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Wednesday, January 11, 2023

Destroyer Escort Development

Destroyer Escorts (DE), or Frigates (FF/FFG), as they’re now known, have an interesting developmental history that illustrates many of the problems we’re dealing with today.

 

The modern DE, as we know it, came to be in WWII.  There are earlier possible predecessors but, for our purposes, we’ll say WWII was the starting point, as typified by the Buckley class.  The type continued to evolve throughout the war and the immediate post-war, eventually developing into missile and helicopter versions, changing names from destroyer escort to frigate and leading, ultimately, to the current Constellation class frigate.

 

In its early guise, the outstanding characteristics of the DE were:

 

Focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW)

Cheap cost and large numbers

Use as convoy escorts for which the main threat was submarines

 

As post-war development took place, the ships grew steadily larger and eventually lost their ASW focus, becoming more multi-function (not a good thing!), expensive, and less numerous.

 

Consider the steady increase in size, as shown in the table below and the scaled silhouette drawings.

 

 

Destroyer Escort Size Growth

Class

Length, ft

Buckley

306

Dealey

314

Garcia

414

Knox

438

Perry

453

Constellation

496

 

 









 

 

 

















Let’s take a look at several representative destroyer escort classes.

 

Buckley – This is the classic destroyer escort of WWII.  Weapons included 3x 3” guns, Hedgehog, 200x depth charges, 2x stern depth charge rails, 3x 21” torpedoes and assorted 40 mm and 20 mm anti-aircraft guns.  Sensors included Type 128D or Type 144 sonar in retractable dome.  The noteworthy aspect of this class was its ASW focus which set the pattern for subsequent DE classes.  This was a focused, efficient, cheap vessel whose cost allowed procurement in large numbers with around 150 being built.  The class had a clear primary purpose and contained nothing that did not directly contribute to that purpose.  The ship was as small as it could be, consistent with its function.

 

In this class, we see all the characteristics of an excellent ship:  small as possible, heavily armed, single function, cheap, simple and easy to build, and numerous.

 

Dealey – This was the first post-WWII DE.  Weapons included 4x 3” guns in two twin mounts, RUR-4 Weapon Alpha anti-submarine rocket launcher, 2x ASW triple torpedo launchers, 2x K-gun depth charge launchers, and 1x stern depth charge rails.  Sensors included the SQS-4 low frequency sonar.  USS Willis, DE-1027, operated a variable depth sonar from the stern.  The class was later modified for DASH operations.  The class was still focused on ASW but one can already see the beginnings of a decrease in ASW weaponry with smaller, lighter torpedoes and fewer depth charges and rails/launchers

 

Garcia – These ships typified the major jump in size that occurred due, primarily, to the incorporation of an aviation component (flight deck, helo, hangar).  Weapons included 2× 5 in guns, 1× 8-tube ASROC Mk16 launcher (16 missiles), 2× triple lightweight torpedo tubes, and 2× MK 37 stern mounted fixed torpedo tubes which were later removed.  Sensors included the SQS-26 bow sonar.  The ship operated the SeaSprite helo. 

 

This class is an example of the beginnings of a fascination with technology over firepower and combat effectiveness as evidenced by an emphasis on aviation as the primary ASW tool rather than up close, volume oriented ASW firepower (depth charges and the like). 

 

The use of 5” guns illustrates additional loss of focus and the movement away from a single, primary function towards a multi-function philosophy.

 

Knox – This class further emphasizes the movement away from a strict focus on ASW and towards a broader, ocean escort role.  Weapons include 1× 5 in gun, 1× Mk16 8–cell ASROC launcher, and 2× triple lightweight torpedo tubes.  Again, the on-board ASW weapons have been decreased in favor of the helo.  Sensors included the SQS-26 bow sonar and SQR-18 towed array.  The ship operated the SeaSprite helo. 

 

Perry – This is where the destroyer escort concept really went off the rails as the focus shifted to ocean escort and anti-air although ASW was still a mission.  However, the Perry’s SQS-56 sonar was considered only marginally capable although the SQR-19 towed array was useful.  This class also saw the near abandonment of ship-based ASW in favor of helo-based ASW with the ship acting as a helo-host rather than an active ASW combatant.

 

Constellation – This class doesn’t even pretend to be ASW-focused.  The ship lacks even a VL-ASROC.  It is a mini-Burke, pure and simple, trying to be all things and being good at none.  This is a class without a mission other than to be a cheaper Burke and not be a failure (see, “Constellation Class Frigate - Success or Just Not Failure?”).

 


 

From the brief history and description of the DE classes, we clearly see that the initial primary characteristics of a destroyer escort,

 

  • Focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
  • Cheap cost and large numbers
  • Use as convoy escorts for which the main threat was submarines

 

were altered, over time, to,

 

  • Unfocused, multi-mission
  • Expensive and few in number (only 20 Constellations are planned)
  • No clear mission or CONOPS

 

 

Focus

 

The WWII DE was supremely focused on one task and one task alone.  It was sized and equipped for that one task and nothing else.  This resulted in the minimum possible construction cost/time and, hence, the maximum number of ships.  We’ve lost that over the years.  Today’s destroyer escorts – which we now call frigates – are multi-focused (multi-functional) which has drastically driven up size and cost, diluted ASW weapons, and drastically decreased the number of ships we can afford.

 

 

Helo-centric ASW

 

We need to address one of the DE trends and that is the adoption of helos as replacements for shipboard ASW.  When they’re in the air and over a contact, helos are quite effective and useful.  The problem is that helos are only sporadically available.  Helos are good for around two 3-hour missions per day.  Even with two helos per ship (an optimistic number) that provides only 12 hours of airborne coverage per day and even that will be sporadic in the sense that in combat there will be many false contacts that will have to be pursued.  Thus, the helo won’t be flying around searching broad areas, as so many people envision.  Instead, they’ll be tied to one contact location for an extended period, trying to prove/disprove a suspected contact.  That’s point coverage, not broad area searching.  Thus, by making helos the focus of our ASW effort, we’ve effectively reduced our coverage area.

 

 

Cost/Numbers

 

Destroyer escorts have, historically, been effective not because they were individually supremely effective ASW machines but because they were ubiquitous.  They were effective due to numbers!  Their presence forced submarines to alter course, miss intercepts, and abort attacks.  As the type has grown in size, complexity, and cost, the numbers have been reduced to the point that their main mode of effectiveness, a ubiquitous presence, is no longer viable.  Our entire supposed ASW force will now consist of 20 Constellations.  That’s not even remotely enough to be effective.  The Navy can claim that Burkes are ASW-capable but they’re not.  They don’t train for it and no sane commander is going to risk a $2B-$3B ship playing tag with a submarine.

 

 

Summary

 

By foolishly trying to make every ship a multi-function, do-everything, single-handed war-winning, mega-machine, we’ve lost all the positive attributes of the type.  We’ve taken a ship that was exquisitely optimized for its role and morphed it into a ship that has no defined role (or, maybe, every role!). 

 

Consider the Constellation.  We clearly do not have a CONOPS for the class other than ‘do everything’ which is another way of saying ‘do nothing well’.

 

The DE development history also clearly shows the relationship between size/cost and numbers.  We’ve gone from 150 Buckleys, at 306 ft long, to 20 Constellations, at 496 ft long.  Size equals reduced numbers.  It can’t be stated any plainer than that.  A 496 ft long frigate is an abomination and makes a mockery of the type’s traditional role while simultaneously reducing, nearly to the point of extinction, the numbers of ASW ships in the fleet.


114 comments:

  1. The Navy FY2023 30 year Shipbuilding Construction plan shows the trend continuing with a future FFG-62 Flight II replacing the Constellation, assuming it will be a larger ship with more VLS cells approx the same displacement as a Burke Flight I, 8300t FLD

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  2. Since helicopters are seen as useful but restricted when only a couple are carried, is it worth looking at pairing the focused ASW Frigate/Corvette with something along the lines of the Soviet Moskva class? Lots of helicopters, backed up with quite a bit of organic ASW armament. This also allows the Frigate/Corvette to ditch the aviation facilities and pile on extra weaponry, sensors, etc (or just make the ship more compact and reduce expenses).

    Pair one (or more) Moskva-type with a group of ASW Frigates/Corvettes and you have something resembling the Hunter-Killer Groups of the Second World War that can escort convoys or be attached to Carrier/Amphib groups.

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    1. Hmm, the comment function has change a bit since I last engaged hehe. The above was by Lofty.

      Delete
    2. Weird, my initial comment vanished. Shall have to type it again and hope I haven't accidentally double-posted (apologies if I have).

      As helicopters are seen as useful but restricted when only a couple are carried, is it worth pairing the dedicated ASW Frigate/Corvette with something along the lines of the Soviet Moskva class? Lots of helicopters backed up with quite a bit of organic ASW weaponry.

      Pair one or more Moskvas with a group of ASW Frigates/Corvettes and you have something along the lines of the Hunter Killer Groups from the Second World War, which can be used to escort convoys or be attached to Carrier/Amphib groups as needed.

      Lofty.

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    3. "comment function has change a bit"

      Yes, the Blogger software has changed and I have no control over it (the flip side of being free). Some people have reported problems with signing in to comment. You can always comment as Anonymous and just add a username at the end of the comment if you can't get a regular sign in to work.

