Pages

Monday, January 2, 2023

What Happened To Streetfighter?

Let’s start the new year with a post that may ruffle a few feathers and contradict some dearly held beliefs..

 

The LCS is an abject failure.  Even its staunchest supporters have been reduced to talking not about what LCS is but what it might have been.  Yes, the LCS failed but, oh, Streetfighter!  The Mighty Streetfighter!  If only the LCS had remained true to the Streetfighter concept, what a magnificent combat vessel we would have had!

 

Streetfighter … it has assumed the status of myth and legend;  capable of total domination of the seas and able to defeat vast fleets of the most powerful ships.  It would have ensured world peace, solved global hunger, and established democracy throughout the known universe!     And now we have the LCS.  What happened?  Where did Streetfighter go?  Why was its self-evident superiority not developed? 

 

Streetfighter?

Let’s take a look and see if we can figure out what happened.

 

Here’s a timeline to help keep track and make sense of the various events that led from the origin of Streetfighter to the LCS we have today … or was it the reverse?

 

 

 

Streetfighter / LCS Development Timeline

 

1987

SC-21 (Surface Combatant for the 21st Century) predecessor studies begin

Jan

1991

End of the Cold War

 

1992

DD-21 / SC-21 officially begins

 

1993

Navy begins to focus on small combatant ships (approx. time period)

 

1995

LCS foundational design wargames (Joint Multi-Warfare Analytical Game) take place in mid-1990’s

Nov

1999

Cebrowski and Hughes publish “Rebalancing the Fleet” which is the first mention of Streetfighter

Jul

2001

Cebrowski unveils Streetfighter ship in Wall Street Journal article by Greg Jaffe

Oct

2001

Cebrowski appointed to head Office of Force Transformation by SedDef Donald Rumsfeld

Late

2001

DD-21 terminated

Apr

2003

Lockheed Martin shows initial LCS concept offering

 

2003

Adm. Clark declares LCS his number one budget priority

May

2004

Initial LCS construction contracts awarded

Jun

2005

LCS Freedom laid

Nov

2005

Cebrowski died

 

 

 

As we see from the timeline, the end of the Cold War, in 1991, left the Navy with a fleet of large combatants and no peer enemy.  Faced with potentially declining budgets, the Navy opted to create a new enemy which it dubbed ‘littoral’.  Despite having absolutely no evidence that ‘littoral’ required anything new or unique, the Navy latched onto it as a rationale for continued funding (see, “Littoral Warfare – Is There Such A Thing?”).  The solution to defeating the littoral bogeyman was the LCS, according to the Navy.  Well, wait ... what about Streetfighter?  Wasn’t it the answer to the littoral challenge?

 

Here’s where we start to see the myths surrounding Streetfighter.

 

One of the [many] misconceptions surrounding Streetfighter was that it preceded the LCS.  In fact, as we see in the timeline, the LCS originated with a series of wargames in the mid-1990’s (see, “LCS Conceptual Origin”).  The first mention of Streetfighter does not occur until 1999, some four or five years later.

 

Whether Cebrowski/Hughes got their inspiration for Streetfighter from the LCS origin games or whether they developed their concept independently is unknown.  I can find no reference to Cebrowski having participated in or referencing the LCS origins.

 

In fact, I can find no actual link between Streetfighter and LCS.  There is no document stating that one flowed from, or morphed into, the other.  As best I can tell, the two concepts never overlapped.  Possibly there was informal, undocumented cross pollination but, if so, there’s no evidence of it. 

 

Again, the timeline demonstrates that the LCS concept arose prior to Streetfighter as evidenced by the mid-1990’s design wargames.  Streetfighter first appeared several years after the original LCS design beginnings.  Thus, all the questions and moanings about the LCS failing to ‘stick’ to the original Streetfighter concept appear to be after-the-fact fantasies and reversed fantasies, at that! 

 

To sum up, the Navy’s official response to the end of the Cold War was, initially, the DD-21/SC-21 program which began in 1992.  However, within a few years, small combatant studies and wargames had begun and the SC-21 program was on the road to termination.  The LCS concept took hold and quickly began to metamorphose into the directionless, do-everything-but-do-it-poorly fantasy ship that we have today.  Streetfighter appears to have been a very brief, parallel but not overlapping, side road on the LCS development path.

 

Now, let’s take a closer look at Cebrowski and Hughes article, “Rebalancing the Fleet”, that first mentions the word ‘Streetfighter’.

 

“Rebalancing the Fleet”

 

Cebrowski and Hughes published their landmark piece describing a future fleet structure that incorporated small combatants dubbed Streetfighters, in Nov-1999.

 

While the piece discussed several important, noteworthy issues such as the cost-risk relationship, it failed to offer any details and relied heavily on non-existent technologies and unproven concepts for its envisioned success.  The article was more of a marketing brochure than a substantive technical analysis.  For example,

 

Foremost, Streetfighter will be able to clear out the clutter and sort friend from foe.[1]

 

That’s a great marketing campaign slogan but offers no actual, technical insight or methodologies for its claimed ability to “clear out the clutter and sort friend from foe”.

 

Another myth about Streetfighter is that it was a single, specific ship.  However, in the ‘Rebalancing the Fleet’ article, Streetfighter is described as a family of ‘capabilities’, not a ship.

 

The Economy B force is a family of capabilities—often referred to as the "Streetfighter Concept"—that, in conjunction with power-projection forces, will enable the U.S. Navy to operate anytime, anywhere … [1]

 

Indeed, Cebrowski/Hughes never actually described what Streetfighter was beyond generalities.  There are suggestions of vessels in the 300-1200 ton range with no specifics.  There was no description of size, speed, weapons fit, sensors, etc.  This has led every subsequent naval analyst to assign their own vision to Streetfighter, just as happened to the LCS.

 

The reality is that ‘Streetfighter’ seems to have originally been a reference to a concept of a family of smaller vessels acting as a group.  It was described as a ‘family of capabilities’, not as a type of ship.

 

 

 

A noteworthy follow up piece by Hughes addresses Streetfighter concerns that were raised at the time.

