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Thursday, April 27, 2023

How Many Shots?

The Iowa class battleship of WWII had a bit over 1200 16” shells of various types in its magazines.  In addition, it carried several thousand 5” shells.
 
Cruisers had some 1400 8” shells depending on class.
 
The Fletcher class carried around 575 5” shells per gun for a ship total of nearly 3000 shells.
 
That’s a LOT of striking power! 
 
Well, sure, you say, but given the accuracy of the time, most of the shells fired were doomed to miss so they had to have large magazines.  WWII naval gun accuracy against ships was generally something on the order of 5%-10%, depending on a host of factors.  Of course, in the land attack/bombardment mission, every shell was a hit against something (that’s what area bombardment is!). 
 
Today, we have precision guided weapons and we like to believe that almost every shot is a hit.  We don’t need large inventories of missiles and we certainly don’t need large magazines of shells for our 5” guns since we just don’t use them and, if we do, we have advanced, precision fire control systems to ensure amazing accuracy.
 
Um …    Why?  Why do we think we don’t need large inventories of weapons?  Why do we think our weapons will hit with unerring accuracy?  It’s certainly not because of any realistic live fire test or exercises that have proven the effectiveness of our weapons because we flat out don’t do those.  It’s not because of the extensive history of actual combat use because there isn’t much and the existing data (Hughes) demonstrates that the accuracy of offensive weapons is actually pretty poor.[2]  It’s not because of calm, objective, reasoned analysis because, except for this blog, no one attempts that.  It’s not because of an objective analysis of modern defenses that our weapons would face because if we did that we’d have to admit that it’s highly unlikely our weapons would be very effective.
 
It turns out that we believe in our weapon’s accuracy because that’s what the Navy and the manufacturers tells us and because that’s what we want to believe.  Of course, the defensive weapon manufacturers also tell us that their weapons will defend with unerring accuracy and invincibility.  Wait, what now?  How can offensive and defensive weapons both have unerring accuracy and flawless performance?  One of the two – or both – has to be wrong.  Elementary logic dictates that you can’t have 100% successful offensive strikes against 100% successful defensive platforms.
 
Uh, oh.  I don’t like where this is going.
 
Is it possible that our vaunted, unerring, offensive missiles may be less than 100% accurate and successful?  If so, that would suggest we need bigger magazines/inventories.  I wonder how much less than 100% effective our attacking missiles will be?  10%?  50%?  80%? 
 
Uh, oh.  I really don’t like where this is going!
 
Maybe we’d better take a brief foray into the font of wisdom … historical data.
 
Unfortunately, there is very little direct, relevant, historical data regarding the accuracy of modern offensive weapons.  That being the case, why, then, do we so firmly believe our weapons will perform as advertised?  Here’s some of the data that I’m aware of, in no particular order:
 
Vincennes – The Vincennes tragedy saw the cruiser fire around 100 5” shells at Boghammer vessels with no recorded hits.
 
Praying Mantis – The April 1988 attack by the US against Iranian forces demonstrated that 5” gun attacks against oil platforms were almost totally ineffective with almost all shots missing.  This may have been due to the lattice-like nature of the target more than any inherent inaccuracy of the guns.
 
INS Hanit – A Hezbollah launch of two (some reports say three) C80x missiles against the unsuspecting Israeli Sa’ar 5 frigate resulted in only a single glancing hit that did little damage.
 
HMS Sheffield – The Sheffield was hit by one of two Exocet missiles fired by Argentine aircraft.
 
SS Atlantic Conveyor – The merchant ship was hit by two Exocet missiles after they reportedly were decoyed away from HMS Hermes (or HMS Ambuscade or transport Regent, depending on sources) and subsequently locked onto the merchant vessel.[1]  That’s zero strikes on the initial target and two strikes on a subsequent, fortuitous target.
 
HMS Invincible – A single Exocet was launched at the Invincible but missed.
 
USS Mason – The Burke class destroyer, USS Mason, was supposedly attacked several times by missiles (C-80x?) fired from Yemen.  No hits were recorded.  It should be noted that the attacks are unverified (see (“Yemen Missile Attacks”).
 
Latakia and Baltim - Israeli missile boats engaged Syrian and Egyptian boats (see, “Missile Boat Battles –Latakia and Baltim”).  Exact missile numbers for launches and hits are unavailable but the overall missile performance of the Gabriel Mk1 and SS-N-2 Styx missiles appears to have been around 10% effective though far more effective on the Israeli side than the Syrian/Egyptian side.
 
Hughes[2] (compiled by John Schulte) presented the data for every known anti-ship missile attack (222 ASCMs from 1967 to 1992), broken down by the defender’s status at the time of attack.  For defenseless ships, primarily large commercial vessels, the probability of hit = 91%.  Against defendable targets (ships capable of defending themselves but that did not), the probability of hit = 68%.  Finally, against defended targets (ships that attempted some form of defense), the probability of hit = 26%.
 
Noting the 26% probability of hit against defended targets and noting that very few defensive missile intercepts have ever been attempted, we can conclude that most defensive efforts are electronic warfare (EW) in nature.  Thus, the vast majority of that diminished 26% hit probability is likely due to EW defensive efforts.  When actual, active, surface to air missile defenses are added to that, the 26% probability of hit is going to drop substantially to something on the order of 10% or less.  Those 8 rack mounted anti-ship missiles that the US is so fond of, then, are going to be very, very lucky to generate even a single hit.
 
Iran-Iraq Tanker War – This would provide an interesting data set for missile effectiveness against unresisting targets but I’ve been unable to find any data on the number of hits/launches.
 
 
Conclusion
 
We see, then, that the historical record across multiple generations of offensive weapons shows that none are particularly effective.  That should tell us something about our habit of providing ships with just two 4-missile, bolt-on, racks of anti-ship missiles (Mk141 Harpoon launcher or similar) as our main offensive firepower.
 
As our fathers in WWII understood, large magazines are necessary to ensure success (reminder – we’re talking about offensive weapons; large magazines are not indicated for defensive weapons). 
 
