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Friday, July 29, 2022

Navy Lays Down the LAW

The just-released CNO Navigation Plan 2022, aside from being a buzzword-filled, worthless piece of garbage, contains a piece of information that dooms Commandant Berger’s entire missile-shooting concept.  The document calls for 18 Light Amphibious Warships (LAW) to be built by 2045.[1, p.10]

 

Berger’s entire concept is predicated on the LAW which will transport his small units and their massive missiles, clandestinely, to hidden bases deep inside enemy waters.  The LAW will then relocate the Marines in the unlikely event they’re spotted and will conduct resupply on a regular basis, again, undetected.

 

Setting aside any mocking of the LAW or the concept, it is clear that the LAW is the foundation of the concept.  Without transport and logistics there is no concept, right?  The Navy appears to be providing only very limited support to the Marines.  Eighteen LAW is woefully insufficient to support the concept.

 

Even if a single LAW could fully transport, relocate, and indefinitely resupply a single unit, the maximum number of units deployed is, then, limited to eighteen.  Now, factor in the need for the LAWs, like any ship, to return to base regularly to repair, replenish, rest, etc. and you see that multiple LAWs are needed to support a single missile-shooting unit. 

 

Add in attrition – does anyone really think that 14 kt, non-stealthy, defenseless vessels trying to operate deep in enemy waters are not going to suffer significant attrition? – and 18 LAWs can only support a few Marine units for a short time;  and even that’s wildly optimistic.  With any realistic attrition factor, it is clear that the concept needs something north of forty LAWs for the concept to have even a small chance of working.


 

Light Amphibious Warship - Artist's Concept


Thus, it appears that the Navy is not on board with the Marine’s concept and is only paying token lip service to the concept. 

 

At best, the Marines may get a couple of LAWs per year over the next couple decades.  The Commandant will be retired in a year or so.  Will his concept still be around by the time the Navy gets around to building LAWs?  It seems unlikely.

 

If the Navy’s forecasted war with China occurs in the next several years, the Marines won’t have any transports and will be relegated to the sidelines.

 

Even if you think Commandant Berger is a genius whose concept will revolutionize warfare and bring China to its knees, it is clear that he has utterly failed to get buy-in from the Navy.  He has failed to convey and communicate the merits, as he sees it, of his concept.  Navy buy-in should have been one of the very first things he accomplished but it appears that was not the case.

 

Eighteen LAWs by 2045, Commandant?  The Navy is telling you what you can do with your concept.

 

 

 

______________________________

 

[1]https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/22121320/navigation-plan-2022_signed.pdf

 

63 comments:

  1. LAWs will be ducks in a shooting gallery for the Chinese. Here is the latest gibberish about this concept.
    https://news.usni.org/2022/07/28/marines-pitching-service-as-western-pacific-recon-asset-for-combined-joint-force
    This is the classic story of who will tell the emperor he has no clothes.

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    Replies
    1. Battlefield awareness is a laudable goal. We did it in WWII with a single coastwatcher rather than an entire Marine Corps but, I digress ... The one aspect of this that the Marines have yet to explain is what asset is going to give them the awareness for hundreds of miles around to take advantage of the missile's range. The surveillance assets that the Marines are discussing are all very short range. For example, the RQ-20b Puma shown in the photo accompanying the article you linked, has a range of 9 miles. That's not battlefield awareness. That's parking lot awareness. The unmanned surface vessel they've discussed has a surveillance range of a few miles, at best. And so on.

      The larger surveillance assets they're discussed, such as the MQ-9A, require major bases to operate from and would invalidate the Marine's 'hidden' base concept.

      Nothing about this concept makes sense and until the Commandant offers a bit of explanation, he's going to continue to be met with skepticism and opposition.

      Delete
  2. The only way this could be supported would be prepo stockpiles of munitions and supplies in the Central Pacific. Buy C-130 seaplanes and have them make supply runs weekly. They would be escorted by AWACs or Hawkeyes for overwatch and can turn back if the enemy attempts to intercept. They may have fighter escort. Range is the issue. Fly into a forward area, offload, and fly out all within an hour before enemy air power can arrive.

