It has been 9 months since USS Connecticut, SSN-22, suffered an underwater collision with a sea mount in the South China Sea. Let’s review the timetable with an eye towards what this tells us about our potential wartime battle damage repair capability and capacity.
2-Oct-2021 Collision with sea mount in South China Sea
8-Oct-2021 Arrived Guam for temporary repairs
4-Nov-2021 CO, XO, COB reported relieved
18-Nov-2021 Leaves Guam for temporary repair sea trial
12-Dec-2021 Arrives San Diego after surface transit from Guam
15-Dec-2021 Left San Diego, CA
20-Dec-2021 Arrived Puget Sound for thorough damage assessment
21-Dec-2021 Arrived Bremerton, WA for repairs
?-Feb-2023 Scheduled start of permanent repairs
The damage is expected to be repaired during a scheduled Extended Docking Selected Restricted Availability starting in February 2023.[2]
If – and that’s a very big ‘if’ – the repairs start on time in Feb 2023, it will have been 16 months since the collision. That’s a pretty poor repair response for peacetime and would be atrocious during war.
Here is what little we know about the extent of the damage. Based on photos – because the Navy isn’t saying anything – the bow was sheared off (or removed as part of temporary repairs) and the sonar dome is gone, presumably resting at the bottom of the South China Sea.[2] Reports suggest that the rudder is damaged, as well.
What will that cost to repair? Here is a hint at the magnitude of the eventual repair bill.
Buried deep in the National Defense Authorization Act, two lines—crafted to prevent easy searching—authorize the Navy to receive an initial tranche of $50 million in repair funds—$10 million for a “spare Seawolf class bow dome” (page 1815) and $40 million for “USS Connecticut emergent repairs” (page 1850).[1]
That’s $50M just for the beginning of the repair bill, largely intended to cover long lead items. A reasonable guess would put the final repair bill in the $300M-$400M range.
As a comparison, here is the cost and timing for a similar repair on the Los Angeles class submarine, USS San Francisco:
In 2005, the USS San Francisco, a Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine, also struck an underwater mountain, a crash that killed a sailor and injured 97 others. It took 3 1/2 years in Puget Sound to install a sonar dome from the decommissioned USS Honolulu onto the boat, in maintenance that in total cost $134 million.[3]
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| USS San Francisco |
The USS McCain required 2 yrs and 2 months to complete repairs. The USS Fitzgerald required 3 yrs to return to active duty and repair costs were reported as $327M[4].
We’re looking at a 2025-2026 time frame to return to active service. That’s four or five years to effect repairs and that’s only if the repairs start on time which I strongly doubt will happen.
This incident and the Navy’s near state of paralysis regarding the repairs tells us what we need to know about our ability to deal with wartime battle damage … we have no abililty!
Damage repair, whether due to combat or accidents, is critical for the maintenance of a strong fleet. Our repair capacity is almost non-existent, repair timelines are terrible, and costs are enormous. Our repair response is atrocious. We have no ability to ‘surge’ a repair.
‘Surge’ a repair? Yes! If you recall, the USS Yorktown, CV-5, was badly damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea. Repair estimates were for 90 days. In a massive repair surge, Yorktown was repaired in 3 days and sailed to participate in the Battle of Midway. The repair surge involved 1400 men and required rolling blackouts in Hawaii to supply the required power for the repair effort.
Connecticut’s repair surge is going to require something on the order of 4-5+ years.
Yikes!
We are not ready for war.
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[1]Forbes website, “Congress Authorizes Millions For Repairs Of USS Connecticut”, Craig Hooper, 20-Dec-2021,
[2]Naval News website, “U.S. Navy Comments On USS Connecticut Submarine”, Peter Ong, 5-Jul-2022,
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/07/u-s-navy-comments-on-uss-connecticut-submarine/
[3]Yahoo News website, “USS Connecticut, damaged in crash with underwater mountain, arrives in Bremerton”, Josh Farley, 21-Dec-2021,
https://www.yahoo.com/news/uss-connecticut-damaged-crash-underwater-220043902.html
[4]USNI News website, “USS Fitzgerald Leaves Mississippi Drydock After More Than a Year of Repairs”, Sam LaGrone, 16-Apr-2019,
We commit an enormous amount of national treasure to the navy, but everything feels like it's being operated on a shoestring.
