As we’ve often discussed, the Marines currently have an identity crisis. They have no viable mission or, at least, none that they’re articulating very well. We’ve discussed this and offered our view of things. Now, let’s approach this from the Marine’s side of things. What do the Marines think about themselves as documented in their own Force Design 2030 annual update report for 2022? As we look at this, bear in mind that the document is written by the Marines and, as such, is a self-congratulatory, public relations piece. Still, let’s see what we can learn about the Marines from their own mouth.
Campaign of Learning - One of the interesting sections of the report is titled, Key Findings From the Campaign Of Learning. For those of you who might be unfamiliar with The Campaign of Learning, it is described as an on-going series of examinations to ensure that the Marines are covering all the bases and making all the right decisions. An alternative description might be that it is a public relations exercise designed to validate decisions already made. Be that as it may, let’s see what the Marines claim to have learned.
Regarding the Campaign, itself,
This past year we invested in the Campaign of Learning itself by taking a more structured approach to collaborating with partners and by applying sophisticated modeling and simulation methods and tools. This is reflected through the refinement and analysis of mission engineering threads we developed in partnership with the Navy.[1]
How’s that for some Class A, unadulterated, worthless, buzzword vomit?
Communications - Moving on, we come to our first nugget of useful information:
Our FD 2030 communication has not been effective with all stakeholders.[1]
Read the phrase, ‘not been effective with all stakeholders’, and remember that statement was written by a Marine Corps desperately trying to put the best possible spin on it. If ‘not been effective with all stakeholders’ is the best possible spin, what are they really saying when the spin is removed? They’re saying that they’ve had an abysmal communications failure that has utterly failed to convince people and generate support.
On the one hand, it’s good that the Commandant recognizes his communication failure but, on the other hand, he clearly has no intention of actually communicating any useful information. Secrecy has been the hallmark of his vision and there is no sign that anything about that will change. If you recall, the Marines promised to begin releasing information about their wargames, as documented in the passage below.
MCWL will publish unclassified executive summaries of all Service-level war game reports related to FD 2030 no later than 1 November 2022 and make these available on the FD 2030 website. Going forward, MCWL will publish unclassified versions of all Service-level war game reports within 90 days of event completion.[1]
To date, I’ve heard found no information about war games. Commandant, are you puzzled why you have a communications failure? You promised information and have not provided anything useful. There’s your problem.
Here’s the referenced FD2030 website, as best I can tell:
https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design-2030/
Missions - Here’s an interesting tidbit:
… a modernized Marine Corps must still be capable of performing global crisis response operations.[1]
On the face of it, this suggests that the Marines want to maintain their traditional roles and missions while adding the small unit, missile-shooting force. That might be fine except that their actions, as opposed to their words, point to an abandonment of their traditional roles and missions. They’ve totally eliminated tanks, the most powerful weapon they had and significantly reduced artillery, their second most powerful weapon, while simultaneously publicly stating that they are out of the amphibious assault business. Does that sound like they want to ‘still be capable of performing global crisis response operations‘? This statement sounds to me like they’re trying to hang on to their traditional funding while abandoning the missions. This demonstrates the identity confusion that has gripped the Corps.
Effectiveness - Continuing, we find what may be the most profound passage in the document:
… our initial observations linked to A Concept for Stand-in Forces, especially for reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, indicate we focused the MLR [ed. Marine Littoral Regiment] too much on lethality and not enough on sensing, the ability to make sense, maneuverability, and deception. While our initial assumptions about the value of the MLR to the FMF and fleets were anchored on the enhanced lethality it could provide via long-range fires, further analysis demonstrates the even greater value of resilient sensing and enabling of kill chains.[1]
What they’re saying that they found that the small, missile-shooting units could not produce enough lethality to make a difference. This is exactly what we’ve discussed many times. A handful of scattered units, working with only a handful of missiles, and lacking any long range targeting, simply can’t generate any significant combat impact. That’s just common sense that becomes readily apparent with just a moment of logical consideration. You didn’t need a Campaign of Learning to come to that conclusion but, hey, better incredibly late than never.
Re-read the quote and un-spin it. It’s saying that the Marines have come to the realization that the Commandant’s vision of defeating China with a handful of missile-shooting, platoon size units is not viable.
It is noteworthy that they are belatedly recognizing that simple surveillance may be more useful than a scattering of nearly useless missiles. This is the old WWII coastwatcher concept. Of course, this doesn’t require entire Marine Littoral Regiments and a fleet of Light Amphibious Warships (LAW). A couple of guys with binoculars and a radio can do the job. Perhaps this is also why the Navy seems so unenthused about acquiring the LAW. If the Marines would give up on the missile-shooting and convert to simple surveillance than the Campaign of Learning would have been worth the effort and the Marines would have a worthwhile, if exceedingly small, mission.
Of course, if coastwatching is the new mission, one can’t help but wonder why we need the Marines when we already have an abundance of SEALs who could do the job. But, I digress …
Logistics - Here’s an issue that has screamed for an explanation since day one and yet gone unaddressed the entire time:
To persist inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone, our Stand-in Forces must be set and sustained by logistics capabilities designed for distributed operations over long distances in a contested environment.[1]
How long have I been harping on this gap in the Commandant’s concept? So far, the Marines have hand-waved away the challenge of transporting, landing, establishing, and resupplying a force without detection. The challenge seems impossible under the conditions of the concept and the Marines have utterly ignored it, at least publicly. Now, it seems some glimmer of recognition of the problem has emerged. The statement sums up the requirement – that is, a logistic contribution under challenging circumstances – yet still ignores the solution. Oh well … I’ll keep harping on it.
By the way, you recall the recent post wherein the Marines stated that the LAW would never operate in a combat zone (see, “The LAW is Confusing”)? Is the above quote the first public glimmer of recognition that the LAW concept is not viable?
