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Monday, March 13, 2023

Iwo Jima Class LPH and Vertical Assault

The Iwo Jima class carrier was the first purpose built vertical assault (helicopter) amphibious ship.  In this post, we’re going to take a look at its original design rationale, abilities, and limitations and examine whether those have remained relevant today.
 
Here are some basic specifications for the seven ship class, built in the 1960’s: 














Iwo Jima Class LPH


The amphibious assault helicopter carrier (Landing Platform, Helicopter - LPH) traces its origin back to a 1946 Marine Corps study on the effects of atomic weapons on amphibious assaults.[1]  Marine leadership, 
… concluded that a few atomic bombs could easily destroy the concentrated shipping and also the beachhead of any classical amphibious assault.[1]
As described by Friedman[1], the Marines settled on the helicopter as the means to achieve physical dispersion of both ships at sea and troops on land.  The greater range of the helicopter would allow the host ships to more widely disperse and would allow the troops to land at more widely dispersed locations thus avoiding the concentrations that an atomic bomb would easily destroy.
 
Their decision was strongly influenced by the belief that helicopters would quickly and markedly advance in capabilities (range, speed, lift capacity) – a belief that turned out, disappointingly, to be only partially met.  Friedman goes on to describe some of the helicopter development issues which is, itself, a fascinating topic but outside the scope of this post.  I encourage you to read it yourself, if you’re so inclined.  It’s well worth the time.
 
The Marines, while eagerly adopting the helicopter as the assault transport vehicle also recognized the vulnerability of the helicopter on the battlefield.  Regarding helicopter transport capacity, 
Even larger helicopters were proposed, but the Marines were reluctant to adopt one that could lift many more than twenty men in view of the high vulnerability of individual craft.[1][emphasis added]
The Marines recognized that concentrating greater numbers of troops in a vehicle that was inherently non-survivable would be a mistake.  In comparison, today’s MV-22 transport is rated for 24-32 troops which raises the concentration of risk issue that the Marines were afraid of.  To be fair, most sources state that the MV-22 troop capacity is not actually achievable in real world applications.
 
What did helicopter assault mean for overall requirements?  The Marines were focused on division-strength assaults, 
The Marines concentrated on the requirements of a divisional assault, which were considerable. For example, a January 1951 study envisaged lifting 10,000 men and 3,000 to 4,000 short tons of material.  Total lift, then, would be 520 HRSs [ed. Sikorsky H-19] or 208 HR2Ss, which in turn would require, in the former case, 20 escort carriers with 20 helicopters each, accommodating 150 to 200 tons of cargo, 500 to 600 assault marines, and a 200-man helicopter squadron.[1]
This focus on division level assaults was a far cry from our current MEU/ARG (3-ship Amphibious Ready Group) and disaggregated ARG which employs the three ships of the ARG separately.  Of course, in the event of a genuine assault operation, multiple MEU/ARGs would aggregate to form MEBs (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) and MEFs (Marine Expeditionary Force) although these aggregations are never exercised and constitute a theoretical capability, only.  Further, with the elimination of tanks, reduction in artillery, elimination of heavy mortars, and lack of anti-air vehicles it is highly debatable that MEBs/MEFs are even combat effective anymore.
 
The Marines also considered the tactical usage of the helicopter, 
Tactically, the Marines considered a flight of ten helicopters best for effective control, so that helicopter carriers were generally designed to accommodate multiples of that unit.[1]
We see then, that the Marines of the time were focused on getting large numbers of helos/troops on the ground quickly as opposed to our current concept of slow, drawn out, one-at-a-time MV-22 landings due to the 250 ft aircraft-to-aircraft separations and immense cleared areas required for landing.
 
To their immense credit, the Marines didn’t just come up with wild ideas and implement them without any proof of concept - as we do today - they conducted actual exercises.  For example, 
… May 1948, 8 helicopters from the Palau simulated a full helicopter attack of 184 aircraft flying from six CVEs, to lift a complete regimental combat team which would seize a strategic crossroads inland of the beach.  … each HRP [Piasecki HRP tandem rotor helicopter] carried six passengers about ten miles from the carrier under heavy fighter cover.[1]
Note the use of fighter cover.  The exercises were tactically realistic as opposed to the unrealistic, set piece theater performances we call exercises today.
 
Following tests, the WWII escort carrier USS Thetis Bay was converted for helicopter operations to further test out the concept.
 