So, what does all this mean on a practical basis?  It means that we need much larger offensive magazines and inventories if we’re to be combat effective.  Specifically,
 
  • We need more SSGNs due to their large missile inventory.
  • We need more offensive missiles, particularly anti-ship missiles on Burkes/Constellations.
  • This demonstrates that the Marine’s tiny missile shooting units are worthless since they lack the salvo density to be combat effective.
 
We need to remember that offense wins wars, not defense.  We’ve become a defensive Navy (see, “Defensive Mindset” and “MoreOffense, Please”) and we need to refocus on offense which means significantly increasing our offensive magazines and inventories.
 
The truism, ‘Attack Effectively, First’, reminds us what’s important but we can only attack effectively if we have sufficient offensive weapons.
 
 
 
________________________________
 
[1]https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/falklands-war-argentina-used-french-jets-sink-two-british-ships-186710
 
[2]”Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat”, Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Naval Institute Press, 2000, ISBN 1-55750-392-3, p.275-276.

71 comments:

  1. Shoving more missiles on already expensive platforms ahs some value, but you will not grow the fleet and you are buying shots at high cost. Speed to reload and bring the rounds up is required. Yes, SSGN's stealth has value, but more won't provide growth or balance. The whole 4 cells in a shipping container is really growing on me although I would also like some fast ships to bring up more VLS rounds from the rear. A fast ferry based LUSV and containerships would help here. Also, fast supply vessels, our ready made patrol boat replacement.

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    1. "Also, fast supply vessels, our ready made patrol boat replacement."

      hear! hear!

      I started a lengthy discussion on the NavWeaps forum about this,

      https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/warships1discussionboards/fsvs-as-lcs-streetfighters-t48083.html

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    2. "Shoving more missiles on already expensive platforms ahs some value, but you will not grow the fleet and you are buying shots at high cost."

      Growing the fleet was not called for in the post. Adding bolt-on Mk141 launchers is a very cheap way of acquiring additional firepower although it is constrained by existing deck space.

      "SSGN's stealth has value, but more won't provide growth or balance."

      ????? Growth? Balance????? I have no idea what you're driving at, here. Try again?

      "4 cells in a shipping container"

      Again, not sure what you're referring to. Are you talking about four containerized missiles on a Mk141 rack? Are you talking about four missiles hidden in a Conex shipping container on some sort of Q-ship?

      "fast ships to bring up more VLS rounds from the rear. A fast ferry based LUSV and containerships would help here."

      Have you thought this through? How many missiles could a USV carry? Enough to be worth the fuel, support, and time? How would missile containers (whatever those might be) be unloaded and then loaded onto the warships? Where would this occur?

      You need to put some more thought into this.

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    3. "Are you talking about four missiles hidden in a Conex shipping container on some sort of Q-ship?"

      The russians liked to shill conex AShMs for Q-ship purposes, but I always thought that was unrealistic. A proposal I've seen from a different nation was that conex AShMs are a quick way to upgun smaller OPVs/corvettes to be relevant in a defensive flight. It's why you see a lot of OPV/patrol boat designs with flight decks - you can stage conex missiles on the flight deck and quickly upgun your boat to fire at the enemy.

      This is, admittedly, more relevant for the smaller navies who can't afford to have DDGs and CGs like America. Of course, sending AShM OPVs against PLAN DDGs is going to result in dead boats, but the ASEAN Premium nations are willing to trade OPVs and corvettes for Chinese DDGs. China's much richer than ASEAN Premium, but it can't afford to trade DDGs for OPVs, not when it still has to deal with America.

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    4. "conex AShMs are a quick way to upgun smaller OPVs/corvettes"

      How do you propose providing targeting? A million mile missile is useless with a horizon range targeting capability.

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    5. We struggle with how to rearm. A remote shooter is the answer and 4 in a shipping container means we could be using a container port to get it done, opening up many more fast options for ship rearming.

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    6. I'm not sure why you're focused on reloading/rearming. That's not really an issue. Naval groups don't stand in one place trying to launch missiles in a never-ending stream. They go out (with the number of missiles needed for the mission), execute a mission, and return to base. At that point, reloading is a leisurely process and occurs while the next mission is being prep'ed and planned. The entire history of naval combat demonstrates that this is so.

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    7. Conex AShM OPVs are getting their targeting from the same place Chinese missile boats are getting their targeting. All of ASEAN Premium's nations have some form of MPA: their MPAs won't live long enough to give midcourse guidance, but they can call in missiles before they die. (The chinese seem quite confident they themselves can pull that off with their fighters and MPAs calling in ASBMs).

      Anyway, the horizon is still a massive range increase over the typical engagement range afforded to autocannon-armed OPVs. And it's not like these poorer nations are any worser off.

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    8. "it's not like these poorer nations are any worser off."

      For a poorer nation, operating in home waters, this may make sense; for the US ... not so much.

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    9. Well yes, that's why that's the intended customer user base. I don't see conex AShMs being offered to the USN because manufacturers know if the USN needs additional missiles it'll just buy more Harpoon/LRASM/NSM launchers.

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    10. "Conex AShM OPVs are getting their targeting from the same place Chinese missile boats are getting their targeting. ... some form of MPA"

      I have no idea what 'ASEAN Premium' is. Setting that aside ...

      Maritime patrol aircraft (I assume that's what you mean by 'MPA') are non-survivable in a war. They're large, slow, non-stealthy and will have a combat lifespan measured in minutes. They won't be providing any targeting.

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    11. ASEAN Premium is a regional in-joke for the richer member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations - Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand; corvette navies for the most part that have maritime patrol aircraft and fighters with antiship missiles. (Singapore skews this average, being the best-equipped and best trained military in the region). The geography of the region means any push the Chinese Navy does against any of ASEAN Premium's nations puts them within range of land-based fighters, which are a further complication.

      "They're large, slow, non-stealthy and will have a combat lifespan measured in minutes. They won't be providing any targeting."

      The Chinese seem quite confident they can use their land-based MPAs and carrier fighters to call in ASBM strikes from far inland, and that they can provide targeting to their missile boat fleet. Are they mistaken? Or do they know something we all don't?

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    12. "Are they mistaken? Or do they know something we all don't?"

