Late 1942.
Japan’s navy has delivered one unpleasant surprise and defeat after another to the US Navy. So many of our ships have been sunk that the waters around Guadalcanal have become known as Ironbottom Sound. Japan has demonstrated remarkable capabilities such as advanced carriers and carrier aircraft, the Long Lance torpedo, superb night fighting optics and tactics, devastating cruiser and destroyer attacks, mammoth battleships, etc.
US naval leaders are meeting to discuss the future ship designs and construction plans for the US Pacific fleet.
The following transcript of a hitherto secret naval meeting has just been released along with other long-classified documents. Admiral Nimitz is identified but the rest of the names are still redacted.
___________________________
Adm. Nimitz: Let’s get started. We’re here to discuss our future ship designs and construction plans. You all know the Japanese naval and aviation capabilities have been a rude surprise and have cost us dearly. We need to develop a fleet that can not only counter these capabilities but exceed them. Ideas?
Person 1: It seems obvious that we need more of everything along with vastly improved torpedoes, a new generation of aircraft, better armored ships, and more firepower.
Person 2: I’d like to offer an alternative approach, if I could?
Adm. Nimitz: Go ahead. I asked for ideas.
Person 2: Instead of the usual progression of bigger, stronger ships with more firepower, I’d like to suggest that we build smaller ships that can operate in a distributed fashion where they would sail individually, deep into Japanese waters. The Japanese will be unable to find them and, if they do find them, will be confused by the number of targets. Japanese uncertainty will be our strength.
*** Drawn out silence ***
Person 3: Wait a minute, I think I get it. You want us to build ships with mammoth amounts of armor so that they can penetrate deep into Japanese waters and survive to inflict damage, right?
Person 2: No, the ships would be unarmored.
*** Drawn out silence ***
Person 4: So, you’re saying instead of armor the ships would have massive gun batteries and torpedoes?
Person 2: No, the ships would have just a few small guns.
*** More silence ***
Person 5: You must be talking about large squadrons of ships, then, with massive air cover?
Person 2: No, the ships would operate independently, with no support.
*** Long drawn out silence ***
Adm. Nimitz: Do I understand you correctly, that you want us to build small, unarmored ships with just a few small weapons to operate individually deep inside Japanese waters with no support even though the Japanese have been sinking entire groups of our best armored, heaviest cruisers and best destroyers on a regular basis? Won’t these ships you’re proposing, operating on their own in enemy waters with no protection and no firepower, just be simple target practice for the Japanese?
Person 2: No sir, they would confuse and confound the enemy.
Adm. Nimitz: Son, the only person who is confused and confounded is you. I’ve never heard a more idiotic idea. You’re either an imbecile or a Japanese agent. Either way, get out of here before I have you shot !
_____________________________
Well, there you have it – distributed lethality presented in the context of WWII in the Pacific. Sounds pretty stupid, doesn’t it? And, I imagine that would have been exactly the reaction of our naval leaders at the time. They understood only too well the harsh realities of naval combat and the kinds of ships and firepower that were needed to fight naval battles and win. They would be aghast at today’s leaders buying into this idiocy hook, line, and sinker.
Distributed Lethality: running your navy on Bitcoin economics.
ReplyDeleteHey, Bitcoin went from being worth nothing to tens of thousand bucks, that's infinitely more successful thank distributed lethality will ever be.
DeleteI just have this to say: LoL. If I saw this as history documentary, I would have definitely laugh out loud.
ReplyDeleteWouldn't the communications necessary for "distributed lethality" be under MASSIVE amounts of strain? In its absence, the "distributed lethality" platforms will get lost, misidentify targets, and likely end up shooting at each other as a direct consequence.
ReplyDeleteRegrettably, all the folks who ran the Navy during World War 2 are long dead. But do you suppose there may be a few folks who had positions of authority during the Cold War? Maybe the 1980's? For example, I believe that John Lehman, who was SecNav during much of the 1980's is still alive and apparently still active, although he's 79.
ReplyDeleteThese folks, while they don't have experience actually FIGHTING a major power war, at least DO have experience PREPARING to fight one, and taking it seriously.
Do you suppose we could prevail on a few of them (call on their patriotism) to come back and serve on a new "General Board", or at least an advisory board, to inject a little historical context into all the current discussions?
For example, they could ask questions like:
With your new super network, that everything will depend upon:
(1) What will you do when major power combat requires EMCON, to prevent the enemy from tracing transmissions to source and sinking the ship?
(2) What will you do when the fabulous network is impaired or even blocked by jamming, spoofing, or even penetration of our computers by the enemy? Or perhaps destruction of our communications satellites?