Delusional Foundation – The following statement exemplifies the delusional foundation of the Marine’s missile-shooting concept:
Our continued experimentation demonstrates that infantry and LAR battalions that field teams or small units with the organic ability to sense, decide, and shoot have a competitive warfighting advantage on a modern battlefield.[1]
If small units truly have an inherent competitive warfighting advantage on a modern battlefield, why do we have brigades, divisions, and armies? Why do we have tanks and artillery? Wouldn’t a handful of squads be sufficient to win any war? Reality, as seen through history, demonstrates the opposite: that small units are simply targets waiting to die and that massed firepower is what wins battles and wars.
Summary
So, what do the Marines say about themselves in the Force Design 2030 annual update report?
- They think they’re identifying and solving problems from their Campaign of Learning.
- They acknowledge a communications/’sales’ problem.
- They believe they still retain all their previous missions/capabilities and remain a ‘global crisis response’ force.
- They believe their emphasis on missile-shooting and ship killing was somewhat misplaced.
- They believe they should be emphasizing reconnaissance over lethality.
- They acknowledge the necessity of logistics but offer no solutions to the challenge.
- They believe small units have some type of inherent advantage on the battlefield.
That’s what they say. However, it is clear that the Force Design 2030 annual update report is heavy on spin and light on reality. The impression one gets is that the Marines – meaning the Commandant – are brooking no alternative opinions or dissent and that the report is purely a public relations tool intended to support continued or increased funding. However, an analytical reading and ‘un-spinning’ of the document reveals numerous serious problems, as we’ve just discussed, and suggests that the Marines, themselves, are beginning to recognize and, ever so grudgingly, admit that the Commandant’s grand vision is not viable. The Commandant won’t say it in those words, of course, but the ‘un-spun’ reading is saying it. The Commandant won’t easily give up his dream but the handwriting is on the wall. When his term expires in July of 2023, I suspect his successor will begin walking back the Commandant’s failed vision.
___________________________________
[1]Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, Annual Update, May 2022
By the way, do you think developing a 155mm variant of the 5" Mk 45 naval gun, the way Royal Ordnance developed a 155mm variant of the 4.5" Mk 8 gun- or even shoehorning the M1299 self-propelled howitzer's turret into a destroyer, the way Rheinmetall shoehorned the PzH 2000 turret into a Sachsen class frigate- is worthwhile for Naval Gunfire Support? (The Navy must insist the resulting gun should be fully compatible with 155mm shells the US Army, Marine Corps, and countless NATO allies and export customers use, to avoid repeating the mistakes that doomed the AGS, of course.)
ReplyDeleteOr do you think the necessary resources will be better spent developing a new 16" gun and new 16" shells, a new battleship to use them, and building new factories or reopening old ones to mass-produce the guns and their shells?
Or should the USN invest in both the 155mm stopgap and the 16" gun platform?
There's also the other issue, effective naval 6 inch/152mm automatics have existed for decades. For example, the HMS Blake used the 6 inch QF Mark 5. This gun achieved a maximum rate of fire of 20 rpm. It was so fast that the gun barrels were wrapped in water jackets like the old MG's, but even those became overwhelmed after a while. They would have crew members hose the guns down to cool them. Compare that to the pzsh2000 with only a 13 rpm rate of fire.
DeleteKeep in mind the Mark 5 was late 1940's technology.
"should the USN invest in both the 155mm stopgap and the 16" gun platform"
DeleteIt all depends on what the intended purpose is for the guns. Setting that issue aside, there's no significant performance/lethality gain between from the existing 5" guns to a new (hideously expensive!) 155mm gun so why do it? Commonality is a red herring. There are more than enough 5" guns to provide economy of scale in ammunition purchasing.
The re-development of 16" guns depends on the intended purpose. I see a use for them but only as an integral part of a true battleship.
"Commonality is a red herring."
DeleteIt shouldn't be, as commonality also brings with it availability, and economies of scale. AFAIK, no one currently manufactures shells for the 6" QF Mark 5 that TheIndependent mentioned, meaning if any navy wants to use the weapon, its government must fund the construction of a factory to produce the shells, and then subsidize the continued operation of this factory. On the other hand, there are multiple manufacturers of 155mm shells, making them readily available and relatively cheap. In a hypothetical situation where a 155mm gun-armed USN ship runs out of ammo during a mission to defend South Korea, she should be able to rearm at a Korean port, using shells originally intended for a Korean Army battery.
"should be able to rearm at a Korean port, using shells originally intended for a Korean Army battery."
DeleteI really am unsure about this since I know little about the mechanics of land artillery but isn't land based 155 mm ammunition a 'dual' system that uses separate powder charges and projectiles? If so, that would almost preclude adopting the 155 mm standard for naval guns as the Navy abhors bag charges.
I don't think it's possible to standardize on 155 mm land-type gun systems for the Navy.
I may be completely wrong about this so feel free to correct me.
"If so, that would almost preclude adopting the 155 mm standard for naval guns as the Navy abhors bag charges."
DeleteThe video seen at www.youtube.com/watch?v=xq3vBB7dNws seems to indicate the PzH 2000 uses combustible plastic charges (or whatever the loader is shoving into the breech, after the shell is loaded).
Besides, didn't the Iowa class battleships' 16" guns use bagged charges? The risk is manageable, as long as the Navy doesn't skimp on crew training and weapons maintenance.
I did a brief stint in Army artillery in the mid nineties. Unlike small arms "fixed" ammunition, artillery ammo (land or naval) is transported and stored as separate components that are assembled when ready to fire. 155mm is "separate" loaded similar to 16-inch, but manhandled instead of using powered equipment. 105mm ammo is "semi-fixed". Soldiers on the gun crew assemble the cartridge from separate components, and hand it to the soldier at the breach, who loads it into the gun. This is similar to naval 5 inch, but again manual vs powered handling. I see no reason why 155mm NATO rounds could not be used as semi-fixed if appropriate casings were provided. If memory serves me correctly, the "Crusader" artillery system the Army hoped for, but never saw materialized, was intended to use 155mm semi fixed.
