I’m baffled as to why observers seem to have such a hard
time drawing valid conclusions from the Ukraine-Russia conflict. More precisely, I’m baffled as to why
observers seem so hell bent on drawing invalid conclusions. This conflict could not be more atypical of
what a China-US peer level war will be like and, therefore, as I’ve repeatedly
stated, we have to be very, very cautious and skeptical about drawing
conclusions. Here’s the latest invalid
conclusion by the US Air Force.
Robust
Ukrainian and Russian air defenses have rendered both sides’ aircraft,
particularly those used for close air support missions, largely “worthless” in
the war between the two countries, according to a top American Air Force
general.[1]
About
60 Ukrainian aircraft and 70 Russian aircraft have been downed in the year
since Russia launched its invasion, according to commander of US Air Forces in
Europe and Africa Gen. James Hecker … [1]
This is nonsense.
Aircraft have not been rendered ‘worthless’ by air defenses; they’ve been rendered ‘worthless’ by the
complete absence of any operational and tactical expertise in their employment. Sure, a single soldier with a .22 cal handgun
can render your entire platoon ‘worthless’ if you continually walk up to him
and allow him to shoot you. The soldier’s
effectiveness is not due to the .22 cal gun;
it is due to your own tactical incompetence. With the slightest bit of tactical expertise
you can easily eliminate him.
Similarly, the effectiveness of the air defense systems is
not due to the air defense systems, it’s due to the operational and tactical
incompetence of the attackers. Both
sides seem to be flying up to the other’s air defenses and seeing how long they
can survive. Well, yeah, that’s a sure
way to render your aircraft ‘worthless’.
Where’s the electronic warfare support aircraft? Where’s the anti-radiation missiles to
suppress and destroy the defenses?
Where’s the coordinated artillery suppression of the air defenses? Where’s the cruise missile attacks against
air defense systems? Where’s the
infantry/armor attacks to destroy and degrade the air defenses? Where’s the coordination with the attacking aircraft? Where’s the signals analysis to locate the
air defenses? Where’s the operational
planning to coordinate efforts? I have
seen zero evidence of any of that, by either side. It’s no wonder both side’s aircraft are
‘worthless’.
Now, if we’re planning to fight China in a similarly inept,
incompetent fashion (and I’m not ruling that out!) then the lessons in this
conflict are applicable. On the other
hand, if we fight with operational and tactical competence then the only
lessons we can draw from this conflict fall into the category or ‘what not to
do’.
What’s disturbing about all this is the failure of our
professional warriors to grasp the underlying reasons for the apparent failure
of aircraft. We seem to be accepting
what we see at face value. Whether it’s
the Marine Commandant thinking that he’s seeing validation of his decision to
eliminate tanks or the Navy thinking they see validation of their decision to
run away from defended coasts or the Pentagon thinking that they’re seeing
validation of unmanned assets, it’s all the same failure to understand the
utter lack of operational and tactical competency in this conflict and,
therefore, the invalid nature of any conclusion drawn therefrom.
The only thing ‘worthless’ in this conflict is our
professional warriors who can’t seem to grasp the realities of this. I assume this is because they, themselves,
have no operational or tactical competence with which to assess what they’re
seeing. All I can hope is that China’s
military leaders are just as incompetent as ours.
__________________________________
The biggest lesson from Ukraine is that the will to fight is key.
ReplyDeleteThe Ukranians have it. The Russians don't. The American people don't have it - see the multitude of voices calling on the Ukranians to roll over and let themselves be raped to death by the Russians.
It remains to be seen whether China has the will to fight or not.
"The Ukranians have it. The Russians don't."
DeleteThat is a lie. The Russians would've withdrawn from Ukrainian territory and lynched.the government leaders who got them in this war, AT LEAST 11 months ago, if they actually had no "will to fight."
"The American people don't have it"
The Americans DID have it (past tense), as seen by the fact we continued fighting in Afghanistan for NINETEEN YEARS. But our government leaders squandered such a critical resource, making it seem all the fighting was for nothing other than to pad war profiteers' profits. The American people's overall reluctance to get involved with Ukraine, is directly due to their government leaders' failures in Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
For the Russians, isn't it more "Putin has it" and he's the only one with a vote. Oh and a large and loyal internal security force who very much aren't being sent off to fight ready to shoot anyone with ideas about said lynching.
DeleteEvery war is different.
ReplyDeleteExperiences from Afghan and Iraqi Wars led Pentagon into wrong path - focus on fighting regional powers and terrorists than competent opponents. LCS, DDG-1000, Striker Brigade, .... a series of mistakes.