      Delete
    4. "Weird, my initial comment vanished."

      Again, the Blogger changes have resulted in some comments randomly going to the blog's spam folder rather than appearing. I have no control and no one has found a trigger or solution. I check the spam folder several times a day and move 'trapped' comments out and back to the normal folder which then allows them to appear as normal. So, if a comment seems to disappear, it almost certainly went to spam. Be patient and it will show up shortly on my next spam check. Sorry about that. I wish there was something I could do about it but there does not seem to be.

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    5. Anonymous,

      You might like this post:

      https://navy-matters.blogspot.com/2019/09/hunter-killer-asw-groups.html

      Delete
    6. Thanks, you saved me pulling that out !

      Delete
    7. Thanks. Forgot about that post.

      What are your thoughts on the Moskva? Worth looking at or would you prefer a pure flight deck of some form?

      Lofty.

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    8. "Moskva"

      The concept of an ASW mothership is solid. I've called for that myself ! However, the specific design of the Moskva is less than optimal. The role of the ASW helo mothership is to STAND OFF from the threat and simply provide aviation assets. Thus, extensive ASW weaponry, as on the Moskva, is not needed. Consider that the forward half of the vessel is dedicated to ASW and AAW weapons which 'doubles' the cost and size of the ship. Also, the superstructure arrangement reportedly caused severe problems with turbulence for the helos.

      So, right concept but wrong specific design. A smaller version of the old Iwo Jima ASW helo adaptation is a better conceptual model.

      Delete
    9. Noted.

      Would be interesting to hear your perspective on other Soviet ships and concepts. What they did right/wrong compared to NATO, etc.

      Lofty.

      Delete
    10. "Would be interesting to hear your perspective on other Soviet ships"

      See, "Kirov Class Battlecruiser"

      Delete
    11. You're basically talking about the old JMSDF ASW squadrons - they'd have a number of ASW corvettes and frigates, with a DDH carrying 3-4 ASW helos acting as flagship.

      Delete
  3. All ship classes seem to go through this growth. Destroyers and corvettes have gone down similar paths. In terms of cost growth, the AAW mission expansion does more damage on numbers than does the helo. UAVs may help improve the helo coverage gap, but I doubt we give up the manned helo entirely. It would be good if the UAV had as much DNA in common with the MH-60 as possible so the AV Det can really handle the workload. 2 UAVs that can fit in a single MH-60 spot would be ideal. If CVLWT can work it really helps get the UAV armed for ASW although other options might be available. It also opens the option of a quad packed VLA. I also would never abandon the hull sonar even if its use for ASW has decreased. If it can help with mines, that i likely valuable as many of our potential adversaries are likely to combine ASW work with mining.

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    1. "2 UAVs that can fit in a single MH-60 spot would be ideal"

      Only if they can equal the effectiveness of the single -60. At the moment, they can't even remotely come close to that so it's a poor tradeoff.

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  4. Would you consider the Chinese Type 056 Corvette a DE or is it too small for that role?

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    1. The Type 056 is 300 ft long which puts right at the Buckley DE size so, in that respect, it's a DE.

      A DE is intended for open ocean work. Whether the 056 was built for open ocean work is unknown.

      DE's were originally intended for ASW. The 056 has some ASW capability but seems to lack some ASW weapons. It appears to be more of a general purpose vessel than a truly specialized ASW ship.

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    2. The 56As have a VDS. These things are all about the hunt for subs close to the mainland where the helos can lily pad. They are general purpose, but they are more ready for a sub hunt than we are.

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  5. So CNO, after reading this, if you could scrap the Connies tomorrow and clean sheet somthing for ASW focus, would you look at building a Dealey, or somthing with aviation?? The post makes that almost rhetorical, but... After looking at dimension numbers, modern GTs would work even in a Buckley sized ship. Thered be large weight and space savings over a steam plant. So now its just swapping in modern sonar and radar (NOT AEGIS) equipment, the only "addition" being some point defense. For the ASROC: box launcher, single arm, twin arm, or VLS?? There's perks and downsides to each. Deck or hull mounted close encounter torpedoes?? Either way, being able to shoot Mk48s would be a nice upgrade over the lightweights. Also, the 5in gun is pretty standard, but maybe its unnecessary, and to save space/weight, maybe the old 76mm would do?? And one, or two?? Do we need two? Redundancy likes the double enders, but worth it for weight amd cost?? I guess with a ship this relatively small, and cheap and (hopefully) plentiful, it could fall into that expendable zone, which puts everything in a different light...

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    1. In the 'Fleet Structure' tab, I've described my preferred mix of destroyers, DE's, and ASW corvettes. Check it out, if you haven't already.

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  6. I don't any have real expertise, I'm just an interested observer. I track with comnavops that affordable and simple dedicated escort vessels will be needed in large numbers in the event of widescale conflict. I feel like the bigger threat to ships is cruise missiles. If yes, would it be better for the "DE"s to be focused on the short and and medium range anti missile fight? I think of it as a corvette sized knife fighter.

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    1. " would it be better for the "DE"s to be focused on the short and and medium range anti missile fight?"

      Anti-air is not a DE's function. That would be the job of an area anti-air platform like an Aegis Burke. A DE should simply have self-defense anti-air which is SeaRAM/CIWS and, possibly, ESSM if the vessel has a small Mk41 VLS.

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  7. I don't have anything profound to say here, but of course, that's not stopping me. :)

    The Burke's roles should be divided into several classes of ships, each of which could be designed for that specific job....and then train to it as well.

    The Constellation should be pure AAW. It should be doing the quarterbacking of a battle group's air/missile defense.

    ASuW role could be assumed by a modernized version of the Gearing class destroyer.

    The ASW role should also have its own specialists.

    One of the phrases that CNO uses, which has really stuck with me is "playing tag with submarines". That says a lot in a few words.
    Keeping that idea in mind, designing ASW ships is a bit challenging.

    Helicopters are pretty handy things to have when prosecuting a sub contact. Their speed and ability to hover make them uniquely suited to serve as a serious threat to enemy subs. They can use a dipping sonar to passively or actively hunt, they can drop sonobuoys for persistency, and they can drop torpedoes or depth charges right where they are needed.

    But the logistical needs (landing pad/hanger/fuel storage) require a fairly big small ship, which is likely too big and too expensive to 'play tag with submarines'.

    That would be something like a Perry class. It would have all the tools for ASW like bow sonar, variable depth sonar, ASROC, etc.
    But it would also have the aviation facilities for two ASW helicopters.

    But those are too much ship to cover all of the navy's ASW escort needs.
    A smaller ship would better fill out the rest of that role.

    That ship would not have aviation assets, so all of that space could be eliminated.
    It would have a bow sonar, VDS, ASROC, counter measures, MK48 launcher, hedgehog/RBU, etc., plus the necessary self- defense armaments.
    All of that takes up space, but can still be crammed into a fairly small ship (by modern standards) if it's purpose built.

    The quandary is what size ship to actually use.
    World War 2 gives us a host of possibilities.
    The Gearing/Sumner/Fletcher class would be an obvious choice, especially since I'd already be building Gearings in an ASuW configuration.
    They'd be plenty fast with projected speed in the mid-30's knots.
    But that speed is largely a factor of their length to beam, 390' long and 41' beam.
    The tradeoff is that, because of the narrowness which enhance the speed, they turn (literally) like a battleship.

    For AAW or even ASuW, that is not a deal-breaker.
    But to dance with submarines and homing torpedoes, that is not the nimbleness you're looking for.

    The Evarts class DE, at 289' length and 35' beam, or Buckley class at 306' length and 37' beam, are probably going to have agility more in line with what would be needed.

    But they aren't fast, 19 knots and 24 knots respectively.
    That isn't going to be enough to keep up with battle groups of warships.
    Of course, stealing the Air Force theory that with enough thrust anything can fly, it would probably be possible to use LM2500 engines to ram those things through the water at the speeds needed. But what would be the acoustical cost of doing that?

    Either way, that smaller ship could be paired with the larger ASW ship to make an ASW escort team.
    For example, one of the Perry-esque ships could work with 3-5 of the smaller ships.
    Those modern DE's could provide the coverage needed while the Perry would have the helicopters to prosecute contacts.

    One piece of technology that would help would be to develop a sonobuoy that could be launched directly from the DE.
    Ideally it would be convenient to be able to fire it from a 5" gun, but I'm skeptical that the instrumentation could survive the shock.

    But even if it had to be rocket based, it would give the DE the possibility of triangulating a possible contact without needing to always have an air asset out there.

    I'd be interested to hear others' thoughts on this.

    Lutefiskj

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    1. The range and lethality of modern torpedoes and sub-launched anti-ship missiles means "playing tag" with enemy submarines is a dangerous idea these days.

      The "traditional" Cold War escort model was to use ship-borne sensors (hull & towed array sonars) to detect targets at medium-to-long range and then use helicopters or fixed wing aircraft to investigate, localize, and prosecute them.

      The problem is, now all submarines are getting quiet to the point where long-ranged, passive detection is no longer reliable.

