For informational purposes, following are some Gross Weapon System costs taken from the Navy budget documents[1,2] for FY2022.
|
Ship Program[1] |
Unit Cost |
|
Columbia SSBN |
$15.0B |
|
Ford CVN |
$12.8B |
|
Virginia SSN |
$3.5B |
|
Burke DDG |
$2.4B |
|
Constellation FFG |
$1.1B |
|
John Lewis T-AO (Oiler) |
$0.7B |
Of course, the ship costs are only partial costs. For example, the Ford cost is simply the Congressional cost cap number. Billions of dollars more have been racked up on the Ford trying to complete elevators, fix EMALS and AAG, making warranty repairs on items that were delivered damaged (main turbine generators, for example), and completion of construction items that were deferred when the Ford hit its cap limit. Those funds are coming from unknown sources and account lines. The Ford’s true cost is somewhere in the $15B+ range.
|
Weapon Program[2] |
Unit Cost |
Qty |
|
Tomahawk |
$2.07M |
60 |
|
AMRAAM a |
$1.7M |
122 |
|
Standard (type unspecified) |
$4.8M |
125 |
|
JASSM |
$1.5M |
25 |
|
LRASM |
$3.4M |
48 |
|
NSM |
$1.7M |
34 |
|
Mk48 Torpedo |
$2.7M |
58 |
|
|
|
|
|
Sidewinder |
$485,000 |
178 |
|
Small Diameter Bomb II |
$227,000 |
180 |
|
RAM |
$930,000 |
100 |
|
Joint Air to Ground Missile |
$303,000 |
164 |
|
Hellfire |
$63,000 |
120 |
a from 2021; none procured in 2022
One concerning aspect is the very small procurement quantities of many of the weapon system programs. For example, when the war with China comes, we’ll need thousands of anti-ship missiles, right? We’re procuring 34 of the small Naval Strike Missiles per year and 48 of the larger, mainstay LRASM missiles. Can we increase our procurement from a few dozen per year to the thousands per year that we’ll need? It seems unlikely. We could, conceivably, double (triple???) production but that would still leave us thousands short of what we’d need. If a factory is producing at a rate of dozens per year, they’re not going to have the capacity to suddenly increase production by a factor of 50x or so. What are we going to do to achieve that kind of instantaneous production capacity increase? What’s our plan? We don’t have a plan, as far as I know. I’ve never heard any discussion of industrial production plans for wartime.
Anyway … this summary is just intended to give us a quick, concise list of some costs to help inform our weapon system discussions. Hope this helps!
__________________________________
[1]Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Justification Book Volume 1 of 1, Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, May 2021,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/SCN_Book.pdf
[2]Department of Defense, Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates Volume 1 of 1, Weapons Procurment, Navy, May 2021,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/WPN_Book.pdf
Conceivably the Pentagon assumes that war with China (or Russia) would turn nuclear so quickly that factory capacity would be irrelevant. The ballistic missile will always get through.
ReplyDelete"Conceivably the Pentagon assumes that war with China (or Russia) would turn nuclear so quickly that factory capacity would be irrelevant."
DeleteThat would be an incredibly stupid assumption, if true.
If true, the Chinese would only have to start a conventional war and wait a few weeks for our munitions to run out and then they'd win the war by default.
That approach would also ignore the highly likely conventional proxy wars that can arise.
Incredibly stupid.
"Incredibly stupid" and "Pentagon" are not mutually exclusive categories.
DeleteAlmost synonyms !
DeleteYou are missing the relative deal that is GMLRS. Marines get 44 rounds at 152k a pop.
ReplyDeleteThe Army uses the GMLRS, as do many export customers, meaning economy of scale brings down the cost. It should also be noted the Navy doesn't load the GMLRS in its warships' VLS cells (with the possible exception of an experimental fit I'm ignorant of), and I question whether the rocket's range and precision are good enough to use from a naval platform, e.g., for shore bombardment or antiship missions.
Delete"I question whether the rocket's range and precision are good enough to use from a naval platform, e.g., for shore bombardment or antiship missions."
DeleteThe GMLRS rockets are guided, that is, they have a guidance system (INS plus GPS) and can steer, so I doubt that accuracy is a problem. Range is about 70 km (a little over 40 miles) so more than a gun but less than many other missiles (although an extended range version is in development). Is that good enough or not?
They are primarily designed for fixed targets, since they just deliver the warhead to a programmed GPS coordinate, and don't track moving targets. So maybe not useful for anti-ship purposes.