      China understands that when conflict with one of those third tier countries comes, China will establish total air supremacy on the first day and THAT will allow China to use MPA aircraft while denying MPA to their enemy.

      The situation changes drastically when China goes up against the US who has large numbers of advanced fighters and F-22/35 stealth fighters. China won't be able to use MPA aircraft outside the SCS and will be running risks trying to use them even inside the SCS.

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    13. Okay, but shouldn't that also cut the same way against the chinese? Chinese MPAs likewise are large, slow, non-stealthy, and are sitting ducks for long range SAMs, let alone stealth fighters - so shouldn't they have a similarly low combat lifespan versus American forces? But Chinese MPAs and Medium Altidude Long Endurance drones - clones of the MQ-4 Triton - are a key aspect of their A2/AD strategy, and they seem to expect their MPAs to live long enough to call in ASBMs and provide targeting to their missile boats and SAGs.

      It's questionable whether China will be able to establish total air supremacy over Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia or Indonesia, not with a single carrier. Vietnam's at the edge of unrefueled range for land-based fighters, and Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia can only be threatened by a PLAN carrier's fighters - I don't think 30 Flankers is enough for them to secure air superiority, not when we need all of 40 Hornets to achieve some measure of air superiority - and as I recall you noted some years ago, we would really need to group multiple carriers and their air wings to secure total air superiority, so that really means we'd need 80 or more fighters.

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    14. "shouldn't they have a similarly low combat lifespan versus American forces?"

      I just answered this but I'll repeat myself,

      "The situation changes drastically when China goes up against the US who has large numbers of advanced fighters and F-22/35 stealth fighters. China won't be able to use MPA aircraft outside the SCS and will be running risks trying to use them even inside the SCS."

      "It's questionable whether China will be able to establish total air supremacy over Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia or Indonesia"

      None of those countries are on China's immediate 'to do' list. In another ten years when China has several carriers then the situation may change.

      "Vietnam's at the edge of unrefueled range for land-based fighters"

      ???? Much of Vietnam is about 100 miles from the major air and naval bases at Hainan. That's very short range for aircraft. Vietnam SHARES a northern border with China. You can't get any closer than that !

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  2. Surface combatants in our navy aren't primary ASuW assets, but the FFGs will have 16xNSMs. Not sure that makes much sense tactically, unless we build A LOT more of them. They're still primarily escorts.

    The SSGNs are massively expensive for what little they carry. Their missile inventory really isn't that large in the grand scheme of things. They only made sense when we had Ohios with time left on their hulls and reactors that could be cheaply converted. They don't make sense now that we'd have to build new Columbias at $8B a pop. I'm more inclined to buy more B-21s instead.

    The Marines appear to recognize EABOs aren't great shooters and say they're focusing more on ISR.

    There does appear to be some recognition that we need more anti-ship missiles, but ramp up still feels sluggish.

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    1. "Surface combatants in our navy aren't primary ASuW assets"

      That's certainly true today. The fact of the matter is that we don't really have any effective anti-surface capability.

      "I'm more inclined to buy more B-21s instead."

      Given the very remote basing, bombers aren't really tactically responsive. By the time a mission could be organized and executed, any target would have long since vanished.

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    2. "Given the very remote basing, bombers aren't really tactically responsive. By the time a mission could be organized and executed, any target would have long since vanished."

      Depends on the situation. The pacing threat appears to be an amphibious invasion or blockade of Taiwan. If so, the enemy ships really can't go far. They will be clustered around landing beaches or patrolling the blockade zone.

      Certainly attacking random, small units that pop up out of nowhere isn't their forte. Perhaps that is best left to tactical airpower or submarines.

      For that, I go into another potential option on that NavWeaps thread above: FSVs as Streetfighters. They have the benefits of potentially low cost, useful range, and relatively large payloads. Organic ISR would have to be via UAV or perhaps helicopter.



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    3. " They have the benefits of potentially low cost, useful range, and relatively large payloads."

      I keep looking for useful applications for small vessels and I have yet to find any.

      The main drawback is the lack of range which, given the lack of viable, survivable forward basing in a war, is a severe problem. In a Taiwan invasion scenario, we'd lose Guam in the first hour which leaves little or nothing in the way of bases within useful range.

      The second drawback is the lack of useful weapons load. Unless one postulates a massive vessel, packed with weapons, a FSV can mount 8 (perhaps 16) anti-ship missiles and launchers usefully. We need on the order of hundreds of missiles attacking simultaneously to overwhelm any significant surface group's defenses. That's not going to come from random FSVs. We could organize large squadrons but then they become a trackable, defenseless target to be destroyed.

      Another drawback is networking. Unless we buy into the idiotic distributed lethality concept, FSVs would have to be intimately networked in order to have any chance to be successful and expecting to successfully operate a large, wireless network in enemy waters in the face of EW and cyber is pure wishful thinking.

      Logistics are a drawback. It requires just as large an overseas logistics system to support and maintain a fleet of small vessels as large ones and the payoff in combat effectiveness is much less.

      And so on.

      So many people are enamored with small vessels but without working through the CONOPS and logistics. When you do, it quickly becomes evident that the concept is unworkable. Small vessels are possible useful in home waters but not as an overseas fleet. Don't feel bad, Hughes ignores this, too.

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    4. "potentially low cost"

      Once you adapt a FSV to naval combat use, the cost skyrockets. You'd need to add the missiles, launchers, various EO/IR/radar sensors, fire control software, fire control stations/computers/compartments, CIWS/SeaRAM(?unless you want a truly defenseless vessel?), firefighting and damage control systems (even if it's only to allow the crew to abandon ship when hit), communications suites for targeting/data transfer, networking systems for off-board connectivity, thermal protection for the ship during weapons launch, utilities to supply electricity, cooling, communications, enhanced berthing, food, water, etc. for crew needs, etc. Nothing about that screams potentially low cost. You're looking at 2x-3x the base cost. Toss in a UAV/helo and the costs double again!

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    5. The Overlord FSVs demonstrated a range of 4,400nmi. 3,500nm+ should be doable at 24+kts with light loads, perhaps more.