 

“22 Questions for Streetfighter”

 

Hughes, himself, offers criticisms of the Streetfighter concept although he does so in what he believes are positive statements.  For example,

 

One of the first things learned by a task analysis of coastal operations is that low-flying aircraft, not big ships or submarines, are the alternative to streetfighters.[2]

 

Thus, Hughes, himself, offers a far more cost effective and combat effective alternative to Streetfighter in the form of aircraft!

 

In attempting to extol the virtues of Streetfighter, Hughes falls back on the common claim that the enemy will be paralyzed with fear at the thought of a single vessel roaming undetected no matter how individually incapable that vessel might be.

 

… if there is a flock of small ships, each powerfully armed yet hard to detect, then the enemy will live in continuing fear over whether he has found them all.

 

An enemy probably also will see deviltry and cunning in a squadron of streetfighters.[2]

 

This is, again, great as a marketing slogan but woefully short on combat reality.

 

Regarding Streetfighter’s self-defense,

 

A 300-ton streetfighter would depend on stealth characteristics, soft kill, numbers, and the ability to lose itself "in the clutter." It could carry light antiair weapons such as Stingers. The design philosophy should be that visual detection of it will predominate, no present missile guidance system will detect and home on it, and added safely comes from confronting an enemy with a swarm of targets.[2]

 

Even a larger 1200 ton Streetfighter was recognized as having inherent defensive problems,

 

A larger version of 1,200 tons might carry not only soft kill systems but also deployable decoys and Rolling Airframe missile (RAM) or the equivalent, while accepting that low observability and active defense are conflicting characteristics.[2]

 

As Hughes recognizes, you can’t defend without broadcasting (radar) your position and if you broadcast your position, you die since you have no credible defense.

 

Hughes does offer one brilliant and prescient observation,

 

The biggest danger is that streetfighter will be conceived as a junior variation of the projection navy: the same habitability standards, spacious bridge, electronically comprehensive combat information center, offices, and paperwork; a galley with cooks and mess cooks; defenses that are supposed to defeat every attack; stocks for months at sea; standard damage-control teams and procedures; and a guarantee for each young captain that one grounding or failed inspection will send him packing.[2]

 

Indeed, this is exactly what happened to the LCS!

 

 

 

Analysis

 

 

‘Wired’ website offers interesting thoughts about the lack of CONOPS, which doomed the LCS.

 

The confusion over the LCS' roles has gone on so long it has created a bizarre feedback loop, with the Navy, its shipbuilders, the Pentagon and America's regional commanders each developing plans and technologies for the LCS based on conflicting assumptions. The result is a warship theoretically capable of almost anything, and increasingly optimized for nothing.[3]

 

This vagueness and lack of a concept of operations also extended to Streetfighter.

 

For all Cebrowski's and Hughes' passion about small-ship theory, and Clark's and Rumsfeld's determination to build the diminutive vessels, no one had clearly defined exactly what a small warship should look like, and what it should and shouldn't do. On at least one key point – expendability – the strategists and the mainstream Navy were totally at odds.[3]

 

This fundamental flaw – the lack of a viable CONOPS - continues to this day and not just for the LCS but for any conceptual small combatant.  I have yet to hear any viable CONOPS for any small combatant in US service.  Supporters of small combatants are wildly enthusiastic about the ships, themselves (meaning, the weapons, speed, stealth, and other physical characteristics), but totally ignore the fundamental question of how the ship will be used. 

 

This was the problem with Streetfighter. 

 

This was the problem with the LCS. 

 

This is the problem with any small combatant.

 

We’ve thoroughly discussed the problems that arise from the lack of a CONOPS when a ship is designed.  Well, here’s someone else’s discussion of the problem as it relates to the LCS.

 

The only thing everyone agreed on was that the LCS would sail close to shore. But no one specified how close "close" really was. One mile? Twenty-five miles?

 

As theorists, Hughes and Cebrowski never had to be specific. Rumsfeld, for his part, was notorious for ignoring the nitty-gritty details of running the military. Clark tried his best to keep his boss happy and grow the fleet.

 

"As a result, the Navy’s leadership was forced to test out arguments for the new ship on the fly," [DepSecDef] Work recalled. "Sometimes the LCS was labeled transformational because of its high speed ... other times it was because the ship was designed to defeat 'asymmetric' littoral threats." On still other occasions, the Navy chose to emphasize LCS' supposed "transformational impact on the American shipbuilding industry."

 

"The constantly changing rationale for the new ship helped to confuse both the Navy’s internal and external audiences," Work concluded.

 

In short, the circumstances of the LCS' genesis were a perfect recipe for a shipbuilding fiasco.[3]

 

And the utterly predictable result occurred.

 

The [LCS] plan was, in a word, ambitious – which was not what Cebrowski and Hughes had in mind when they argued for the Navy to add smaller, simpler, cheaper ships. In the course of just four years, the Navy fought, embraced, and then completely corrupted the small-ship philosophy. Instead of compact, brute-simple coastal brawlers, it would get over-inflated, gas-guzzling, gutless ships dependent on ultrahigh-tech gizmos.

 

In the absence of clear missions and realistic capabilities, LCS became everything to everyone, as long as no one thought too hard about anything.[3]

 

More generally, the following illustrates a (the?) fundamental flaw in all the ‘streetfighter’, small combatant type ship designs and force structures.  It makes the assumption that large ships are unable to function in a littoral scenario – an assumption that is utterly unsupported by any evidence and, in fact, a great deal of evidence exists to support the exact opposite conclusion!  For example, the destroyers at Normandy that sailed right up to shore to do battle with German shore batteries conclusively proved that large, ocean-going ships had no problems operating and fighting successfully in shallow waters.

 

In the late 1990s, the Navy realized it had a problem. Its 9,000-ton cruisers and destroyers, inherited from the Cold War, were great for open-ocean warfare against the Soviets. But the same ships were considered too vulnerable to safely operate in the shallow, crowded, chaotic coastal waters – aka, the "littorals" – that were fast becoming the next naval battleground.

 

Here, dangers might include gun-armed speedboats, missile-firing fast-attack craft, small submarines and sea mines, plus antiship missiles and aircraft launched from land.

 

The preceding assumption, that large, ocean-going ships can’t function and survive in shallow waters is valid only if one cedes all offensive operation to the opponent … which is exactly what we’ve done;  witness Iran’s constant harassment (to include mining of merchant ships – an act of war or piracy or both).  If, on the other hand, one retains the right of offensive action, any large, ocean-going combatant can wipe away littoral threats with no effort.