"primarily designed for fixed targets"
DeleteYou've pretty much answered your own question.
GMLRS is useless for anti-ship work and is limited to fixed targets. In a real war, how many fixed targets will the enemy obligingly provide us? Very few ! The only viable set of fixed targets will be facilities like ports and established bases. However, those are largely on mainland China and a 40 mile standoff from mainland China is simply not feasible or survivable by a surface ship.
GMLRS is very expensive for use as an area bombardment weapon.
That range figure is not all it seems. In order to have any decent inland range, the ship will have to approach shore very closely. For example, if you want to hit a target that's 20-30 miles inland, you have to approach to 10-20 miles of shore, and so on. The Navy has doctrinally decided that ships are not survivable in that proximity to land, hence the doctrinal movement of the amphibious force out to 25-50+ miles from shore.
What does that leave? Not much! I see very limited use for a GMLRS. Now, ironically, the original MLRS has some potential value as an area bombardment weapon if you're willing to move the launching ship inshore.
Ships with guns will look pretty good in week 3 of a shooting war.
ReplyDeleteI wonder what China's on-hand inventory levels of missiles look like?
Lutefisk
Do we even have enough factories (in case one is unusable due to the workers going on strike, accidents, enemy attacks, sabotage, etc.) with enough workers to produce enough shells to make those guns USEFUL, instead of the dead weight all guns become when they run out of ammo?
DeleteProbably not.
DeleteLutefisk
Not that I'm excusing the current acquisition stupidity, but it's possible that there's plenty of shells & charges just sitting around in warehouses. When's the last time the Navy actually shot off enough ammunition to deplete whatever cold war-era stocks were built? I don't know if the various current 5" guns all take the same charges as the older guns, but to a degree, a 5" shell hasn't changed that much in the last 50 years, at least in weight & overall length. No idea about driving band & bourrelet diameter though. Also no guarantee that the Navy wouldn't come up with some reason not to allow such a thing, even in war conditions, cause "They're old and therefore bad."
DeleteWouldn't surprise me at all if it turned out not to matter, since with all the info about various ship subsystems falling apart due to low maintenance and crew issues that's been coming out, how many of those guns & feed systems will keep working under wartime conditions?
Gray
An idea I've pondered is creating Navy reserve units at munitions plants. The Navy could have "Naval Munitions Battalion 3" adjacent to a plant with 500 or so sailors trained to build munitions in a 2nd or 3rd shift. If the Navy needs to instantly boost production, just mobilize the unit and within 48 hours output doubles or triples.
DeleteG2mil, not that I don't like the concept, but is it practical? Is the the limiting factor the number of shifts in a munitions factory, or is it the entire supply line of components such as explosives or metals for component manufacture? I'd be incredibly surprised if the various companies working to manufacture explosive fillers, for instance, could substantially increase production in a hurry. Imagine the situation with just-in-time logistics at every stage of supply & production, for every single part in the production chain, and trying to call suppliers saying you needed 2-3 times as much NACO propellant for making charges. It's going to be the same with every other step.
DeleteI don't have obvious examples from military development, but I do have one good one from the civilian ammunition manufacturing sector. A few years ago now, when firearms/ammunitions sales went through the roof (Obama Rush, no politics, just what people called it) there were tons of people asking why the ammo companies didn't just ramp up production. At that moment in time, Winchester was actually reducing the total number of shifts in one plant, while saying they were incapable of increasing production to increase supply. The reason, as it turned out, was because their supplier of dimensioned brass sheet for stamping primer cups & anvils was incapable of increasing output. This wasn't because they didn't have enough shifts, or enough machines, but because the rush on ammunition coincided with a rush on bulk copper on the world market, which apparently had to do with some Chinese power generating plant projects all starting at the same time. What would have been the solution? Were all the companies in the production chain supposed to stockpile vast quantities of the various raw materials & finished products, just waiting for demand to spike?
It would be plausible for a defense contractor to be required to do just that, but I seriously doubt that anyone in the Pentagon is going to think of it, or bother writing that concept into a contract. Another option would be keeping production at something approaching wartime consumption expectations, and stockpiling the excess, but the same problem comes up. Because the cost of munitions now, for better (or worse) is so much higher in relative terms than WW2-era munitions, that's going to be a hard sell. An obvious solution would be to develop & deploy systems that don't cost so much relative to their historical analogues, but I think the politics & money involved would prevent that, regardless of whether or not it was possible.