      Pick a Filipino gulf, say Leyte. It's outside most of the Chinese A2/AD range. FSV squadrons and their logistics can stage from there. Run them along the east coast of the Philippines, forcing Chinese ISR to overfly the islands and potential EABO air defenses there, up to Basco or Itbayat, using the islands as cover. From there they could fire on ships operating east or south of Taiwan. That round trip is around 1300nmi, easily within FSV range.

      Another possibility is operating from Singapore up through the Spratleys, only a 1,700nmi round trip.

      These ships are rated to carry up to 300 tons on their mission deck. 8 NSMs only weigh 8 tons total. They have plenty of payload capacity. Each could carry a LOT of NSMs, but it's better to build more FSVs to carry a modest number of missiles than try to pack a lot of missiles on a handful of ships. 10 FSVs carrying 16 missiles each is 160 missiles.

      Arm the FSVs with modest self defenses consisting of lots of chaff and decoys and point defense systems like SeaRAM/Phalanx. Some could carry ESSM in the same way the Stanflex 300s carried them as modules on deck. On could include a DDG or two for area air defense, but that might be a more tempting target.

      ISR would have to be part networking, but they do have capacity to carry small UAVs like Integrator, V-BAT. A specialized aviation variant could carry Fire Scout or lillypad a MH-60 with a pad and fueling (see the various yacht support vessels with helo pads that are based on FSV designs).

      The vaunted Russian EW and cyber hasn't shut down Ukrainian comms. Far from it. I don't see how the Chinese could shut down the much larger Pacific theater. Local disruptions, sure. Certain systems that prove vulnerable to cyber, yes. Generic lack of comms, no.

      I don't feel bad at all, thanks. I haven't ignored any of it.

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    6. "You're looking at 2x-3x the base cost. Toss in a UAV/helo and the costs double again!"

      The base cost of an FSV is around $30M. Double that is $60M - still dirt cheap.

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    7. "Overlord FSVs demonstrated a range of 4,400nmi. 3,500nm+ should be doable at 24+kts with light loads"

      I haven't seen any published specs on range but the rest of that statement is heavy on wishful thinking. Assuming your number is correct and that the 4400 nm range is at a cruising speed of, say, 15 kts, there is no possible way the range only drops to 3500 nm at 24 kts.

      As you know, range is meaningless unless you're conducting a one way trip. Radius is what's relevant in combat. So, even using your number, the radius is 2200 nm and I'm sure that's very lightly loaded. Maintaining a minimal fuel reserve of, say, 20%, that drops the combat radius down 1760 nm. Add a worthwhile payload and that range drops, perhaps, another 20% to 1400 nm. Now, that 1400 nm has to be used to get to and from the operating area which leaves very little fuel to actually conduct the operation. This is one of the serious problems with the LCS and a small FSV doesn't make it any better.

      "Pick a Filipino gulf,"

      Sure, why not? It's not like the Chinese would conduct an invasion of Taiwan and monitor the nearby Philippines for US activity, right? Plus, the Philippines are a sure bet to jump into a China-US war on our side rather than opt for neutrality, right?

      This is exactly what I encounter every time small vessel discussions arise. Proponents have to stipulate so many fantasy-level conditions to make it work that it's just pure wishful thinking.

      "The base cost of an FSV is around $30M."

      Not when the Navy spec's it! The Light Amphibious Warship (LAW), which is essentially what you're describing but without any of the weapons, sensors, comms, etc. is estimated to cost $100M and every Navy estimate doubles in cost very quickly so we're looking at $200M, at least. Now add in all the stuff you've called for and it would be something on the order of $500M !

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    8. The Navy bought two FSVs for the MUSV program for $30M each. The LAW is larger, and not based on a commercial design.

      I agree it could be double or triple that - $60-90M. Still pretty cheap, comparatively.

      What I spec'd out doesn't have to be on every vessel. Each doesn't need a helo pad and ESSM and a VTOL UAV. We can build variants. Some may be more expensive than the others.

      A combat radius of 1,400nmi is perfectly fine for Leyte to Basco (700nmi one way).

      "Monitoring the nearby Philippines" is not a simple task. Have you looked at a map of the area? Plus, Leyte is 1,000nmi from the nearest Chinese air base. They don't have much that can reach that far.

      We have some closer cooperation with Philippines now than we used to, but if they wanted to stay out of the war, we could just refuel outside their territorial limit, or just do it without their permission.

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    9. "The Navy bought two FSVs for the MUSV program for $30M each. "

      I don't know which specific vessels you're referring to. As I understand it, the Nomad and Ranger were converted from existing commercial vessels and were purchased already built and used. I have not seen costs on either. If you have a link to purchase costs, please share it.

      "A combat radius of 1,400nmi is perfectly fine for Leyte"

      Do you really believe China will allow us to operate from the Philippines? Do you really believe the Philippines will side with us in a war with China? They barely tolerate us now!

      "They don't have much that can reach that far."

      Other than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, sub-launched cruise missiles, carrier aircraft, submarines, bombers, and, with a bit of tanking, any aircraft.

      They also have multiple bases on artificial islands throughout the SCS.

      Again, the degree of fantasy conditions required to construct a viable CONOPS for small vessels is stunning.

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    10. How will China prevent us from operating in the eastern Philippines? Are they going to invade Samar and Leyte? Are they going to dedicate a carrier battlegroup to hunt a bunch of FSVs? They only have a bit of tanking period and hunting a bunch of FSVs is probably not high on their list (not to mention tankers are prime targets for our airpower). They don't have unlimited numbers of ballistic or cruise missiles and I doubt will want to fire one or more of their <100 DF-21 ASBMs at EACH FSV. And if they do, great! Better at them than at a CVBG. Their subs will be busy trying to keep our SSNs off of their invasion force.

      You seem willing to grant the Chinese godlike and unlimited powers of ISR, EW, comms, C&C, and strike. Assuming the enemy is 100 feet tall is just as bad as underestimating them.

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    11. "How will China prevent us from operating in the eastern Philippines?"