Obviously, things HAVE changed since the 1980's (more ubiquitous reconnaissance, more accurate and longer ranged cruise missiles, and so on), but I imagine many of the basic underlying principles (for example, the importance of protecting our logistics forces and the need for expeditionary logistics and repair capabilities) are the same. Even though our current leaders seem to have forgotten about them.
"all the folks who ran the Navy during World War 2 are long dead."
DeleteYou don't have to have actually fought in WWII. The lessons of that combat are recorded and readily available for study and comprehension. I did not serve in WWII and yet I've learned the lessons. If I can do that, anyone can.
"Obviously, things HAVE changed since the 1980's"
Yes, ranges and such have changed but the fundamentals (damage control, armor, firepower, logistics, scouting) have not changed.
I think Person 2 is CNO William Pratt, master mind of the MK14
ReplyDeletetesting, a man who'd rise high in our Navy of Today.
Person 2: No, the ships would operate independently, with no support. They will submerge when threatened and carry torpedoes to kill enemy ships.
ReplyDeleteAdm. Nimitz: Good idea!
Submarines are expensive, and require expensive maintenance to keep operational. The architects of "distributed lethality" are under the delusion they can win a war against a peer competitor cheaply, meaning their combat platforms must be built and run as cheaply as possible, which automatically excludes submarines as a platform unless a dozen of the latter can be built for the cost of an Arleigh Burke class DDG.
DeleteWhen the only submarines we're willing to consider are $3B Virginias (or $6+B SSN(X)s), sure, they are too expensive.
DeleteNote, the Gatos and their like weren't "submarines" in the modern sense. They were surface ships that occasionally submerged to avoid threats. They spent most of their time on the surface.
We could build something like that again. I bet it would be a lot cheaper than a Virginia, or even a modern SSK.
"surface ships that occasionally submerged to avoid threats.
DeleteWe could build something like that again."
That's an interesting thought. There are a couple of issues to address:
1. The extended time on the surface in a modern surveillance/detection environment is a concern. Can a vessel survive or evade detection when operating largely surfaced? In WWII, subs were safe from any surveillance longer than eyeball range. Today, with radar, satellites, UAVs, EO/IR, etc. it is difficult to avoid detection if you're surfaced in enemy waters.
2. Can a ship/sub evade a determined ASW effort? One of Japan's major ASW failings was that they gave up too quickly on contacts. Can a ship/sub that is [presumably] limited to 5-10 kts submerged escape a determined ASW hunting/killing effort? I suspect not.
3. Unless the ship/sub is shaped like a modern sub (teardrop shape), it will not be acoustically quiet when submerged. If it is shaped like a modern sub then ... it's a sub and will cost what a sub costs!
Still, with proper tactics, it would be interesting to evaluate a ship/sub and see if there's a role for it. I'm inclined to doubt it but it would be well worth a look.
1. It would be far more difficult to detect and keep track of a smallish submersible than a traditional surface ship. It could run at periscope depth for significant periods, snorkeling. Not an easy target for radar or EO/IR. But yes, it would be easier to find than an SSN or true SSK. It's not meant to replicate the capabilities of an SSN. It gains effectiveness from low cost and numbers.
Delete2. Maybe not, but does it need to to be effective? If a single, small, low cost, submersible forces a determined ASW effort to kill it, then maybe it's still winning. It's tying up a disproportionate enemy force.
3. Shaping affects a sub's radiated noise as speed increases. If it stays relatively slow, then it will still be very quiet. Note, it can also shoot back.
We've tested fired AIM-9X from submerged vertical canisters. Adding a handful to the mast would make hunting the submersible with helicopters or low flying MPAs much more dangerous.
Battery technology has come a long ways since WWII. A Type VIIC or Baleo had a third of the battery power of a single Tesla Model 3 LR.
The concept is interesting, but where would such ships operate from, geographically?
Delete1. It would be far easier to detect and track than an actual submarine, as you acknowledged. You'll lose lots of them. That takes the discussion to cost and cost's derivative, numbers. If the armament is a few torpedoes (a diving PT boat), it will be cheap but ineffective. If the armament is a couple dozen torpedoes, it's an SSK and will be too expensive to lose.
Delete2. I'll take a survey of the crews and see if they think it's winning as they're being sunk right and left.
3. If it's shaped like a real sub then it's a real sub and will be expensive. If it's shaped like a surface ship (the Gato, for example) it will be noisy. Can't have it both ways. One of those iron triangle situations.
"We've tested fired AIM-9X from submerged vertical canisters."
Has anyone conducted any tests to see the success rate of a blind fired missile? The seeker field on an air-to-air missile is not very larger. I would expect very poor lock on success rate. Also, the more you add to a vessel, the higher the cost.