      Even the FFG's Low Frequency Active Towed Sonar (LFATS) probably won't provide reliable long range detections, and it will obviously be detected by submarines.

      So if we're going back to close-range detections as the norm, we may need to "play tag" again. But I think unmanned vessels are probably the right way to do this, not manned destroyer escorts. Team a group of MDUSVs with a few manned vessels to form a mini ASW task force. The manned vessels provide the helos, air/surface defenses, and C2. The unmanned vessels play tag, since they are much cheaper and more expendable.

      Hunters & bird dogs.

      Also remember, the goal of an escort is to prevent enemy subs from attacking the HVUs. It's not necessarily to kill every sub. Driving them away before they can attack is also success.


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    2. "The unmanned vessels play tag"

      The problem with this is the detection and tracking. There is no reason to believe (and every reason to disbelieve) that a small, low powered sonar can detect and track a modern submarine when our very best, largest sonar fits on Burkes cannot reliably do so. Yes, if we know where a sub is and just need to 'pin it down' for an attack then a MDUSV (Sea Hunter or something of that nature) could act like a helo and possibly localize the sub. A group of MDUSV would be even better but that's a very problematic exercise in distribution/dispersion.

      If a Sea Hunter type could reliably detect and track a sub, the Navy would be engaged in a crash program to replace all our existing Burke sonars and towed arrays with a tiny Sea Hunter sonar. They aren't which tells me all I need to know about the MDUSV detection/tracking effectiveness.

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    3. "Also remember, the goal of an escort is to prevent enemy subs from attacking the HVUs. It's not necessarily to kill every sub."

      Yes! An often overlooked aspect/goal of ASW. Excellent reminder to everyone. This is also why I push for a non-aviation ASW corvette that will, in large numbers, be effective through submarine deterrence as opposed to outright kills.

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    4. "There is no reason to believe (and every reason to disbelieve) that a small, low powered sonar can detect and track a modern submarine when our very best, largest sonar fits on Burkes cannot reliably do so."

      The question here isn't "can or can't", it's "at what range".

      A smaller LFATS will have a shorter detection range, yes. But if we're talking 16 miles for the large LFATS and 8 miles for the small, we're really not talking about THAT much of a difference. Both are still within torpedo or missile range.

      If we're stuck with small radii either way, we need to build a lot more platforms. Lots of little circles. MDUSVs are both cheaper and more expendable.

      We sweep in a line of MDUSVs, 16 miles apart. Either sprint/drifting or just pinging away. Behind the line are the manned ships controlling a few MDUSVs each, and providing protection and helo support. How wide of a sweep just depends on how many MDUSVs you have.

      If they're protecting HVUs, then they have to form an outer shell towards the front of the convoy/TF in the direction of travel.

      If a sub decides to shoot at the MDUSVs, well then you know somethings out there. Flaming datum is useful too. Better a $35M MDUSV than a manned FFG or corvette.

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    5. I still have doubts whether or not our communications, electronic warfare, and AI technology is advanced enough to entrust an unmanned platform- whether UAV, USV, or UUV- with hunting and killing enemy submarines, especially when a competent enemy will use electronic warfare to jam communications between the unmanned platform and its control station. Jamming also dramatically increases the already high risk the unmanned platform will attack a friendly or allied unit by mistake.

      A better use for the USV and UUV, is as an expendable decoy, i.e., have it use active sonar to deter enemy submarine attacks- or at least draw attacks to itself instead of the manned vessels it's protecting.

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    6. "If we're stuck with small radii either way, we need to build a lot more platforms."

      And THAT'S the essence of effective ASW!

      "sweep in a line of MDUSVs"

      Conceptually, an MDUSV is a mobile sonobuoy. We laid sonobuoys in chevrons along the line of advance. This would be a similar concept.

      The Navy desperately needs to conduct realistic search/detect/track exercises and see if an MDUSV can actually find a real sub that's trying its best to avoid detection. I'm unaware of any such exercise having been conducted. Perhaps you know of any?

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    7. "We sweep in a line of MDUSVs"

      One of the [many] issues with using large numbers of unmanned vessels is communications. Controlling ASW MDUSVs will require frequent - or continuous if the controlling vessel is also doing signal analysis - communications which is the opposite of EMCON and offers the enemy a free fix on location.

      Again, realistic exercises against actual signals detection units are needed to hammer out these issues and gain some knowledge about tactics.

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    8. Hey folks, there is absolutely no reason the selected MDUSV couldn't use a Captas-4 with TBU-37MFTA. The cancelled VDS for LCS was tested on an even smaller FSV. That USV could still have room to load weapons to prosecute on board and some basic decoys and defense. If one were to go that route. Criticism being its load and not designed to be quiet.

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    9. "One of the [many] issues with using large numbers of unmanned vessels is communications. Controlling ASW MDUSVs will require frequent - or continuous if the controlling vessel is also doing signal analysis - communications which is the opposite of EMCON and offers the enemy a free fix on location."

      If the MDUSVs have to use powerful, active sonars to find subs, I'm not too worried about comms EMCON between the ships and MDUSVs.

      Modern LOS communications can use phased arrays with directed beams instead of omnidirectional antennas. The Navy's new NTCDL does this, and use Ku-band, which has high atmospheric absorption. So the enemy would have to be fairly close and in the direction of the beams to pick it up. If they're that close, they're also within SAM range. There is also work on laser-based comms for ships. This would be virtually impossible to pick up.

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    10. "The Navy desperately needs to conduct realistic search/detect/track exercises and see if an MDUSV can actually find a real sub that's trying its best to avoid detection. I'm unaware of any such exercise having been conducted. Perhaps you know of any?"

      The two MDUSVs were designed for the "Continuous Trail " experiments, so they don't have the right sensors. They have a mid-frequency sonar in a bulb under the hull. What they need is a LFATS and towed array.

      So I doubt they've been used to test what I'm talking about.

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    11. "Modern LOS communications"

      Comms of any type are not as secure as we believe.

      That aside, presumably the concept of operations would have these vessels WELL out in advance of the group. As a pseudo-replacement for S-3 Vikings, they would operate on the order of fifty miles or more in advance. Operating at LOS distances is almost pointless. If you detect a submarine at LOS distance, it's already launched its torpedoes and sunk several of your main ships.

      For beyond LOS operating distance, constant comms are required which give the enemy a free location on you.

      Active sonar also gives the enemy a free location. Passive sonar is the presumed normal operating mode.

      Again, the Navy needs to conduct realistic testing to work out these kinds of tactics.

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    12. Passive sonars are less and less able to pick up quiet submarines at useful distances. That's why the main sonars of both the LCS ASW module and the FFG-62 are Low-Frequency ACTIVE Variable Depth Towed Array Sonars (LFATS).

      If you have a line of MDUSV at 16nmi spacing and behind them an FFG also at 16nmi away, the FFG will be outside or at the max end of torpedo range of any sub in front of the MDUSVs. Also, the MDUSVs will detect the torpedo first, allowing more time for the FFG to evade and use countermeasures. It's not perfect, but it's better than using a manned ship with nothing in front of it but hostile waters.

      We could use something like TALONS to extend the coms range of the USVs, or another airborne platform. We could also use MDUSVs as relays, so the FFG doesn't have to have direct comms with every MDUSV, it just has to have them with at least one. Obviously both styles of relay adds another link in the comms chain that can be broken, but it's a possibility.

      Instead of just one line of MDUSVs in front of the FFG, you could have a multi-layer grid to provide more depth. It requires more MDUSVs, but it provides more standoff for the manned ships. It also gives you ready-made spares on hand in case the enemy starts attacking the MDUSVs.

      I also wonder if we could use the MDUSVs as nodes in a multi-static array. Let some broadcast while others listen. The enemy will still know where the grid is, but it won't have detailed tracking on every USV.

      I'm open to other ideas, but given that passive sonars are less and less useful and even active sonars don't have multi-CZ level range, I'm not sure how else to do this.

      Lots and lots of sonobouys, but they suffer from the range problem even more than the MDUSVs, and they aren't mobile. Maybe some combination of both.

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    13. It's a tactical question ... do we want to use active sonar and give the enemy a definite location on us or do we want to use passive sonar that keeps our position unknown but may miss a submarine? Risk either way.

      The passive/active question is not as cut and dried as you suggest. Passive sonar is less effective than it once was but so is active sonar with the advent of anechoic tiles, 'bubble' coatings, supposed active noise cancellation, etc.

      There's also the issue of number of unmanned vessels. Each vessel is an acoustic source that will provide a location and the more there are, the easier it is for the enemy to detect and localize. Of course, if they're escorting a carrier, it probably doesn't matter as a carrier can be heard by a SOSUS type array half an ocean away!

      Another issue is speed of advance. The tried and true anti-submarine tactic is speed of advance which, unless you have the bad luck to literally sail right over a submarine, forces the enemy sub to go to speed to achieve an intercept location and makes its detection more likely. Sonar systems don't work well at high speeds due to self-noise, turbulence, etc. A line of MDUSVs (or Burkes or any other sonar platform) would be of little use at speed. Sprint/drift wouldn't work because the drifters couldn't catch up. This is one reason we had S-3 Vikings. They were the only platform able to get ahead of a fast group and stay ahead while remaining effective at searching.