In the Vietnam war the US lost thousands of aircraft until they started fielding dedicated electronic warfare, SEAD, tactical reconnaissance aircraft in numbers.
ReplyDeleteIn the 1991 Gulf War these aircraft proved incredibly effective and proved their worth but stealth was considered better.
Stealth was the future and would replace everything else this was the dream and so all the useful support aircraft were retired.
It's now 30 years after the Gulf War and neither the USAF, USN or USMC is completely stealth with all having large numbers of non-stealthy aircraft with no support aircraft remaining.
I foresee a repeat of Vietnam war era losses of US combat aircraft if a war with China happens as F/A-18's, F-16's and F-15's attempt to attack targets surrounded by SAM's and AAA vastly superior to Vietnam war era weapons.
"What’s disturbing about all this is the failure of our professional warriors to grasp the underlying reasons for the apparent failure of aircraft."
ReplyDeleteThat's because our "professional warriors" are not professional warriors. Warriors do not rise to the top in peacetime.
Granted that 'warriors' do not rise during peacetime but does that necessarily preclude intelligent people? No one passes through the academy by being stupid. Even a non-warrior ought to be able to grasp and implement basic tactical and operational principles. How is it that, from a very large pool of intelligent people, we manage to find and select the very dumbest and most incompetent? That seems unlikely. The law of averages would suggest that some intelligent, competent people ought to occasionally be promoted.
DeleteWhat happens to people when get promoted?
Careerism is a phenomenon - and we like to blame it - but one can create a very lucrative career without doing flat out stupid stuff. An officer who understands, supports, and implements basic tactical competencies in their command ought to be able to do so while also pursuing a career? What changes?
If we are actively seeking out and promoting stupidity and incompetence, that would logically imply that the CNO is the stupidest, most incompetent person in the Navy, right? The evidence certainly seems to support that!
"How is it that, from a very large pool of intelligent people, we manage to find and select the very dumbest and most incompetent?"
DeleteLiteral freaks aside, they are neither dumb nor incompetent.
In fact, they are quite good at what they want to do and have been selected (sometimes implicitly) for.
That simply does not involve winning wars, and amusingly Russia/China have differently flavoured versions of the same problem.
Senior military officers become career bureaucrats. And a career bureaucrat's priorities are, in order of importance:
Delete1-My career
2-My agency
3-The job I am supposed to do.
That makes their decisions all wrong.
You echo the same bitter testimony of Col. Jack Broughton in his book, "Thud Ridge". The massive losses of the F-105 over Hanoi were blamed on the airplane, or the pilots, instead of the total lack real planning or strategy to defeat enemy threats.
ReplyDeleteIt also reminds one of the sacrifice of men like Sen. John McCain who were sent on strategic bombing missions, day after day, in a subsonic ground attack A-4, without radar, without HARM, without air defense suppression, and many times without even air cover.
In both cases, years passed by without any senior leader ever stopping to think how missions could be done better to reduce losses or make the missions more effective. It is a great testament to all the pilots' bravery.... and the ridiculous thick headedness of their senior leadership.
" the ridiculous thick headedness of their senior leadership."
DeleteBear in mind that those thickheaded senior leaders were once brave pilots, themselves. What happens to make them suddenly become thickheaded? How does this transformation occur?
I guess it depends how deep you want to go, but short command tours, the obsession with "numbers", careerism, and vague strategic goals all had a hand in it.
DeleteHaving experienced a bad situation, a normal person, when they get the opportunity to change things, would opt to improve things rather than continue a bad status quo. What turns idealistic, intelligent, EXPERIENCED, competent pilots into idiots when they reach higher command levels? It's a mystery that I have no answer for but it's too simplistic to just say that leadership is incompetent. There has to be a reason why good people nearly 100% go bad.
DeleteI agree completely, yet post-WWII (and especially post-Korea), we have this systemic problem of highly trained & experienced leaders having great difficulty changing course.
DeleteIf you are interested, Roger Thompson in his book, "Lessons Not Learned" spends several pages discussing the Navy's air campaign over Vietnam discussing this very problem. It sheds a lot more light on the leadership problem.
https://www.usni.org/press/books/lessons-not-learned
I think it was aviation expert Chuck Myers who wrote a couple scathing articles about the stupidity of using carrier air to attack coastal targets in North Vietnam where hundreds were lost. Battleship 16-inch and even cruiser 8-inchers could have destroyed coastal targets with zero risk.
