I’m seeing more and more examples of military observers and analysts drawing conclusions about future warfare from the Ukraine-Russia war. I suspect most of the desire to draw conclusions and lessons stems not from any attempt to better understand combat but, rather, to support pre-existing opinions and positions. For example, the US military, has fully committed to the pursuit of networks and data over firepower despite absolutely no supporting evidence that networks and data can compensate for substantially reduced firepower. The military, then, is eager to latch onto any glimmer of news that would support and justify continued construction of networks as the primary ‘weapon’ of the US military. Whether those conclusions and lessons would apply to any but an unbelievably incompetent enemy like Russia, is of no concern to US military leadership. Their concern is to use the ‘lessons’ to obtain continued (or increased!) funding from Congress.
I cannot stress enough that the Ukraine-Russia war is exquisitely unique – and largely useless – as it relates to war with China. Russia has been astoundingly inept in every facet of war. It is extremely unlikely that China will be equally inept. Therefore, attempts to draw lessons from Ukraine-Russia are likely invalid.
Even the US military has rare glimmers that something might be wrong with the attempt.
After watching Ukraine take on Russia in both the real world and in cyberspace, a top American cyber official [Mieke Eoyang, deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy] said the Defense Department must “think very differently” about how it will fight in both realms in the future.[1]
According to Ms. Eoyang,
… one of the things she’s seeing “is the context of the armed conflict dwarfs the cyber impacts” of the war.
“When you think about the physical destruction relative to the cyber disruption of what happens here, things that Russians tried to disrupt via cyber… did not have the strategic impact that they wanted, and they sought to destroy those things physically,”[1]
A US military official coming to the conclusion that firepower has more of an impact than cyber actions? I’m astounded! Isn’t that exactly what I’ve been saying for the last several years?
This completely upends US military thinking and beliefs. The primacy of firepower over networks is sacrilegious to the orthodoxy of the US military which has ceded firepower superiority to the Chinese in the desperate, misguided hope that networks and data can, somehow, compensate for the lack of destructive firepower!
Unfortunately, just to prove that an isolated flash of insight into reality is just that – isolated - , here’s Eoyang’s overall conclusions and cyber objectives for the US military.
… Eoyang said DoD is now thinking about cyber operations in the context of armed conflict in four ways:
Making sure government-to-government communications and networks are secure, shown in how DoD’s communications with Ukraine have helped enable its defense and intelligence sharing.
The importance of secure communications within the military, like how Ukraine’s military has been able to share information with forward commanders.
In the informational space, thinking about what it means for Ukrainian citizens to be able to communicate with the world and tell their stories through social media platforms like TikTok, Twitter and Facebook, which “has denied Russian the information environment that they want to prosecute this conflict.”
The inherent value in ensuring “essential” government functions. “As you look at attempts to destroy the kind of essential data that makes a country a country…such as passport records, birth records, property records…What do governments need to be able to continue to operate its essential function?” Eoyang said.
Sure enough, most of those objectives have nothing to do with actually fighting and winning a war. They’re mostly about non-critical, non-combat, government functions which, by definition, are generally worthless.
Eoyang seems to recognize that Russia is performing incompetently, to put it mildly.
“I think we were [expecting] much more significant impacts than what we saw,” she said. “And I think it’s safe to say that Russian cyber forces, as well as their traditional military forces, underperformed expectations.”[1]
Despite this recognition, she wants to draw conclusions that will guide our future military preparations. Unless we have reason to believe that China will perform just as incompetently, we should be very , very, very, very, wary of drawing conclusions and lessons from the Ukraine war.
As I constantly say, all the networks and data in the world won’t matter one iota when a horde of enemy soldiers armed with clubs bash your brains in because you didn’t have the firepower to stop them.
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[1]Breaking Defense, “DoD must ‘think very differently’ about armed conflict, cyber in light of Ukraine war: Official”, Jaspreet Gill, 16-Nov-2022,
"As I constantly say, all the networks and data in the world won’t matter one iota when a horde of enemy soldiers armed with clubs bash your brains in because you didn’t have the firepower to stop them."
ReplyDeleteI am reminded of the Russian hacker squad conducting cyber attacks on Ukraine, whose location was triangulated and then permanently silenced with an airstrike.
Points well made. This kinetic vs info/cyber weigh-in shouldnt even be a thing. There are places for it no doubt, but it should be some teeny tiny part of our efforts. Nothing like what it is now. And Im also going to say that whatever we're paying Ms. Govt Functionary, its too much...