Battery capacity is almost tactically irrelevant in the face of a determined enemy who is willing to sit on top of a 5 kt target and keep dropping homing torpedoes (they've come a long way since WWII). At 5 kts, or so, no one is going to evade a homing torpedo.
All of the above is trivia. The only significant question is what do we gain from this even if it could work? It would have even less surveillance capability than a surface ship (lower and fewer sensors), little useful speed, and a very small weapons load unless we allow costs to increase significantly. It would be a submergible PT boat and there's no reason to believe it would be any more effective than a PT boat and would, without question, be much more expensive.
The entire distributed lethality concept is an unworkable fantasy no matter what vessel we concoct for it. A true submarine can be effective but they are very expensive and that's not the Navy's DL concept.
How about a variation on this idea. Rather than ship/sub warships, how about a cargo ship or tanker that runs mostly submerged but with a streamlined sail at the surface to provide air for the engines? Maybe plaster radar absorbing materials on the sail. Seems like that would be a lot harder for reconnaissance assets to detect through much of the Pacific while it's delivering stuff. (rather than actually trying to operate in enemy waters). And maybe even harder for radar or IR guided anti ship missiles to lock on to.
DeleteMaybe combine it with a bunch of small unmanned (unpersoned?) decoy ships carrying equipment designed to mimic the acoustic and radar signatures of the cargo ships.
These can work- see the success drug smugglers have with "narco-submarines"- but remember the US Coast Guard often captures such semi-submersible vessels. Don't assume the concept and the technology behind it are guaranteed to succeed, like the idiots responsible for the Littoral Combat Ships.
DeleteDistributed lethality was impossible impossible to put into practice without modern datalinks and long rang missiles.
ReplyDeleteNow any F-35B from any ARG can detect enemy and many ships in different locations will get data for long range missile attack.
All that Navy need for this - long range missiles.
An F-35 is NOT a high end surveillance asset. It has very limited sensor capabilities and range relative to broad area maritime surveillance needs. An F-35 is equivalent to the soda straw view.
DeleteRegarding the distributed lethality concept, the concept does NOT envision carriers or amphibs hanging around in enemy waters to host an F-35. That would result in a very short life span for the ship. Thus, there won't be any F-35s available for distributed lethality targeting.
You need to come up to speed on the distributed lethality concept. Detection and targeting are the major flaws in the concept. Any surveillance asset that is continuously using active sensors and broadcasting data is going to be quickly detected and killed.
"Any surveillance asset that is continuously using active sensors and broadcasting data is going to be quickly detected and killed."
DeleteThe E-2 should be able to provide the long-range sensor capabilities necessary to make "distributed lethality" platforms valid- assuming a full-sized aircraft carrier accompanies them- but Russian and Chinese arms manufacturers both claim they can manufacture "AWACS killer" missiles with which to arm fighters. Has the USN practiced with tactics to counter such weapons, e.g., have fighters escort the E-2s to shoot down AWACS killer-armed fighters, have the E-2 crews practice temporarily shutting off their radar as the plane maneuvers to thwart an AWACS killer's onboard sensors, etc.?
"E-2"
DeleteDo you see the inherent flaw in this? If you have a carrier group in the vicinity to host the E-2, you don't need distributed vessels to do the shooting. You've already got carrier aircraft and dozens of escort vessels with NSM/LRASM/Tomahawk. The distributed vessels, aside from being redundanct and pointless, would just compound the difficulties of target identification. Friend or foe? Shoot or don't shoot? This is why we don't try to involved submarines with surface ships.
Setting aside the risk of anti-AEW missiles, having a carrier E-2 obviates the need for distributed lethality.
"Do you see the inherent flaw in this?"
DeleteI do- note the sarcastic "assuming a full-sized aircraft carrier accompanies [the distributed lethality platforms]"- but the main point is our potential adversaries studied our tactics and are working on countermeasures against these tactics, against which we need to work on counter-countermeasures.
Have you seen or heard of the "distributed lethality" proponents devising means of compensating for the platforms' weaknesses and enemy tactics that exploit these weaknesses? Or are they actually as stupid as they present themselves, assuming the enemy will simply roll over and die in the face of such (flawed) technology?
"assuming the enemy will simply roll over"
DeleteThat seems to be the basis of most of our technologies and tactics !
For example, we're confident that we'll destroy any enemy UAVs through a variety of means and we're equally confident that our UAVs will roam enemy skies with impunity, thereby granting us total situational awareness.
" counter-countermeasures."