DeleteAnyone know if the USN last year's plan to cut 25 EA-18G Growler's approved by Congress, the aircraft made up the five expeditionary VAQ attack squadrons that supported USAF and Navy/Marine shore-based operations, the five expeditionary VAQ squadrons are separate from the Navy’s VAQ squadrons that deploy on aircraft carriers.
ReplyDeleteUnderstand the a/c were planned to be upgraded to Growler Block I and II and with the integration of the very expensive new Next Generation Jammers, did see a DOT&E report last year the Raytheon NGJ-MB underperforming in several important areas.
I've been unable to track that. As best I can tell, we still operate 5 land based squadrons, 9 air wing squadrons, and one training squadron. However, information is sketchy and not very authoritative. For example, the NavAir website offers this cryptic statement,
Delete"Four U.S. Navy Expeditionary VAQ squadrons uniquely support U.S. Air Force and Navy shore-based operations. All EA-18G squadrons are stationed at NAS Whidbey Island, with the exception of one squadron (VAQ-141) attached to CVW-5, Forward Deployed Naval Force, based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan."
Taken at face value, this suggests the Navy has only four (maybe five?) Growler squadrons and that certainly isn't correct so ...
They mentioned 'close air support' in that blurb. Its been known for a long time that CAS in the face of a modern air defense could be a near suicidal mission. In the 80's USAF predicted that within a space of about two weeks of a full on, non-nuke war in Europe that at least 2/3's of ALL A-10's built would be destroyed or rendered inoperable. Israel looked at buying some A-10's and declined after their experiences in Sinai and Golan in '73.
ReplyDelete"suicidal mission"
DeleteOne of the rules of operations is to NOT conduct suicidal missions. There are plenty of other missions to fully occupy aircraft. There's logistics, supply convoys, bases, depots, and a million other worthwhile targets and that can't all be heavily defended. In fact, given the fluid, mobile nature of modern warfare, MOST will be only lightly defended because heavy defenses (meaning large, fixed SAM batteries, radars, and control systems can't be set up. Defenses that are set up are susceptible to suppression and destruction by SEAD as long as you go about it intelligently.
"after their experiences in Sinai and Golan in '73."
DeleteThose experiences provided the perfect example of coordinated air-land operation. The Israelis quickly adapted and the 15-Oct cross-canal attack by paratroopers and tanks eliminated SAM sites which opened the way for aggressive air operations.
It's all about intelligent operations and proper tactics.
While it’s true that we can learn some lessons from the Israeli experience in 1973, if you’re looking for an example of well co-ordinated air-ground operations, the Yom Kippur war definitely isn’t one.
DeleteThere were a number of reasons for this, chief among them was the inexperienced IAF leader Benny Peled’s poor working realtionship with CoS David Elazar, which led to Peled effectively ignoring Elazar’s orders on the outbreak of war to prioritize the taking out of Egyptian SAM sites and focusing instead on striking Egyptian air bases, the threat from which was clearly negligible.
During the first critical days of the war, instead of supporting Israeli ground forces at the Suez bridgehead, on Peled’s orders the IAF bombed Qantara to the north, achieving nothing at all but losing half a dozen F-4s in the process. After three days the Israeli troops holding the Bar Lev line strongpoints were, for want of air support, overrrun or forced to surrender, with the loss of 600 dead, and Sinai left wide open to the Egyptian army.
Poor IAF-Army coordination continued throughout the war, resulting in the IAF being unable to give effective support to Israeli ground forces in Sinai, and consequent heavy losses in men and tanks, notably from the unexpected use by Egyptian infantry of Soviet Malyutka anti-tank missiles. In the end, the superlative gunnery skills of well trained Israeli crews in their Centurion tanks saved the day, but initial losses were unnecessarily heavy.
On both the Northern and Southern fronts, the IAF continued to take heavy losses from Soviet SAMs (notably the SAM 6s against which there was no solution except brute force), and AA guns (notably Soviet ZSU 23-4s which accounted for about half of the IAFs losses). Ultimately it was the Israeli Army that ended up taking out the SAM batteries, and opening a window for the IAF, but despite this, the IAF failed even to interdict the 60,000 strong Iraqi expeditionary force on its 1,000 km drive towards the Golan Heights.
Aircraft losses were very high - in the first three days of the war the IAF lost (destroyed or damaged) about 20% of its front line force of 300 or so aircraft. By the end of the war the IAF had lost (destroyed) more than 120 aircraft and scores of pilots, killed or captured, with many of the remaining aircraft unserviceable owing to battle damage, although (allegedly) all were returned to service.