At that point, the Marines seemed fully committed to helicopter assault.  A Sep-1954 report stated, 
… over the next ten to fifteen years most existing attack cargo and transport (AKA and APA) ships would be replaced by helicopter carriers.  “This will be occasioned by the VTOL aircraft becoming the principal means of placing personnel ashore under assault conditions.  Supporting personnel and heavy equipment will still be landed by water-borne means but the majority of assault troops will be air-landed.”[1]
Ultimately, a new design LPH, the Iwo Jima class, was built along with several Essex class conversions.  The purpose-designed Iwo Jima class, not surprisingly, offered several significant advantages over the Essex conversions.  Even so, the design was not without its flaws, 
The amphibious force commanders criticized the Iwo Jima design for its “complete lack of landing craft, so that it is of doubtful utility under non-flying conditions and must depend on other types with landing craft to give it an over-the-beach capacity.[1]
This flaw eventually led to the development of the LHA design which incorporated both aviation and  a well deck to support waterborne landing craft.  Interestingly, we have returned to exactly the original flawed design with the new America class variants which have no well decks.
 
 
Discussion
 
Let’s examine several aspects of the original vertical assault concept that birthed the LPH.
 
Rationale
 
As noted, the original rationale was dispersal of ships and troops in response to the threat of atomic bombs.  The original Marine thinking was dominated by the fear of atomic warfare.  With the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), that is no longer a concern.  Any use of atomic weapons would immediately escalate the war to a global nuclear war and eliminate the need for a localized amphibious assault.  In other words, no one is going to bother with an amphibious assault while waging a global nuclear war.  Thus, the original rationale is no longer valid and yet we have not modified our current thinking to account for it.
 
Strengths
 
  • Helos allow the rapid transport of troops from a greater distance than waterborne landing craft.
  • Troops can be delivered to safer or more strategically beneficial locations rather than to a central troop/beach concentration although safer locations also imply less operationally relevant and useful.
  • The greater range of the helos allows greater separation of the helicopter carriers.
 
Limitations

  • Bad weather may ground aviation.
  • Lack of waterborne landing craft prevents any other means of assault.
  • Helo assault is limited to troops and light cargo.  Heavy equipment, tanks, armored vehicles, etc. cannot be transported by air.
  • Helos are extremely vulnerable to even modest anti-air defenses.
  • Helo carriers have very limited wave transport capacity.  For example, 20 helos per wave x 15-20 troops per helo = 300-400 troops per wave and that’s just troops, no equipment.  It would require 5-7 waves, over many hours or multiple days, to get the full troop complement ashore and that assumes no helo attrition.  The reality is that any reasonable helo attrition would likely result in a portion of the troops never getting ashore and certainly not in a timely manner.
  • Limited by the need/availability of suitable cleared landing sites; such sites can be reasonably anticipated by the enemy and become fire traps as demonstrated in Vietnam.
 
Sustainment

The original Marine leadership was focused on division level assaults.  What they failed to address was sustainment.  While simply moving troops ashore is easy (ignoring the extreme vulnerability of the helicopter and the potential lack of suitable landing sites), sustainment via helicopter is not.  In fact, it is impossible.  The logistic supply demands of a division in combat are staggeringly huge and the cargo carrying capacity of a helicopter is vanishingly small.  This remains an unexplained – and hand waved away – weakness in today’s various vertical assault concepts (helos, MV-22, well deck-less LHAs, etc.) as well as the Commandant’s dispersed, hidden, platoon size missile shooters concept.  It is not possible to sustain an assault using helicopters.
 
 
Summary
  
The original rationale for the LPH and vertical assault was dispersal due to the threat of atomic weapons.  As, discussed, this is no longer a valid concern.
 
It is noteworthy that the original Marines identified significant weaknesses in the concept including the extreme vulnerability of helos to anti-air defenses and the absence of waterborne landing craft as an alternative.  Other weaknesses included the inability to transport heavy equipment, the limited number of troops that can be transported per wave, and the impossibility of sustaining an assault using vertical transport.
 
We see, then, that vertical assault is an inherently flawed concept that was justified only by the extreme atomic threat.  With no realistic atomic threat today, one has to ask why we’re still pursuing the flawed vertical assault concept?
 
Where does this leave us today?  For starters, we’ve begun repeating the original mistakes such as the absence of waterborne landing craft in the early variants of the America class LHA.  Additional problems include the extreme vulnerability of vertical landing aircraft to anti-air defenses, first noted by the Marines back in the original concept development.  In fact, the threat to helos has increased markedly over the years with the advent of small, portable, shoulder launched, heat seeking, anti-air missiles of the Stinger type.  Vertical landing aircraft are simply not survivable over a defended battlefield as has been repeatedly demonstrated in the real world (Vietnam, Soviet Afghanistan, US Afghanistan, etc.).
 
