As we’ve often discussed, the Marines currently have an
identity crisis. They have no viable
mission or, at least, none that they’re articulating very well. We’ve discussed this and offered our view of
things. Now, let’s approach this from
the Marine’s side of things. What do the
Marines think about themselves as documented in their own Force Design 2030
annual update report for 2022? As we
look at this, bear in mind that the document is written by the Marines and, as
such, is a self-congratulatory, public relations piece. Still, let’s see what we can learn about the
Marines from their own mouth.
Campaign of Learning - One of the interesting
sections of the report is titled, Key Findings From the Campaign Of
Learning. For those of you who might be
unfamiliar with The Campaign of Learning, it is described as an on-going series
of examinations to ensure that the Marines are covering all the bases and
making all the right decisions. An
alternative description might be that it is a public relations exercise
designed to validate decisions already made.
Be that as it may, let’s see what the Marines claim to have learned.
Regarding the Campaign, itself,
This
past year we invested in the Campaign of Learning itself by taking a more
structured approach to collaborating with partners and by applying sophisticated
modeling and simulation methods and tools. This is reflected through the
refinement and analysis of mission engineering threads we developed in
partnership with the Navy.[1]
How’s that for some Class A, unadulterated, worthless,
buzzword vomit?
Communications - Moving on, we come to our first
nugget of useful information:
Our
FD 2030 communication has not been effective with all stakeholders.[1]
Read the phrase, ‘not
been effective with all stakeholders’, and remember that statement was
written by a Marine Corps desperately trying to put the best possible spin on
it. If ‘not been effective with all stakeholders’ is the best possible
spin, what are they really saying when the spin is removed? They’re saying that they’ve had an abysmal
communications failure that has utterly failed to convince people and generate
support.
On the one hand, it’s good that the Commandant recognizes
his communication failure but, on the other hand, he clearly has no intention
of actually communicating any useful information. Secrecy has been the hallmark of his vision
and there is no sign that anything about that will change. If you recall, the Marines promised to begin
releasing information about their wargames, as documented in the passage below.
MCWL
will publish unclassified executive summaries of all Service-level war game
reports related to FD 2030 no later than 1 November 2022 and make these
available on the FD 2030 website. Going forward, MCWL will publish unclassified
versions of all Service-level war game reports within 90 days of event
completion.[1]
To date, I’ve heard found no information about war
games. Commandant, are you puzzled why
you have a communications failure? You
promised information and have not provided anything useful. There’s your problem.
Here’s the referenced FD2030 website, as best I can tell:
https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design-2030/
Missions - Here’s an interesting tidbit:
…
a modernized Marine Corps must still be capable of performing global crisis
response operations.[1]
On the face of it, this suggests that the Marines want to
maintain their traditional roles and missions while adding the small unit,
missile-shooting force. That might be
fine except that their actions, as opposed to their words, point to an
abandonment of their traditional roles and missions. They’ve totally eliminated tanks, the most
powerful weapon they had and significantly reduced artillery, their second most
powerful weapon, while simultaneously publicly stating that they are out of the
amphibious assault business. Does that
sound like they want to ‘still be capable
of performing global crisis response operations‘? This statement sounds to me like they’re
trying to hang on to their traditional funding while abandoning the missions. This demonstrates the identity confusion that
has gripped the Corps.
Effectiveness - Continuing, we find what may be the
most profound passage in the document:
…
our initial observations linked to A Concept for Stand-in Forces, especially
for reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, indicate we focused the MLR [ed.
Marine Littoral Regiment] too much on lethality and not enough on sensing, the
ability to make sense, maneuverability, and deception. While our initial assumptions about the value
of the MLR to the FMF and fleets were anchored on the enhanced lethality it
could provide via long-range fires, further analysis demonstrates the even
greater value of resilient sensing and enabling of kill chains.[1]
What they’re saying that they found that the small,
missile-shooting units could not produce enough lethality to make a
difference. This is exactly what we’ve
discussed many times. A handful of
scattered units, working with only a handful of missiles, and lacking any long
range targeting, simply can’t generate any significant combat impact. That’s just common sense that becomes readily
apparent with just a moment of logical consideration. You didn’t need a Campaign of Learning to
come to that conclusion but, hey, better incredibly late than never.