Gray
Great comments about the materials issue. The solution would be stockpiles on-site of needed materials.That is not always practical, but with many thousands of sailors in the Navy reserve with dubious duties, I'd prefer a couple thousand of them ready to lend a hand at munitions plants.
Delete"Navy reserve units at munitions plants"
DeleteI love outside the box thinking but this may not be as effective as hoped. I don't know the specifics of munitions manufacturing but I would be very surprised if manpower was the limiting factor in most production. The upstream components and raw materials are almost always the limiting factor in production. For example, one of the current limitations on electronics, automobiles, etc. is computer chips. Our chip manufacturing is max'ed out. There are no more to be had. A munitions manufacturer can't just produce additional chips out of thin air and very few modern weapons are produced without computer chips. Similarly, our rare earth supply is limited and most/all of it comes from China. When war comes, our rare earth supply will suddenly become zero. And so on.
That is amazing, and disturbing. The quantities listed seem more appropriate for training and testing, not arming a fleet!
ReplyDeleteYou could not be more right ! I thank you for pointing that out.
DeleteThis is further proof of my constant statements that we are not testing or training realistically or usefully. We should be expending at least that much every year in tests and live fire training.
Am guessing, of course, but Ford probably cost more than 20B, plus the air wing that doesn't actually matter right now since the carrier can't operate in war.
ReplyDeleteIn regards to the USS Ford, there is no news on the internet about its upcoming three-month mini-deployment in the Atlantic this fall. No date set even now. Several stories mentioned this early this year, but nothing since March. They want to stay in the Atlantic so they can slip into Norfolk or Newport News for repairs without too much attention.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/02/03/us-navy-carrier-ford-to-go-on-unusual-deployment-this-year/
Will the Navy kick this can down the road, again!
I stumbled across some news about the USS Ford deployment from August 7, 2022. Looks like she's going. Any idea why someone scribbled "Cat 4 No Go" on a Growler.
Deletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HJfGysECo2s
Ok these are the prices, the real question is the timeframe in which the planned munitions will be produced and delivered. Probably the timeframe won't be short at least a year or two. Even by ordering higher numbers we wouldn't be seeing them in the fleet tomorrow. The problem is mostly in lead times.
ReplyDelete"Even by ordering higher numbers we wouldn't be seeing them in the fleet tomorrow. "
DeleteExcellent point !
I wonder how many of those missiles have China in their component supply chain? This won't be for processor chips, the Pentagon isn't *that* dumb. However, I'd bet there will be cable, or connectors, or other components that are quite easy to make, but where lack of active manufacturing in the US will cause problems when production needs to be suddenly increased.
ReplyDeleteThe UK is finding US chips & parts in Russian weapons,
Deleteso we are making something.
"the Pentagon isn't *that* dumb"
DeleteWould you bet on that?
@Chinese Gordon: Yes, the US still makes quite a lot of electronics. But does it make the boring, low-margin stuff that is still necessary, like cables and connectors? It certainly can, but getting that spun up when needed takes precious time.
Delete@Lonfo: The Pentagon anticipates "Hollywood" style threats. They would not use Chines-made processors for fear that the missiles would turn on the US. But I'm not at all sure they anticipate failures that Hollywood would never use in a plot.
The Chinese have around 70-80 ships with air defenses sufficient to require anti-ship missiles. The rest can be killed with bombs.
ReplyDeleteNSM probably won't be used much against these ships since it's surface launched and too short ranged.
LRASM will be the main killer, since it is air launched. We plan to buy 488 LRASMs, which if evenly budgeted across all 80 ships gives us around 6 LRASMs per ship. Probably too skimpy, but maybe only doubling or tripling that number would be sufficient. I don't think we need to be buying thousands per year. Maybe low thousands total.
We have other options to attack even these defended ships. We can use AARGM-ER to attack their radars, and MALDs to confuse and jam them. A combination strike with AARGM-ER, MALD and LRASM would likely reduce the number of LRASMs needed per ship.
I'd like to see us invest in JSM. If it stays in the NSM price range, it'd provide a lower cost option to LRASM, and one that can be carried internally by F-35A/Cs.
"budgeted across all 80 ships gives us around 6 LRASMs per ship."
DeleteIf you have the opportunity to launch a strike, you're not going to go with the calculated bare minimum number of missiles; you're going to use ten times overkill, if you can.
Recall that our own Aegis was designed to defeat saturation attacks. Assuming it's capable of that, a mere half dozen or so missiles is not going to succeed against an Aegis level defense which the Chinese claim to have and we believe they have.