The inability to transport heavy equipment by air continues, today, and is a serious weakness in the concept.  This limitation relegates any assault to a light infantry effort only and makes the enormous cost and resources dedicated to such a limited capability highly questionable.
 
The need for secure, cleared landing sites has only gotten substantially worse with the advent of the MV-22 which requires enormous cleared areas and huge separations between aircraft to the point that a massed assault is simply not possible.  Landings will have to be a very slow, one-at-a-time affair that is ideal for enemy defensive fire sequentially focused on each landing aircraft in turn.
 
Despite clearly and correctly identifying the inherent flaws in the vertical assault concept, Marine leadership pushed ahead with vertical assault in the belief that the atomic threat was more significant than the known weaknesses.  One can only speculate whether the Marines would have adopted vertical assault if there had been no perceived atomic threat.
 
With no realistic atomic threat today, one has to ask why we’re pursuing an inherently flawed concept?
 
Worse, we have taken the concept and reduced it from a full, divisional level effort and capability to a light infantry effort with no supporting tanks, armor, artillery, heavy mortars, or mobile anti-air vehicles.  Is the staggering cost to build and operate 30+ amphibious ships worthwhile to deliver light infantry ashore?
 
It would seem that vertical amphibious assault is an example of inertia.  The helo assault was established and continues just because it exists.  It exists because it exists.  We need to re-examine this 1940’s era concept in light of the known flaws and, especially, modern defenses which have rendered helos even more vulnerable than they were originally.  The cost/risk to benefit ratio does not support continued vertical assault.
 
 
 
___________________________
 
[1]Norman Friedman, “U.S. Aircraft Carriers, An Illustrated Design History”, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983, p.359-370.


21 comments:

  1. Thanks for this, absolutely brutal logic. Also the reason why as a first step for any project, process, or product Elon Musk makes his engineers at Tesla and SpaceX justify or rethink any requirements. Nothing saps resources like bad requirements then they gain lives of their own (lightning carriers!).

    ReplyDelete
  2. Noticeable last March 2022 the Russian amphibious invasion fleet assembled to take Odessa never landed as they realized it would only result in total failure.

    https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1499259886189830148?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1499278576151056389%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es3_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fgcaptain.com%2Frussian-navy-fleet-nears-port-of-odesa%2F

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  3. With modern missiles (Javelin ... etc.), landing crafts & AAV & LACs can be sunk or disabled as easily as helos can be shot down, by light & mobile defending forces. Heavy amphibious assault seems to have become impossible, unless done very far away from the operationntheater and then modern logistical requirements make it impossible to sustain.
    The alternative would be to seize a port, but since the number of deep (enough) water ports is very limited, they are easy to defend.

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    Replies
    1. "With modern missiles (Javelin ... etc.), landing crafts & AAV & LACs can be sunk or disabled as easily"

      Yes and no. Yes, given the way we would attempt an assault today. However, no, it is not an impossible task to conduct an assault. It just needs the right tools and doctrine which we figured out in WWII. High volume, heavy caliber naval gunfire is used to suppress the defense during the landing approach. We understood this in WWII. It doesn't matter how magnificent a modern missile is if the operator is dead or hugging the ground as high caliber rounds explode all around.

      " ports ... are easy to defend."

      No, they're difficult to defend since there is very little area available to site defenses. Mines remain the most effective defense but are easily dealt with, WITH THE PROPER EQUIPMENT. This is why I've repeatedly stated that port seizure should be the Marine's main mission. To be sure, it's a challenging mission and requires specialized equipment, training, doctrine, and tactics.

      To simply write assaults off as impossible is short-sighted but it does require the proper tools and training.

      As a reminder, almost every amphibious assault in modern times has succeeded.

      Delete
    2. Agree 100%, Don't understand why top brass don't see this. They can even ask for loads of cash for new equipment to help them. As I've said before, they also need training and Kit to defend a port until the "army comes along." IE if they are quick they may be able to get control of a port without too much fighting (or none) eg Darwin N Australia, BUT they would have to hold it until the "heavies" arrive.

      Delete
    3. "With modern missiles (Javelin ... etc.), landing crafts & AAV & LACs can be sunk or disabled" In Normandy on the night before D Day (I think it was) a British paratrooper sank a German patrol boat with a primitive anti-tank missile of the era (PIAT) and chased another away.

      I suppose that also means that if you can get your marines safely ashore with their Javelins etc they can then make life difficult for their enemy.

      Delete
  4. During peacetime, these ships would make a great "mother ship" for a Marine contingency or COIN mission off the coast of some 3rd world country. Would avoid a lot of the "footprint" which annoys the natives.