DeleteThe Army 155mm howitzers do not use cased ammunition, but require bag charges, something the Navy considers too dangerous and slow to load.
ReplyDeleteDidn't the Army begin using combustible plastic cases in place of bags, for its artillery? Or is that only Germany and those who imported German equipment? (I'm going off memories of a 'Future Weapons' episode featuring the PzH 2000.
DeleteI've been out for a while, but it looks like they now use a plastic case to load the bags. The number varies depending on the range.
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q-5l9L2l3a8
It looks like a high rate of fire, but after a minute they must slow to a round a minute to prevent the barrel from heating up red and warping. And a red hot barrel may ignite the bags before the breech is closed, causing serious injuries to the crew. This is needed anyway as the crew tires.
You can see they are very manpower intensive. A nine-man crew plus several guys to unload and unpack the ammo. They must screw on the fuse to each round, for safety reasons. Women can't crew these guns as the work requires muscle.
Compare this to a two-man HIMARS crew that sits in an armored cab and can move instantly after firing to dodge counterfires. And women can do it!
I posted a book on future warfare on-line 8 years ago, if anyone cares to browse, it's free, and now a bit dated.
ReplyDeletehttp://www.g2mil.com/war.htm
It includes this:
This warping of military strategy discussions into sales pitches for new expensive equipment was criticized a few years ago by Marine Corps General Paul Van Riper: "There's an unfortunate culture developing in the American military that maybe should make you nervous. I don't see the rich intellectual discussions that we had after Vietnam. I see mostly slogans, clichés and unreadable materials." Van Riper was referring to the Pentagon's blueprints for the future, which are dull and void of details.
"warping of military strategy discussions into sales pitches"
DeleteYes, yes, yes!!!! The US military has substituted technology for strategy which leads to discussions of specific weapon systems instead of discussions about warfare, in general, and its derivatives of strategy and doctrine.
There is a 3 part article over at Proceedings this month talking about war games on the new Marine Littoral Regiment concept. It does not fare well.
ReplyDeleteFor those, such as myself, who don't subscribe, would you like to summarize the article?
DeleteThey give everyone 5 free articles a month now (which this would be 3). Much of the summary will be findings as each section of the article are whoppers so far as Proceedings goes. Tons of detail on the exact scenarios and how the games were performed.
DeleteFindings:
-MLR works well as a covering force.
-MLR has more sensors than shooters. It should focus on the ISR angle.
-MLR will create sea denial as red will avoid the MLR once known.
-Ambiguity makes red commit more ISR to find and keep an eye on the MLR.
-Sustainment is a pacing function. LAW is needed to keep MLR supplied therefore red targets the LAW sorties requiring us to eat resources protecting the sortie.
-MLR combat credibility is tied to coalition support. Given we are planting the MLR on foreign soil it seems a given.
-NSM needed more range or help to get a mission kill on a PLAN carrier group in the second scenario. JSM off an F-35 was more effective.
-MLR presence in the RYukus could keep lines of communication to Taiwan open and denied to PLA.
-MADIS has no ballistic missile defense capability and the unit was exposed and could be eliminated in this fashion.
-MLR needs more organic sensing which MQ-9B can provide, but its very vulnerable to shoot down.
-In conflict, the MEU was more cost-effective to sustain than the MLR
-The MLR was marginally more combat effective than the MEU in terms of cost imposition on the PLA, on the order of 3 percent.
-Really the last article goes into lots of comparing MEU MLR costs and it seemed like there was a lot more to learn there.
In May 2022, students at the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) conducted a series of unclassified exercises and wargames intended to explore the potential of two key elements of Force Design 2030: the concept for stand-in forces (SIF) and the current prototype of the Marine littoral regiment (MLR).
You need to be careful, as you read the article, that you are cognizant of the context and limitations. Following are conclusions WITH SOME RELEVANT CONTEXT.
Delete- The US was allowed to pre-position forces in other country’s territory ... an unlikely scenario without which the entire concept would have been rendered non-viable!!!!!!
- The aim of the game participants was to avoid escalation, not engage in combat.
- The MLR was effectively non-lethal without the coordinated firepower of other forces.
- “When RED identified the location of MLR forces, it avoided placing naval forces within range of the MLR capabilities to mitigate risk of escalation.” MLR was effective at denial ONLY BECAUSE AVOIDANCE OF ESCALATION WAS THE ENEMY'S ASSIGNED GOAL. This seems like a very unlikely condition in reality. There was no evidence that the MLR could exercise denial in a combat situation.
- Blue was allowed to pre-position (unlikely) but Red was, apparently not allowed to pre-scout the MLR locations.
- The game revealed the weakness of logistics and the LAW.
- Combat was simulated by a commercial computer game and forces were SEVERELY constrained. No, joint force Chinese forces that would, in reality, exert overwhelming aerial superiority for reconnaisance and attack.
- The parameters of the game HAND WAVED LOGISTIC SUPPORT INTO AN ASSUMPTION THAT IT WAS A GIVEN. This was the only way the MLR could be effective to any degree.
- The MLR was unable to conduct its own targeting and so a hand-waved, perfect regional network was assumed to exist.
- The MLR NSM was unable to penetrate enemy SAG defenses.
- The MLR was found susceptible to detection and destruction by ballistic missiles despite the Chinese rocket forces and regional aerial forces not being included in the game
Taking away the several constraints and hand-waved assumptions, the MLR was totally ineffective and non-viable. That's the key takeaway and that same hand-waving is what the Marines are doing for real (logistics, basing rights, detection, regional targeting network, etc.). Nothing I've seen indicates this concept has the slightest chance of success.