Losses on this scale were obviously unsupportable, and without massive American resupply from its bases in Germany, Israel would almost certainly have had to use (or threaten to use) its nuclear deterrent, with who knows what consequences for the world.
All this is still a pretty contentious matter in Israel, as ultimately nobody ended up wearing the blame for what was, contrary to your beliefs, in many respects a fairly comprehensive debacle.
I have seen more news sources take this at face value than have professionals stating as such. I really think we won't know for some time, like the Patriot success rate in Gulf 1 for instance. I think one of the big behind the scenes is ISR, good intel, and timely targeting.
ReplyDeleteI think they are acting “smart”. The airforce have been trying to kill the CAS-mission since the like 1970, and now they got a chance to use data to support that wish. The fact that they are lying and drawing false conclusions from the data is by design.
ReplyDelete/W
Dear Air Force: You don't want the CAS mission? Fine, give it and the equipment and personnel and budget that go with it to the Army.
DeleteThe airforce would rather die than give the army fixed wing combat aircraft. The A-10 project was just there to stop the army from getting the CAS-mission when last time the discussion was to give it to the army. AF has been wanting to kill that program ever since.
Delete/W
Amen to this, this is so true, there are some emerging lessons, but most is reinforcement to common sense. Anyone with a pulse can see where the Ukrainians and Russians still conduct devastating airstrikes on each other, and that the Russians will take risks and probably realize their ballyhooed EW pods don't work very well, and low altitudes just invite IR missile and MANPAD hits. Other common thoughts that pop up, such as A-10's that can't conduct CAS. So let's use a whole new mix of stealthy jets to do this. Stealth won't do much at a low altitude against a good E/O sensor. But simply making a next generation successor to the venerable Maverick missile and the JAGM that simply has 3-4x the range (feasible with today's propellants) puts the A-10 outside Shorad range and it is an awesome weapon truck again. Using JDAM's with the ER wing kits, outstanding and cheap. It's much easier to keep a 30-100 million dollar jet alive by using combinations of EW/HARM missiles/MALD's. Now if they'd spend more on expanding maintenance teams and less on special interest units that don't make more combat power (how bout less HR Navy personnel that Civilians can do that work- at less cost with less training reqs that have nothing to do with the job- or less base personnel doing non combat jobs, all instead pushed into maintenance of ships and aircraft), we might have larger # of squadrons, better maintenance, with more at readiness levels, WINNERs. That should be a lesson they learn, you need more at the start of a war, not 50-60% of your force with the rest being worked on.
ReplyDeleteThe "leaders" have served their time in the lower ranks, and done their professional education, but there's a far more potent force shaping them. To make an impression on politicians, senior officers need to adopt some set of ideas that sound original and radical, and most important, send money to the right politicians' districts. They are then forced to stick with those ideas. If they don't, the politicians will stop listening to them. If that happens, the service gets less budget, and their fellow-officers turn against them.
ReplyDeleteSo senior officers interpret everything as confirming their ideas and decisions, no matter what the actual evidence (which is often complex and ambiguous) indicates.
Most comes down to a cost/benefit analysis. Is it worthwhile to risk $100 million F-35 multi-role aircraft to strafe some trucks?
ReplyDeleteWe don't have simple low cost attack aircraft like the A-4s, even in the Marines. I've wondered if building an A-18 would work. No radar, extra cannon, armored cockpit for maybe $20 million each. Add some to some Navy squadrons prior to deployments depending on expected missions. They would fly in coordination with the F/A-18Fs or Gs escorts. Or maybe rebuild some old C models as A-18s.
"We don't have simple low cost attack aircraft..."
DeleteWe can use the AT-6 attack variant of the T-6 trainer, for this.
"I've wondered if building an A-18 would work. No radar, extra cannon, armored cockpit..."
Not cost-effective. As an adaptation of a twin-engine supersonic fighter, it'll still be too expensive for use against enemies without modern air defenses. Against enemies that have modern air defenses, its lack of stealth will make it as useful as a target drone- and just as survivable.
"AT-6 attack variant"
DeleteWhat combat scenario would this be useful in given its limited range, short endurance, small weapons payload, non-stealth, non-armor, and slow speed?
A-1 Skyraider baabyyyy!!!!
DeleteLutefisk
"What combat scenario would this be useful in given its limited range, short endurance, small weapons payload, non-stealth, non-armor, and slow speed?"
DeleteThe same ones the Brazilian Air Force uses for its Super Tucano light attack.aircraft: Ones launched from friendly territory, against enemies lacking modern air defenses.
Against those with, "light attack aircraft" are no better than cruise missiles.
"Ones launched from friendly territory, against enemies lacking modern air defenses."