      Aside from all the weapons and assets I listed that can be brought to bear, China is far more likely to obtain Philippines' co-operation or neutrality than we are. Either of those options prevents us from using Philippines as a base unless you're advocating the US invading Philippines.

      "Are they going to dedicate a carrier battlegroup to hunt a bunch of FSVs?"

      If the FSVs can hurt them then of course they would. If the FSVs can't hurt them then the FSVs are a waste of time. Which is it?

      "They only have a bit of tanking"

      We have no carrier tanking and yet we turned front line Hornets into tankers. Why wouldn't China do the same or perhaps use some of their hundreds of retired/reserve aircraft as tankers?

      "doubt will want to fire one or more of their <100 DF-21 ASBMs at EACH FSV."

      Of course they wouldn't launch at the FSVs. Kill the base and the FSVs die. Torpedo the base supply ships and the base and FSVs die. I know you understand basic operations so why are you ignoring elementary operations theory?

      "just as bad as underestimating them."

      Which is what you're doing!

      If you want to be taken seriously, devise a CONOPS for FSVs that doesn't require fantasy level assumptions. Come up with realistic basing, logistics, and support. Come up with realistic combat tactics that don't depend on a regional, perfect network and mythical, undetectable surveillance assets. Until you do that, you're just engaging in fantasy level wishful thinking. You're doing exactly what the Navy is doing when they jump on, say, the unmanned wagon with zero realistic exercises demonstrating any usefulness whatsoever.

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    12. "Are they going to invade Samar and Leyte?"

      Interesting that you ask that question given that you proposed us doing exactly that:

      "just do it without their permission."

      That's an invasion!

      A small amount of logical consistency would bolster your credibility!

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    13. This is the FSV design we are talking about:
      Seacor's data - original owner
      https://seacormarine.com/vessel/ava-j-mccall/

      Incat Crowther - The designer:
      https://www.incatcrowther.com/ships/workboats/crewboat-and-fast-supply/ic15007/

      Gulfcraft LLC only posts details on the prior ships these were developed from, but it provides a lot of additional detail:
      https://gulfcraft.com/crew-supply-boats/200-class-200-209/najla-mccall

      Note on that last one that it can still make 24.5 knots at 350 DWT. Commercial ships that use waterjets play to their strengths. Slowing LCS down to 14 knots to go 3500nm was dumb.

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    14. "How will China prevent us from operating in the eastern Philippines? Are they going to invade Samar and Leyte? Are they going to dedicate a carrier battlegroup to hunt a bunch of FSVs?"

      The very presence of a chinese carrier battlegroup in the SCS, acting as a fleet in being, will by necessity constrain US naval movements. At least one USN CSG is going to be detached to hunt the PLAN CVBG, because otherwise that PLAN carrier group is going to wreck havoc against american material shipping transiting the SCS to Taiwan. Convoys need escort. Logistics at sea has to occur at a further offset. All air and sea movement has to be tactical.

      The PLAN CVBG doesn't need to fire a shot to constrain the USN's movements and operations.

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    15. You misunderstand, we don't have to set foot on Philippine soil to do this. Just would be nice to use a protected gulf to refuel from logistics ships.

      If they won't let us, Palau to Basco along the coast is only 1,100 nmi. The FSVs could do this too, but they'd have less time on station.

      Chinese aircraft would have to violate Philippine airspace to reach them. Would the Philippines sit idly by while that happens, after all of the bullying they receive from China? Or are they more likely to look the other way if we use one of their gulfs or bays?

      We just announced a deal with the Philippines to use four more bases. Do the Chinese have this level of access?

      https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3349257/philippines-us-announce-locations-of-four-new-edca-sites/

      All of this would happen in the context of a war over Taiwan. This wouldn't be the only thing happening. The main Chinese effort would be in and around the island of Taiwan, not far off in the Philippine littorals. If the Chinese divert aircraft, subs or carriers to hunt these small, inexpensive ships far away from their main effort, at the fringes of their A2/AD zone, then that's practically as good as getting hits with the FSV's missiles. It means our bombers and subs will have an easier time reaching the invasion force. It means we can single out their tanker, strike aircraft and ships far away from their bases and closer to ours. It means any CVGB they send is losing protection of airpower from the mainland.

      So let 'em come.

      Delete
    16. "we don't have to set foot on Philippine soil to do this. Just would be nice to use a protected gulf to refuel from logistics ships."

      That's an invasion! Territorial waters are Philippine 'soil' ! If you're beyond 12 miles, it's not really protected water, is it?

      "Chinese aircraft would have to violate Philippine airspace to reach them."

      That's hilarious! They don't care about anyone's airspace now and yet you think they'll respect Philippine airspace during a war??? Seriously, that's your best, yet! I'm still chuckling!

      "We just announced a deal with the Philippines to use four more bases."

      That's a nice baby step for us but they aren't bases for us. Philippine constitution forbids foreign troops. We're allowed to TEMPORARILY house small units during exercises. Not a base.

      "that's practically as good as getting hits"

      Considering that the Chinese forces in the region would vastly outnumber us AND have much shorter distances to cover, that's some major, Pentagon-level, delusional thinking.

      Just a related thought ... your FSV concept sounds pretty much exactly what the LCS was supposed to do and that turned out to be a disaster. One of the (many!) main reasons for failure was the inability to establish suitable forward basing and logistics support and yet you think we'll have no problem establishing basing and logistics support for FSVs, in another country who isn't going to allow us to be there, DURING A WAR! Again, Pentagon-level delusion. Let's take the LCS model that failed AND DO IT AGAIN!

      Delete
    17. Forward basing has never been an LCS issue, it was a plan they didn't do because the ships had problems and their maintenance strategy was ridiculous.

      Delete
    18. "Forward basing has never been an LCS issue"

      Of course it has! We were unable to work out a viable scheme for peacetime forward maintenance and support (other than a couple of pre-existing maritime facilities in friendly countries and even those didn't work out well due to costs and manpower issues) so one can only conclude that suitable wartime facilities would be even more scarce.

      Delete
    19. "That's an invasion! Territorial waters are Philippine 'soil' ! If you're beyond 12 miles, it's not really protected water, is it?"