 

 

Conclusion

 

It seems clear that the common belief that Streetfighter preceded the LCS is incorrect.  The corollary belief that LCS ‘abandoned’ the Streetfighter design is also false as there is no evidence that the LCS ever had any formal connection with Streetfighter.  Further, Streetfighter was never a Navy program of record and, therefore, there was never any official embrace of Streetfighter other than, perhaps, some informal and undocumented hope that Cebrowski’s appointment by Rumsfeld to head his pet Office of Force Transformation might result in some degree of incorporation of the Streetfighter concept into the LCS.  By that time, however, the LCS was already pretty well set, at least in concept.

 

Most importantly, Streetfighter appears to have never been given any definitive form in the way of specifications.  In fact, I can find no Cebrowski-Hughes artist’s concept drawing of what the Streetfighter vessel might have looked like.  The lack of any formal description has given rise to endless versions proposed by subsequent naval commentators but none have the slightest connection to Cebrowski and Hughes’ concept which, indeed, never actually specified an actual vessel – only a ‘family of capabilities’.

 

Thus, all the romanticism about Streetfighter is just that:  romantic notions that were never actually espoused by Cebrowski and Hughes.

 

All subsequent Streetfighter discussion has been pure, individual speculation with no attached CONOPS – just a vague array of marketing slogans by people who are more enamored of ship weapons than any useful description of how a Streetfighter would actually function.  If you want to begin to get an understanding of just how flawed the small combatant concept is, read the post, “Undisputed and Unaccepted”, which discusses some of the flaws in Hughes small combatant concept as described in his fleet tactics book.


 

We can blame the LCS for a host of failings but failing to follow the design of Streetfighter is not one of them.

 

 

 

 

 

Disclaimer:  Information from the beginnings of the LCS and Streetfighter are hard to find.  If someone can produce information I haven’t found, I’ll gladly consider it and modify my conclusions, if appropriate.

 


________________________________

 

[1]USNI Proceedings, “Rebalancing the Fleet”, Vice Admiral A. K. Cebrowski, USN, and Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.), Volume 125/11/1,161, Nov-1999

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1999/november/rebalancing-fleet

 

[2]USNI Proceedings, “22 Questions for Streetfighter”, Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.), Vol. 126/2/1,164, Feb-2000

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2000/february/22-questions-streetfighter

 

[3]https://www.wired.com/2011/08/future-warship-ran-aground/


75 comments:

  1. The ironic thing is that there was a fairly sensible concept that got encoded as "Littoral," a fast craft for dealing with Iranian speedboats in the Gulf. The problem was that everyone in the Navy surface warfare communities jumped on the bandwagon, and the craft grew out of control into LCS. That could in theory deal with speedboats, but was obviously way too expensive for that kind of combat.

    A sensible craft for that would essentially be a modern equivalent of a WWII PT boat. You'd have helicopter-derived turboshaft engines, a bunch of Harpoons, and a lighter-weight CIWS than Phalanx, something like a https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DARDO.

    It's commanded by a Lieutenant, at most, preferably a j.g. At this point, offboard maintenance and abandon-it-if-badly-damaged makes sense.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. " there was a fairly sensible concept that got encoded as "Littoral," a fast craft for dealing with Iranian speedboats in the Gulf."

      Are you referring to Streetfighter, LCS, or something else?

      Delete
    2. Something else, which *may* have been the origin of the LCS concept before it got vastly over-elaborated, but as far as I know, never got a name of its own.

      Delete
    3. Okay, if it never had a name can you, at least, describe what it was, where it came from, what time period it was from, who was pushing it, or how far it advanced in development, if at all?

      What was the concept?

      I can't say I'm familiar with whatever it is (at least not based on the info you've provided!) but I'd love to know more.

      Delete
    4. It reminds me of the swordsman in The Lost Ark. Don't over think it, just shoot him and move on. We long for the PT boat, but the MH-60 or AH-1Z can do all that. They just need a good roost with enough gas and other desirable characteristics.

      Delete
    5. "We long for the PT boat, but the MH-60 or AH-1Z can do all that. They just need a good roost with enough gas and other desirable characteristics."

      Well said. It should be noted the PT boat ALSO needs a good roost with enough gas- and unlike the helicopter, this roost is likely a sitting duck for enemy LAND ATTACK munitions, as not only must a prospective PT boat mother ship be large, but she must slow down if not outright STOP to service a PT boat. A helicopter can land on a ship moving at full speed, and be serviced while the ship continues moving at full speed.

      Delete
    6. " the MH-60 or AH-1Z can do all that. They just need a good roost"

      Agree in concept. Now, how do you provide the 'roost'?

      Delete
    7. "Now, how do you provide the 'roost'?"

      The US Navy already has more amphibious assault ships than the Marine Corps need. If those LHAs, LPHs, and LPDs aren't enough, the service can order something like the JMSDF's Hyuga class DDHs.

      Delete
    8. "amphibious assault ships"

      Okay, so you're suggesting that we have very large, very non-stealthy, very non-defensible mother ships hanging around a naval battleground to provide combat helo support. The mothership would be an enormously attractive and vulnerable target (sink/mission kill the mothership and all the helos go away). Is this really a viable option in a realistic combat setting?

      I ask this not to criticize or even, necessarily, to disagree, but to prompt you to think this through a bit deeper. How will we keep this easily detected and hugely vulnerable mothership close enough to service short legged helos and yet not be found and sunk? If you say the answer is Aegis escorts then do really need a helo/mothership? Wouldn't the Aegis escorts be perfectly capable of dealing with small boats themselves?

      Again, not arguing, just prompting more analysis before we start piling helos on LHx ships and sending them into combat.

      Delete
    9. A Trimaran about the size of an EPF could perform that mission. Design it with a level of stealth about like LCS-2. Forget modules. I mean you could use larger ships for hangar maintenance and just have a lilly pad for 2 like FSF-1, but you loose your stealth with the helo on deck and that ship was too small to carry the fuel needed among other things.

      Delete
    10. "A Trimaran about the size of an EPF could perform that mission."

      How would you envision it defending itself?