Barring the absolute perfect circumstance of an entirely unhindered attack, we would have to figure on losing some percentage of attacking aircraft - and the LRASM missiles - prior to the launch point. This becomes more likely as the Chinese gain additional aircraft carriers over the coming years and can engage in the same type of long range, layered defense we do.
I would also point out that we lack the number of aircraft (presumably from a carrier group) to conduct an effective attack. A single carrier can't conduct an effective strike once aircraft are subtracted from the total for CAP, BARCAP, TARCAP, HVU escort, tanking, etc. There won't be any actual strike aircraft left. Even a carrier group is hard pressed to muster a small strike, today. I've posted on this (see, "Carrier Strike").
AEGIS hasn't been tested against that level of saturation attack. I've seen no indications the Chinese systems have either. Have either been tested against stealth missiles?
DeleteIf we lack the aircraft, buying a lot more missiles won't help us.
Large strikes would likely be carried about by USAF bombers. B-1s can carry 24 LRASMs, B-52s up to 20. Presumably B-21s will be cleared to carry them too.
We actually don't have to kill all of these escorts, if we kill the ships they're escorting (e.g. carriers, amphibs, logistics).
As I said, I think 1,000-1,500 would be a more comfortable number of LRASMs. A strike with a combination of LRASM and MALD/-J, preceded by AARGM-ER, would require fewer LRASMs. We're buying up to 2,000 AARGM-ERs and 1,500 MALDs.
"AEGIS hasn't been tested against that level of saturation attack."
DeleteNo, it has not. That lack is one of the many failings of our testing program(s). Nonetheless, if we believe our systems can handle saturation attacks, we have to believe that Chinese systems (direct copies) can, also.
On the other hand, we have not tested our anti-ship missiles against any kind of realistic defense. The historic data suggests a 10-20% effectiveness, at best, for anti-ship missiles (Hughes data compilation).
Many things we should be testing !
"Large strikes would likely be carried about by USAF bombers."
Possibly, although there are several problems with that:
1. Our 18 or so functional B-2 bombers will, presumably, be totally engaged in much higher priority attacks on strategic bases, ports, and facilities, possibly in mainland China. A few enemy ships will not make the priority list.
2. Even if we do wish to dedicate bombers to anti-ship work, where will they come from and how responsive can they be? Guam will almost certainly be put out of operation and kept out from a steady rain of ballistic and cruise missiles. We seem to be devoting little attention to base defense, as far as I know. Any bombers will be thousands of miles from enemy ships. Planning and assembling a strike does not happen in minutes. By the time a strike can be approved, planned, resourced, assembled, launched, and arrive at a launch point, the target ships will have had many hours/days to move on. Can we maintain contact long enough to provide targeting data? I seriously doubt it, just like I seriously doubt China can successfully target our ships at extreme distances.
3. By the second week of a war, we'll be lucky to have a 10% readiness/availability rate for stealth bombers. They simply require too much maintenance to keep flying on a daily basis. This puts us solidly back to point 1., regarding priorities. We can't keep stealth aircraft at 50% fully mission capable rates in peacetime. We're certainly not going to come anywhere near that in war.
All of this demands that we desperately conduct realistic offensive and defensive tests for anti-ship missiles.
If the objective was to sink an invasion force threatening Taiwan, then that IS the priority target.
DeleteAFAIK, B-2s aren't scheduled to get LRASM. Just B-1, B-52, F/A-18E/F, B-52, P-8A, F-35, and presumably B-21.
"If the objective was to sink an invasion force threatening Taiwan"
DeleteIn any conceivable scenario, Taiwan will be the Hour-1 Chinese objective. We will not have time to mount any kind of response and China will, without doubt, have a heavy, far flung BARCAP around Taiwan for exactly that possibility. Realistically, the US will dither for weeks before deciding what to do.
B-1/52 are not survivable in a contested attack role and the other aircraft are even less so. Someday, the B-21 will possibly be a viable platform but that will be well down the road.
And, there's always the targeting issue.
Let's not make them ten feet tall.
DeleteThe Chinese aren't going to invade Taiwan in an hour. Maybe a Week-1 objective.
They only have to get within 300nmi or so to launch LRASM.
That's a huge area for Chinese air to cover. They don't have much tanking,. Persisting at that range won't be easy.
Carrier air could clear a path for the bombers.
Let's also not reduce them to one inch tall.