      So we'll be in a WAR with a nuclear-armed superpower, who will sink one or more of our carriers in the first few days, where we are launching hundreds of missiles at their invasion force and they are bombing our forward bases in Japan and Guam, but you're worried about breaking the 12-mile territorial limit of the Philippines?

      Umm.. Ok? I suspect we've done far worse in the past under similar circumstances.

      Regardless, as I said, we could sortie from Palau too. They seem eager to let us build basing there.

      The LCS wasn't supposed to do any of what I've mentioned. It was an ASW, MIW and anti-small boat speedboat. It's failures had little to nothing to do with forward basing or logistics.

      Delete
    20. "you're worried about breaking the 12-mile territorial limit of the Philippines?"

      Clearly you're not which puts on the same level as China. Well, good to know where you stand !

      "It's failures had little to nothing to do with forward basing or logistics."

      You don't see many LCS apologists around anymore - not even the Navy. You're letting it all hang out, today !

      Delete
    21. You know what, I don't think they'd even really need to "invade" the Philippines. These ships are designed to transfer personnel, cargo, fuel and mud to oil rigs in the middle of the ocean. The all have DP2 dynamic positioning to hold station in the middle of nowhere. They could meet a tanker at an arbitrary point in the ocean and refuel probably in anything short of a Typhoon.

      Delete
    22. "meet a tanker"

      Because of the relatively short range of an FSV, you expose the tanker closer to the combat area. China would love to slip an SSK into the area and wait for one of our few and precious tankers to come along!

      This is the kind of thing that a CONOPS would address and which you've declined to do.

      Delete
    23. We are designing a smaller tanker for basically this purpose.

      Delete
    24. "The SSGNs are massively expensive for what little they carry."

      That's an odd statement given that they carry 154 Tomahawk missiles which is far more than any other platform.

      As far as cost, cost is irrelevant. It's value that's important and the value of a stealthy, nearly undetectable platform that can go anywhere with a high degree of safety and launch a massive strike on its own is priceless.

      As I say, an odd statement.

      Delete
  3. We seem to be accepting that the expected performance of very exquisite and expensive missiles is not comparable to their cost. If so, perhaps we'd be better served with dramatically higher numbers of less exquisite, good enough, and much less expensive weapons.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "perhaps we'd be better served with dramatically higher numbers of less exquisite, good enough, and much less expensive weapons."

      An overarching theme of the blog!

      Delete
  4. Adoption of the long range anti-ship missile (LRASM) should help, as it can be launched from the Mk 41 VLS. Over eight missiles could be carried. Yes, this would mean fewer Standards, Tomahawks, and VL-ASROCs. The mix would have to be based on mission requirements.

    The post started out discussing guns. Those who don't like battleships say that modern, precision weapons make the 16-inch guns unnecessary. One counter argument is that often the enemy's general position may be known, but his precise location is not known. In that scenario, precision weapons aren't useful and big guns excel.

    Mark Stille's book US Navy Cold War Guided Missile Cruisers says in Vietnam the cruiser "Boston fired so many rounds her 8-inch gun barrels were worn smooth." Frigates, destroyers, cruisers, and even a battleship put a lot of artillery on enemy positions in that war. Unfortunately, I don't have the source handy, but quite some months ago, I read that an estimated 1 million artillery rounds had been expended in the war in Ukraine. This blog warns against reading too much from specific details in that conflict, and that is understandable. But we probably can agree that if we (Heaven forbid) get into a shooting war with a peer nation, we will fire a lot of shells and missiles.

    Regarding the USS Vincennes versus speedboats, we might not be able to say the Russian AK-130 with its dual 130 mm guns and theoretical rate of fire of 40 rounds per minute per gun *and* its Russian fire control system would have done better than the Mk 45. But couldn't we develop a 5-inch gun with less dwell time? There have been a lot of developments in automation since the 1970s. We should be able to develop a naval gun firing over 20 rounds per minute that functions reliably. (Sorry from moving from the topic of magazine capacity to firepower.)

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "Adoption of the long range anti-ship missile (LRASM) should help"

      In theory, yes. However, the Navy appears to have suspended active development of a VLS-LRASM.

      "we will fire a lot of shells and missiles."

      An absolute certainty!

      "we might not be able to say the Russian AK-130 with its dual 130 mm guns and theoretical rate of fire of 40 rounds per minute per gun *and* its Russian fire control system would have done better than the Mk 45."

      I love the AK-130 ... on paper. As far as I know, there is zero real world experience with the AK-130 so we have no idea how it would perform. The Mk45 sounds wonderful ... on paper.

      I don't think there's anything inherently wrong with the Mk45. I just think it's an incredibly challenging task to hit a target miles away with a naval gun. Modern sensors and fire control have clearly not improved the accuracy much over WWII performance. It's just a very difficult task!

      "develop a 5-inch gun with less dwell time?"

      I'm not sure what you mean by dwell time. The phrase, 'dwell time', is one I coined in describing the phenomenon of having to stay on target against swarm boats longer then necessary because their incapacitation is very difficult to demonstrate. Note, the dwell time (as I use the term) is zero if a 5" gun actually hits a swarm boat. It would be catastrophically destroyed. The reality is that a 5" gun, barring the occasional dumb luck hit, just can't reliably hit a small boat target.

      If you have some other meaning for dwell time, please clarify.

      Delete
    2. Your definition is how I take dwell time. I recall you writing a post or comment about the Bofors 57 mm gun not being good with dwell time in part because of its inaccuracy and also because though it has a relatively high rate of fire, the 57 mm shells aren't lethal enough.

      I was thinking of a crew firing a 5-inch gun at a moving target, such as a speedboat, sea drone, or even an aerial target such as a cheap, slow kamikaze drone. The first shot might not be that close to the target, and even if the shrapnel from an air burst hurts someone or damages the target, the target could remain in the fight. The gun crew then adjusts, fires again, and perhaps this time the explosion occurs on or closer to the target, either destroying or disabling it. The process of observing, adjusting, and firing (observe, orient, decide, act?--OODA?) should be easier to do with a more rapid rate of fire.