ReplyDeleteCyberwar problems being solved in Ukraine include
ReplyDeletehow to get an Iris-T radar to cue an I-Hawk battery.
Which DigiKey microcontroller allows a Harm to be
launched from Mig-29. The US military (you Marines)
loves buying stuff that is compatible with each other,
so there are some worthwhile lesson to be learned.
Coming up, are there enough Whitworth wrenches
in Ukraine to support Challenger tanks ?
I'd like to revise an extend my remarks..
Delete"The US military (you Marines)
loves buying stuff that is INcompatible with each other,"
Noteworthy how little we have witnessed about Russian supposedly (maybe real but who knows?) ECM, hacking, jamming etc capabilites? Do they have those vaunted capabilites and just decided not to use them? Incompetence? A mix of both? Or its just not as important as we all thought?
ReplyDeleteMaybe just like combined arms works between armor, infantry, artillery, the whole electronic realm can't just be used alone or piece meal or general incompetence, maybe the lesson here is how to blend the "e" spectrum together with kinetic strikes and movement.
"...have those vaunted capabilites and just decided not to use them? "
DeleteJust my uninformed guess, but maybe that was initially the case. But... after Ukraine didnt roll over in a few days, weeks, or even a few months, at some point Id think they would unleash any capabilities they had to get it done. I cant imagine theyre holding back anything remotely useful at this point. Calling up reserves and using second string equipment, but not using useful electronic tools by now seems unlikely to me...
"not using useful electronic tools by now seems unlikely to me..."
DeleteSo what does that suggest to you about the effectiveness of cyber warfare versus kinetic firepower?
Maybe we learning the wrong lesson, not that it's not useful but that the consequences aren't as bad as we think.
DeleteEx: Russian jamming surely taking place and I'm sure comms are difficult for Ukrainians BUT the lesson is how FAST did the Ukrainians adapt or just dusted off the old war play books, learned a few hard lessons and jamming doesn't mean much anymore because they changed how and when they communicate and moved on? Maybe this applies to the broader e spectrum, its got its place but its not the winner take all US DoD thinks it is. Militaries will or WON'T adapt.
Ex: GPS, how fast will US military adapt to its lose if China takes it out? If its fast, no big deal. If US cant find its way out of a brown bag because they so lost, we screwed.
"So what does that suggest...?"
DeleteTo me it says those vaunted tools are overhyped, and theyre either not having the larger effects that are intended, or they're somewhat easilly sidestepped, even by a (at least initially) tech-inferior opponent. Without having detailed knowledge of what is/isnt being done, its tough to make.more than that general statement. But whatever the case, it seems to me that zeroes and ones dont have the effect that 105, 155 or 7.62 can...!!!
"or they're somewhat easilly sidestepped"
DeleteThat would seem to be the conclusion, however, this war is so atypical that drawing conclusions from it is extremely risky. I don't think China is going to be as inept as Russia. Given what we know China has already done to our military and industrial networks, I anticipate much worse when war comes. Still, explosive effects trump cyber by a wide margin.
" zeroes and ones dont have the effect that 105, 155 or 7.62 can...!!!"
Brilliantly and succinctly put! The bigger the number, the bigger the effect?
ComNavOps look at this https://www.g2mil.com/bm747.htm
DeleteHere is an article on this topic (GPS jamming) from a year ago.
Deletehttps://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2022/07/22/why-isnt-russia-jamming-gps-harder-in-ukraine/
"Here is an article on this topic (GPS jamming)"
DeleteUnfortunately, the article is pure speculation and offers no conclusion. Other than as very basic background information, it serves no purpose.
Did you see something in it that was noteworthy?
As a Cold War Era Veteran (Army 1988-2009) my take on the whole discussion is that Cyber warfare is a Force Multiplier, in that we can use it to enhance our abilities to War heads on foreheads.
DeleteFor example, we can use the Cyber Operations to disrupt the enemies' abilities to conduct C4I operations, which may utilized give the Commander on the Ground or at Sea the time and or ability to conduct kinetic operations against the enemy. by doing things through Cyber warfare to deceive the enemy, confuse the enemy, shut down critical systems etc.
GPS: I remember when we transitioned from paper based map and compass navigation to GPS navigation. As a NCO in the both the Combat Engineers and Cavalry I had a tendency to issue the handheld GPS with half dead batteries. I did this knowing that at some point in our movement they would die, thus requiring the utilization of an analog system to make upon for the loss of the technology. I was my way of training my soldiers on how to continue their mission even if their issued technology was degraded.