ReplyDeleteLutefisk
Have to pay for all those admirals some how
Delete-LP
Shoe string. That's what so infuriating with DoD!!! We sure getting closer and closer to spending a cool trillion and everything looks like trash! USN ships are covered in rust. Where's the pride of ownership?!? How does this allowed???
DeleteIt sort of is, but you can be sure that the shoestring has all the proper politically correct attitudes.
DeleteThe T-45 is probably going to be replaced by a carrier incapable plane. So your first landing on a carrier is going to be in a F-35 or what ever your rated for. Very exciting for the deck crew, but not in a good way.
DeleteThe Navy officer corps has been taken over by Ferengi.
@Spig. What's the worst that can happen?
DeleteThey build a trainer that can't land on a carrier, so not strong enough, do some testing, realize they can't even do touch and goes, have to redesign the landing gear, test some more, realize the air-frame isn't tough enough, lose a couple of years, test some more, realize that all the first batch concurrency jets are useless, trash those, order new ones, USN realize that "you know, we need pilots to practice carrier landing after all", cancel program and start all over....that doesn't sound that bad?!?.....sarcasm...
I wonder how much of the navy focus and budget is consumed with trying to skip generations of technology with things like unmanned etc?
ReplyDeleteLutefisk
Been bad few weeks for USN. Reading the unclassified report of this accident and crappy leadership on board was depressing and then the latest report on Bonhomme Richard fire where it sure looked like no one wanted to take control and be a leader with a billion dollar ship on fire was also depressing....maybe USN has a leadership problem?
ReplyDelete"maybe USN has a leadership problem?"
DeleteMaybe ????!!! Have you read this blog?
Forgot to put "sarcasm"....long time reader.
DeleteDon't worry, I understood. Just havin' some fun !
DeleteOne of my grandkids wanted to apply to the Naval Academy. Academically excellent, athletics, community service, naval family history - GF survived PH etc - decided not to apply after visiting the fleet in SD, Ships were rusty killed it for her.
ReplyDeleteThe problem seems to be those fundamentals that don't show up in the public often or as a major item on a megacorporation's balance sheet. The fleet maintenance problem often mentioned here as well as the ammunition stockpile (roughly the size of a postage stamp).
ReplyDeleteI don't see any of this being taken care of till congress starts looking and stay looking under the hood.
There is no Mad Nacy program on CNBC for old men to obsess over.
DeleteAlso OT, one bad idea fixed by peer pressure. Can't win for losing some days. https://www.defenseone.com/?oref=d1-nav
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, the other 99 bad ideas remain !
DeleteWow, just wow! I shouldn't be surprised at both the cost and the length of time for the repair, but I am. The U.S.S. Yorktown (CV-5) "Herculean" repair effort of 1942 would not be possible today. It would be one thing if we had two dozen Seawolf-class SSNs to lessen the impact of the U.S.S. Connecticut going to get repaired, but we don't so I think this is going to hurt a bit.
ReplyDeleteI think at this point, Captain Crunch would be a vast improvement. The "Powers to Be" are rather quick to pull the trigger on sacking COs/XOs. Does anything positive ever come out of these investigations or inquiries that can be used as examples of what not to do, etc? The lights are definitely on in the Department of the Navy, but there is nobody home.
I suppose I could do the research first, but Im just gonna ask- how much.of this timeline is due to the sub being basically a "one-off", since the class is so small??? Not saying that all the points made arent dead-on at all, but could the lengthy estimates be because there isn't much of a major supply system or support for the Seawolfs???
ReplyDelete"could the lengthy estimates be because there isn't much of a major supply system or support for the Seawolfs"
DeleteCould be. But, if so, how then do we explain the USS San Francisco, a Los Angeles class sub, from a class of 62 vessels with, presumably, an incredibly robust support/supply system, taking 3-1/2 years to repair for the exact same damage?