      Delete
    11. - RAM or Searam over the hangar
      - 57 or 76mm bow gun
      - 1 or 2 tactical length mk 41 with ESSM
      - NULKA
      - SEWIP
      - 2 mk 38 mod 4
      - Ideally 360 IR/EO and a small fixed face air search radar.
      - Let the helos do the ASW if needed.

      Delete
    12. That's an ambitious amount of hardware. Have you tried laying it out on a plan of the EPF to see if it can fit?

      If you're using VLS ESSM you need some kind of fairly capable, 360 degree air search radar. A single, fixed face radar won't work.

      If you can fit it all, I like it!

      Delete
    13. I used an Incat and tried not to take too many liberties. We really need a 4 face little guy EASR. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1uKl0LKsbO-C9vmMXiPtA4eP6GAKvb1C9PyFPq_tmsos/edit?usp=sharing

      Delete
    14. Where did you envision locating the Mk41 VLS modules?

      Delete
    15. This would be the ideal situation for posting a link to a hand sketch, if you have any interest in doing so. I wish the Blogger program supported HTML image insertion but it does not appear to do so. It does support links, though.

      Are you familiar with Shipbucket website for pixel-editing ship pictures? You might enjoy it checking it out at shipbucket.com.

      Delete
    16. Forward of the deck house. It needs to be back a good bit if working with a catamaran. Trimarans could fit them about where the weapon module is on LCS-2. LCS weapon modules weigh less and only cut one deck, but their overall volume is almost the same as a mk 41 strike length launcher.

      Delete
  2. CNO, look into the Naval Post Graduate School archives, the CROSSBOW and SEA ARCHER reports. I believe these describe what evolved into Streetfighter.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I'm aware of those reports. They were a near-science fiction proposal for a littoral combat group.

      The time frame was 2002 and, as such FOLLOWED Streetfighter rather than preceding it.

      Was there some aspect of the report that particularly caught your attention?

      Delete
  3. Actually, I think that the smell combatant was SEA LANCE

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. As I vaguely understand it, Sea Lance was the vessel that was intended to deploy the Expeditionary Warfare Grid which seems to have been some kind of sensor grid. The vessel, itself, was a lightly armed ship similar in appearance to the current Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).

      Delete
    2. FSF-1 would be the more like EPF/JHSV concept. Sea Lance was the radical, small departure. Never really understood Sea Lance at all. Way small, not stealthy, barely modular.

      Delete
  4. From the GlobalSecurity.org website about "Streetfighter":

    (https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/streetfighter.htm)

    "As of mid-2001,the Office of Naval Research was considering construction of a Littoral Combat Ship with a displacement of 500 to 600 tons. The LCS would have a draft of about three meters, an operational range of 4,000 nautical miles, and a maximum speed of 50-60 knots. The cost per ship might be at least $90 million.

    The Streetfighter would be a smaller, very fast ship (part of the more general Streetfighter concept), that could compete successfully with the enemy for control of coasts and littoral waters. They envisioned these ships costing less than 10% as much as current Battle Force ships, while comprising more than 25% of the total number of surface combatants [that is at least 25 but note than 50 units]."

    In 2014, Robert O. Work wrote a very lengthy piece on the LCS titled: " The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why."

    "The decision to exclude small combatants from future fleet plans was not universally applauded. War games, fleet experiments, and analyses conducted throughout the 1990s suggested the need for a new generation of small combatants
    able to penetrate a contested littoral and scout for and eliminate threats hidden in coastal clutter.

    Two distinct concepts emerged from this work. The first was a heavily armed 2,200 to 2,600-ton “multi-warfare capable ship” with a composite superstructure, medium caliber gun, medium-range air defense and antiship missiles, armed helicopters (preferably two), armed unmanned aerial systems, and land attack missiles to strike shore based missile batteries.
    The second, more widely publicized concept was a family of small, fast, and stealthy littoral combatants known as Streetfighters, championed by the Naval War College.
    Between 1999 and 2001, proponents of small combatants used these concepts to openly question the wisdom of building a surface fleet composed entirely of large, multi-mission warships."

    (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA594372)

    I hope this helps.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I've read that. Was there something in particular that caught your attention?

      Delete
    2. 1) proponents of small combatants used these concepts to openly question the wisdom of building a surface fleet composed entirely of large, multi-mission warships."
      2) They envisioned these ships costing less than 10% as much as current Battle Force ships, while comprising more than 25% of the total number of surface combatants [that is at least 25 but note than 50 units]."

      Delete
    3. Okay. Now, do you agree or disagree with those statements?

      Delete
  5. I recently finished the third edition of Fleet Tactics. It has a fictional scenario in which the US Navy gets involved in a dispute between Greece and Turkey. One fictional American ship is the Cushing-class corvette, an 800-ton ship armed with a 76 mm gun, eight Harpoon missiles, and minimal ASW capabilities other than a single LAMPS helicopter. Interestingly, the real-life Ambassador III-class missile boat (minus the aviation component) has the same firepower.

    There also is a fictional 200-ton Phantom-class missile boat that deploys from a 40,000-ton mothership. Phantoms are armed with the fictional Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM), described as a navalized Army missile.

    The Cushings are sent to distract the Turkish navy and allow the Phantoms to move into position unnoticed and then launch missiles against Turkish targets. The Phantoms are claimed to have "no electromagnetic signature" and difficult to spot by eye, especially at night. They sound like the Swedish Visby-class corvette, though the Phantoms are much smaller.

    Though the description of the Phantoms is vague, I interpret them as being some kind of Streetfighter. The action takes place among islands, which I gather is an ideal operating environment for smaller warships.

    This scenario is repeated from a previous version of the book. In the third edition the authors add that if this mission were carried out today, air and sea drones could take the role of the Cushings in distracting and drawing fire. I don't recall seeing it in the book, but I've read elsewhere that Streetfighters might have ejection capsules for the crew. That has to be an acknowledgement that these small ships were likely to be lost in battle.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "I've read elsewhere that Streetfighters might have"

      As pointed out in the post, as best I can tell, there was never any actual Streetfighter design so whatever you read is just someone's imagination and personal vision of what Streetfighter ought to be. That doesn't make it good or bad, just totally unofficial and imaginary.