      Lots of issues and the Navy is doing no tactical development that I'm aware of.

      Delete
    14. I tried to sim this a bit in CMO. Obviously all usual caveats of limited testing using a commercial sim apply.

      Interestingly, if the sub was moving (a Type 039G Song-class SSK), passive sensors still picked it up first at 14-18nmi. But if the sub stopped, passive sensors didn't work at all, even if I ran the MDUSV over top of the Song. Active sensors (CAPTAS 4) picked up the Song at ~8nmi even if stopped.

      If that holds true, then maybe using multiple waves of MDUSV/FFGs, with the first passive and trying to be quiet to pick up the movers, and then the second active and loud to pick up the stationary boats might work?

      Definitely some tactics to consider on both sides.

      Delete
    15. You might experiment with a Yuan class SSK which is supposedly much quieter than the Song class.

      The Yuan carries the Yu-6 torpedo which is the equivalent to the US Mk48 and has a range of 28 miles. If your game shows detection at 8-18 miles, ships are likely already sinking. This just says that the ASW assets need to be way out in front of the main group. Again, this suggests the need for fixed wing ASW aircraft.

      How does the game model detection capability of the searching platform as a function of the searcher's speed (self-noise problem)? Detection range should decrease as the searching platform increases speed. Or, does the game ignore the searching platform's speed?

      Delete
    16. Apologies, it was a Type 039C Yuan.

      It does model speed of the sonar platform. At 30kts, it didn't detect the Yuan at all, passively or actively, even when I ran over it.

      The Yuan has to detect and get a track on the MDUSV too, before it can launch. Yes, some MDUSVs may die. That's part of the reason to use them. But if an SSK shoots at an MDUSV, then you have a pretty good idea where it is and can pounce on it with helicopters.

      Delete
    17. " if an SSK shoots at an MDUSV"

      The sub will do what subs have always done and that is to penetrate the escort screen to get at the HVUs. Of course, with today's longer range torpedoes, and depending on the escort's arrangement/distance from HVU, the sub may not have to penetrate anything. It can shoot from outside the screen. This argues for a widely dispersed screen and is one of my [many] overarching combat themes - that groups will be far more spread out in combat than we're used to seeing in the publicity photos the Navy releases. From what I can glean about exercises, the Navy has also forgotten that groups need to be spread out in combat and no longer practices operating spread out.

      Of course, spreading out increases the number of escort vessels required, whether manned or unmanned, or it increases the gaps in the screen if sufficient numbers of escorts are not available.

      A 4-carrier group, for example, with 25-30 manned escorts, might need an additional thirty or forty MDUSVs to provide sufficient coverage if used as a 'sweep' in front of the group (perhaps more if two 'waves' are used, as you suggested in one of your tactical ponderings). Can we build and deploy/control that many for each major surface group? Would the comms required to control that many vessels wind up being an electromagnetic flashing light for the enemy? So many tactical aspects that need to be worked out and I don't see the Navy working on any of them.

      Delete
    18. "It does model speed of the sonar platform. At 30kts, it didn't detect the Yuan at all, passively or actively, even when I ran over it."

      And what does it do to the detection range at, say, a 25 kt speed of advance where sprint/drift is not really viable?

      Delete
    19. "And what does it do to the detection range at, say, a 25 kt speed of advance where sprint/drift is not really viable?"

      Sprint/drift is still viable, but the MDUSV would have to be pretty fast.

      I think we can deploy and control that many MDUSVs as long as the ratio of MDUSV to manned controller vessel doesn't get too high. If you think 1 FFG can control 3 MDUSVs, then you need 10 FFGs to control 30.

      I don't think the comms necessarily have to be a big flashing light visible from far away. We just can't use omni-directional HF radios. They have to be phased arrays in bands that don't propagate as far, and only powerful enough to do the job. We know how to engineer this kind of thing. It's not magic.

      The F-35's LPI/LPD MADL datalink is a good example, and that's far more difficult to pull off.

      Delete
    20. The handful of comms people I've talked to all say the same thing - that comm security is nowhere near as good as most believe. I have no better knowledge on the subject so I'll leave at that. It's one of the major aspects of combat that the US military really needs to test under realistic conditions.

      "We know how to engineer this kind of thing"

      No, we know how to claim we know this kind of thing. There is no proof that we actually can do it successfully in a combat environment and we seem not to want to test it.

      "The F-35's LPI/LPD MADL datalink is a good example"

      I've seen zero evidence that it works without being detectable. It's another in a long line of unproven claims.
      Have you seen any proof of performance? Claims are easy, reality is not. Consider all the systems whose lofty claims have fallen flat. There is no reason to believe our comm security is, actually, secure nor is there any proof to the contrary. I'm guided by the general history that says EVERY system ever put into combat has failed to live up to its claims, especially early in combat before improvements come out, and I'm guided by the comm experts I've talked to who unanimously make the general statement that no comms are as secure as believed.

      Take it for what it's worth.

      Delete
    21. Low Probably of Detection (LPD) was a design goal for MADL. How low the detection probability is no doubt highly classified.

      But remember, MADL is meant to be LPD while flying over enemy territory. This is a much harder challenge than LPD comms within in a task force at sea, where the airspace above and around it is contested or controlled by friendly airpower and IADS. Enemy ESM systems won't be able to get as close or be as numerous as the F-35 case.

      But I concede, I don't have any specific data to back my case up, other than a general understanding of how these things work and the physics involved.

      Anyway, I've presented my thought on how to perform both escort and offensive ASW, anyone else want to try.

      Delete
    22. On USV Speed:
      Overlord RFI: 28kn full load calm water, 20kn with a casualty.
      MDUSV RFI was 24-27kn sustained.
      Sea Hunter design speed - 27kn
      The overlord design selected for MUSV has a max speed 38 kn, sustained 33, economic 24.5.

      Delete
    23. One has to wonder how noisy all of those vessels are. Sea Hunter was at least a bespoke design. The others are converted offshore crew supply vessels. I'm sure they're noisy.

      Delete
    24. Again, the dilemma is whether to throw a whole bunch of noisy (acoustic and electronic) assets out to find the subs while advertising your position or minimize noise, hide your position, but risk subs? No easy answer.

      Delete
  8. I think accommodating air defense systems is an absolute requirement for a modern DE.

    IIRC, the Luftwaffe's maritime patrol aircraft were able to scout for Allied convoys' locations, and relay that info to Kriegsmarine subs, in World War II, which then made driving off or destroying those aircraft a priority for the convoys' escort carriers- a task that will likely fall upon a DE nowadays, due to limited availability of the US and its allies' carriers, including LHDs, LHAs, and Japanese DDHs operating the F-35B.

    Then there's the fact antiship missiles will be an ever-present risk to the DEs- can't protect something if you can't protect yourself- so VLS cells loaded with the Evolved Sea Sparrow, and CIWS mounts, will be an absolute necessity. Fortunately, BMD defense and its associated costs are unlikely to be needed; an antiship ballistic missile is expensive, will be rare for that reason, and its use likely reserved for CVBGs instead of supply convoys and the DEs escorting them.

    ReplyDelete
  9. I kind of figured when I first saw the FFG(X) that it was not going to be a dedicated ASW ship. My first clue was the G after the double FF's. So, I knew it going to be a "mini Burke" or "Burke-light." If I recall correctly the FF's of the Knox-class had either a single Mk-25 8-cell RIM-7 Sea Sparrow BPDMS or Mk-29 8-cell RIM-7H Improved Sea Sparrow (IBPDMS) launcher for defensive purposes only.

    There are going to be sufficient numbers of Arleigh Burke's in a CSG to provide long-range AAW.

    Here is an idea to ponder: The average price tag for a Constellation-class FFG is about $1Billion. The average cost of a Legend-class NSC (National Security Cutter) is between $670M to 735M. The NSC is about 70 feet or so shorter than the Constellation-class and a displacement of 4600 tons to the 7000+ tons. Speed wise, the NSC is a little bit faster (28+ knots to 26 knots. This is where it gets interesting. The range of the NSC is 12,000 nautical miles whereas the range of the Constellation is about 6900 nautical miles at 16 knots.

    In my opinion, I would prefer a dedicated ASW vessel to be derived from NSC based on the three most important attributes (again, my opinion): lower cost to build, longer range, and higher speed. Bonus: There are 9 out of a planned 11 (maybe a 12th) already in commission with the USCG. Send of the Navy folks to a couple of these NSC's and sail around to evaluate the ships and submit findings. This stuff does not have to be complex or expensive.Just my $1.38.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Some talk over on USNI about this today and how the NSCs are built so slowly they already have some obsolete parts to contend with. I'd still take them vs the nothing we are headed to. I see the opportunity in either coming up with an upgraded naval OPC or clean sheet design. In either case use the 12V version of the 20V genset in Connie to have enough electric power for shaft mounted motors.

      Delete
    2. Caveat: The NSC has Dual Level 1/Class 1 helicopter hangars.