I can only comment on what the Marines have to offer. The MEU concept along with the core competencies. To an actual combat arms soldier/Marine we see the value of highly motivated and will trained cadres that can accomplish a mission in a reliable fashion. The example of using SEALs are coast watchers? SEALs primary functions are raiding and recruiting. OPSEC? Read all their books, nothing secret about their operations. Actual mission accomplishment? The best that can be said about their training and reliability is that the Teams can be expected to succeed in spite of themselves. Which is all well and good against Pathan tribesmen (and just why were SEALs deployed to Afghan?), likely not in contested areas where actual infantry skills are to be needed. The SBS takes their people from the Royal Marines, and admittedly high standard organization. To expect the BUDS pipeline to produce a seasoned NCO is ludicrous at best. Better to move the Marines into their traditional roles of Naval Infantry and raiders and phase out the SEALs. But that would undermine their primary purpose; Recruiting. For every BUDS trainee the Navy enlists a score of potential wannabes, inspired to endure the sights and smells of hot bunking and smelling a fat guy in the hammock above farting through a nap between watches.
ReplyDeleteAs far as the Coast Watching idea, there was/is a thing called ANGLICO that accomplished just that. Just like the Army has 13 Fisters for arty, the Marines had artillery spotters. No use reinventing the wheel. And in Expeditionary warfare it would be better to roll infantry training into the Marine pipeline anyway. The day of the mass airborne drop was over after Malta. Considering the lack of discipline in Big Green, the Marines greatest gift would be bringing discipline back to the chain of command. Instead of the inconsistencies of the Army, the Corp has resisted the atrophy that all but the hoorah units of the Army has experienced. If nothing else, let the Jarheads run the infantry training programs. Better for all to have some nads somewhere.
Recruiting!!!
DeleteSEALs are used to attract young athletic guys (jocks). Nuclear power is used to attract the smart ones (nerds). In both fields, the initial entry requirements are much lower than what will be required to complete the training. The majority of recruits who join the Navy to be a SEAL or a Nuke won't finish the training, but that gives the Navy plenty of extra bodies to fill various positions.
Sorry about the discussion drift, just a personal gripe of mine.
MM-13B
What is a Marine Corps actually for?
ReplyDeleteNaval Infantry (Amphib Ops)? Sure. But that is not its true purpose.
Every Marine Corps ever created was to police the colonies and do the dirty work of empire. More importantly for our discussion: They protect ruling governments (which are friendly to us) from an Insurgency. The Marines who enlisted at Tun Tavern were not hired to fight the Revolution, but to grab the colony at Nassau. And they continued this mission all over the Americas in the Banana Wars for 150 years.
What does that mean in current times? It means Marines need to be refocused on Counter-Insurgency as their main role. This was always their main role until 1932 when FDR's "Good Neighbor Policy" ended Dollar Diplomacy and the need to send Marines into constant Banana Wars to enforce repayment of our loans to them. FDR loved the Marines, and didn't want to lose them, so he refocused them on amphibious operations to support War Plan Orange (War with Japan). The post WWII obsession with Amphibious Ops is not a sufficient justification as the Army could easily do the same job. Hence, the Marines constant identity crisis.
The Amphib mission might or might not still be useful, but COIN will always be needed (and it is a mission the Army is unsuited for). This will require a smaller Corps (~40,000 Men), but one completely optimized for that role. The last Marine COIN Manual was the 1940 "Small Wars Manual". It needs to simply be updated and refreshed.
Of course, if there is a big, conventional land war, the Marine Corps can easily form several Infantry Divisions and assist the Army (as was done in WWI). If an Island-Hopping campaign is envisioned in a war with China, I guess that can be practiced too. However, Counter-Insurgency is the perfect role for the long decades of peace we normally have. The Army should always be practicing for the next "Big One", not running around putting out little brush wars.
Thank you for the history lesson. That makes perfect sense to me.
Delete"If an Island-Hopping campaign is envisioned in a war with China, I guess that can be practiced too."
DeleteHistory, current trends, and common sense suggests that the next war may involve initial loses including island bases, and opponent gains that will include islands. Victory may likely require, at some point, retaking lost territory, that will include islands. Whether or not a island-hopping campaign is desired, it may at some point be required.
Using the Falklands conflict as a model, the UK Marine brigade existed as a functioning combined-arms unit. It was able to be the tip of the spear at very short notice, and act as a source of institutional knowledge and guidance for the rest of the UK military, eg a Marine general in command of a marine-army light division. Army units were part of the initial landings and follow-on littoral operations. However, Army units suffered greater losses and more logistical and organizational issues doing so. Why this was is very debatable, but nonetheless it was so.
This was policing a colony, in a certain sense, but it was also a war of defence against a powerful and aggressive local power. I believe the UK Army without Marines could probably have defeated the Argentinian forces on the islands, but with greater cost and uncertainty. I believe there are lessons here for this discussion.
"Every Marine Corps ever created was to police the colonies"
DeleteYour history of the Marines is incorrect or, at least, high spun in a misleading manner.
As I would hope you know, the Marines were created by the Second Continental Congress. Their first action was an amphibious raid to secure supplies of gunpowder at the British port of Nassau. The Marines departed after two weeks, leaving the port in British hands - hardly an attempt at colony building! After the Revolution, they were disbanded and, eventually, reconstituted to serve aboard Navy ships as naval infantry.
They served throughout history on land and sea, protecting various American interests.
This is what HQMC thinks. If you want to know what Marines think, track down "U.S. Marine Corps Postmortem" the 2019 Essay Contest presented by the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity, Marine Corps University. A collection of essays by Marines who were NOT enamored of Force Design 2030.
ReplyDelete"This is what HQMC thinks."
DeleteHQMC is the Marines. As you've seen, no amount of disagreement within the Corps (if there is any) has stopped or even slowed the implementation of the Commandant's vision. In every way that matters, FD2030 is what the Marines think.
"...In every way that matters, FD2030 is what the Marines think."
DeleteMakes me wonder, probably will never know BUT I wonder, what were the other options that Berger could have taken? We know of wargames BUT I'm sure there was some input from others and some other options were presented to him....why did he pick this one?!?