      Regarding the book's scenario, Hughes omits all kinds of highly relevant factors in contriving his scenario. It's been awhile since I last read it but my recollection is that he ignores the entire lead up to the battle (assembly of forces, surveillance of forces, assembly of counter-forces, etc.), vessel support requirements, forward basing requirements, land based enemy air assets, land based missiles, and so on. In other words, in presenting his scenario he just assumes the battle 'pops' into being so that he can then explore/present his salvo equations. Unfortunately, the myriad other factors largely render his scenario invalid.

      As I've said many times, Hughes work is the equivalent of Naval Combat 101; it's a nice starting point for a student but most definitely not the finishing point.

      Delete
  6. The problem is that what we call Destroyers now have really morphed into the roles that were once the role of Cruisers (and even to some extent Battleships): General purpose long duration line of battle units. Remember the Destroyer is a shortened form of Torpedo Boat Destroyer. Their purpose was to prevent ultra-light units with torpedoes from getting close to enough to kill an expensive Main Combatant with single shot. They were to be considered expendable to save the heavier combatants, even intercepting torpedoes with their hulls. Unfortunately, the navy need ships to fill their role, but is unwilling to accept expendable ships (although unmanned may change that) so the defensive needs bloat them.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. A ship may be expendable, but her crew is NOT. Not only will the loss of life be used in enemy propaganda, devastating our service members' morale and domestic support for our war efforts, but the loss will mean the service wasted the time and money spent training these service members- members who can no longer serve on other ships, performing other vital missions.

      Remember the big mistake that was the Royal Flying Corps' (predecessor to the Royal Air Force's) refusal to issue parachutes to its pilots?

      Delete
    2. The harsh reality of war is that some units ARE expendable. The Flower class corvettes of WWII were expendable. The PT boats were expendable as they attempted to buy time to get our naval construction effort in gear. The picket ships at Okinawa were expendable as they sought to protect the high value units of the invasion fleet.. That doesn't mean you recklessly throw them away but it does mean that they're meant to undertake the high risk tasks and can be lost without causing a catastrophic impact on the overall war effort.

      Delete
    3. "The harsh reality of war is that some units ARE expendable."

      No. The harsh reality of war is that ALL units are expendable. It is only a matter of what you gained in the process of losing them.

      Delete
  7. I think this Proceedings article covers your timeline as described. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012/september/birth-littoral-combat-ship

    My gripe remains designing some basic ships and how they fit in the fleet rather than radical, non evolutionary ideas from non-sailors. How to get more with less, consolidate and standardize parts. We are missing an opportunity.

    F-125, Type 26 and derivatives, and FFG-62 all use 20V MTU 4000 53Bs. Korean FFX Batch II and batch III use the 12V of the exact same engine. We could build a smaller combatant with LM2500+G4 CODELAG and the 12V gensets, the shaft motors from the Korean ships and have a lot of engineering ratings that could cross train between FFG and FFL ship types. Our ship could have those original small combatant desires.
    - 2 MH-60
    - Stealth (Including acoustic)
    - Real self defense without being a full AAW combatant
    -It would still have speed and endurance
    -Basic modularity, like anyone else's successful ship. By build or shipyard period. A Captas 4 and an 11M RHIB could be a rear launch capability depending for what kind of role the ship is being fitted out. The other truly modular item missing from our ships is Mk 41 VLS.

    ReplyDelete
  8. I think the closest occurrence of a 'streetfighter' type action in modern times was the Bubiyan Turkey Shoot in the Gulf War of 1993. Where the Iraqi navy was essentially obliterated by missile armed helicopters. It showed that light forces can be incredibly vulnerable to the properly equipped air forces.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bubiyan
    https://youtu.be/DR0UWc_uN0I

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. And yet those who proposed the "Streetfighter," EPIC FAILed to learn from this. One must question their qualifications as naval officers.

      Delete
    2. "those who proposed the "Streetfighter," EPIC FAILed to learn"

      I don't know what Cebrowski's thinking was but Hughes seems to have been totally focused on his salvo equations which, to be fair, were valid ONLY WITHIN THE CONFINES OF HIS VERY NARROW FLEET VERSUS FLEET SCENARIO. Misguidedly, he then appears to have extrapolated from that to a general conclusion that small boats were the solution (to a problem that didn't really exist!).

      Delete
  9. " Despite having absolutely no evidence that ‘littoral’ required anything new or unique, the Navy latched onto it as a rationale for continued funding"

    If you look at the vast majority of naval battles, they are named after nearby land masses. Relative nearness to shore is not particularly new. Designing ships to fight ever closer to shore makes sense only if their weapons and sensors can't reach far enough from more open positions.

    ReplyDelete
  10. What happened to the Pegasus hydrofoils? A proven design that would be difficult to hit, and mostly impossible for torpedoes. Only 240 tons with a 76mm gun that could outrun any ship or sub.

    In a major war, I'd have these hiding in rivers and bays waiting for intel tips, then dashing out to sea to unleash Harpoons at whatever ventured within range, then fleeing back to safety.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus-class_hydrofoil

      Delete
    2. They likely suffered from similar problems to the LCS, i.e., mechanical unreliability and the resulting high maintenance requirements, and short range. The difference is the USN wasn't stupid enough to promote the Pegasus as the be-all and end-all of its fleet; impose minimal manning and the resulting maintenance inadequacy; order the ship BEFORE appropriate weapons were available to arm her, or think to employ her in an inappropriate manner, e.g., send this short-ranged ship across the Pacific to fight China, where she'll be a sitting duck due to running out of fuel.

      Delete
    3. "similar problems to the LCS"

      Yes and no. No, the reliability and maintenance were not an issue. Relative to large surface combatants and the overall Navy budget, the Pegasus was free to operate. Yes, the Pegasus' biggest problem was that it had no viable CONOPS. The Navy built it and then had no idea what to do with it ... sound familiar?

      The design was excellent (fast, heavily armed, cheap relative to the Navy budget) but it had no role. The Navy has never been supportive of small combatants and the lack of a CONOPS sealed the Pegasus' fate.

      Delete
    4. "order the ship BEFORE appropriate weapons"

      Well ... it's true that they didn't design the vessel using non-existent weapons, however, they did commit to a large quantity of vessels before the first was built. I've seen numbers of 30 - 100. The program was suspended after Zumwalt left office and then, ultimately suspended after several had been ordered. Congress stepped in and insisted that the Navy complete several more. Having attempted to cancel to program, the Navy had no use for the class and didn't know what to do with them (no CONOPS). They wound up doing some drug interdiction work, if I recall. Other than Pegasus, itself, the remaining five vessels served for around 10 years and were retired.