      I would definitely ditch the 57mm, MK110, Red Rider BB Gun in favor of the OTO-Melara 76/62 Super Rapid:

      echnical data:
      Caliber: 3 inches / 76,2 mm
      Barrel lenght: 186 inches / 4,72 meters (= 62 caliber)
      Weight: 7900kg, empty (Super Rapid)
      Shell: 76 x 900 mm / 12,34 kilograms
      Elevation: - 15° to + 85°
      Traverse: 360°
      Rate of fire: Compact: 85 rpm / Super Rapid: selectable from single shot up to 120 rpm
      Muzzle Velocity: 925 m/s (1100 m/s - DART)
      Magazine: Compact: 80 rounds / SR: 85 rounds

      Range:
      16 kilometers with standard ammunition
      20 km with extended range ammunition
      up to 40 km with VULCANO ammunition


      Evolution:
      - Compact
      - Super Rapid
      - Stealth casing
      - DAVIDE/STRALES radio frequency guidance system for DART guided ammunition

      Ammunition:
      - HE (high explosive) - 6,296kg / Range 16km / effective range 8km (4km vs. air targets at elev. 85°)
      - MOM (multi-role OTO munition)
      - PFF (pre-formed fragmentation) - anti-missile ammunition
      - SAPOM (semi-armored piercing OTO munition) - 6,35kg / Range 16km
      - SAPOMER (semi-armored piercing OTO munition, extended range) - Range 20km
      - DART (driven ammunition reduced time of flight) - sub-calibre guided ammunition against multiple targets
      (missiles and maneuvering targets at sea) 4,2kg in barrel / 3,5kg in flight / 660mm lenght / effective range >8km
      - VULCANO (76mm unguided and guided extended range ammunition) - under development



      According to Ingalls Shipbuilding:

      Bertholf (WMSL 750) 5/4/2008
      Waesche (WMSL 751) 11/6/2009
      Stratton (WMSL 752) 9/2/2011
      Hamilton (WMSL 753) 11/25/2014
      James (WMSL 754) 6/5/2015
      Munro (WMSL 755) 12/18/2016
      Kimball (WMSL 756) 9/19/2018
      Midgett (WMSL 757) 5/1/2019
      Stone (WMSL 758) 11/9/2020
      10th NSC, Calhoun (WMSL-759) was launched in April 2022, commissioning in 2023.
      11th NSC, Friedman (WMSL-760), under construction.
      12th NSC, Currently unnamed (WMSL-761) waiting for LLTM contract awarding, $300M has been authorized for the 12th NSC.


      This is only real issue I found with the NSC program outside the customary hiccups.
      "In January 2018, a whistleblower lawsuit against Lockheed Martin was unsealed, alleging that the company had sold defective communications systems to the NSC program. The qui tam lawsuit, filed by a former Lockheed employee, said Lockheed had concealed known problems with the radio-frequency distribution systems installed on nine NSCs, preventing them from simultaneously transmitting and receiving multiple radio signals. To settle the lawsuit, Lockheed agreed to pay the federal government $2.2 million and to provide repairs valued at $2.2 million to the faulty systems."

      Delete
  10. I only have one question: have submarines become more effective and dangerous from longer distances than WWII submarines? If the answer is yes, then some changes need to be made to the DE/FF design, to include longer range weapons, more effective sonar (either on-ship or via helos), reduction or elimination of a deck gun(s) that cannot engage a modern submarine at range (completely ignoring the fact they would most likely not be surfaced anyway), (and to copy Aim9Snake's comment) add anti-ship missile defenses, and reduce or completely rethink the depth charge delivery system due to submarine improvements making existing systems far less effective. What does that leave you? Something that does not look like a WWII DE and more like a Knox/Garcia. If the design can be distilled down to the least costly but still effective one, then I think you can still be less expensive and bloated than a Connie, but still bigger and more expensive than a modern Knox/Garcia.
    Last thought: remember, adversaries improve technology just like we do and designs have to change accordingly. That is by no means a defense of the bloat, growth, and Multi-Mission focus of modern US Navy design ideas, but our enemies get a say in what we have to design simply by improving what they field.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. We are going to need ships that also help retain sailors. Imagine what the retention for an LCS would be if it ever spent real time working the North Atlantic in winter.

      Delete
  11. A while back, if I'd been asked to define a frigate, I'd say it was a warship smaller than a destroyer and optimized for ASW. With the Constellation class, the US Navy doesn't agree with me, at least not with the second half of my definition.

    If it were up to me, a modern US Navy frigate would have the Phalanx, RAM or SeaRAM, and ESSM for air defense, but not Aegis and Standard missiles. Aegis would add a lot of expense and the ship would still be inferior to the Burkes, Ticonderogas, and CNO's AAW destroyer and independent cruiser concepts in countering aerial threats. And from what I've learned on this blog, I'd make these new weapons a priority:

    A 21-inch torpedo that can be fired from a surface ship
    A revived Sea Lance or an enhanced VL-ASROC with greater range
    A modern Hedgehog-type weapon

    Unfortunately I can't recall my source, but I read that Hedgehogs are superior to depth charges because depth charges explode at a predetermined depth and can cause loss of sonar contact with the enemy submarine, whereas Hedgehogs aren't supposed to explode unless they hit the enemy boat. I know some allied navies use depth charges, but I wonder how much utility they have in modern warfare except in specialized circumstances (e.g., the reduced-power depth charges Sweden developed to chase Soviet submarines out of their territory).

    I worked with a man who served in the Navy in the late 1960s-early 1970s time frame. He said that the Navy replaced the term destroyer escort with frigate because destroyer escort sounds like a hooker. He said he heard a Navy captain say that. I know that's not the real reason, but I thought it was amusing.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Navy_1975_ship_reclassification

    My friend also was once on a hill, functioning as a spotter as his ship's gun fired on a target. US Navy Frigates of the Cold War by Mark Stille says the Garcia class frigates got 5-inch guns because the 3-inch guns on the Bronstein class were considered too light. Frigates did provide fire support in the Vietnam war, though we had destroyers, heavy cruisers, and--briefly--a battleship. I wouldn't know for a fact what the Navy's future fire support missions will be, but this paper describes potential scenarios with fire support requirements exceeding what a Burke-class destroyer could provide.

    https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4300/RR4351/RAND_RR4351.pdf

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "Unfortunately I can't recall my source, but I read that Hedgehogs are superior to depth charges because depth charges explode at a predetermined depth and can cause loss of sonar contact with the enemy submarine, whereas Hedgehogs aren't supposed to explode unless they hit the enemy boat."

      Neither Hedgehogs or depth charges see much use in contemporary warships. I think the reason is due to advances in submarine and weapons technology. Contemporary subs can attack from longer ranges, e.g., via antiship missiles, meaning they don't have to be within range of an enemy ship's Hedgehog or depth charge launcher, to threaten it.

      Delete
    2. "Contemporary subs can attack from longer ranges"

      Japanese Long Lance torpedoes could be fired from great ranges and yet that almost never happened. Most uses were at ridiculously short range.

      If you can guarantee that you'll never encounter a sub a close range then your comment is correct. However, the reality is that close range encounters WILL occur, especially in shallow waters where acoustic conditions are so bad that both sides will literally stumble upon each other.

      Missiles meant the end of dogfighting ...

      Delete
  12. (continued)

    I'm unaware of naval fire support being used in the Ukraine War, but supposedly an enormous amount of artillery ammunition has been expended in that conflict. I realize the Navy went back to a 3-inch gun with the Oto Melara 76 mm gun on the Perry class, and that weapon probably is better than the Bofors 57 mm gun used now. Elsewhere, I've come across people's disappointment that frigates used to have 5-inch (127 mm) guns and now they have 57 mm guns.

    Then again, CNO's fleet structure calls for an assault support ship with multiple 5-inch guns, independent cruisers with 8-inch guns, and battleships with 16-inch guns. So ideally, frigates would not be needed to provide fire support. One, possibly two Oto Melara Super Rapid 76 mm guns may be sufficient for a frigate's main gun requirement without taking up too much space or adding too much expense.

    Returning to the subject of ASW, Stille's book says under some circumstances, the SQS-26 sonar had a range of 80,000 yards. He says because that exceeded the range of ship-mounted weapons the LAMPS helicopters were developed.

    So, there is one reason the Navy made putting helicopters on warships a priority.

    I have an additional explanation, though mine is speculative. (It may be correct, but I haven't read it anywhere.) Aircraft Carriers Volume II, 1946-2006 by Normal Polmar states, "…the ASW carrier air group of the mid-1960s numbered 20 S-2D or S-2E Trackers and 16 SH-3A Sea Kings plus three E-1B Tracer radar aircraft." When the modified Essex-class CVS carriers were phased out, we lost the platforms for a lot of ASW helicopters. Perhaps giving all new frigates, destroyers, and cruisers an aviation capability was designed to compensate for that loss.

    CNO's Hunter-Killer ASW Groups post, linked elsewhere in this discussion, proposes another solution

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "So ideally, frigates would not be needed to provide fire support."

      Correct !

      Delete
    2. This comment has been removed by the author.

      Delete
  13. My comment was too long and I messed up breaking it up. Sorry. Part one:

    A while back, if I'd been asked to define a frigate, I'd say it was a warship smaller than a destroyer and optimized for ASW. With the Constellation class, the US Navy doesn't agree with me, at least not with the second half of my definition.