    During war, they can be a great platform for ASW helos.

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  5. MV-22 is maybe one of the best expressions of inertia ever. Requirements stemming from Operation Eagle Claw. Hardly reqs for vertical envelopment or amphibious assault. How far is Tehran from the ocean?

    We have a real connector problem. LCAC is too big and burns too much gas for carg o delivered ashore. LCU-1700 hardly keeps pace with the times and fit so few on a ship they also become a potential single point of failure. I always say look to nature and lthe commercial world for inspiration, but here I also see a past connector that can help. LARC-LX.

    We could build a tracked or wheeled variant using some existing tech from havy mining equipment to get from ship to shore and even across the beach. Now, you could potentially be launching many connectors off a ro-ro or store more connectors in the vehicle footprint of an amphib. It may need to be launched or moved to the well deck in order to be loaded, but we could probably design this thing to be a bit faster and longer legged.

    It really gets into the problems on problems that develop as you stack the house of cards higher and higher after year. Goes to the piece John Konrad just wrote. Our problems all tie back to the fact we don't build ships or ever conclude that our solution to our problems is to build more ships and direct talent that way. https://gcaptain.com/an-svb-bailout-could-immediately-solve-many-global-problem/

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  6. I wrote two articles about this topic after concluding vertical assault became obsolete as surface to air missiles arrived, and armored amphibious vehicles became worth less once modern anti-tank missiles arrived. I didn't write worthless because they are still valuable in swampy areas or to cross small streams and narrow rivers.

    The solution is a return to the LST. They don't need connectors and can shrug off hits from tank fire, anti-tank missiles and even smaller anti-ship missiles. As they take hits their huge water pumps used for beaching can keep them afloat until they beach themselves. The only danger is if they carry fuel or ammo as cargo, but LCUs can carry that in a later wave.

    http://www.g2mil.com/Devo-Amphibs.htm

    So the LAW is not bad idea if 50 are gathered and sent charging toward shore all at once led by LCUs with tanks firing and fast Mark VI boats and aircraft providing cover fire, ideally after a B-52 strike with long-distance glide bombs. The LCUs and Mark Vs are launched by LHDs a couple hundred miles or more offshore.

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  7. As a side comment, the ship industry reps at USNI News shocked me by hinting there are problems with the Ford.

    https://news.usni.org/2023/03/11/video-navys-newest-carrier-uss-gerald-r-ford-faces-toughest-test-yet

    [my comment]

    1. "As part of the exercise, the carrier crew is working to meet the launch and recover stats of the existing Nimitz class. While an increase of 30 percent in the sorties generation rate over the Nimitz class was the selling point for Ford, the carrier hasn’t hit the legacy benchmark yet." [Just needs another decade!]

    2. "While USNI News was aboard the carrier last week, Ford stayed close to home, at one point making tight circles in view of the seaside hotels of Virginia Beach while the rest of the strike group finished qualifications ahead of COMPTUEX." [Another "deployment"]

    3. "The operational availability depends in part on how quickly sailors can troubleshoot the most common faults in the launching system, Navy officials have told USNI News.
    “We’ve gotten very good at coming through minor issues. We do not have hardly any catastrophic issues that take us down for extended periods of time,” Ens. Justin Knighton, the aircraft launch and recovery equipment maintenance officer,"
    [Tell me about these "hardly any" catastrophic issues. How many, how long did they last.]

    4. "Standard operating procedures for repairing or bypassing degraded systems safely are being constantly written and rewritten on Ford." [Constantly?]

    5. "Lanzilotta said he doesn’t spend much time thinking about the previous issues with the ship or the promises that the Navy and Pentagon made about the carrier’s performance. My job here is to make the ship and this crew as ready as it can be today,” he said. “I don’t get too wrapped up in some of the things that have happened in the past.”
    [What things happened? When?]

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    Replies
    1. From the article,

      "“On the Ford, we have the additional challenge of pilots and flight deck nailing procedures, as well as the newness of the systems that are not quite operating at the same efficiency as a Nimitz-class "

      'Not quite operating at the same efficiency as a Nimitz'???? For twice the cost????

      "A bright spot for Ford has been the performance of the Advanced Weapons Elevators."

      ???????????

      Delete
    2. g2mil: speaking of USNI, did you see that, a year and a half into the AUKUS arrangement, we've agreed to sell the Aussies a trio of *used* Virginias almost ten years from now, because we don't have the capacity to sell them new ones or to refurbish 688(i)s to give them or do anything at all sooner than that? We won't even start having our existing subs make more port calls on Oz for a few years.