      The Mark 45's predecessor, the Mk 42, had a rate of fire of 40 rounds per minute but this was reduced to 28 rounds to improve reliability. After all these decades, I hope we can develop a 5-inch gun with a higher rate of fire without sacrificing reliably. There is a 5-inch (127 mm gun that is advertised as firing 32 rounds per minute.

      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otobreda_127/64

      I don't know whether this weapon works reliably at that rate of fire, or if it has ever been used in combat. But suppose we can develop a 5-inch gun that fires 32-40 rounds per minute with at least the reliability of the Mk 45 at 20 rounds per minute. A mount with a single barrel could be used on large Coast Guard cutters and some other ships. A turret with two 5-inch guns (a western counterpart to the AK-130) could be the big guns on destroyers and the secondary guns on cruisers and battleships.

      Would that be worth something to you? Do you think that would be a good idea?

      (I bring all this up because swarm attacks are a definite possibility. I would not deny that rockets and missiles have a place in repelling swarm attacks, but missiles are expensive. Shells are relatively cheap, as are some of the weapons that could be used for swarm attacks.)

      Delete
    3. DPICM ammo for the 5” gun!

      Also goes back to the point CNO makes that one gun isn’t enough. Barrages of any ammo are more effective with more barrels giving you better saturation of the target.

      Delete
    4. "The process of observing, adjusting, and firing (observe, orient, decide, act?--OODA?) should be easier to do with a more rapid rate of fire."

      No, each shell/shot is its own, self-contained event. I'm not going to list all the factors that go into accuracy but it is clear that there are more factors, with wider variabilities, than our fire control systems can deal with - hence, the almost complete lack of accuracy!

      Therefore, faster firing doesn't increase the accuracy a single bit (maybe makes it worse due to barrel heating, wear, warping, etc.?). What rate of fire does is simply offer more chances for a 'dumb luck' (which is almost what fire control is!) hit. That's why we see rates of fire of 1000-6000 or so rounds/min in CIWS type guns. Each individual shot will be inaccurate but, with enough of them, law of averages guarantees that one will be in an effective location if you fire enough shots.

      " Do you think that would be a good idea?"

      I'm for anything that increases the number of weapons!

      "missiles are expensive"

      NO!!! Yes, when you go to the neighborhood hardware store to buy an anti-ship missile, the price tag may seem large (look for sales!) but when you compare the cost of the firing platform that missile is saving, the cost is miniscule. That million dollar missile expended against a $50K speedboat may seem like an expensive overkill but if it saved a $2B Burke, it was well worth it. NEVER look at just the cost; look at what the cost accomplishes!

      Delete
    5. "DPICM"

      This is a very small sub-munition that would not produce a catastrophic kill and would not help the dwell time issue.

      Delete
    6. I recognize what you're saying in your last paragraph. I did write "I would not deny that rockets and missiles have a place in repelling swarm attacks." The right weapon for the job will depend on the type of threat, how many of them there are, where the threat is, and how many missiles, shells, or other weapons are in your magazines.

      Delete
    7. "No, each shell/shot is its own, self-contained event."

      Understood, but would not more events help?

      "Therefore, faster firing doesn't increase the accuracy a single bit (maybe makes it worse due to barrel heating, wear, warping, etc.?)."

      That's an important point. The most obvious countermeasure is water cooling. The RAND report Naval Surface Fire Support: An Assessment of Requirements offers several other options on pages 54-56 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4300/RR4351/RAND_RR4351.pdf

      shape memory materials
      graphene gun barrels or barrel liners
      self-healing materials to coat the interior of a barrel
      bulk metallic glasses/amorphous metals

      Maybe realistic testing would find that 5-inch gun turret with two guns sending a total of 64-80 shells downrange per minute won't be as effective at stopping swarm attacks as I hope. But if the barrel preservation technologies mentioned above actually work, they will make it less likely that a ship will shoot its barrels smooth in a conflict. This is useful for land-based artillery as well.

      Delete
    8. "The right weapon for the job will depend on the type of threat, how many of them there are, where the threat is, and how many missiles, shells, or other weapons are in your magazines."

      Perhaps more important than any of the factors you listed for the 'right weapon' choice is the value of the target being defended. A Burke or carrier justifies the use of the absolute, can't fail, cost-be-damned choice of weapon. We're protecting a mega-billion dollare asset!

      Delete
    9. "won't be as effective at stopping swarm attacks as I hope."

      You might find it instructive to look at some of the many videos on YouTube that show gunnery exercises against swarm targets (speed boats). They're for smaller caliber guns than 5" which means they have much higher rates of fire. They uniformly show astounding inaccuracy (spread of shot as shown by splashes) and long dwell time and that's under the most perfect circumstances possible.

      Delete
    10. An enemy may attack with dozens, perhaps hundreds of inexpensive aerial and sea drones. These cheap weapons may have small warheads, but given how lightly protected modern warships are they could still kill sailors and cause lots of damage to the ships. Many, perhaps all of a ship's missiles could be expended intercepting the drone warm. At least that would be the goal of the attack. The enemy could then launch a large salvo of anti-ship missiles.

      Carlton's proposed NAVROC may be better at countering swarm attacks than anything currently in the arsenal.

      http://www.g2mil.com/NAVROC.htm

      Quote:

      "Firing a 420mm NAVROC with a 600lb warhead at a small boat would literally 'blow it out of the water' just by exploding within 50 meters."

      Your 16-inch air burst shells also should have an excellent effect against drone swarms or salvos of missiles. But the NAVROC could be implemented much more quickly.

      Here is a serious question: What is the ideal number of missiles for a ship? Your proposed AAW destroyer and independent cruiser have 96 VLS cells, and the ASuW/ASW destroyer has 32 cells. You wrote about possible improvements to the Virginia-class cruisers:

      https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2020/04/virginia-class-cruisers.html

      "Had they continued to serve, the Virginias might have been upgraded to VLS at some point. Given their size, it is likely they could have accommodated 128-160 VLS cells. A truly powerful ship, indeed!"