"other options were presented to him....why did he pick this one?!?"
DeleteI doubt very much that he became Commandant and then sat in his chair listening to presentations on various options and then picked this one. I'm positive he formed his view at some earlier point in his career and bided his time until he became Commandant at which point he began to implement his vision.
Mind you, I have absolutely no evidence to support my theory. It's pure speculation.
As you note, ComNavOps, the USMC has lost the plot with respect to its mission.
ReplyDeleteI have felt for some time that their best option is to emulate what the Royal Marines did when faced with budgetary extinction after WWII—reconfigure themselves as a combination 1) commando/special forces/asymmetric warfare force and 2) amphibious/naval infantry force. Let the Army focus on large unit strategy and tactics across broad continental fronts, while Marines focus on small unit strategy and tactics with an emphasis on littoral areas.
This would be a smaller but more focused Corps. It would turn the baby Army missions that are responsible for so much headcount growth in recent decades back to the Army, and Marine air would turn the air superiority mission back to the Navy and would focus on ship-shore movement of forces and close air support (CAS) of forces ashore.
In taking over the commando mission, the RMs effectively took over the UK equivalent of SOCOM. SOCOM has a current headcount of about 30,000, so assume a similar number of Marines if SOCOM is absorbed into the Corps. Let the Army, Navy, and Air Force keep about 10,000 each in Green Berets, SEALs, and AFSOC to work with Marine SOCOM the way that SAS and SBS do with the RMs. Every Marine E-5 and above would become commando trained and qualified.
For the amphibious mission, I would propose as the basic organization a combined arms Marine Expeditionary Regiment (MER) including an infantry battalion, tanks, artillery, amphibious armor, air, engineers, logistics, command, and support, about 3500 personnel in total (yes, I would give tanks and artillery back to Marines). Amphibious squadrons would be sized to carry a MER, forming an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). Three MERs plus command and support would constitute a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) of about 11,000 personnel. Three MEBs plus command and support would form a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) of about 35,000 personnel. Given the Marines’ standard 3:1 rotation, 3 MEFs would make approximately 105,000 personnel in the total expeditionary force. Marine air is integrated into the MER (and thus MEB and MEF organizations) and included in the number above, at a total strength of about 20,000. One idea that might be considered, in return for moving the air superiority mission to the Navy, would be to move the ground attack and strike mission to Marine air. Carriers would ordinarily carry a full complement of air superiority fighters, but where the mission required, one or two Navy fighter squadrons could be replaced by Marine attack squadrons.
Allowing about 10,000 for admin and training, that would make a USMC of about 155,000, a decrease of around 30,000 from current levels. That could be offset by a doubling of the Marine reserve to 80,000 for an end strength of 235,000.
In an environment where winning budget battles is more important than winning war battles, this concept will probably never fly with top Marine brass. But I do think it would produce a Corps that was more focused and lethal, in keeping with, “the few, the proud,” tradition.
"One idea that might be considered, in return for moving the air superiority mission to the Navy, would be to move the ground attack and strike mission to Marine air."
DeleteHow will the Marines provide ground attack and airstrikes? The 2022 Russo-Ukrainian War seems to indicate there are EXACTLY two ways:
1) High and fast, with precision guided weapons, to minimize the strike fighters' exposure to enemy air defense. That'll require a full-sized carrier- the VTOL and STOVL planes like the AV-8B Harrier II and the F-35B Lightning II, which the Marines launched and want to continue launching from amphibious assault ships, made too many design compromises for VTOL and STOVL capabilities.
2) Low and slow, with expendable or even kamikaze drones, as manned aircraft are extremely vulnerable when flying this way- not only to enemy air defense, but to crashing into trees and other terrain features. These drones are short-ranged, meaning the launch platform must be close to the frontline, and vulnerable to enemy artillery as a direct consequence. Is the Navy willing to risk bringing a billion-dollar warship within range if enemy coastal artillery and missile batteries, to launch UCAVs?
If you know of a third method, please enlighten us.
No I don’t know another way. Perhaps some incremental improvements could be developed in the short run, but a long-term solution is clearly needed. It’s outside my area of expertise, mate, I’m a sailor, but I think that people who do this for a living should be able to come up with answers.
DeleteMy expectation would be that the swiftest and surest approach to finding better ways is to have a branch that focuses specifically on the problem, the way the Marines and Andrew Higgins figured out how to do amphibious assaults between the World Wars. The Army and the Air Force have a devil of a time figuring out close air support (CAS) because it isn’t the primary responsibility of either. If it’s your Marines on the ground and your Marines flying the airplanes, then you are going to solve the problem. I think that having the Army focus on large formation, broad front, continental campaigns and the Marines focus on small unit and littoral evolutions puts each in position to develop optimum strategies and tactics peculiar to their distinct environments.
I do think that my proposed MER that unites infantry, armor, artillery, and air at a fairly low command level would be conducive to finding, developing, and employing strategy and tactics for use in this area. One critical factor is speed and having command on the spot can only help that.
Another critical path in development would be having repeated realistic live training exercises, with honest and objective evaluation of results. The interwar Fleet Problems provided opportunities for Marines to test and evaluate their amphibious doctrine in live scenarios, and that must be done extensively with any proposed solutions in any area.
I really see the Marines in my proposed model taking on a significant role in developing new methods, strategies, and tactics for both amphibious and commando/special forces/asymmetric/COIN operations. If Marines can solve the CAS problems, then perhaps those lessons can be extrapolated to Army and/or Air Force the way the amphibious lessons were extrapolated in WWII.
And no, this is not some typical military vaporware non-solution. This is a process for finding and implementing a solution or solutions.
"If you know of a third method, please enlighten us."
DeleteAs you know from long time reading of this blog, aircraft strike is neither viable nor desirable. Aircraft are out of the strike business in all but non-existent threat scenarios (truck plinking terrorists, for example). Cruise missiles and [nearly non-existent] naval gun fire are the way to provide strike and ground combat support.