    If it were up to me, a modern US Navy frigate would have the Phalanx, RAM or SeaRAM, and ESSM for air defense, but not Aegis and Standard missiles. Aegis would add a lot of expense and the ship would still be inferior to the Burkes, Ticonderogas, and CNO's AAW destroyer and independent cruiser concepts in countering aerial threats. And from what I've learned on this blog, I'd make these new weapons a priority:

    A 21-inch torpedo that can be fired from a surface ship
    A revived Sea Lance or an enhanced VL-ASROC with greater range
    A modern Hedgehog-type weapon

    Unfortunately I can't recall my source, but I read that Hedgehogs are superior to depth charges because depth charges explode at a predetermined depth and can cause loss of sonar contact with the enemy submarine, whereas Hedgehogs aren't supposed to explode unless they hit the enemy boat. I know some allied navies use depth charges, but I wonder how much utility they have in modern warfare except in specialized circumstances (e.g., the reduced-power depth charges Sweden developed to chase Soviet submarines out of their territory).

    I worked with a man who served in the Navy in the late 1960s-early 1970s time frame. He said that the Navy replaced the term destroyer escort with frigate because destroyer escort sounds like a hooker. He said he heard a Navy captain say that. I know that's not the real reason, but I thought it was amusing.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Navy_1975_ship_reclassification

    My friend also was once on a hill, functioning as a spotter as his ship's gun fired on a target. US Navy Frigates of the Cold War by Mark Stille says the Garcia class frigates got 5-inch guns because the 3-inch guns on the Bronstein class were considered too light. Frigates did provide fire support in the Vietnam war, though we had destroyers, heavy cruisers, and--briefly--a battleship. I wouldn't know for a fact what the Navy's future fire support missions will be, but this paper describes potential scenarios with fire support requirements exceeding what a Burke-class destroyer could provide.

    https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4300/RR4351/RAND_RR4351.pdf


    ReplyDelete
  14. Part two:

    I'm unaware of naval fire support being used in the Ukraine War, but supposedly an enormous amount of artillery ammunition has been expended in that conflict. I realize the Navy went back to a 3-inch gun with the Oto Melara 76 mm gun on the Perry class, and that weapon probably is better than the Bofors 57 mm gun used now. Elsewhere, I've come across people's disappointment that frigates used to have 5-inch (127 mm) guns and now they have 57 mm guns.

    Then again, CNO's fleet structure calls for an assault support ship with multiple 5-inch guns, independent cruisers with 8-inch guns, and battleships with 16-inch guns. So ideally, frigates would not be needed to provide fire support. One, possibly two Oto Melara Super Rapid 76 mm guns may be sufficient for a frigate's main gun requirement without taking up too much space or adding too much expense.

    Returning to the subject of ASW, Stille's book says under some circumstances, the SQS-26 sonar had a range of 80,000 yards. He says because that exceeded the range of ship-mounted weapons the LAMPS helicopters were developed.

    So, there is one reason the Navy made putting helicopters on warships a priority.

    I have an additional explanation, though mine is speculative. (It may be correct, but I haven't read it anywhere.) Aircraft Carriers Volume II, 1946-2006 by Normal Polmar states, "…the ASW carrier air group of the mid-1960s numbered 20 S-2D or S-2E Trackers and 16 SH-3A Sea Kings plus three E-1B Tracer radar aircraft." When the modified Essex-class CVS carriers were phased out, we lost the platforms for a lot of ASW helicopters. Perhaps giving all new frigates, destroyers, and cruisers an aviation capability was designed to compensate for that loss.

    CNO's Hunter-Killer ASW Groups post, linked elsewhere in this discussion, proposes another solution.

    ReplyDelete
  15. Minor quibble, the 21" torpedo tubes (Mk 15s) onthe Buckleys were pure ASuW weapons, virtually useless against submarines. It could be argued that they were in fact a fairly useless addition. As far as I can tell, only 3 destoyer escorts in the entire war fired torpedoes in anger (Battle off Samar, 3 of the 4 DE's fired their torpedoes, USS John C. Butler never discharged her torpedoes because she was kept with the carriers to lay smoke).

    In any case, it could be argued that the change to lightweight torpedoes on the Dealey class actually represented an increase in ASW specialization, as those tubes were for dedicated ASW weapons.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I would note that submarines in WWII were surface ships that could submerge for a short time. Much of a submarine's time was spent on the surface, including during attacks. The 21" torpedo was a viable ASW weapon against a surfaced sub and it had, of course, the dual use as an ASuW weapon, as you note.

      Delete
  16. Off topic story. I just read this article on USNI's website. "The Navy Wants Independence LCS in Bahrain for Mine Countermeasure Mission."

    From the article," The Navy is close to reaching initial operating capability for the MCM mission package after trials on USS Cincinnati (LCS-20)." That was a quote from Brig. Gen. Annibale (OPNAV N95).

    Thought I would share it with the group.

    Article link: https://news.usni.org/2023/01/11/navy-wants-independence-lcs-in-bahrain-for-mine-countermeasure-mission#more-100212

    ReplyDelete
  17. All,

    I just read this a few minutes ago. Lockheed-Martin has pitched to the US Navy the pairing of the Patriot PAC-3 MSE Missile from the MK 41 VLS.The standard PAC-3 MSE is about 19 feet long which could be compatible with either the tactical (22 feet long) or strike-length (25.25 feet long) versions of the MK 41 VLS.

    If this were to come to fruition, it could conceivably boost the Navy's Anti-air and BMD capability.

    Article link:

    https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/patriot-missiles-paired-with-naval-vertical-launchers-pitched-by-lockheed

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. That's not necessarily a positive development. Patriot has not enjoyed great operational success. The Gulf War results appear to have been between 0-10% success based on post-war analysis. Other historical uses have been similarly suspect although solid data is hard to come by.

      Barring extensive REALISTIC tests, Patriot would not be my choice for a defensive missile.

      Delete
    2. The missile has nothing to do with the system from 30+ years ago at this point. It would be a better local BMD system than SM-6. They also build way more per year than SM-6 is projected to reach. In my goofy mind, one other advantage would be it could also quad pack in a mk 57 launcher.

      Delete
  18. WWII was very different from what we are seeing today. Large multi ships logistics convoys, submarine packs (in the Atlantic), submarines spending a lot of time on surface and detected by shipborne / airborne radars, submarine weaponry limited to torpedoes (+ occasional gun) ... etc.
    What about focusing on SSKs to defend against submarines rather than dedicated ASW frigates ?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The problem with SSKs is their range and endurance. SSKs work for nations who're fighting in their own backyards, but are nonstarters for the US, which fights halfway across the world.

      Delete
    2. "The problem with SSKs is their range and endurance."

      You say that and yet the US extensively deployed submarines in WWII from Pearl Harbor to patrol areas along the Japanese and Chinese coasts. Patrols would last up to 8 weeks. How would SSKs be different from that?

      Delete
    3. After the very initial stages of the war, Pearl was a safe submarine base, never in serious danger of being attacked.
      Would that apply in the case of a China war?

      Delete
    4. "Would that apply in the case of a China war?"

      That's a good question and I like good questions. The only thing better than a good question is a good question with a proffered answer accompanying it. So, what would you see as the threats and how credible would they be?

      Delete
    5. I don't see a full-fledged China-USA war happening anytime soon, but in that case if I'm China I'm throwing the kitchen sink at Guam and Pearl since it's not like there's many US bases in the region anyway.
      Missiles, mines, submarines, the whole shebang. Shut them down and America's logistics chain is screwed up for quite a while.
      Then you can seize Taiwan and whatnot.

      Delete
    6. Would Americans react differently to an attack on Pearl Harbor now than they did in 1941? Do the Chinese think we would react differently? If we fail to prevent them from seizing Taiwan while fighting there is one thing and I feel we might accept a new status quo and move on. If they attack the U.S. directly that feels like another thing entirely. I do not think we would just accept that and move on.

      Delete
    7. "If we fail to prevent them from seizing Taiwan while fighting there is one thing and I feel we might accept a new status quo and move on."
      Most likely, although public opinion can be manipulated and there a zillion factors involved.

      Delete
    8. China's attitude towards Taiwan is like America's attitude towards Hawaii. If you want to know how China will react to US plans for Taiwan, just ask yourself how the US will react if China claims the Kingdom of Hawaii is under her protection, and plans to station naval, air force, and army assets on the islands, to protect them.

      Answer: It will be UGLY.

      Delete
    9. "China's attitude towards Taiwan is like America's attitude towards Hawaii."

      Unless I misunderstand your point, your analogy is badly and fundamentally flawed. Taiwan wants nothing to do with China. In total contrast, Hawaii wants to be part of the US. The situations are complete opposites.

      Delete
    10. "Taiwan wants nothing to do with China."

      WRONG. Taiwan is technically the successor state of the Republic of China, whose rule the Communists usurped when the latter won the Chinese Civil War and founded the People's Republic of China. Many of its older citizens still consider themselves Chinese.

      Delete
    11. Don't be a lawyer. Taiwan wants nothing to do with China. They don't want to be part of China. They don't want to be subjugated by China. They don't want to be politically, financially, or militarily dominated by China. They don't want to be ruled by China. Taiwan wants nothing to do with China.