      Delete
    5. "Well ... it's true that they didn't design the vessel using non-existent weapons, however, they did commit to a large quantity of vessels before the first was built."

      I was referring to the LCS and its mission modules when I wrote, "The difference is the USN wasn't stupid enough to... order the ship BEFORE appropriate weapons were available to arm her."

      Delete
    6. "They likely suffered from similar problems to the LCS"

      The 'They' appears to be a reference to the Pegasus program and it seemed that you were comparing it to the LCS and stating, correctly, that at least the Pegasus didn't spec non-existent weapons. If that's not what you meant, forgive me.

      The Pegasus program did, as I noted, commit to a large quantity of vessels before the first was built. For an evolutionary development of a ship line, this is acceptable but for a fairly radical, never before built vessel this is foolish and cried out for a prototype. How much better - and cheaper - would things have been if the LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, AFSB, MLP, etc. had all been limited to a single prototype since none turned out to be successful?

      Delete
    7. Advances in UAVs solves the Pegasus problem of OTH targeting. I see these valuable in dense island chains like the Philippines, Indonesia and the Marinas, not on the open ocean, where they hide near shore and dash out to intercept supply ships, convoys, or lone destroyers. Great for CSAR. And they are difficult to hit due to their tiny size and quick turning. And they risk a crew of just 21 and carry a 76mm gun and six anti-ship missiles.

      Compared to the LCS that is ten times larger, a hundred times the cost, needing five times the crew, with just a 57mm gun and eight anti-ship missiles.

      Delete
    8. "Advances in UAVs solves the Pegasus problem of OTH targeting."

      I'd be wary of saying that UAVs solve the problem. They certainly offer possibilities. However, a Pegasus size craft could only operate small UAVs, Scan Eagle types, and likely only one, for example, which have a very limited range and sensor field of view (the soda straw analogy). This also presupposes that the enemy obligingly allows us to operate UAVs without hinderance, which seems unlikely.

      The OTH problem is also one of the major issues with Hughes small combatant concept.

      I've advocated small UAVs as naval sensors but with the notation that they would only be effective when used in large numbers - something not possible when a Pegasus type vessel is the host platform and is operating, essentially, alone.

      A specific, viable scenario for a lone, small UAV as a successful sensor for OTH targeting would be if you already know the approximate location of the target and just need final, firing-quality data. You send the UAV out to the location, 'pop up', confirm, transmit, probably die, and then the host launches. Of course, if you already knew the approximate location then you likely had some other recon asset and don't need the UAV so ...

      Delete
    9. You could break down and stow a full orbit of say 5 Jump 20s to launch from a vertrep station on a small ship. They could use satcom. They could use a SAR radar.

      Delete
    10. "Advances in UAVs solves the Pegasus problem of OTH targeting."

      "They could use satcom. They could use a SAR radar."

      How resistant is a UAV's remote control system to jamming and other electronic warfare techniques and technologies? How resistant is its satcom or other communications system with which it may relay targeting data for an antiship missile platform? How resistant is the tiny- and thus, WEAK- radar a UAV small enough to launch from a Pegasus class hydrofoil, can carry?

      These are questions demanding SERIOUS answers in a SERIOUS war, i.e., one against a peer competitor, like Russia or China. Has anyone been asking these questions? Or do they intend to limit the USN to flinging cruise missiles at antigovernment insurgents too weak to face the US in a set piece battle?

      Delete
    11. I'd be hot for Link-16 too, but thus far I haven't seen it in anything smaller than MH-8C and MQ-1C.

      Delete
    12. "Jump 20s to launch from a vertrep station on a small ship."

      Yes, but that's not what we're talking about. We're talking about operating from a Pegasus and there is no space for a 19 ft x 10 ft UAV.

      Delete
    13. "Jump 20"

      People seem to have the impression that a UAV is the equivalent of an E-3 Sentry AWACS or something; that it will see everything for a thousand miles in all directions. That's not even remotely correct. A small UAV offers a very small field of view from whatever sensor it uses. A hand-size camera, IR, or mini-radar is not going see much. That's useful under certain conditions but it's not a broad area maritime surveillance capability.

      And then there's the survivability issue. If a UAV is close enough to see, say, an enemy ship then it's been within detection and engagement range of the ship for quite some time and is likely already destroyed. It stands to reason that the large EO/IR or radar of a ship has a much better range of detection than a hand-size UAV sensor, right? This is why I keep emphasizing UAVs with passive electronic sensing that can be effective from a distance and becomes more effective with large numbers and triangulation.

      Delete
    14. The UAV is a small object looking for a big one. The ship is a big object looking for a small UAV. That does factor in. No one is saying its a full recon plane, but it can see way more than the ship can in many scenarios and does not reveal the ship. If the ship being hunted has the missile to hit it, that missile will likely cost more than the UAV. We have seen this equation play out in Ukraine and it will continue elsewhere and at sea.

      Delete
    15. "The UAV is a small object looking for a big one. The ship is a big object looking for a small UAV."

      That's irrelevant. What's relevant is the sensor performance and the ship's sensors far, far, far, far outperform the UAV.

      "missile will likely cost more than the UAV."

      Again, irrelevant. The issue is NOT the cost of the missile versus the cost of the UAV, it's the cost of the ship being hunted. If the ship 'spends' a million dollar missile to shoot down a $10K UAV, the ship wins in the sense that it protected and preserved a billion+ dollar ship. THAT'S the cost that's important.

      Now, if you do that a thousand times then you have a problem but that's not the case in naval combat. Since no one but Turkey seems to want to develop a UAV carrier, ships only have one or two UAVs, at most. Shooting it down 'blinds' the other side and, again, that's a very good use of a million dollar missile. Spending a million dollars to blind the enemy (presumably leading to sinking him) is a very cost effective action.

      Delete
  11. The M80 Stiletto would have been the perfect model for a street fighter/littoral combat vessel. The prototype was deployed to south america for drug enforcement missions several times, and special ops.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. This is the perfect example of a ship without a CONOPS. What mission/role do you see for it (CONOPS) and what specific armament would it be able to carry that would allow it to execute that mission?