We as an organization (DOD) need to return to realistic training that simulates the loss of our technological advantage, for if we fail to do this kind of training I fear the initial start of any conflict that the US is a direct participation party will result in higher initial casualties. All because we relied too much on our technology
"All because we relied too much on our technology"
DeleteSpot on!
Want to foul up a high tech countries game plan. Go low tech. (ie. offline, emcon., no internet.)
ReplyDeleteWe need first understand realities behind this war.
ReplyDeleteNeither US nor Russia wants to escalate it to a nuclear war but Putin seems willing to nuke US (not Ukraine) in case his Russia can no longer exist.
Therefore, for the Biden Administration, victory means Russians overthrow Putin so US can do further things with goal to neutralize its nuclear weapons. What a dream if Americans no longer under threats of total destruction?
On Putin's side, victory means US and EU have to settle according to his terms thus current Russia is preserved. US and EU will not interfere its business deals and economy. Russia will continue exist as current form with nuke power to make Americans behave.
Ukraine is only a tool.
Therefore, Russia doesn't want to overthrow current Ukraine government. Rather, keep a sick and corrupt entity to drain resources from US and EU to exhaust them to term. To continue this war, Russia needs economic supports. China and India, etc. are doing so for their own national interests. Just google the web to find published trade data between Russia and China in 2022, you would know how Russia can still sustain its fighting power. Most important thing is not to obtain some advanced Chinese weapons but economic supports which technically not violate neutrality declared by China. Didn't Switzerland do businesses with Nazi German during WWII?
So, reality is that Russia doesn't want to occupy whole Ukraine as Soviet Union did in Afghan which ended up as a nightmare (US also did). Russia only wants part with Russian majority and leave rest parts to exhaust US and EU to term. Russia thus commits only limited resources in battle field. You can see why Russia waited so long to mobilize its reserves. At the same time, Russia has left some best weapons standby in case NATO enters battle field, they won't be overwhelmed.
Therefore, there is no analogue of the Ukraine War vs possible conflicts between US and China which are likely in West Pacific. Navy, not army or marine, would play most important role. On the other hand, there do have one similarity - nuclear weapons which will prevent either US or China goes to far thus large scale carrier battles are extremely unlikely.
China's view is if Russia falls, they are next; if Russia withstands, US lead alliances will collapse.
ReplyDeleteArguably, China has most advanced battle field cyber technologies which are confirmed by their civilian communications such as 5G, etc. This is why US wants to kill Huawei. Example:
https://inf.news/en/military/48d7958fb1aea9d06000379155538320.html
Without Chinese weapons and battle field network, Russia can still fight. For Russia, China keeps "neutral" now is better for it as well as China.
Biden Administration's action will either bring the nation free from Russia nuclear overhang or ... terrible, US loses its leadership of the free world.
As China's view on this conflict and Russia's "safeguarding" it...
DeleteThat's a farce. The Chinese are exploiting the Russians in almost every trade they do now and if the Russians escalate with nukes or collapses, we may see the PLA reclaim the territory in Siberia it considers "historically" theirs...
I will say, Siberia is a bigger prize then taiwan with little risk of western intervention to get in the way.
Agree with Purple. China is now the defacto leader in the relationship. Russia is getting far weaker far faster than USA or Europe. Russian demographics are terrible and China might not even need to invade Siberia, they've taken over with factories and business in Siberia, its almost already another province of China!
DeleteSomething i think gets lost in Ru-Uk war is how China played Putin and how they now are in charge. Well played China, well played.
As far as I can tell, the US military obsession with networks started because they thought it was something they could do better than any opposition. It probably was twenty years ago, but it isn't now - see the Chinese leadership in 5G for an example. However, once the US military has got hold of an idea, challenging it is a very risky business, and conforming to it is much safer for your career.
ReplyDeleteThe US needs a Jackie Fisher, preferably quite soon.
In a semi-related question- is anyone aware of the terms (if any) attatched to the weapons packages going from the US to Ukraine?? Is it like Lend-Lease, is there a monetary sum to be repaid, do we get any equipment back etc or is it all free or(???)
ReplyDelete"I cannot stress enough that the Ukraine-Russia war is exquisitely unique – and largely useless – as it relates to war with China."
ReplyDeletePlus:
"A US military official coming to the conclusion that firepower has more of an impact than cyber actions? I’m astounded! Isn’t that exactly what I’ve been saying for the last several years? "
Just so.