      Delete
    12. I just read the results of a Taiwan ethnicity identification survey.

      60% identified as Taiwanese
      35% identiried as mixed Taiwanese/Chinese
      5% identified as Chinese

      Note, this is ethnic identification NOT political identification. It does, however, strongly suggest that Taiwan wants to remain completely independent and has no desire to move closer to China politically.

      Delete
  19. "the Perry’s SQS-56 sonar was considered only marginally capable "

    Is a better hull-mounted sonar available today? I like a bow-mounted sonar, but recognize that adds cost and drag. If a ship is to protect carriers, that drag means stronger engines and more complexity and cost.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The Spruance/Burke SQS-53 is notably superior to the Perry's SQS-56.

      Delete
    2. Then I take it the SQS-53 is not limited to bow dome installations. Thanks!

      Delete
    3. The -53 (derived from the SQS-26) is a bow mounted, low freq, combination active/passive sonar. The current version on Burkes is the SQS-53C.

      Delete
  20. On the note of using helicopters for anti submarine warfare: how about the newly selected V-280 for the US Army? It has very very long range "900 miles, almost three times that of the UH-60."(as per below link) and should, with folding wings and all, fit in the same spaces as Blackhawks (or Seahawks as the case may be with maybe some ship hangar enlargements) as below claims

    https://www.sandboxx.us/blog/did-the-army-make-the-right-choice-with-the-v-280-valor/

    It would make great economy of scale, just put some ASW equipment inside and they would cover a very wide area given their range, longer than helicopters, it would really help spread out ASW coverage.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "how about the newly selected V-280"

      I suspect it wouldn't be suitable for the same reason the MV-22 wasn't: it's probably not hover capable. Yes, it can briefly enter hover mode but it doesn't operate well and stably there.

      Aside from being unstable and highly accident prone in hover mode, it gulps fuel in that mode. I haven't followed the V-280 so I could be wrong but it seems highly likely that any tiltrotor suffers from similar problems.

      Delete
    2. It does not have to hover: it can do like our ASW aircraft's in World War 2 and given the extremely long range and improvements the V-280 is supposed to have, they can use like the magnetic anomaly detector or MAD(which needs to be brought back in numbers anyway in my opinion), sonar buoys, and similar tactics to our Anti Submarine Warfare bombers of World War 2 below

      https://uboat.net/allies/documents/usaaf_asw3.htm

      And unlike the converted bombers of World War 2 the V-280 (if converted) can be based on the Constellation "destroyer escorts" of today.

      Delete
    3. One of our main ASW sensors is the dipping sonar and that does require the aircraft to hover. We can operate like the S-3 Viking, without a dipping sonar, but if we want to do that then we need a true fixed wing aircraft.

      Tiltrotors combine all the worst aspects of both fixed wing and helos. The Navy evaluated the MV-22 for ASW and decided it was unsuited. There is no reason to believe that the V-280 would be any different or better.

      Delete
    4. V-280 diagrams compare it to a folded UH-1 which is a much larger footprint than a folded MH-60. And who wants their rotors that far off the edge of a Burke's stern with 13-16' freeboard?

      Delete
    5. "The Navy evaluated the MV-22 for ASW and decided it was unsuited. There is no reason to believe that the V-280 would be any different or better."

      The V-280 is a lot lighter than the MV-22. Per Wiki, the V-280 disc loading at max takeoff weight is about 16 lbs/sf. That's about 60 percent higher compared to the Seahawk and about a third less than the MV-22. Being that there is no Seahawk replacement under development, I'm sure the Navy (and the Marines to replace their Hueys and Cobras) will give the Valor a good look.

      Delete
  21. Dear CamNavOps, this isn't strictly on topic but does fit the blogs format well and I would value your opinion: Could you analyse the new wargaming report of the CSIS on Taiwan? It seemed to echo a lot of your concerns concerning the number of airframes etc.

    The report is available as a free PDF here: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I've been debating whether to do this or not. I'm leaning towards not doing it because the report didn't present their operational plans that went into creating the results so there's nothing concrete to discuss. They presented the final results but not how they got there.

      In order to analyze the results I'd need to see the operational plans that were used. Did the results occur because of poor operational plans or because the other side was in a superior strategic position? Without the operational plans, I can't know.

      Beyond that, I can see several fundamental flaws in the methodology which render the results suspect.

      In short, there's not enough there to analyze in any meaningful way.

      Did you see something specific you'd like to point out?

      Delete
  22. "Beyond that, I can see several fundamental flaws in the methodology which render the results suspect"

    Would be interested to know what the fundamental flaws you were thinking of.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The CSIS study seems to be funded by the USAF and so tells us that "since airfields can't be knocked out for more than a few hours (it ASSUMES that Chinese just bomb airstrips with cruise missiles but do NOT target the fixed handful of ammo, fuel, and repair facilities required for the aircraft to fly) but a sunk ship is sunk forever" that ALL THAT IS NEEDED to beat China is a REALLY large number of long range air-launched missiles since the USAF will ALWAYS be able fly and ALWAYS survive losses and the US only needs to kill invading Chinese ships. They have a video that goes with this BUT this basically talks about the correct mix of USAF aircraft needed to fire the missiles. It is not clear that the air-launched US missiles need to be able to target ships as they want to use mainly USAF missiles. The previous studies saw the Chinese defeating the US because they were not funded by the USAF.

      Delete
    2. "what the fundamental flaws you were thinking of."

      They don't describe the aviation aspect beyond saying that US bombers will deliver overwhelming numbers of missiles and sink the entire Chinese fleet. Where are these bombers coming from? Bombers can't do much more than about one sortie per week, assuming they're flying out of CONUS (Guam will be neutralized in the first hour of a war and Middle East bases will not be available due to politics) due to the extensive maintenance requirements. We currently have around 15 operational B-2 bombers. Combat attrition (which the study does not seem to incorporate) and maintenance attrition will quickly reduce the bomber force to under a dozen.

      The B-1 bomber fleet numbered 62, recently, and 17 were retired from that number. It is likely that no more than around 30 B-1's are operational and those are being retired as the B-2 comes on line. Again, attrition and mechanical failures will quickly reduce those numbers even further.

      Other study failings include an utterly unrealistic modeling of submarine actions.

      Ridiculous success rates for both offensive and defensive missiles.

      A 3.5 day 'turn' which precludes any flexibility or agility.

      An unrealistic assessment of the Chinese aviation capability and numbers.

      The complete absence of any description of the combat operations.

      And so on.

      Delete
    3. We discussed how to attack an air base and put it out of commission for the long term. See, "No Fuel, No Fly"

      Delete
  23. If you look at the complete history, adding year, beam, and draft, there has been a steady increase in size since WWII:

    Buckley (1943) 306x36 ft, 1700 T
    Dealey (1954) 314x37 ft, 1900 T
    Claud Jones (1956), 312x38 ft, 2000 T
    Bronstein (1963), 372x41 ft, 3000 T
    Garcia/Brooke (1964), 414x44 ft, 3400 T
    Knox (1969) 438x47 ft, 4100 T
    Perry (1977) 453x45 ft, 4200 T
    Constellation (2026) 496x65 ft, 7300 T

    Buckley, Dealey, and Claud Jones were in the 2000 T range, jump to 3000 T with Bronstein and Garcia/Brooke, then to 4000 T with Knox/Perry, and to 7000 T with Constellation. To paraphrase Sesame Street, one of these things does not belong with the others. The Connies are not ASW frigates. The USN took a GP frigate with decent ASW/ASuW capability (could plug a major hole in the USN) and bastardized it into an Aegis platform without enough missiles to be a competent AAW ship. So now it is neither a viable AAW nor ASW nor ASuW platform. I still think the plan is for a cheaper and less capable replacement for the Ticos that the USN is in a rush to dump, which is stupid.

    I would keep the Connies as FREMMs. I like having EMPAR as an alternative/backup to Aegis, particularly given Aegis’s rumored reliability issues. I’d like it better if the weight issues could be resolved to carry SMART-L as well. Give up some habitability space and move some things around to reduce superstructure. I like the Brit concept of CIC/operations room down in the ship for protection rather than up by the bridge. I’d give up the after 76mm gun, or maybe replace it with the 57mm popgun from the Connies, and I’d go with the FBNW 32-cell VLS version. I believe that’s 16 short (5m) and 16 long (7m) cells, so load out something like 8 Standard, 8 VL-ASROC, 8 NSM, and 32 quad-packed ESSM.