      Notable limitations are the range (a few hundred nm), endurance (food, water, berthing, laundry, etc.), and the need for a very close base/mothership, either of which would be very susceptible to attack and destruction.

      So, with the above in mind, now describe how the M80 would fit and function in the mission you envision.

      Delete
    2. Not really looking at one the size of the prototype, but a upscaled M hull vessel with at least 1800 mi range. Weapons fit can be whatever you want. I would make it a concealed fit (ie. VLS SSM/SAM, LW TT, a pop up 30-76mm for self defence. ) Something along the Visby line, but lower profile. CONOPS would be coastal strike, littoral operations. No ASW, anti ship and inland strike missions (TLAMS fit). AAW self defence only.

      Delete
    3. I like M80 originally too, because it was this stealth platform in an LCAC footprint, but it really can't do much and would definitely be dependent on a mother ship. I think the better discussion point coming from that ship is whether there is a reason for an all composite vessel. I could see that in the littoral for stealth, shallower draft, better fuel economy and speed for engine size. Look at the Global Response Cutter design vs. Fast Response Cutter.

      GRC:
      http://bratco.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/LASNAUD-GLOBAL-CUTTER-SWB11750P.pdf

      FRC:
      https://media.defense.gov/2018/Apr/11/2001901927/-1/-1/0/FLYNN_SENTINEL-CLASS-FRC-2018.PDF

      Delete
    4. "CONOPS would be coastal strike, littoral operations."

      That's not really a CONOPS, it's a vague location and a slogan. 'Littoral operations' could be, literally, anything!

      Setting that aside, we also need an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and I can see from this and other comments that I need to do a post on it.

      I'm not picking on you or even, really, criticizing your idea. I'm just pointing out that most of the people commenting about their preferred ship or weapons fit are falling into the same trap the Navy does: designing a vessel without a solid CONOPS or AoA.

      Delete
    5. "but it really can't do much and would definitely be dependent on a mother ship."

      CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS!!!!!

      'Can't do much' depends on what you want it to do.

      CONOPS!!!!!!

      A mothership (or not) is part of a CONOPS. CONOPS addresses not just what weapon a ship will have but how the ship will be used and supported. If the mothership can't survivably operate in the projected area of operations then it doesn't matter how amazing the M80 or whatever vessel we're considering is because it won't be supportable.

      CONOPS covers all that stuff, not just the fun weapons. Logistics wins wars? Well, the nitty gritty, boring logistics and support aspects of a CONOPS are what makes the vessel under consideration a success or failure.

      Consider the LCS. Setting aside its weapon/module failures, the Navy didn't bother to hammer out the details of the support and the support has failed miserably, resulting in the need for MORE bodies to operate the LCS than the Perry it replaced! When the LCS goes to war, there won't be any friendly, contractor run, support base nearby. What will the LCS do then? Nothing! Because, after two weeks, when its due for its mandatory shoreside maintenance, there won't be any! The Navy didn't think that through, did they?

      We just hand wave away the issue of how to survivably operate a mothership near a combat area but that's the key to the success of any small Streetfighter type craft. To be fair to the Navy, that's a major reason why they've never really pursued a small combatant. In a forward deployed scenario, there's no good way to support them.

      Most of a CONOPS is the boring stuff but that's what makes a success or failure.

      Delete
  12. Of course I'm just guessing as to what the purpose of this class of ship would be.
    But it seems like the WW2 Evarts class DE would be a good frame to build this on:
    - 289 foot length
    - 35 foot beam
    - 9 foot draft
    - 1360 tons full load

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evarts-class_destroyer_escort

    Rig it out with modern engines, electronics and weapons and light armoring strong enough to withstand automatic cannon fire.

    Lutefisk

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "Of course I'm just guessing as to what the purpose of this class of ship would be."

      And yet, as a long time reader, you know that answering this question is the FIRST step and MUST be done before any ship selection or design!

      Take a shot at it. We're discussing a Streetfighter type vessel, whatever that means, so go ahead and postulate a role/CONOPS and then see what ship and fit meets that requirement. Try it. It's fun! I do entire blog posts on this kind of thing!

      Of course, if you begin to analyze it, you may find there is no viable mission/CONOPS! Or maybe there is ...

      Delete
    2. Don't fall into the trap the Navy has - designing a platform first and then looking for a mission.

      Delete
    3. As I was reading your post and the comments, I had in my head a complement to a Gearing class surface engagement ship.
      As I've remarked in previous posts, I would like to take a Gearing class destroyer and update it to fight up close and personally against enemy surface ships in places like fjords, the Aegean, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Persian Gulf, etc.

      I could see this Evarts class update as a brown water/littoral complement to the Gearing.

      With a draft of only 9', it should be able to get into some fairly shallow water. My intent would be that this would engage and kill missile boats, patrol craft, and speed boats close into shore and in confined waters.

      I would arm this with a single 76mm fore and aft, 20mm phalanx fore and aft, a single SeaRAM, and a single 30mm Goalkeeper.
      It would also need to have vertically launched Hellfire amidships.

      Electronics would include a single panel rotating TRS 3D radar, an EO/IR search capability, and ECM.

      This would need to be armored to resist auto cannon fire to prevent being disabled by quick raking fire from smaller enemy platforms.

      My intent is that it would overpower the smaller craft that it was engaging, taking advantage of its comparative size and strength.

      At 289' length and 35' beam, this should also have a decent turning radius. It could be an option for an ASW configuration for use in brown water sub hunting.

      Remove the rear 76mm gun, add a bow sonar, hedgehog on the fantail, maybe a towed array, ASROC in place of the Hellfire, and a couple of MK48 tubes if there is room.

      The ASuW and ASW versions, working together, might also be useful in harbor defense as well.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    4. "fight up close and personally against enemy surface ships in places like fjords, the Aegean, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Persian Gulf, etc."

      Okay, you've described a concept of operations and the ship would fit that concept. The next step is an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). Just because this ship COULD meet the requirements doesn't necessarily mean that it's the BEST way to meet the requirements. For example, might a sweep of helos/aircraft be a better way to defeat small surface ships/craft? Might a single Burke, standing off (no need to go into shallow water!) and firing, say, ESSM in anti-surface mode be a better way to accomplish the mission? Might a helo(s) from a Burke be a better option? And so on.