Since this particular question/thread was about theoretical capabilities, the discussion focus should be on developing naval gun support in large calibers and the attendant supporting capabilities such as Aegis counter-battery fire.
Close ground support should be provided by naval gun fire, initially, and then, in short order, ground based artillery.
Of course, the Navy has no worthwhile gun support and the Marines have dropped their tanks and much of their artillery. This should lead one to realize that opposed amphibious landings are not currently feasible and should point the way to what needs to be developed if one desires assault capability in the future.
IT'S NOT ABOUT AIRCRAFT!
"No I don’t know another way."
DeleteYes, you do. You just don't seem to want to accept it.
" I would propose as the basic organization a combined arms Marine Expeditionary Regiment (MER) including an infantry battalion, tanks, artillery, amphibious armor, air, engineers, logistics, command, and support, about 3500 personnel "
DeleteAre you aware that you've exactly described the existing MEU?
"SOCOM has a current headcount of about 30,000"
DeleteSOCOM has around 70,000 personnel.
"Are you aware that you've exactly described the existing MEU?"
DeleteNot when they get rid of tanks and artillery
Alright, I should have said the pre-existing MEU. The point is that you're proposing exactly what we had. Nothing wrong with that but it's not anything new. All we need to do is restore tanks and artillery and we're right where you say you want to be. The only thing different would be that you've given it a slightly different name: MER instead of MEU. Same size, same capabilities, one letter different.
DeleteYou seem fixated on calling them commandos but isn't that what the Marines have always been? They trained to do raids, extractions, embassy protection, crisis response (whatever that means), insertions, covert recon (Force Recon), etc. Isn't that a commando force for all practical purposes?
I'm failing to see what you're proposing that's actually new or different other than eliminating much of SOCOM, which I'm all for.
"SOCOM has around 70,000 personnel."
DeleteI believe that includes Green Berets, SEALs, AFSOC, and MarSOC. My proposed 30,000 Marine SOCOM plus 10,000 each Green Berets, SEALs, and AFSOC would be roughly comparable in size.
"You seem fixated on calling them commandos but isn't that what the Marines have always been?"
Pretty much. I see this as getting back to their roots. I think they have become too enamored of the baby Army and baby Air Force missions, perhaps because they generate headcount and budget, and I would propose getting away from that and back to their roots. I do see some delineation between special forces and naval infantry, although I think there are probably a lot of shared attributes and carryover lessons going both ways.
"The only thing different would be that you've given it a slightly different name: MER instead of MEU."
DeleteWell, it is different from what a MEU is now and in the future. I am actually using the regiment title because I would expect it to be commanded by a colonel, and regiments are historically commanded by colonels. Lieutenant commands a platoon, captain/major commands a company, major/lieutenant colonel commands a battalion, colonel commands a regiment, brigadier general commands a brigade.
"'No I don’t know another way.'
DeleteYes, you do. You just don't seem to want to accept it."
I think I know what you are hinting at here, and if that's where you are going then my response is that I think you are incorrect because I have pretty consistently pushed that answer. But I don't want to start a debate without knowing clearly what we are debating, so I would appreciate some clarification.
ComNavOps, if that is too spreadsheety for you, I apologize. I don't really know another way to express it.
ReplyDeleteMission engineering is essentially kill-chain analysis, which can be useful if done correctly. Not buzzwords but terms may be unfamiliar to amateurs.
ReplyDeleteMarine Corps wargame reports can be found at:
https://www.mcwl.marines.mil/divisions/wargaming/
"Marine Corps wargame reports can be found at:"
DeleteI don't see anything beyond a couple of names of some games and vague, brief, buzzword descriptions. Is there something I'm not seeing?
If you register on site you should be able to get access. Presumably.
DeleteI've tried to register and it appears to be a non-functional link. Have you been able to successfully register?
Delete"They’ve totally eliminated tanks, the most powerful weapon they had and significantly reduced artillery, their second most powerful weapon, while simultaneously publicly stating that they are out of the amphibious assault business. Does that sound like they want to ‘still be capable of performing global crisis response operations‘? "
ReplyDeleteWhen they talk about "global crisis response operations", they don't mean opposed amphibious assaults. This is more like the Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), HA/DR, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), stability opps, and the like.
Tanks and artillery aren't essential for these missions, though tanks can be valuable (e.g. Somalia).
"When they talk about "global crisis response operations"
DeleteWell, this is the crux of the matter. No one knows what they think those operations are and the Marine's actions don't match their statements. NEO and HA/DR are not even combat ops. TRAP is not their responsibility unless it's their aircraft which it won't be unless they're back in the combat ops business. 'Stability ops' can mean anything.
So, if your interpretation is correct, then they've relegated themselves to non-combat or constabulary type ops and they don't need 180,000 troops, big deck amphibious ships, a mini air force, a cyber organization, or most of whatever else they have. If, on the other hand, they include combat ops then they most certainly need tanks, artillery, etc. which they've given up.
Until they settle on what their core mission is, they're just floundering, as we're seeing.
NEO certainly can be combat operations, or have the serious potential to escalate to combat operations. The "N" stands for Noncombatant, which implies there are combatants somewhere.
DeleteHA can be as well. Marines had to escort relief convoys in Somalia. TRAP is part of the Marine's mission list. Stability and peacekeeping imply the potential for instability and non-peaceful conditions, in other words unrest or combat.
I don't think they need 180,000 troops. Without the 2.0 MEB JFEO requirement, their main sizing construct is forward presence. We have around 32,000 Marines deployed in a typical year. Around 18K are stationed in Japan, but this could be done by the Army. The Marines would prefer a 1:3 deployed to non-deployed force ratio. So subtracting that 18K from the 32K we get around 14K forward deployed. Three times that gives us an operating force of 42K. The current USMC operating force is ~100K out of 180K total Marines. 42K/100K = 42%.
Therefore 42% of the current total USMC force of 180K is ~76K.