DeleteAnd how does that help us in a war with China?
I'm all for having a very low end, cheap, simple 'truck plinker' but let's not confuse that with a high end, CAS aircraft.
"And how does that help us in a war with China?"
DeleteIt doesn't; against China and Russia, we need stealthy combat aircraft with AESA and other advanced sensors, armed with long-range weapons so they may strike from beyond enemy air defenses' reach. My argument is against anyone proposing the use of the A-10 and other aircraft that lack the high performance and advanced technology necessary to survive on the modern battlefield, yet are far more expensive to acquire and operate than a simple turboprop light attack aircraft like the AT-6, making the A-10 and its ilk a waste of money- and lives, in any fight against a peer competitor.
AT6 could do great things if it is given enough fuel for long time on station. Look at the OV-10 Broncos flown in Iraq as an example. They could even do a anti Chinese militia ship mission
ReplyDeletehttps://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3519/those-old-ov-10-broncos-sent-to-fight-isis-were-laser-rocket-slinging-manhunters
In other posts we've seen comnavops suggest that in a pacific peer fight that - for ships - radiating means inviting attacks that modern ships are poorly equipped to defeat or survive and that ship captains will quickly learn learn to rely on passive sensors almost exclusively. This simplifies the fight and brings it to gun range. One wonders how true this might be for the air war. Will losses of high end radiating sensors or reluctance to use them bring us back to aircraft that fight primarily with passive E/O sensors?
ReplyDelete"This simplifies the fight and brings it to gun range."
DeleteWhoops! You went one step too far, there! While the use of passive sensors might well mean closer encounters, the main implication of passive sensors is that we should be developing alternates to radar which still give us broad area situational awareness. The technology best suited to do that is the small UAV. Cruisers (of which there are none) and large destroyers (of which there are many) should have the capacity and capability to operate hundreds.
"Will losses of high end radiating sensors or reluctance to use them bring us back to aircraft that fight primarily with passive E/O sensors?"
This is such a good question that I'm going to do a post on this. Thanks for the idea! If you'd care to offer a username, I'd love to give you proper credit.
Could that be the trigger for a gun renaissance?? It'll show that were woefully short on weapons density, and armor. I just had a vision of destroyers trading shots until their magazines were empty minutes later, and they limped away from each other, damaged and on fire. Not necessasarily a realistic encounter, but there are ideas and potential lessons instantly visible from it...
Delete"If you'd care to offer a username, I'd love to give you proper credit." No credit needed. I enjoy the blog and look forward that new post!
DeleteThere are some articles out there about how Russian-made Ukrainian jets have been adapted to fire the HARM. I've also read that anti-radiation missiles don't destroy all that many air defense systems. The counter argument is that (1) the HARM also can be used as a sensor and (2) if an air defense team has to shut down its equipment to avoid detection and/or destruction, the HARM still has accomplished a mission kill. Perhaps we'll get some numbers about effectiveness in Ukraine someday.
ReplyDeleteAn enormous number of artillery rounds have been expended in this war. This could be one lesson from Ukraine that does apply to future conflict. This blog has had discussions on improving 5-inch guns and even bringing back 8- and 16-inch guns for 21st century cruisers and battleships. Guns are being mentioned on this thread. Mark Stille's book US Navy Cold War Guided Missile Cruisers states, "The old converted missile cruisers with 6- and 8-inch guns were extensively used for gunfire support duties [in Vietnam]. Canberra and Boston, both reclassified as heavy cruisers by this time, were especially active in this capacity. Boston fired so many rounds her 8-inch gun barrels were worn smooth" (page 17).
There are anecdotes of guns in Ukraine wearing out, even barrels bursting. Liquid cooling probably is not practical for land-based artillery, but it is an option for naval guns. Pages 54-56 of this report discuss some technological options for increasing barrel life. If these options actually work and are practical to implement, they should be pursued.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4300/RR4351/RAND_RR4351.pdf
From OP Allied Force, the Serbs fired 700 SAMs and killed 2 aircraft; NATO fired 700 HARMs and killed 2 launchers, so it was about roughly an even trade.
DeleteFocusing on KDR however, ignores the suppression aspect - a SAM doesn't have to hit to force a strike package to drop the bombs and go evasive. Pilots are not robots, they don't think "Oh, my wingman got locked on but I'm not spiked, I'm okay to press on."
The converse is true - a HARM doesn't have to hit to force the SAM to turn its radar off and displace.
So much bullshit... They employ it all.. Coordinated artillery, cruise missiles, anti radiation missiles
ReplyDelete