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    Replies
    1. "C-130 seaplanes"

      This could work if all you need to deliver is food. If, however, you need to deliver missile reloads, spare engines for vehicles, replacement launch vehicles, and similar heavy items, how do you unload from a seaplane to the shore? The mechanics of the unloading operation for heavy equipment are daunting, bordering on impossible.

      Yes, the receiving unit could have fork lifts, heavy duty cranes on barges, and so forth but, again, that kills the concept of 'hidden' bases. A unit with those kinds of equipment and facilities will have been spotted and destroyed long before any resupply is needed !

      The Marines have totally ignored the logistic aspects of this concept when it should have been the first thing they addressed. Instead, the Commandant appears to have started with the missiles and is trying to work his way backward and is failing.

      Delete
    2. Something like Convair's R3Y Tradewind, with it's front, upward lifting cargo door, would have solved some of those problems.

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    3. "Convair's R3Y Tradewind"

      Again, setting aside the very large, non-stealthy, non-survivable in enemy territory nature of the aircraft, it still requires large, heavy vehicles or some sort of crane equipment to unload. Remember, it's not sufficient to just get the load off the aircraft; the load then has to be transported to wherever it's going to be stored or used. That requires large, heavy transport vehicles. All of this ruins any hope of clandestine bases which is what the Marines concept involves. The concept was just not thought out very well.

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    4. C130 seaplanes would make a lot of sense. HIMARS are always tied to a nearby airfield for Ammo resupply and these other missiles will probably be similar. We need a small amphibious unload vehicle along the lines of a larger Argo 8wd to bring Ammo from the aircraft to the launcher.
      This allows for far more locations, but it would take some great night flying and luck to keep the enemy from observing the C130 ops.

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    5. Wouldn't the concept of these small, clandestine forward bases be accomplished by say a frigate or corvette carrying the same missile load, and equal or hopefully better range capability? We could let a squad of marines camp on deck if that would help the Commandant feel useful.

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    6. HIMARS has a built-in crane for reloading and moving the replacement missile pods around doesn't require heavy equipment. For something like ROGUE Fires or JTLV-mounted missiles, one might be able to mount a crane for reloading. Since the missiles are individually packed, you're only liftting maybe 4,000 pounds at a time.

      To your bigger point about clandestine bases, ships aren't undetectable either. And, after firing off a few missiles, how long will it take to narrow down where they came from? At the same time, how many EABO bases could we operate and adequately support? Five, six, ten?

      This type of mission could be better accomplished by small, stealthly, unmanned ships loaded with missiles, say 32 VLS cells. Operating individually or in small groups, they could cover far more area than a handful of EABOs

      Delete
    7. "This type of mission could be better accomplished by small, stealthly, unmanned ships loaded with missiles"

      Okay ... a few questions:

      1. Where would these small craft operate from since we have neither forward bases nor motherships?

      2. Where would these craft get their surveillance and targeting from considering that we're talking about operating in enemy controlled air and water? A million mile missile is useless with a horizon range sensor.

      3. Since we don't have Terminator level artificial intelligence yet, these unmanned craft would require extensive and frequent, if not continuous, communications. Would not both the sending facility and the individual craft be pinpointed for the enemy by the constant communications?

      4. Manned or unmanned, these are still ships that require constant maintenance, as any ship does. How would the maintenance be provided?

      5. When spotted, presumably these ?defenseless? craft would be written off as lost. What do you envision these throwaway craft costing given that a small LCS costs on the order of $600M?

      Delete
    8. "HIMARS has a built-in crane for reloading and moving the replacement missile pods around doesn't require heavy equipment."

      That's not quite accurate. It does not have a general purpose crane. It has an extendable winch with very limited range of motion and is useful only for reloading. HIMARS is not capable of transporting missiles other than by loading a single pod. Some other vehicle/crane must move the pods to and from storage and place the pod in an open area where the HIMARS vehicle can maneuver itself into position for the reload.