Anything can, theoretically, turn into combat. Getting up in the morning could turn into combat. The reality is that those missions almost never involve actual combat. If someone believes there's a realistic chance for combat then we need to either turn the operation over to a combat organization or the Marines need to regain their full combat capability. As it stands, they're barely above police level.
DeleteForward presence is a worthy topic and has been analytically shown to have no deterrent value. (see, "Forward Presence Disproved")
Despite having no deterrent effect, forward presence, as you note, drives too many of our force dispositions. We need to eliminate most/all of our forward presence and adjust our force structure and size accordingly. However, this is not the subject of this post.
"In 1996, the US Military assisted in safeguarding and evacuating Americans from Liberia when that nation's civil war reignited into factional fighting and general violence in Liberia. During the first week of April 1996, as a result of intense street fighting during the ongoing civil war in Liberia, about 500 people sought refuge on American Embassy grounds and another 20,000 in a nearby American housing area."
DeleteThere isn't any "intense street fighting" in my neighborhood when I get up in the morning, nor is there an ongoing civil war.
This is a typical NEO operation. We don't call on the Marines to evacuate noncombatants unless there's a real threat of violence.
The Marines still have ACVs, LAVs, armored HMMWVs & JLTVs, attack helos, F-35s, mortars, and some artillery. That's a LOT more than just a police force. They're more heavily armed and armored than Army IBCTs.
"Forward presence is a worthy topic and has been analytically shown to have no deterrent value. (see, "Forward Presence Disproved")."
DeleteApologize if this is a hijack, but I think the effectiveness of forward presence depends upon how seriously the opposition takes your intentions. Referring back to the referenced thread, I think a couple of situations cited by posters there are insightful--the USA forward presence in Europe with no Soviet attacks or advances, and the British withdrawal from the South Atlantic emboldened the Argentines to attack the Falklands/Malvinas.
We do not know exactly what the Soviet intentions in western Europe were post-WWII but we do know that they did not attack, arguably because our actions made it clear that we were serious. Although not a combat evolution, I think the Berlin Airlift sent a strong signal that we were very serious.
Conversely, the British clearly signalled to Argentina that they were not serious, emboldening them to invade. The resulting British response signalled something else, and subsequent actions have continued to show intent to retain the islands, so Argentina has not attacked again.
Considering these, I would modify your statement to say that presence must be accompanied by intent to have deterrent value. Things like FONOPS don't signal intent.
"USA forward presence in Europe with no Soviet attacks"
DeleteIn the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union there has not been a single report of any plans or intentions the Soviets ever had of invading Europe. If they never intended to invade then our presence deterred nothing since there was nothing to deter. We could just as legitimately say that the presence of fish in the rivers prevented a Soviet attack. We could also just as legitimately say that our troops in the mainland US have prevented Canada from attacking.
There is not a single bit of evidence that our presence in Europe prevented anything. You're just making that up.
Read the linked post on the subject. An in-depth analysis demonstrated the lack of deterrent effect from forward presence. Making up something because it fits your pre-conceived notion does not negate the analysis.
"people sought refuge on American Embassy grounds"
DeleteAnd there was no Marine combat.
From the article that I suspect you quoted, "Air Force special operations forces led the evacuation effort, Operation Assured Response..
And there was no Marine combat.
Thank you for providing an example of the lack of combat in these types of tasks.
"There isn't any "intense street fighting" in my neighborhood when I get up in the morning, nor is there an ongoing civil war."
I'm not sure what community you live in but the rest of America has seen frequent examples of riots, looting, and crimes of all types. In recent years, violence is never more than a heartbeat away.
Marines go in when there's the threat of violence. There was plenty of violence going on in and around the Embassy at that time. Just because it didn't spill into the grounds and the Marines didn't have to engage in fighting doesn't make the threat less real. The presence of heavily armed Marines may've been a deterrent to violence.
Delete13 US military service members (mostly Marines) were killed during the NEO from Kabul.
"I'm not sure what community you live in but the rest of America has seen frequent examples of riots, looting, and crimes of all types. In recent years, violence is never more than a heartbeat away."
I think you've been watching too much Fox "News".
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/10/31/violent-crime-is-a-key-midterm-voting-issue-but-what-does-the-data-say/#:~:text=In%202021%2C%20the%20most%20recent,the%20National%20Crime%20Victimization%20Survey.
Interestingly enough, Fox stopped talking about it right after the mid-terms. Go figure.
https://www.mediamatters.org/fox-news/foxs-coverage-violent-crime-has-dropped-after-midterms
"I would appreciate some clarification."
DeleteYeah ... except in the case you cited, it was the Air Force that conducted the operation.
"British withdrawal from the South Atlantic emboldened the Argentines to attack the Falklands/Malvinas."
DeleteThis is correct. However, in my opinion the presence of those small pre-conflict forces were not a deterrant, but their reduction contributed in part to the Argentinian belief the UK would not fight. The unsettling implication is that forward presence did not deter (although as a garrison on UK territory it had other functions also), but once in place it couldn't be reduced without increasing risk, and thus can be a trap.
The larger context is that the UK had already failed to act regarding an earlier intrusion on South Thule in 1976, and the UK had already stated they were willing to negotiate over sovereignty. The draw-down of forces was part of a larger whole.
One interesting aspect is that the UK sailed SSN's to reinforce the Falklands immediately pre-conflict. This directly led to Argentina invading early, leaving the UK facing better weather and fewer Exocets, amongst other consequences. This act of reinforcement arguably won the conflict.
"The unsettling implication is that forward presence did not deter (although as a garrison on UK territory it had other functions also), but once in place it couldn't be reduced without increasing risk, and thus can be a trap."
DeleteOutstanding analysis!
"The larger context is that the UK had already failed to act regarding an earlier intrusion on South Thule in 1976, and the UK had already stated they were willing to negotiate over sovereignty."
