions that do nothing well, only to discover how expensive it was and that we have no money left for the lighter drones / light aircraft that were supposed to benefit from EMALS. CVN-78 would be great if it didn't cost $13B and have so many operational problems, but the Navy broke its own rules about introducing too many new technologies to a single platform and the results were inevitable.

    We should have lower-cost stealthy subsonic microfighters (X-36 style airframe, but with a pilot since AI is not ready for prime time and we need a pipeline of experienced pilots for eventual transition to our fancy F-35s flying top cover. It's a 21st century "A-4", if you will, purely designed to take care of anything that doesn't require a F-35 or Super Bug. It'll be armed with a pair of SDBs or Griffin or Javelin and a pair of Stingers. That's sufficient for attacking all targets except large ships / bunkers / aircraft shelters / IADS.

    Buying a bunch of cruise missiles and expensive strategic bombers or super carriers only helps when you can find worthwhile targets for them to strike (and a platoon of armored vehicles, an oil or munitions depot, AA gun, or an infantry formation doesn't really qualify). These stunningly capable machines can only ever be in one place at one time, so the fewer assets you have, the longer the war drags on. Capability is relative to how and where you can actually use it. F-35s aren't going to be attacking tanks unless there's nothing else better for them to do. Meanwhile, infantry still need fast jets to come over the beach to drop guided munitions on the enemy. The F-35 can do that, plus a whole lot more, but having 1 F-35 is not equal to having an entire squadron of small / agile / stealthy attack jets that we can afford to lose every so often.

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  18. Smaller and lower cost aircraft and weapons would bolster our numbers quite a lot. This is a need vs want dilemma. Do you need to outright sink an enemy frigate if smashing its radar or damaging its propeller with a mini torpedo will mission kill it? You can send a sub to mop up after its dead in the water and not capable of using its sensors. Stealthy cruise missiles are rather meaningless if I can afford to launch a dozen less costly weapons for the same money, because some will get through regardless of enemy air defenses. The first solid hit is an instant mission kill. Ukraine has proven that much. An enemy would go bankrupt trying to intercept a swarm of SDBs dropped from a dozen microfighters.

    The Sea Control Ship / escort carrier was the correct carrier concept for a shooting war that involves significant attrition. In WWII, we built over 100 aircraft carriers. We lost a dozen of them, including some of our much more expensive fleet carriers. How individually capable those escort carriers were was less important than simply "being there" and inflicting casualties. I think Taffy 3 did a good job proving that; and yes, I know they still took a beating. Mobile airfields only hold enemy targets at risk when there are enough of them to attack from multiple directions, losses can be replaced, and there are enough sensor platforms capable of finding targets for your strike group to hit. Otherwise, it's an anti-ship duel against aircraft or land-based launchers in most cases. The aircraft and man-made islands win those fights too frequently to pin our hopes to a half dozen super carriers never being seriously damaged in a shooting war with a peer-level adversary fielding thousands of anti-ship missiles and aircraft. Quality does count, but so does quantity.

    China's Navy is clearly a factor, but only because it's actually there in significant numbers and training (therefore capability) is improving. We don't need stealth destroyers, LCS, a new frigate (unless it has as many VLS cells as a destroyer and we can buy more of them for the same money spent), or any other wunderwaffe nonsense. F-35s are quite useful to have, but there aren't enough of them to go around and the cost ensures that there never will be. What we need are an arsenal of ships and weapons so deep as to either convince our enemies that they don't have sufficient firepower to sink enough of our ships to change the outcome of the war, or that their military will be utterly decimated if they're arrogant enough to try anyway. Despite their own mistakes, the Chinese are definitely not stupid. They understand all of this and are actively trying to overwhelm American and Taiwanese forces with numerical superiority and capabilities good enough to get the job done. Winning that fight means swearing off wonder weapons in favor of having enough ships / weapons / sensors / sailors trained to win that war.