      Delete
    9. "Wouldn't the concept of these small, clandestine forward bases be accomplished by say a frigate or corvette carrying the same missile load, and equal or hopefully better range capability? We could let a squad of marines camp on deck if that would help the Commandant feel useful."

      Hah.
      Surface ships wouldn't be able to survive for long, of course, but this whole EABO "concept" can be replaced by submarine-launched missiles, which would actually work.

      Delete
    10. "whole EABO "concept" can be replaced by submarine-launched missiles,"

      As always, the central challenge is targeting. A sub has targeting and off-board sensor communication issues. Acoustic sensing (as in a sub) is challenging in and around islands. So, yes, a sub is stealthy and can fire missiles (we don't actually have an sub-launched, anti-ship missile, do we? I don't know if the anti-ship Tomahawk is operational on subs yet) but targeting is problematic.

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    11. Targeting is going to be problematic anyway because the whole "concept" is silly and a budget grab, hence the scare quotes.

      At least a sub has stealth and firepower, unlike a platoon of Marines.

      (I would also hope that multi-billion dollar subs could perform well in shallow water and near islands, but frankly I wouldn't bet on it.)

      Delete
    12. "we don't actually have an sub-launched, anti-ship missile, do we?"

      Actually, there IS a submarine launched version of the Harpoon. I think they launch it from torpedo tubes.

      Delete
    13. "submarine launched version of the Harpoon"

      I think that's been withdrawn from service but I'm not sure.

      Setting that aside, one of the problems with this whole concept is salvo density. We think that it would take dozens of simultaneous missiles to overwhelm an Aegis ship or even a ESSM equipped frigate. If that's true - and assuming the same for the Chinese defensive systems - where does the salvo density come from? The Marines are, presumably, only going to have a half-dozen or so missiles available. More than that and they'll stand out like a sore thumb and negate their already laughable notion of remaining hidden. A sub, even with a torpedo tube launched Harpoon would only be able to put a couple of missiles into the air. Of course, anti-ship Tomahawks from a subs vertical launch tubes might be of sufficient number assuming the sub has foregone land attack for an anti-ship loadout.

      Do you see what I mean when I say that this concept has not been well thought out? There's more holes in the concept than Swiss cheese!

      Delete
    14. They started loading sub launched Harpoon again acouple years back.

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    15. "I think that's been withdrawn from service but I'm not sure."

      Actually, you WERE correct. But they are currently being "un-withdrawn". According to this article:

      https://seapowermagazine.org/boeing-is-refurbishing-harpoon-missiles-for-u-s-navy-submarines/

      The Harpoon was withdrawn from submarine service in 1997 but Boeing is refurbishing some (albeit not very many) which will then be deployed on submarines.

      USS Olympia actually fired a refurbished Harpoon at RIMPAC in 2018.

      If we squint, this may actually serve as good news, that is, evidence of a fairly rare smart decision on the part of the Navy. After all, they were withdrawn from service in 1997, in the belief that they were no longer useful. Yet, rather than following the normal path with ships and simply scrapping them, the Navy preserved them in storage "just in case". And of course today, "just in case" has happened. Yay Navy !!

      Delete
    16. Regarding your overall points about salvo density, I have no particular expertise in determining how many missiles are required to overcome ship's defenses, so I accept your analysis.

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    17. Did you note the quantities of missiles and the time required for refurbishment and delivery? It was 20 missiles, in total, and the contract was let in Feb '21 with delivery scheduled for Dec '22. That's 20 missiles in just shy of two years! Could it go any slower? Twenty missiles? That's not exactly rearming the fleet !

      And the Navy claims war with China is likely in the next six or seven years? Where's the sense of urgency?

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    18. "so I accept your analysis."