There implication is that there was no deterrence at work, there, at all. Likely Argentina was going to attack regardless of UK forces and it was just a matter of choosing an opportune time.
For deterrence to work, the enemy either has to believe the force is capable of preventing the action being deterred (denial), or the action will provoke a larger response (punishment).
Delete60-odd Royal Marines could not deter by denial, and the drawdown signaled to the Argentinians that the British may not have the will to punish them.
"There is not a single bit of evidence that our presence in Europe prevented anything."
DeleteThere is actually one very strong bit of evidence. We were there and it didn't happen. We can speculate forever over what might have happened, but what we do know incontrovertibly is what did and did not happen.
As far as no Soviet plans to invade, it is entirely likely that the presence of a significant USA force discouraged even planning for such an event.
We cannot know for certain.
One thing which seems pretty certain to me is that presence does nothing unless it is presence in sufficient strength to discourage a possible foe from even trying, either because failure is imminent or the cost of success would be too high.
"One thing which seems pretty certain to me"
DeleteYou're totally ignoring the Stimson report which analyzed over 100 events regarding forward presence and deterrence and concluded it accomplishes nothing. You're ignoring the FACT that not a single shred of evidence has ever surfaced that the Soviet Union ever planned to invade Europe and yet you think presence prevented an invasion that was never contemplated. You're ignoring the FACT that our entire European presence did NOT deter Russia from seizing Crimea and invading Ukraine. You're ignoring the FACT that China was undeterred as it actively seized (and continues to expand) the entire South China Sea despite the presence of substantial US forces.
Your capacity to ignore facts and cling to a belief is impressive.
"We were there and it didn't happen"
DeleteWe were forward deployed in Europe and no meteors struck. Therefore, forward presence deters meteor strikes.
We were forward deployed in Europe and global warming became a problem. Therefore, forward presence not only does not deter global warming, IT CAUSES IT.
We were forward deployed in Europe and Canada did not invade the US. Therefore, forward presence deters Canadian invasions of the US.
I can keep going but the point is made. Using this kind of logic, one can make up anything and it can't be disproved.
Re-read the Stimson report post (Forward Presence Deterrent Effect Disproved) and explain away their hundred-plus examples and then I might begin to believe you.
In the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, not one former official has spoken about contemplating an invasion of Europe. Not one document has emerged. Not one scrap of information has surfaced. And yet you continue to believe it was only our presence that held the Soviet Union at bay. That's unsupported faith in a theory that borders on religious. I'll give you that.
Thought Exercise:
DeleteRussia invaded Ukraine because they saw weakness and an unwillingness by the West to intervene.
What if we had put a US Army brigade in Ukraine, with the expressed goal of defending against a Russian invasion. Do you think they still would've invaded? Would they have been deterred?
By your logic, the answer is "No, they would've still invaded." The risk of killing Americans, drawing the US into the war, and fighting a US combat unit would not have deterred them.
"a US Army brigade in Ukraine"
DeleteSince we're making up pure nonsense, what if China had put a brigade in Ukraine to counter our brigade?
"Since we're making up pure nonsense, what if China had put a brigade in Ukraine to counter our brigade?"
DeleteInterestingly, China has actually signed a mutual defense treaty with Ukraine... a mutual defense treaty that they've been pretending doesn't exist.
In my circles, there's a certain school of thought that the Ukraine conflict was a missed opportunity for China to flex its muscles on the world stage and show that it was truly one of the great powers, and that its word means something. Imagine a world where China condemned the Russians and and wholeheartedly supported Ukraine, instead of this half-hearted bothsiding it's been doing. China would have gained much political capital that it could have used to galvanise the world.
Instead, because of China's ineptitude at diplomacy, and because it sees international relations as a transactional relationship between a ruler and vassal states, what actually happened was they've squandered their best opportunity to earn credit, and have shown that their treaties aren't worth the paper they're written on.
Now it's up to the US to take advantage of that.
"a world where China condemned the Russians"
DeleteYou're aware that Russia massively borders China and that significant amounts of oil enter China via Russian pipelines? The last thing China wants is a hostile Russia sitting on top of them as they contemplate a war with the US. This would drop them squarely into a two-front war.
It is also unclear exactly what the treaty covered. It is presented as a nuclear security guarantee as opposed to a conventional mutual defense treaty.
"shown that their treaties aren't worth the paper they're written on."
They've proven that many times over. They ignored the UNCLOS tribunal ruling which they are a signatory to, for example. The Chinese have no honor or integrity.
"Now it's up to the US to take advantage of that."
Yes and, so far, we're utterly failing to do so.
The best example of forward presence was the large force sent to the Philippines in 1941. It did not deter. Most American aircraft were quickly destroyed resulting the worst American defeat of the century.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cG1yLs__mec
Might be time for a post about the Ford in hopes someone helps fill in the blanks. We were told the Ford was finally ready to deploy last year, but in March were told a three-month mini-deployment would occur this Fall. In August it became a two month deployment. Departed October 4th.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.dvidshub.net/news/430714/gerald-r-ford-carrier-strike-group-departs-first-deployment
Spent a week pierside in Halifax, a week anchored off Portsmouth. Then reports of curtailed ops due to weather, the CO said EMALS needs more work, and reports of numerous broke landing wires. See the Nov. 14th post at this blog.
https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2022-11-14/ford-navy-first-deployment-8047788.html
"On Sunday, storms and rough seas didn’t allow for flight operations that would have highlighted EMALS. Huffman characterized the system, once heavily criticized for its high cost and unreliability, as “absolutely performing where we need it to be.” But he also acknowledged that there is more work to do on EMALS,"
It heads straight back to Norfolk arriving Nov 26th, a week short of two months. It's hard to track success because while they made a big deal about this deployment, they never released an itinerary.
https://www.dvidshub.net/news/433992/gerald-r-ford-carrier-strike-group-returns-homeport-concluding-inaugural-deployment
Yes, I remain skeptical. The Ford captain in England said EMALS needs work, and it headed straight home.