DeleteI didn't say China would complete an invasion in one hour. I said it would be an Hour-1 objective, meaning we wouldn't get any prep time. The bulk of their force would already have come and gone by the time we could respond.
More importantly, we need to think operationally. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan will be meticulously planned and executed. They'll be operating under cover of their mainland forces and will have extensive air cover and ship defenses far to the east of Taiwan. They know where we'll be coming from. Worse, Guam will have been hit hard in the first five minutes of a war and we'll have no operational base there for many weeks. Where will our air forces come from? We have to face facts. Taiwan will be a 'freebie' operation for the Chinese unless we're willing to strike first - which we're not. The enemy's initial operations are always 'free'.
And, again, we'll have no targeting over the strait.
We desperately need to conduct realistic tests. Otherwise, we're planning nearly blind.
Can an LRASM pass through an Aegis level defense with a reasonable chance of survival?
Can an LRASM be intercepted and shot down by aircraft along the way? How successfully?
Can an LRASM overcome electronic countermeasures?
At what range will an LRASM be detected by ship and airborne surveillance assets?
And so on. With those answers we can begin to plan anti-ship strikes with INFORMED data instead of blind guesses, as now.
You're also failing to account for one of the fundamental truths of war: weapon expenditures will be ten to a hundred times whatever was estimated. In combat, no one is going to wait for rock solid surveillance, identification, and targeting. Missiles (or any weapon) will be flung at the slightest hint of a target (most of those hints will be false) because no one wants to wait and give the enemy the first shot. If you think you'll need six missiles per ship, the combat reality is that you'll use sixty per ship with most being aimed at false or fleeting targets. That's what you calculate your inventory requirements on.
Delete"Worse, Guam will have been hit hard in the first five minutes of a war and we'll have no operational base there for many weeks."
DeleteWhy would China do something like that, though?
Best play for them is to focus on Taiwan only, say it's just an internal affair and conclude the whole operation before USA/JAP governments decide whether to intervene or not.
"Can an LRASM pass through an Aegis level defense with a reasonable chance of survival?"
DeleteI'd guess not, but if it can then USN ships aren't safe, either.
"Why would China do something like that, though?"
DeleteBecause we're talking about a US-China war. If China can manipulate events to so as to preclude US involvement then this discussion about US LRASM inventory requirements is moot.
"I'd guess not, but if it can then USN ships aren't safe, either."
DeleteQuite right ... which is why it's so vital for us to conduct realistic testing and find out.
What jumps off the page at me is China's ability to "run out the clock" on US weapons available for immediate use, and also to seriously deplete even reserve stocks.
DeleteChina has a huge (~4000) numbers of obsolete and obsolescent land-based aircraft. It wouldn't be too far fetched for them to plan to use these old assets to soak up US missile inventory. Then once everyone is out send in the first team to finish the job.
This would apply to both carrier-based aviation and escorts with VLS cells that cannot be reloaded at sea.
"China has a huge (~4000) numbers of obsolete and obsolescent land-based aircraft. It wouldn't be too far fetched for them to plan to use these old assets to soak up US missile inventory."
DeleteSoak up AND destroy. Send 200 old MIGs flying at Mach at sea level at a carrier group in a semi-kamikaze mission. Pilots can eject just prior to impact. They would not only soak up missiles, but I suspect some would get through and hit. And you double their range when they are not expected to return. Jamming and decoys don't work either.
"Send 200 old MIGs flying at Mach at sea level at a carrier group in a semi-kamikaze mission. Pilots can eject just prior to impact."
DeleteYou're forgetting the One Child Policy's long-term impact, as well as a son's importance in Chinese culture. Any government or military leader who proposes a "semi-kamikaze mission," will get lynched.
An old Sino Defence article (note the British spelling of "defense," as the author is Singaporean) claimed obsolete fighters would be converted into kamikaze UAVs. Considering how many drones China exports, we can conclude its military has the necessary technology to use them this way.
"It wouldn't be too far fetched for them to plan to use these old assets to soak up US missile inventory. Then once everyone is out send in the first team to finish the job."
DeleteIf only ships weren't set in concrete and immobile. It would be nice if you could move them so that they could leave the battle zone when their missile inventories are exhausted. Alas...
Lutefisk
"The tyranny of distance". Combat is a problem anywhere in WestPac. The US has a problem with hardened basing that is the just-right distance away in a war with China. The US has a problem from adopting a VLS system that can't be reloaded at sea. The US has a problem with sea-lift capacity and quality. The US has a problem with a fleet that has been largely politically and MIC driven. And the US has a problem with inventory levels of just about anything and everything that is needed to fight a war with an aggressor the size of China.