      That's not my analysis, that's the Navy's ! I'm not nearly so optimistic. The point is that the Navy/Marines need to be consistent in their logic. If they truly believe it requires many dozens of simultaneous missiles to overwhelm ship defenses then the Marine concept is pointless. If, on the other hand, it only requires a few missiles then our entire Aegis system is a waste of money and we need to drastically rethink our entire naval existence and operation.

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    19. "Did you note the quantities of missiles and the time required for refurbishment and delivery?"

      Yes, I did. And I was also troubled by that. Although during the article they did say that "The Navy has a deep inventory of Harpoon Block IC missiles", which at least suggests the possibility that significantly more could be done if necessary.

      I have no idea why so few. Perhaps it's a budget thing. Many things are.

      Delete
    20. Of more concern is the time frame. It doesn't matter how deep the inventory of potential rebuilds is, if it requires two years to convert a missile that's of no use if China acts sooner.

      Is 20 conversions per year our maximum capacity? We have no way of knowing but the article kind of suggests that might be the case. If so, that's of no use in a war and it would take us decades to convert enough missiles to matter.

      Let's also bear in mind that Harpoon is still a very sub-par missile by modern standards despite the upgrades which are mainly inertial and GPS guidance and range. The warhead is smaller, it's non-stealthy, it's subsonic, it has limited terminal maneuvering, it has no penetration aids, and so on. It's obsolete. Refurbishing an obsolete missile just makes it slightly less obsolete.

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    21. "That's not my analysis, that's the Navy's ! I'm not nearly so optimistic"

      Good point. I've often wondered if something similar to the Air Force's MALD decoy (but launched from land or a submarine) might be useful. They're a lot skinnier than the Tomahawk or other anti-ship missiles, so we could launch several from a launcher. Plus some of them have jamming capability. Would that change the analysis any?

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    22. "Of more concern is the time frame"

      The only hypothesis I can think of that might be positive is the following:

      If we haven't built harpoons for awhile, they may have had to recreate the production line for some critical part that needed to be installed. If that's the case, they may not all take that long.

      Obviously we have no idea whether this is the case.

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    23. "MALD ... Would that change the analysis any?"

      We basically have that in the form of various decoys (Nulka and similar), SLQ-32/SEWIP, floating radar reflectors, etc.

      The problem is that the Navy refuses to conduct realistic tests so we don't know how effective these various defensive measures are. Maybe they're great. Maybe they're worthless. We're betting our defenses on complete unknowns.

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    24. "If we haven't built harpoons for awhile,"

      We have been building Harpoons, just not for the US. I looked at Harpoon contract history and they've been building quite a few for foreign countries. Perhaps the manufacturing of new missiles for other countries has reduced the capacity for rebuilds for the US? Pure speculation on my part.

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    25. "We basically have that in the form of various decoys (Nulka and similar"

      I was actually thinking of the MALD since it could fly along with the harpoons and present a lot more targets to the CHinese defenses. And perhaps even jam them.

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    26. "The problem is that the Navy refuses to conduct realistic tests "

      Agreed. I thought we should have learned this lesson in the first year of World War 2, when failing torpedoes (due to inadequate testing) resulted in the loss of many submarines and the escape of many targets.

      But I guess no one studies history anymore.

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    27. "MALD since it could fly along with the harpoons"

      Oh, you meant offensively. My bad.

      There is no ship-launched version of MALD, as far as I know, but there is, of course, air-launched versions that are certified for use from Hornets and would, likely accompany air-launched Harpoon strikes.

      If you're suggesting a ship-launched (VLS) MALD, it doesn't exist but there is likely no reason why one couldn't be developed. It would lack range for Tomahawk 'escort' but would be sufficient for Harpoons.

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    28. Yes, I was suggesting a new ship and submarine launched decoy similar to the MALD. Not using the existing MALD. It's true that the current MALD doesn't have the range of a Tomahawk, but it's also much shorter than a Tomahawk. So there's room, in any launcher than can handle a Tomahawk, to stretch it. WHich I assume would increase the range.