The two eye-openers, for me, in the Ukraine War are:
1. Neither country can operate inside the others air-defense umbrella with impunity. Forget impunity; make it 'at all'. Russians living in WWI-style trenches staging human-wave attacks wouldn't last 2 minutes if Apache/Warthog were in the picture. Ukrainian HIMARS wouldn't last 10 minutes if SU-25 Frogfoots had free-range. Excepting drones and missiles the sky's clear on both sides.
2. $3K DJI drones destroying multi-million dollar tanks. And ammo dumps.
OK. So maybe the Ukraine war is unique. But I have a problem with this:
"For example, the US military, has fully committed to the pursuit of networks and data over firepower despite absolutely no supporting evidence that networks and data can compensate for substantially reduced firepower."
I don't think history bears that out. It was either CDR SALAMANDER or USNI who wrote, years ago, that the number of VLS tubes in the early-to-mid 2000s far far surpassed the firepower of the 1990s (Reagan buildup) despite fewer hulls. Looked for the ref but can't easily put my hands on it at the moment.
Point being that USN net-centric focus, in all these years since, was deliberately leveraging multiple cueing platforms to place warheads on foreheads.
And here we are. F-35 is a cueing platform. F-22 a little less so. Stated goal for B-21. AWACS and E-2D? Probably. Why not P-8? C-130 (with a module). That's the hope; certainly it's the trend.
The trend. The idea is that GPS-guided 155 cannon shells are so accurate they require far fewer rounds fired to destroy what needs to be destroyed; expense per shell standing in for cost of networking. I note we now, also, have GPS-guided mortar shells. Coming to .556 and .762 near you- Some day. But 50-cal first; because 'trend'.
This is why I want multiple arsenal ships with hundreds of VLS tubes. I'm willing to trade off stealth and speed. Go ahead and armor them; which I pretty much agree with.
VLS destroyers for QRF. Because they have the speed and slightly more than minimal self-defense capabilities.
If we insist on carriers, soon to be drone-centric, then build CRUISERS with lots of AAW tubes. Cruisers because they can keep up with a CVN.
Wait a minute. Where was I going with all this? Oh, yes- Investment in networks over the last 2 decades has been important, and deliberate, to enable targeting for tubes at-sea. Let's work on getting more VLS-tubes (firepower) deployed at-sea. Because a ship, which is a moving target, is harder to target.
Flexibility. Survivability. Lethality.
"2. $3K DJI drones destroying multi-million dollar tanks. And ammo dumps"
DeleteThat's always been the case tho - what kills you is always cheaper than you are. An infantryman carrying hundreds of thousands of dollars of gear and training dies to a 30 cent bullet. A billion dollar Burke dies to a million dollar Tomahawk.
On the other hand, there's the counterpoint people forget with these cost comparisons, which is the cheaper a weapon is, the more of it you have to fire to get a kill.
"Russians living in WWI-style trenches staging human-wave attacks wouldn't last 2 minutes if Apache/Warthog were in the picture" -
DeleteSECNAV is badly misinformed. The Gerasimov doctrine (aka "Mongol" tactics, aka "my shells against your people") that the Russians have been using since 2008 using is ideally "contactless" - the ground forces "should" destroy all enemy contacts BY FIRE WITHOUT really contacting the enemy (see various Col Macgregor articles on destroying the enemy as they approach and before they ever get into their assembly areas). It doesn't matter what type of unit the enemy has (troops, helis, etc) , they are all taken under fire and destroyed. Only then do your ground forces go in to "advance over the enemy ashes".
Early last year the Russians overdid this somewhat and retreated too quickly and too often - maybe to stay within the "letter" of the plan? but they seem to be getting better at it with practice. Their war-of-attrition strategy seems to be inflicting the 8:1 to 10:1 human losses on the Ukrainians that they were hoping for, however, so they stick with it. Note that the key to its effectiveness is the Russian's massive artillery and air defense advantage and annual shell production (US 155mm = approx 30K per year since 2000, Russ equivalent = approx 1.5M per year since 1945).
But the various videos show that no one is really doing human wave attacks in this war -- in fact it is rare to see very many troops, at all in the trenches at all. Much more like a historic naval battle than a land battle.
"what kills you is always cheaper than you are"
DeleteNot really. Or, only in the very narrowest perspective.
To use your example of the infantryman being killed by a bullet, the bullet didn't just magically appear in front of the infantryman. That bullet was manufactured at a facility that cost millions of dollars to construct. It then had to be transported to the enemy soldier who fired it and that transport effort cost many hundreds of thousands of dollars or more. The enemy soldier carried all the same gear and had all the same training as the unfortunate infantryman. Thus, the real cost of getting that bullet to 'appear' in front of the infantryman was enormous.