    As for the ASW frigate, I’d go with something in the Garcia size range. I want the best sonar available, which means bow-mounted SQS-26/53, along with VDS and tail. I really like ComNavOps’s idea of a Virginia-like side arrays around the hull. I want to run as quiet as possible during ASW ops, which means IEP or CODLAG. Extensive use and doctrine of helos for ASW in USN and allied navies dictates a helo. I would prefer two, because of reliability and flight time limitations that ComNavOps mentioned, but these ships are not going to operate alone, probably 8 or so in the fleet escort role, which should provide enough redundancy--maybe one manned and one unmanned. As for torpedoes, I am not a fan of the standard triple tubes because of difficulties reloading and exposed operator positions. Since homing torpedoes don’t really have to be trained, the Knox arrangement of a torpedo room with fixed tubes that can be reloaded like on subs appeals. I would like to be able to carry both 12.75”/324mm and 21”/533mm, so thinking of double tubes to both sides, stacked 12.75”/324mm over 21”/533mm. Adding those ideas to ComNavOps’s ASW DE at the fleet structure tab, this is my proposed ASW frigate:

    • 1x 76 mm Super Rapid STRALES/DART
    • 2x2 (1-12.75”/324mm stacked over 1-21”/533mm) Fixed torpedo tubes, reloadable from torpedo room like subs or Knox
    • 2x RBU-ish ASW rocket depth charges, located where ASROC on Garcias
    • 32-cell Mk41 VLS (16 VL-ASROC, 8 NSM, 32 ESSM quad-packed), where after gun on Garcias
    • At least one H-60 helicopter, two if possible, or one H-60 and one drone
    • VDS
    • Bow mounted multi-frequency sonar, SQS-26/53
    • SQR-20 multi-function towed array
    • Wide aperture lightweight fiber optic sonar array (Virginia class side arrays)
    • IEP or CODLAG propulsion

    Build 60 FREMMs and 80 ASW frigates. Based on FREMM/Connie costs, FREMMs should cost around $1B each, and at half the size of FREMMs/Connies, ASW frigates should cost around $500MM each, both cheaper with long production runs. 60 FREMMs ($60B) and 80 ASW frigates ($40B), plus legacy 22 Ticos (replace with real cruiser) and 40ish AAW Burkes would be a pretty stout escort force.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. They are finally developing a mini torpedo to shoot from SSN decoy tubes. Might be the weapon to shoot by rocket you are looking for. I've also thought, why not make one to shoot from the SRBOC launchers or even a plain old 120mm mortar. A little light on boom, but it could be numerous and make the sub noisy for the big weapons to hit.

      Delete
    2. Sorry, but you aren't getting even half of that gear on a 3400 ton hull. If it was possible, it would have been done long since. The reason the Perry's went with the SQS-56 was weight. So you aren't getting an SQS-53 on a significantly smaller hull, along with 32 VLS cells.

      Delete
    3. "you aren't getting even half of that gear on a 3400 ton hull."

      I don't know whether you can fit the list of equipment but other navies have produced some pretty heavily equipped ship classes in that size range. For example, the Russian Gorshkov class frigate at 442 ft long (28 ft longer than a Garcia) has an impressive outfit quite similar to the listed equipment.

      Delete
    4. "Sorry, but you aren't getting even half of that gear on a 3400 ton hull."

      Well, let's compare to ~3000T Garcia:

      • 1x 76 mm Super Rapid STRALES/DART - Garcia had 2x 5", so a reduction here
      • 2x2 (1-12.75”/324mm stacked over 1-21”/533mm) Fixed torpedo tubes, reloadable from torpedo room like subs or Knox - Garcia had 2x3 so should be an even trade
      • 2x RBU-ish ASW rocket depth charges - located where ASROC on Garcias
      • 32-cell Mk41 VLS (16 VL-ASROC, 8 NSM, 32 ESSM quad-packed) - located where after gun mount on Garcias
      • At least one H-60 helicopter, two if possible, or one H-60 and one drone - Garcias carried one LAMPS, added length/beam/draft to accommodate should be doable
      • VDS - should be doable with extra length added for helos
      • Bow mounted multi-frequency sonar, SQS-26/53 - same as Garcia
      • SQR-20 multi-function towed array - should be doable with extra length added for helos
      • Wide aperture lightweight fiber optic sonar array (Virginia class side arrays) - not sure about this one, or whether it would even work, but really like the concept
      • IEP or CODLAG propulsion - shouldn't be an issue, GT/diesels are smaller than steam plants, and electric motors and storage batteries should fit easily in space occupied by shaft alleys and reduction gears; IEP or CODLAG should come with electric generation/storage capacity to support future weapon energy requirements

      It's almost a 1 for 1 with the Garcias, and adding 20-30 feet and 500T should give plenty of room/capacity.

      "If it was possible, it would have been done long since."

      If it were possible, and if the USN were not being run by a bunch of idiots. I'd say more the latter than the former.

      Delete
  24. Personally I think the Japanese have (had) the best modern plan for ASW the fairly cheap Abukuma class DE (I've lost the link but I did find the procurement cost once and in adjusted dollars they cost about 1/3 the cost of an LCS even with the shortened production). Esentialy just for ASW and secondary Surface warfare. Then tied to say a CV like the Hyūga providing the Helicopters.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Add if the US could come close to the Japanese build cost and assuming say VLS to get ASROC and ESSM that be 60 ships to the ~20 LCS. The Hyuga cost Japan about 1.5 billion in current dollars. So even 6 as flotilla leaders is less than a Ford. I can see people argue all the Helicopters in one basket is bad. But I have to think a small CV could have more pilots, more maintenance crew and more spares such as to maintain far higher rates of helicopter operations than one crammed onto a frigate.

      I tricky thing I see with the USN... is gasp this solution does noting involves some fantastical minim crew solution were said crew is magically cross trained in every possible thing a ship could do and supported by super uber this time really the defense contractors civilian support will cheap always waiting waiting in port.

      Delete
    2. Weird I got logged off for my add on post?

      Delete
    3. What gets me with Japan is all their ships have fixed face radars now and generally 2 CWIS. No way around the fact FFG-62 feels a little out of balance with the times. No plan for 360 degree EO/IR. Surface search radar will also be rotating so far as I understand. I worry less about the 32 VLS as I can see where quad packing eventually provides a ship with the potential for 128 VLS shots. Plus the RAM launcher isn't anything to sneeze at. I'd really like a BAE vs Leonardo shoot off between 57mm and 76mm versions with actual current available ammunition types.

      Delete
    4. "Leonardo shoot off between 57mm and 76mm versions with actual current available ammunition types."

      For me its been over since a USCG ship could not sink a fishing ship hulk with it 57mm gun after it floated into the the Alaska fishery lanes post the 2011 tsunami. They had to send teams over to rig explosives to sink the thing. If you can't sink a floating civilian hulk than there no point in pretending you even have a gun. 76 mm should be the absolute minimum

      Delete
    5. @AndyM
      At the recent January SNA2023 Washington L3Harris previewed the Shipboard Panoramic Electro-Optic/Infrared (SPEIR) system with a panoramic integrated wide field of view (WFOV) capability, NAVSEA awarded them a $206 million contract last April, to perform engineering and manufacturing development (EMD), LRIP contract options covering up to 21 SPEIR systems, will extend to March 2031, if contract line items are exercised will bring the total to $593 million.
      The SPEIR would cue the existing NFOV Mk 20 EOSS Mod 1 (IR mid-wave imager, a color visible camera and a laser rangefinder on ship used in the GWS for the 5" Mk45).

      The major advantage of a the SPEIR WFOV would be to provide ship situational awareness while allowing the ship to maintain strict EMCON minimizing active emissions that could well be picked up by enemy. Below deck with its computer AI algorithms for turbulence mitigation, automatic target detection, image stabilization and tracking with image enhancements to help the ship crews quickly detect, locate, and defend against airborne drones, fast-attack boats and anti-ship missile threats etc. SPEIR will be integrated with Aegis, presuming it will be the surveillance for the targeting the new 30mm MSI Mk38 Mod 4 and which may fire the new Army/NG proximity fuzed 30 projectiles
      @Kath
      Don't think 76mm would have the firepower, maybe a LWT needed below the waterline.

      Delete
    6. Mk 38 mod 4 has an off mount eo/ir site so my guess is Speir might help the other. My beef with Speir is it is only one mount. Most others I see from CHina Japan and South Korea seem to have 4.

      Delete
    7. "previewed the Shipboard Panoramic Electro-Optic/Infrared (SPEIR) system"

      I remember seeing similar systems described and advertised in Proceedings a decade or two ago. I don't recall the manufacturer(s). The point is that this is not new technology. I don't know why it hasn't caught on. There are some drawbacks but that's true of any surveillance technology.

      Delete
    8. " 76 mm should be the absolute minimum"

      It depends on what the ship's mission/CONOPS is. If the requirement is ship-sinking, a 76 mm is utterly incapable. Even a 5" gun is incapable of sinking a warship.

      If the requirement is stopping small boats then a 76 mm is fine and offers enormous advantages over larger guns.

      CONOPS, CONOPS, CONOPS!

      Delete
  25. "Leonardo shoot off between 57mm and 76mm versions with actual current available ammunition types."

    Don't need it. Scratch the 57mm, at least as a main gun. Maybe, maybe has some use as a secondary weapon. Then again, maybe not.

    ReplyDelete
  26. I am not sure a helo really needs to do "broad area ASW". It's envisioned role is to localize and engage contacts generated by the ships sonar. It does that pretty well.

    I do agree that one helo can only provide limited flight hours per day. But that just speaks to the need to embark a 2nd helo (like a DDG does,) and additional crew/maintainers.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "I am not sure a helo really needs to do "broad area ASW". It's envisioned role is to localize and engage contacts generated by the ships sonar"

      This was covered in the post.

      Delete

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