DeleteYou might enjoy this post: "Counter Assault"
"Have you seen or heard of the "distributed lethality" proponents devising means of compensating for the platforms' weaknesses and enemy tactics that exploit these weaknesses? Or are they actually as stupid as they present themselves, assuming the enemy will simply roll over and die in the face of such (flawed) technology?"
DeleteWhatever they are doing, what they are not doing is conducting live, realistic, boots-on-the-ground training and testing of strategy and tactics and resources to deal with what actual enemies are apt to do in wartime. Until we do that on a regular (preferably annual) basis, we are just kidding ourselves.
We need to have the best trained Navy in the world, and we need to prove up every strategy and tactic that we intend to use during the course of that training. I don't think we have the required level of training today. I don't know who does. Back in my active duty days, it was pretty clear that the Royal Navy was the best trained. We had better kit, but they had better crews. When we did things with them, it was pretty clear that they slowed down their tempo to work with us. That is one reason why I like things like Perisher, FOST, and Spring Train, and believe we should implement them.
To take this back to distributed lethality, we need to exercise at least once a year on a full fleet--or close to it--basis, to find out if those things really work in a wartime environment, such as a full-blown electronic warfare environment. ComNavOps, you frequently take exception to my thoughts on fleet design, even though the end result comes very close to your own thinking (24 versus 27 carriers, for example, is not much of a jump; if you want either, you can probably live just fine with the other). I don't think either of us really knows what is needed, because the USN does not have any record of actual warlike exercise play to validate (or invalidate) requirements. I am pretty sure that one of the first things that would be exposed in realistic warlike training would be the uselessness of the distributed lethality concept, and in particular the unmanned ship aspect of that. Of course, I am also pretty sure that the main reason that we don't have that training is because none of the USN brass want the emperor's new clothes to be exposed.
The Japanese have a new SSK coming out that is using lithium batteries and fuel cells to charge them. That means there is basically no sound in normal operations.
ReplyDeleteSSKs are quiet, for sure. However, it's not just a matter of machinery noise. Noise also comes from turbulence which is created by the water flow over the sub's hull and various protrusions (props, rudder, sail, vents, discharges, scoops, etc.) and openings. Cavitation is another noise source though controllable, to an extent, by regulating depth and speed.
DeleteConcentration of forces is a classic military strategy. It has passed innumerable tests and proven itself as a strategy par excellence. Furthermore division of forces risks defeat in detail by enemy forces.
ReplyDeleteBoth these are something every since time immemorial military commander swears by. One wonders what is so special in modern times that one espouses a strategy which is in direct contravention to them.
As mentioned earlier the lone or small force ideas stem from the long usage of special forces teams in the last few decades by US and other militaries. What they forget that all these "wars" in the last two decades were not war in the classical sense. They did not involve peer militaries and essentially war guerilla warfare insurgencies.
- BM
Thanks CNO- what a funny (although actually sad) way to look at todays idiocy. I appreciate the actual LOL chuckle with my coffee...👍🤣
ReplyDeleteThat's me ... making mornings better !
DeleteIn 1942 an Allied Fleet was destroyed in the Java Sea. American Admiral Hart demanded the Allies concentrate their ships for a decisive blow, but they were anxious to attack as soon as Japanese ships arrived and complained to Roosevelt. Hart was fired, and the "distributed" Allied ships were easily destroyed in small groups by the Japanese. Here is a short video.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_oKLSVvRsQY
In fairness to the leaders of ABDACOM, they really did not have enough resources to mass a credible force. But even their meager forces would almost certainly have done better massed than the distributed forces worked.
DeleteInterestingly, ABDACOM was dissolved on 25-Feb-1942 prior to the Battle of the Java Sea.
DeleteAs you have written about before, CNO; our first experiment with Distributed Lethality near the First Island Chain was with PT Boats north of Guadalcanal in 1943. John F. Kennedy almost got killed for his trouble.
ReplyDeleteWasn't one of the original roles of cruisers, aside from scouting and raiding, to operate indipendently from the fleet? They were capable of high speeds, had decent armour/weapons and long range.
ReplyDeleteBetween 1941 and 1945 cruisers where gradually downgraded to just air defence and to fire support for troops onshore. Since ships classed as cruisers, even if they are mostly bloated destroyers have done just air defence and have launched cruise missiles.
Would a modern gun cruiser, with decent but not superb air defence be better suited for independent operations the a DDG or a LCS?
Going back to the scenario proposed in 1942 and considering that any surface ship even back then was exposed to air attack, especially in japanese waters, cruisers would have been the units best suited to raid japanese shipping in home waters. In the end I think it would have come down to what was considered an acceptable loss and the potential damage that could be obtained.