The same applies to a million dollar missile that sinks a billion dollar ship. That missile came from an enemy ship that cost a billion dollars to deliver the missile to its target.
And so on.
The overall offensive and defensive cost curves are pretty much a wash. Only in the very narrowest perspective does one see a cost differential.
Yes, there are a few exceptions to the rule such as the ubiquitous RPG wielded by a third world militiaman that kills a tank. That's probably a truly one-sided cost affair. However, those cases are the exception, not the rule.
"Gerasimov doctrine"
DeleteI have seen no evidence linking the Gerasimov doctrine to a concept of disengaged infantry using artillery to pursue a contact-less war. From my limited understanding, the Gerasimov doctrine emphasizes non-kinetic actions (political, propaganda, etc.) to shape the battlefield and world opinion.
This is not a land combat blog so I hesitate to pursue this any further unless you care to tie it back to naval combat.
"the number of VLS tubes..."
DeleteI dont think that shows a preference of firepower vs networks per se. The tube counts in the 2000s were a function of a decade of producing Burkes that carried about 30% more tubes than the Spruances, some of which had NO VLS. The 90s were also a decade that was just seeing the retirement of the last WWII platforms, their early follow ons, the majority of the arm-launcher cruisers, etc. So I don't think a straight 90s vs 2000s VLS count shows a push for more firepower so much as it just shows the complete VLS phase in and the retirement of older platforms.
"Note that the key to its effectiveness is the Russian's massive artillery and air defense advantage and annual shell production (US 155mm = approx 30K per year since 2000, Russ equivalent = approx 1.5M per year since 1945)."
ReplyDeleteSeveral things.
1. The US isn't the only producer or supplier of artillery shells to ukraine. NATO as a whole is more then capable of matching & exceeding the Russians. Spain for example is capable of producing in excess of 250k a year.
2. While statistics are questionable, it's been estimated Russia had a stockpile of 17 million shells, of which 10 million have been used or destroyed in 11 months of combat. A yearly production rate of 1.5m is dosen't sustain current levels of consumption.
3. Russia's artillery is being used to make up deficiencies in other areas, (such as aviation, armor, infantry, etc.) But logistics & Russian command & control are limiting its impact.
"17 million shells, of which 10 million have been used or destroyed in 11 months of combat."
DeleteI know munitions usage in actual combat ALWAYS far exceeds pre-war estimates (so why don't countries adjust their pre-war estimates up? But, I digress ...) but those numbers mean a usage rate of around 34,000 shells per day every single day of the conflict. As inept as the Russians have been in all aspects of this conflict, that seems unbelievable. Does it seem believable that Russia even has the logistics to deliver 34,000 shells per day to front line batteries? Or that 34,000 shells per day could even be unpacked for use? I'm not a land combat person so, who knows. To be fair, you did say that the statistics are questionable.
Perhaps there have been some truly major strikes that destroyed tens of thousands of shells at a time? Again, no such reports have come out that I'm aware of.
I have no particular point to make other than the note that we should be wary of ANY information coming out of this conflict as it is all primarily propaganda regardless of which side and whatever source.
I did say the statistics were questionable and hard to pin down.
DeleteThat said, several months ago the Russians were claiming they were firing 60k rounds a day.
It's been a while since I counted, but when HIMARS was introduced, many large stockpiles were destroyed and several lost to sabotage. Exact tonnage is hard to pin down, but I've seen estimates for the crimea depot range from 10,000 tons to 45,000 tons of munitions destroyed.
Now that Russia has decentralized its depots, the new estimates of artillery fire is 6-8k on a slow day.
I apologize for the brevity of my response. As is my habit, I replied before rushing to go to work. I'd suggest this topic deserves a whole post to itself if you feel it doesn't stray to far from the blogs focus.
ReplyDeleteIt's a very worthy topic but, as you note, it's outside the scope of the blog. What that means is that I don't have the time or resources to pursue it but if someone else (hint, hint) wanted to, I'd be happy to publish the results.
DeleteThis would be a difficult topic to research as there are few sources and none that are reliable, as far as I know.
Have to start digging into it!
ReplyDeletehttps://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/pentagons-annual-weapon-test-report-reverses-classification-reveals-major-program-challenges/
You're going to be disappointed. I'm about half way through and, so far, the only real information presented is reliability data on Ford systems. There may be less information in this report than last year. Very disappointing.
Delete