    We should have a separate Wonder Weapon Budget to allow for experimentation without commitment to overpriced or under-performing weapons that don't provide enough meaningful improvement over what we already have. You cannot remain on the cutting edge by drowning in your operational budgetary requirements (buying things too expensive to be practical), either. We need tightly focused capabilities with an extreme emphasis on comprehensive training, all centered around purpose-built weapons. All potential capability is in vain if you fail to train to it or lack the logistical support to sustain it or cannot afford enough of the "goodness" to change outcomes.

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    Replies
    1. I'm assuming that this and the preceding comment are by the same anonymous author (please place a username at the end of comments, people!).

      That being the case, these comments are an odd collection of obvious statements, repetition of the overall blog, a bunch of incorrect statements, and a few good ideas that, again, largely repeat previous blog themes.

      The central thrust of the two comments seems to be to buy cheap and small. There are, however, problems with that concept. For example, 'micro fighters', whatever those might be, will, presumably, have insufficient range to be combat effective. And so on.

      Why don't you try commenting again but this time pick a single topic and offer some detail and, perhaps, some facts, examples, and logic to support your subject? I look forward to it.

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    2. ComNavOps,

      I accidentally clipped my user name (kbd512) when I had to break up my post. I haven't read your overall blog, so apologies if I was unaware of something you or someone else already stated elsewhere. I found your blog yesterday and I read this one post before responding. I read more of your posts since and some comments as well.

      The 747 cruise missile carrier proposal made me think of Boeing’s “micro fighter” concept from the early 1970s, which also intended to use converted 747s. Boeing wanted to air launch and recover 10 miniature fighter jets from their 747s. The fighter was able to fit inside the fuselage of a 747-200 with the passenger carrying amenities removed. Something that small with a non-afterburning engine and non-supersonic airframe would be a great addition to Navy carriers using modern sensors and guided weapons. Navy aircraft carriers don’t have to launch and recover jets at 30,000ft. Boeing tried to convince the Air Force to buy into their “airborne aircraft carrier” concept, which included their “micro fighter” concept, in a bid to render the Navy’s super carriers obsolete. The proposal never went anywhere since aerial refueling was seen as a better way to extend the range of the more capable jets that the Air Force already owned.

      A conga line of ships and trucks stretching all the way back to America would be required to supply enough fuel / food / spare parts / people to all those far-flung bases. That’s what we already have in “actual reality”, so we already know what the results would be under “alternate reality”. The logistical tail would consume a lot of the money needed for more aircraft. The Air Force would have more money for more planes, but most of them would be tankers and transports, rather than more fighters and bombers.

      Bases remain more vulnerable to a greater variety of attacks than ships because they’re on land and don’t move. You can layer as many air defenses as you want, but you’re still a minor variation on the Maginot Line theme. After WWII ended, there have been more successful attacks against American air bases than our missile-armed warships. The Navy has damaged or sunk more of their own ships than enemy action, despite continuously waging wars ever since WWII.

      Modernized 747s would burn 86.4Kgpd, if we could keep one in the air for 24 hours. USS Kitty Hawk burned 200Kgpd. CVW-5 consumed 94Kgpd during their 1999 deployment to the Persian Gulf, where they flew 1,300 combat missions. We can continuously operate a Kitty Hawk class super carrier and its air wing for an entire year, or 3.4 Boeing 747 cruise missile carriers for the same fuel burn. That’s 100Mgpy we have to provide, either way. Source is Federation of American Scientist’s article on CVW-5’s 1999 deployment to the Persian Gulf aboard Kitty Hawk. 3.4 not-so-cheap bomber substitutes is all we get to continuously use for the same fuel transport effort as an entire aircraft carrier and air wing. We have around 4,000 Tomahawks, so 56 of those 747 cruise missile carriers can be farmed out across the planet or 26 Ohio class cruise missile subs. Nuclear power may not save a penny in direct cost, but we’re no longer concerned with providing fuel for the ship. The only thing changing is how much logistical support needs to be provided and how expensive it is to do that.

      Physics and geography would also have to be revised under this alternate reality for the results to be any better than they are right now. Ocean going transport is very cheap and very flexible compared to the alternatives, so ships acting as mobile air bases still have a reason to exist.

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