DeleteWe really don't understand well what problems the Chinese have as they aren't very forthcoming. Guaranteed they have lots of problems, but we do know they have a very aggressive warship building program and we can assume their weapons build program is somewhat similar. We also know they have been incredibly aggressive with bringing the PLANAF up to date, and are the only country aside from the US that has stealth aircraft fully operational in line service.
I stumbled on an interesting YouTube video a couple of days ago. Not too hard to poke holes in it, but it certainly emphasizes the absolute requirement to mass carriers and escorts in a CSG in the face of Chinese land-based aviation.
https://youtu.be/vJXWJ-Px5tU
"requirement to mass carriers and escorts in a CSG in the face of Chinese land-based aviation."
DeleteI haven't watched the video but you should understand that it is foolish to even contemplate setting a CSG against land based air on any but the most restricted and specialized circumstances. Carriers don't stand and fight (whether against other carriers or land bases). They execute a specific, limited mission and then retire as fast as possible. They don't stand and duke it out with land based air.
Indeed. The video is worth a look as it considers what could go wrong with a FONOPs through the Spratly Islands with a hugely under-escorted Reagan CSG.
DeleteThe results are not pretty, and it leaves China and the USA at war. Not what you might expect when the focus is on Taiwan. But somewhat realistic none the less.
It also gives a pretty good glance at a situation that Stalin would have been proud of. Quantity has a quality all of its own.
"Send 200 old MIGs flying at Mach at sea level at a carrier group in a semi-kamikaze mission. "
DeleteThey're already converting hundreds of old J-6s (MiG-19s) into drones.
Really? Is there a reference for that?
Deletehttps://ca.sports.yahoo.com/news/sure-looks-china-turning-old-161800939.html
Deletehttps://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/10/20/china-shows-off-drones-recycled-from-soviet-era-fighter-jets/
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a38028066/china-turning-old-fighter-jets-into-drones/
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/j-6-uav.htm
"Why would China do something like that, though?
ReplyDeleteBest play for them is to focus on Taiwan only, say it's just an internal affair and conclude the whole operation before USA/JAP governments decide whether to intervene or not." As has been discussed before on this website, if the Chinese focus on ammo/fuel storage/maint facilities on non-Japan mainland US targets, it would likely take us months/years to rebuild them depending on how many were hit and our feeble abilities to move large amounts of ammo/fuel/new facilities by sea. No air or sea would be able to operate from them during this period -- they would have to operate from the US West Coast.
So the trade off for China would be (1) they can not strike them and "hope" the US/Japan (S. Korea has already said -- no war with China, only defend ourselves from N. Korea) will not contest the invasion with air/ships (we can always contest with subs, however). If US/JP contest then they might take x amount of invasion losses forcing China to take out these bases anyway (ie- "hope the invasion is successful") or (2) take out the bases at the start and guarantee that only US subs could contest an invasion for months/years ("guarantee invasion will be successful"). Their choice.
Those numbers are worrying.
ReplyDeleteEg when US attacked that Syrian airbase for use of gas weapons they fired 59 Tomahawks. So a whole year's production gone in one night against one target and even then the base wasn't fully neutralised.
Look at the Russians in Ukraine - they ran out of high end missiles pretty early on and are now dragging ancient "denuclearised" horrifically inaccurate Kh-22s back into action.
I remember reading a Yugoslav-then-Croatian admiral talking about the country's naval defensive capability. He was lamenting that the salvo capability had decreased massively to only maximum 32 missiles launched from FACs and shore launchers (and missile stocks only down to about 60). Their main foreseeable opponent was the Italian navy which had a large surface fleet including a carrier (I doubt the carrier would be used in close confines of Adriatic).
Apparently during Yugoslav times they counted on a salvo capability of 60-80 Styx type missiles fired from variety of FACS, corvettes and land launchers.
He discussed about needing large numbers of simultaneous missile launches to get past air defences (Styx was pretty useless by 1980s but this strategy commenced implementation in 1960s when Osa class missile boats were first acquired).
Soviets had similar swarm strategies for taking out carrier groups with whole regiments of T-u22Ms firing dozens of anti ship missiles against one carrier group.
So if the US uses similar tactics against PLAN, they will probably need one years' production of LRASMs to target one major Chinese group.
(Of course not all missiles might be fired, some might be on ships that are already sunk/damaged or have suffered malfunctions).