      On the other hand, a lot of places, including this blog, warn that if you have too many missiles on one ship, and that ship is lost, you've lost a lot of firepower (an argument against the arsenal ship with 500+ cells).

      https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2013/09/vls-are-more-better.html

      The post linked just above says that the ideal number of VLS cells for a large warship is about 100, though if the Navy adopts anti-ship missiles fired from the Mk 41 VLS, a larger number of cells may be optimal.

      It's probably always going to be a balancing act with trade-offs.

      Delete
  5. One wonders why the Navy did not adopt the excaliber round. It would need to be downsized for the 5 inch gun though.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. They don't do show bombardment anymore and a GPS round wouldn't be useful targeting moving ships. Maybe a better question is why didn't they adopt laser-guided shells like the Copperhead.

      Delete
    2. There were attempts at a 5" radar guided round that used a millimeter wave seeker (like Longbow Hellfire) with maneuvering fins. There would be a significantly higher cost vs normal rounds, but the phit would also increase. Alas, the project seems to have been abandoned.

      Delete
    3. The new GLSDB ground launched small diameter glide bomb has a variant with a laser seeker to hit moving targets. One wonders if a weapon like this could be developed tor naval use. Not sure what other sensors this weapon has. ( Boeing/Saab development )

      Delete
    4. if They've adapted SDB II/Stormbreaker to GLSDB, then it'll also have IIR and milimeter wave radar seeking.

      Delete
    5. "One wonders if a weapon like this could be developed tor naval use."

      What specifically would constitute 'naval' use? Anti-ship? Land attack? Something else?

      Delete
    6. Reportedly one version of this weapon can hit moving targets, the other can hit stationary targets. This ground launched version has a 150km range. (Boeing/Saab collaboration)

      Delete
  6. Since only the rare missile will hit the target, it needs to be powerful enough to do some real damage.

    ReplyDelete
  7. No modern navy equip large caliber guns for one simple reason - cost effect. It is expensive to manufacture large guns plus barrels need to be replace after *** shots. Most important, shells fired have low accuracy after long distance thus you need to fire many rounds. No need to say, shells' ranges have no match to large missiles.

    Not just US, you can see China doesn't install guns larger than 130mm on ships.

    Even for Army, you rarely see nations deploy guns above 155mm (Russia use 203mm is only one which I can see). Army tends to use MRLS than large caliber guns for the same reason - cost effectiveness.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. It all depends on the intended use. If you envision a need for area bombardment in support of amphibious landings, for example, then large caliber naval guns are incredibly cost effective. If you anticipate close up naval engagements because your expensive missile inventory was used up in the first weeks of a war, then large caliber naval guns are incredibly cost effective. If you see a need to enforce a blockade and sink large merchant ships, then large caliber naval guns are incredibly cost effective. If you intend to destroy many enemy bases and believe you can get near them, then large caliber naval guns are incredibly cost effective. If you need to destroy enemy bases that have been established around the world, then large caliber naval guns are incredibly cost effective. And so on.

      By the way, attempting to compare guns to missiles demonstrates a lack of understanding of what their functions are. Naval guns and missiles perform two different functions. You wouldn't compare rifles to artillery because they perform two different functions. Guns and missiles perform two different functions.

      The Army settled on 155 mm artillery due to transportation and logistics (ammo) constraints, not cost effectiveness. Neither of those factors apply to naval guns on ships since they're self-mobile and have enormous magazines.

      Delete
    2. Please see page 56 of this document, an Army engineering officer's master's thesis about naval surface fire support:

      https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA481976.pdf

      Quote:

      "In 1981 it was revealed in Congressional debate why the United States Navy decommissioned the only active U.S. battleship (USS New Jersey) during the Vietnam War. During the debate, John Warner, who was Secretary of the Navy at the time (now Senator Warner, R-VA), stated he was “ordered to take it out of service because its belligerency and its antagonism was impeding the progress of the peace talks.”230 Having a single warship’s removal being cited as a condition to attend peace talks speaks well of its psychological impact and potential shaping effect upon current and future adversaries. The wisdom of decommissioning vice withdrawing is worthy of debate given the outcome of the conflict and since North Vietnam never protested carrier presence during the Paris peace talks."

      Six 21st-century battleships could force an enemy to accept our terms, or better yet, deter a war.

      That PDF file is a gold mine of information about battleships and their big guns. I hope this helps.

      Delete
    3. I scratch my head that we didn't have a successor to the battleships. Not necessarily a next-gen battleship but a surface combatant with large guns as it's primary focus.

      At least you can replenish the guns at sea and maintain a higher-tempo of firepower lobbed to the enemy.

      Delete
    4. "Please see page 56 of this document,"

      Thanks! I hadn't seen that one. It looks good and I'm reading it now.

      Delete
    5. I was able to read about half of the thesis so far. Excellent information. The magazine capacity tables and the quotes from Marines alone speak volumes. Interesting that the Marines also were calling for reactivation of the Iowas officially up until less than 20 yrs ago...!!

      Delete
  8. You're welcome, CNO.

    Regarding the concern raised above about gun barrel life, I posted this elsewhere in the comments.

    The RAND report Naval Surface Fire Support: An Assessment of Requirements offers several other options on pages 54-56.
    https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4300/RR4351/RAND_RR4351.pdf

    shape memory materials
    graphene gun barrels or barrel liners
    self-healing materials to coat the interior of a barrel
    bulk metallic glasses/amorphous metals

    ReplyDelete
  9. Our anti-ship missile inventory is woefully inadequate (quantity, quality, capability (warhead lethality, range, speed). In addition to seeing newer, more capable designs; it would be nice if we looked to build a anti-ship missile attack as as an integrated mass, with several types of missiles/warheads/seekers integrated into a pre-planned strike. Jamming payloads, optical seekers, submunition warheads, warheads designed to strike under the waterline, EMP warheads, and so forth.

    GAB

    ReplyDelete
  10. Striking power and armor--two things that ComNavOps harps on (correctly) but the Navy seems to ignore.

    In combat it is not the fanciest toy that wins, but the one that works.

    ReplyDelete
  11. Sure the missiles are outdated and can be easily replaced by shells especially guided and precision ones.

    ReplyDelete

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