Re-read the quote and un-spin it. It’s saying that the Marines have come to the
realization that the Commandant’s vision of defeating China with a handful of
missile-shooting, platoon size units is not viable.
It is noteworthy that they are belatedly recognizing that
simple surveillance may be more useful than a scattering of nearly useless
missiles. This is the old WWII
coastwatcher concept. Of course, this
doesn’t require entire Marine Littoral Regiments and a fleet of Light
Amphibious Warships (LAW). A couple of
guys with binoculars and a radio can do the job. Perhaps this is also why the Navy seems so
unenthused about acquiring the LAW. If
the Marines would give up on the missile-shooting and convert to simple
surveillance than the Campaign of Learning would have been worth the effort and
the Marines would have a worthwhile, if exceedingly small, mission.
Of course, if coastwatching is the new mission, one can’t
help but wonder why we need the Marines when we already have an abundance of
SEALs who could do the job. But, I
digress …
Logistics - Here’s an issue that has screamed for an
explanation since day one and yet gone unaddressed the entire time:
To
persist inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone, our Stand-in Forces must
be set and sustained by logistics capabilities designed for distributed
operations over long distances in a contested environment.[1]
How long have I been harping on this gap in the Commandant’s
concept? So far, the Marines have
hand-waved away the challenge of transporting, landing, establishing, and
resupplying a force without detection.
The challenge seems impossible under the conditions of the concept and
the Marines have utterly ignored it, at least publicly. Now, it seems some glimmer of recognition of
the problem has emerged. The statement
sums up the requirement – that is, a logistic contribution under challenging
circumstances – yet still ignores the solution.
Oh well … I’ll keep harping on it.
By the way, you recall the recent post wherein the Marines
stated that the LAW would never operate in a combat zone (see, “The LAW is Confusing”)? Is the above quote the first public glimmer
of recognition that the LAW concept is not viable?
Delusional Foundation – The following statement
exemplifies the delusional foundation of the Marine’s missile-shooting concept:
Our
continued experimentation demonstrates that infantry and LAR battalions that
field teams or small units with the organic ability to sense, decide, and shoot
have a competitive warfighting advantage on a modern battlefield.[1]
If small units truly have an inherent competitive
warfighting advantage on a modern battlefield, why do we have brigades,
divisions, and armies? Why do we have
tanks and artillery? Wouldn’t a handful
of squads be sufficient to win any war?
Reality, as seen through history, demonstrates the opposite: that small units are simply targets waiting
to die and that massed firepower is what wins battles and wars.
Summary
So, what do the Marines say about themselves in the Force
Design 2030 annual update report?
They think they’re identifying and solving problems from their Campaign of Learning.
They acknowledge a communications/’sales’ problem.
They believe they still retain all their previous missions/capabilities and remain a ‘global crisis response’ force.
They believe their emphasis on missile-shooting and ship killing was somewhat misplaced.
They believe they should be emphasizing reconnaissance over lethality.
They acknowledge the necessity of logistics but offer no solutions to the challenge.
They believe small units have some type of inherent advantage on the battlefield.
That’s what they say.
However, it is clear that the Force Design 2030 annual update report is
heavy on spin and light on reality. The
impression one gets is that the Marines – meaning the Commandant – are brooking
no alternative opinions or dissent and that the report is purely a public
relations tool intended to support continued or increased funding. However, an analytical reading and
‘un-spinning’ of the document reveals numerous serious problems, as we’ve just
discussed, and suggests that the Marines, themselves, are beginning to
recognize and, ever so grudgingly, admit that the Commandant’s grand vision is
not viable. The Commandant won’t say it
in those words, of course, but the ‘un-spun’ reading is saying it. The Commandant won’t easily give up his dream
but the handwriting is on the wall. When
his term expires in July of 2023, I suspect his successor will begin walking
back the Commandant’s failed vision.
___________________________________
[1]Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, Annual Update, May 2022