      I don't recall the exact article, but I've run the numbers in a comment on this blog before detailing submarine construction rates in the 1980s and in the last decade or so, and our capacity appears to be about 40% of what it used to be.

      SSNs and SSGNs, while not omnipotent wunderwaffen, will be extremely useful in almost any Pacific war scenario, and we just don't care that we can't service or build them.

      Delete
    3. It seems like the USN wants the Aussies to build a nuclear sub repair facility that it can use, so is offering some used subs they can afford to get that facility built.

      Delete
  8. "In comparison, today’s MV-22 transport is rated for 24-32 troops which raises the concentration of risk issue that the Marines were afraid of."

    It's kind of interesting that when we look at transport helicopters, we see 4 basic classes (based on troop capacity):

    Light: 2-4 pax (Kiowa, Little Bird)
    Utility: 6-11 pax (Huey, Blackhawk)
    Medium: 20-24 pax (Sea Knight, V-22, Puma, Mi-8)
    Heavy: 30-50 pax (Chinook, Sea Stallion)

    Since Vietnam, the US Army has run a two aircraft fleet of Utility helos for squad transport and Heavy helos for platoon transport (Huey/Chinook, Blackhawk/Chinook). In contrast, the USMC and pretty much most European nations chose to split the difference and run medium lift helos instead, carrying 2 squads.

    Now of course, the US Army is a premium AAA army, not a small indie army like the European and Russian armies, but it's still interesting to see that the Army, operating from land bases, where they aren't constrained by LPH/LHD hangar sizes, chose to prioritise the smaller, more numerous squad helos over platoon helos for the helicopter transport fleet and the air assault mission.

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    Replies
    1. "chose to prioritise the smaller, more numerous squad helos over platoon helos for the helicopter transport fleet and the air assault mission."

      Are you suggesting that the Marines should be focused on smaller transports for their amphibious assault needs? Are you suggesting that the MV-22 is ill-suited for assault?

      Delete
    2. I think the point being made is greater dispersal of troops across smaller helicopters.

      I think the argument that ATGMs and missiles would sink all landing ships is a fallacy.

      These missiles have great utility, but amphibious assault invariably would need heavy concentrated shelling to force the enemy to keep his head down. By the time the shelling stops the lcu and lsts are near enough for the majority of them to reach the beach.

      Maybe it would be a great idea to add quite a large number of 20-30 mm guns in the lcu and lsts to provide suppressive fire.

      Also, amphibious assault would always be a numbers game. You do not send 4-6 vessels, but a large number. Quantity definitely matters here.

      One more point needs to be kept in mind that in the world wars or in later large scale wars, assault always happened post getting control on the air.

      -BM

      Delete
    3. "Are you suggesting that the Marines should be focused on smaller transports for their amphibious assault needs? Are you suggesting that the MV-22 is ill-suited for assault?"

      It's an observation on my part. You'd think that Big Army would go with Chinooks for efficiency in transport, since they don't have space constraints, but Big Army prefers to use a massed wave of Blackhawks instead.

      MV-22 carries 24 troops, or two squads - that's par with the CH-46 Sea Knight from Vietnam. To an extent, I think that's a compromise the Marines have gone with, because a flight deck has limited deck parkings spots -a UH-1, CH-46 and MV-22 all take up the same deck park, so when deck parks and wave size are the bottleneck, medium helos are an understandable compromise. Six Hueys drops 2 platoons on the beach; six Sea Knights/MV-22s drops 4 platoons.

      Delete
    4. "Six Hueys drops 2 platoons on the beach; six Sea Knights/MV-22s drops 4 platoons."

      Of course, that's theoretical. The relevant question is how many of those transport aircraft and troops survive the landing. You've undoubtedly seen (and read in this blog!) the ridiculously slow landings of the MV-22 and the massive clearances they need to land (250 ft separation). That's not conducive to a fast, survivable landing. In contrast, Hueys in Vietnam dropped into a landing zone in a matter of seconds, paused for about 5 seconds to unload and bounced backed into the air. THAT'S SURVIVABLE! And, even that resulted in horrific aircraft and troop casualties. A giant, painfully slow MV-22 landing is not survivable.

      Delete
  9. Update on earlier post on the hypersonic CPS missile as the FY24 Justification Book on Weapons Procurement, Navy released though not the R&D Justification Book as yet.

    Shows total procurement cost of the 68 missile five year buy to 2028 at $3.6 billion, averaging $53 million per missile

    USNI News reported latest March 5 prototype test flight scrubbed due to battery failure.


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    Replies
    1. One has to wonder how many targets justify one or more $53M missiles?

      Delete

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