      It might turn out that your ship can meet the requirements but is not the preferred way ... or maybe it is. The AoA will tell you that.

      Not only does the Navy not develop CONOPS, they also seem to totally ignore AoAs. They fixate on platforms and then try to find a mission or, as the Navy puts it, 'get it into the hands of the sailors and see what they can do with it'. That's completely backwards.

      I know you're captivated by the WWII destroyer adaptations and that's perfectly fine to play around with but if you're trying to link them to actual missions then you need the CONOPS and the AoA. Hopefully, this discussion makes it even more clear to you/us just how incompetently the Navy has been handling ship design.

      You and I can have fun imagining ships but the Navy has an obligation to follow the proven process and design ships with, and according to, the dictates of the CONOPS and AoA. By not doing so, they are guilty of professional malpractice and dereliction of duty.

      Delete
    5. "I would arm this with a single 76mm fore and aft, 20mm phalanx fore and aft, a single SeaRAM, and a single 30mm Goalkeeper.

      "It would also need to have vertically launched Hellfire amidships."

      Why use a single Goalkeeper 30mm CIWS, which uses ammunition incompatible with the Phalanx 20mm CIWS? Remember, the Goalkeeper is heavier, and its mount must penetrate the ship's deck, unlike the Phalanx- one reason it's rarely used, despite the advantages its larger caliber and greater range offers.

      Why use vertically launched Hellfire missiles, which have pathetically short range, compared to a Harpoon antiship missile? If you want to shoot small combatants, shouldn't the 76mm gun be good enough?

      Delete
    6. "Why use ... "

      It's all about CONOPS. The weapon/sensor fit depends on what the ship is being used for. Too many people are fascinated by the technology of the ship and ignore the concept of operations. If you have a solid CONOPS, the fit will be obvious!

      Delete
    7. We really need a matrix of abilities and what you'd want for that role. Then the size ship and guts start to reveal themselves.
      - If I want self deployment I want endurance of 21 days? 30? 60? and range of 3500@14? 3500@16, 4000@20?
      - If I want an ASW ship I want propulsion signature management, Captas 4, and MH-60R? (I'd want a bow sonar too, but which and why?)
      - If I want self defense I want RAM/Searam, Mk 110? SEWIP, NULKA, 3-4 face air search radar?

      Doing this sort of thing constantly brings me back to the U.S. needing what I'd call the modern Gearing which to me is Korean FFX Batch III or French FTI where the former is much more in keeping with U.S. design evolution.

      Delete
    8. "constantly brings me back to the U.S. needing what I'd call the modern Gearing"

      And now you've wandered away from the small Streetfighter concept. That's fine and it illustrates the difficulty (impossibility?) of finding a viable use for a Streetfighter type craft. Cebrowski/Hughes can play with their small boats but they never laid out a viable CONOPS.

      Delete
    9. "...I know you're captivated by the WWII destroyer adaptations..."

      Yes, but it's really a factor of my lack of naval knowledge.

      In WW2 we built ships of every size imaginable to perform the duties a navy needs to perform during wartime.
      Those duties are fundamentally unchanging, just in need of modern application.

      The WW2 designs are readily available to be used in conversation with the tools (wiki) and knowledge (a sort of general understanding of history) that I possess.

      For example, that's how I first became aware of the Des Moines class cruiser. I was looking at WW2 heavy cruisers and the 'succeeding class' link on wiki took me there.

      The WW2 destroyers are kind of like that. You had a post about Fletchers and it opened my eyes to that entire class of ship.

      Those hulls would be great starting points for modern ships. I might adapt the shape if the modern fluid dynamics would make a more efficient design. But those ships are fast and have good range, are we really that much better?

      And I don't see a lot of small ships like those in modern navies, which I think is a mistake on their parts.
      There might be modern options that would be better, but I'm not personally aware of them.

      Anyway, that's kind of where I'm coming from on these.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    10. "Why use a single Goalkeeper 30mm CIWS, which uses ammunition incompatible with the Phalanx 20mm CIWS?"

      That's a good question.

      My reasoning is that the GAU-8 30mm weapon is superior to the M61 20mm in almost every way.

      It fires at basically the same rate of fire.
      It has a similar muzzle velocity.
      The heavier round maintain that velocity longer so it has a flatter trajectory and superior ballistics.
      At the business end, the round will do significantly more damage.
      But on the down side, it's heavier and it requires more space to store the rounds.

      So why use the Phalanx at all?

      The primary purpose of the CIWS is to shoot down incoming missiles. For that purpose the 20mm phalanx (backing up the SeaRAM) should be adequate in most circumstances, and with lower total weight and needing a smaller space.

      But if I need to engage a very large missile, or an airplane or helicopter, or a boat, or (God forbid) a ship....the phalanx is just going to poke 15mm holes in them
      The 30mm, especially using high explosive incendiary ammunition, is going to be orders of magnitude more effective.

      And we're talking about a ship here. Of course space isn't unlimited, but there is a lot more flexibility than there would be on something like an armored vehicle.

      I think the added capability is worth it.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    11. "Why use vertically launched Hellfire missiles, which have pathetically short range, compared to a Harpoon antiship missile? If you want to shoot small combatants, shouldn't the 76mm gun be good enough?"

      Another good question.

      In some ways it just comes down to how the ship going to be used.
      I foresee this as operating in close to shore, in congested waters, using EMCON, ID'ing enemy with EO/IR, and engaging at short range with other small combatants.

      In that environment I would expect the 76mm gun to be pretty effective. But the swarm thread pointed out that dwell time might be too great in some circumstances.

      That's a time to use the hellfire, as a supplement to the 76mm guns (and the 30mm CIWS).
      Also, it might be advantageous tactically to combine the hellfire attack with the gun engagement.

      A harpoon might be a good weapon to have, but it might be more missile (range and warhead) than is necessary to perform the primary mission of the ship.

      My biggest question is if there is enough mission to justify building an entire class of warship.

      Lutefisk

      Delete
    12. "Anyway, that's kind of where I'm coming from on these."

      Don't get me wrong. The WWII designs are a great place to start and you're doing well to study them!

      Delete
  13. And yes, that isn't a Streetfighter at all.

    ReplyDelete

Comments will be moderated for posts older than 7 days in order to reduce spam.