The Yorktown, CV-5, was a class of 3 ships and yet we managed to complete 3 months of repairs in 3 days using only the resources on Hawaii, at that moment.
We have to be consistent in our logic. If the lengthy Connecticut repair is due to being part of a small class then the USS San Francisco should have been a very fast since it was part of a very large class ... and yet it took 3-1/2 years. The Yorktown should have taken years since it was a 3-ship class like the Connecticut. So ... it would seem that the size of the class is not an issue.
Good point- although Id think that Yorktowns damage was much less technical to repair. Todays systems are more fragile, complex, the wiring, alignment and adjustment etc are all much more time n labor intensive. (Not making excuses, just being realistic) Of course, on the other hand, in my mind, a full bow replacement on the SF, well, that seems like somthing thats more on the Yorktown repair level, and shouldve been measured in months, not years. Of course peacetime malaise and lack of urgency comes into play also. Could it have been done in months with the proper incentive?? Probably. Another factor relevant to Connecticut AND SF, is the lack of sub repair facilities, and maintenance backlog. Any emergency repairs are at the mercy of empty drydocks and repair facilities, (where we clearly dont have enough capacity) and pushing an unscheduled repair throws a wrench in the whole maintenance schedule, which at least in peacetime isnt somthing taken lightly...
Delete"... the lack of sub repair facilities, and maintenance backlog.... an unscheduled repair throws a wrench in the whole maintenance schedule ..."
DeleteAnd now you've correctly answered your own question! The speed of repair (or lack thereof) is purely a function of our repair drydocks, facilities, skilled trades - in other words, our repair capacity. We lack the maintenance and repair facilities and capacity to support our fleet in peacetime, let alone war. This is a criminal failure on the part of Navy leadership and 'generations' of CNOs who should know better and should have insisted on support capacity instead of new ships but, instead, stuck their heads in the sand and ignored the problem.
A CNO is committing what amounts to treason by asking for one dollar for new ship construction before he's solved the maintenance and repair requirements for the existing fleet. Our string of CNOs have reduced our fleet to a hollow shell and seem determined to continue along that path.
" Id think that Yorktowns damage was much less technical to repair."
DeleteAre you sure? You're thinking that today's electronics, for example, are much harder to repair ... but are they? We don't actually repair electronics, do we? We just replace circuit boards and components. The Yorktown repairs (wish I had an itemized list - that would be fascinating!) were actual repairs. They had to fabricate parts in machine shops, rebuild machinery, re-run conduit, etc.
We arrogantly believe that our systems are more complex and, in a sense, they are. However, in another sense, the old systems were more complex. Trying to repair an optical lens range finder had to be harder than replacing a circuit board.
Something to think about.
Oh I completely agree- the paradigm of todays equipment being "more technical" is largely hogwash. Its all relative!!! While the systems on a CV or BB are pretty basic today, at the time they were state of the art. No argument!! BUT... The sheer volume of wiring and conponents in the nose of an SSN , and the relative fragility of todays computer gizmos isnt to be dismissed. I agree that an itemized list of Yorktowns damage and repairs would be fascinating- although my thin understanding is that it was mostly structural, with decks, bulkheads, and fuel tanks being the majority of them. Not a lot of technical work, even for back then...
DeleteI guess the boat’s being repaired in the same shipyard that’s building new boats. Given that we know how resource constrained we are right across the board, could it be that someone’s made a call to prioritize new construction over repairs?
ReplyDeleteIn which case is that perhaps not a legitimate decision? Your main point is still entirely valid of course, but the problem might not be incompetence by those responsible for managing the repair timeline, but rather the reality that our shipyards are short staffed and inefficient, and our shipbuilding workforce ageing and unproductive.
At the risk of a pointless semantics discussion, the protracted repair timeline may be the correct decision GIVEN THE STATE OF OUR SHIPYARDS. Where the incompetence enters is in having allowed our shipyards to reach this state. The current state is the result of decades of incompetent decisions, one after another, that lie at the feet of our series of pathetic CNOs (and Congress!).
DeleteThe reality is not that we're constrained (we are) but that that constraint was entirely self-inflicted.
Your comment almost sounds like it's bordering on rationalization and willing acceptance of conditions that you feel just kind of happened and there was nothing we could have done about it (like catching a cold), rather than having been self-inflicted. If I'm misinterpreting your tone, I apologize.
I'm trying to emphasize that nothing about this sad state of affairs is just bad luck. From the inadequate training and performance of the sub's crew (if you believe the Navy's report) to the near absence of repair capacity, the Navy has failed at every level for decades on end in order to reach this state.
I agree completely that the current state of our naval shipyards represents a massive weakness in our defense capability, but I'm not sure that this is the result of "decades of incompetent decisions, one after another, that lie at the feet of our series of pathetic CNOs (and Congress!)", although certainly they're not innocent of blame.
DeleteThe key issue in my view is that throughout our history naval shipbuilding has piggy backed off a thriving merchant shipbuilding industry; today however the United States to all intents and purposes no longer has a merchant shipbuilding industry - (over the last few years we've built on average around 10 ships suitable for ocean going commerce, while each year China builds about 1,000 such ships.)
Unless we can somehow rebuild that national resource (and I don't believe we can do that within any reasonable or useful timeframe), our naval shipbuilding capacity will continue to waste away as the workforce ages, essential and irreplaceable skills are lost, shipyard productivity declines and our young people overwhelmingly choose college over apprenticeships.
Yes, Congress played a role in allowing this state of affairs to arise and continue, notably the Reagan administration's decision unilaterally to eliminate shipbuilding construction subsidies. But in the broad scheme of things neither past Congressional action, inaction, nor a succession of incompetent CNOs could have done very much in practical terms to change the current outcomes, as these represent not poor decision making but rather the core and systemic functioning of our economy and our wider societal preferences.
I should be very interested to learn of any ideas or suggestions that you may have to turn things around.
"these represent not poor decision making but rather the core and systemic functioning of our economy"
DeleteI was afraid of this. You have a mistaken understanding of what has led us to the current state of affairs. I've explained all of this throughout this blog and you ought to find it interesting reading.
I'll offer you a summation of a few of the central problems that have led to the current state:
1. The Navy has intentionally pursued a misguided and woefully mistaken policy of constructing fewer and fewer ships of ever increasing cost - a construction-cost death spiral. This has resulted in the consolidation of the shipbuilding industry and elimination of many shipyards. I've repeatedly described the simple solution to this problem - indeed, the only solution! We must stop building multi-function, mega ships and return to building smaller, single function ships. This would conceptually double the number of ships we build which would double the number of yards and skilled trades personnel we could gainfully employ.
2. The Navy has compounded the negative consequences of point 1. by nearly abandoning ship maintenance. This results in still fewer shipyards being required and the loss of many more yards and skilled personnel. If we did nothing else except implement required maintenance on the ships we currently have, we'd double the number of yards and skilled trades personnel we could keep employed.
Yes, Congress has played a role in the current state of affairs but it has largely been a passive role of omission instead of actively exercising their power of oversight and funding.
I won't go into more detail because, as I said, I've covered all this in much greater depth throughout the blog and you can review the archives to get all the details.
"In a massive repair surge, Yorktown was repaired in 3 days and sailed to participate in the Battle of Midway."
ReplyDeleteRepairs on Yorktown started as she headed back to Pearl Harbor and continued after she left port for Midway. While it's remarkable what was accomplished in those three days, the repairs were just enough to get her back to sea. The Navy relaxed a few safety rules in doing so, like purging her tanks of stored aviation fuel before starting repairs. And, critical engine repairs were skipped which limited her top speed.
In the future, I think we'll same with ships repaired to make them seaworthy and sent back into battle with some deficiencies in their engines, electronics, and weapons.