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    29. I guess as far as implementation details are concerned, we could look at whether the current MALD could be launched by a Mark 41 launcher by adding a booster rocket. They've tried that with the JASSM-ER, for example.

      Not sure whether that would be possible for a submarine launch. Obviously the water is a consideration.

      As you've mentioned, it doesn't have the range to escort a Tomahawk, but it could cover a Harpoon or NSM.

      Delete
    30. "it could cover a Harpoon or NSM."

      Of course, every launch cell/tube devoted to a decoy is one less Harpoon/NSM available. Whether the decoy is sufficiently effective to justify the reduction of missiles is unknown.

      Delete
    31. One point to keep in mind for Mark 41 launch is that, since the MALD is much skinnier than a Tomahawk, you could launch several from a single cell. Just like the ESSM. Not sure it would be four. But it would most likely be more than 1.

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    32. "Some other vehicle/crane must move the pods to and from storage and place the pod . . ."

      The Marine Corps use their MTRV Mk 37 HIMARS Resupply Vehicle. It has a built-in crane and with a trailer can transport two HIMARS missile pods. I would think the Marines would use the same vehicle to resupply NMESIS and JTLVs. How many would fit on a LAW makes for a good question. Again, this isn't sophisticated equipment. Getting it across the ocean is the problem.

      Delete
    33. "How many would fit on a LAW makes for a good question."

      The more relevant question is how many vehicles - of any kind - are needed to make a combat EFFECTIVE unit? More than just a couple makes for an easily spotted unit.

      Delete
  3. Why has Congress not put these questions to the Commandant and required him to respond?

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    Replies
    1. Because there is no one in Congress that has the experience necessary to press the Commandant for answers. Besides, they are too busy with other "important work".

      Delete
    2. "no one in Congress that has the experience necessary"

      To be fair and objective, there are some representatives who served or have special interests (naval related companies in their districts, for example). More importantly, ever representative has a fairly extensive staff and one member of ever staff ought to be assigned to be a subject matter expert on the military. This is true to at least some degree but I don't know just how widespread the practice is.

      Failing that - or in addition to that - Congress ought to be able to depend on the expertise and integrity of our uniformed military leaders. Unfortunately, as thoroughly demonstrated in this blog, that is a false hope.

      My point is that Congress has plenty of opportunities and resources to call on for guidance about military matters and many do avail themselves of that guidance.

      Having established that a Congress possesses a pool of expertise, to some degree, their reluctance to exercise their Constitutional oversight duties is disappointing although, to be fair, they have been doing more of that in recent years and I applaud them while encouraging them to do more. Congress, for example, has been the only thing that has prevented the Navy from conducting wholesale early retirement of the Ticonderoga ship class. Congress has also clamped down on the Navy's emerging practice of accepting incomplete ships. And so on.

      Congress is doing their job better than the Navy is doing theirs although neither are doing a good job.

      Delete
  4. Their desire for LAW is the worst. In firstest with the mostest would take the C-130 seaplane and work to get the most out of an EPF like hull. Figure out how to make it beachable. oother catamatans beach. Figure that out and a ramp. Plan to move up to a company just like EPF was intended to do, but hit the beach. Obviously like any other ship, real self defense is a must. None of this will happen.

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  5. Real Clear Defense says the Davidson window when China will attack Taiwan closes in 2027. At the rate of building 18 in the next 24 years starting in a couple of years we will have 2 LAWS in service by 2027 and 1 available any time while the other is used for training. 1 LAW delivers 75 Marines which is half of a Company and is less than 1/8 of the Batallion size normally required to operate independently.
    The Commandant’s concept needs a contracting solution. III MEF needs to contract cargo ships or ferries to be available to transport Marines and to stand by until needed. Rehearsals for loading and unloading different types of ships are necessary to see which ship types are suitable. Once underway, these ships would need Navy escorts to survive the journey to their destination.

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    Replies
    1. We do need an actual org and plan to go grab useful hulls on the cheap as far out of the normal procurement process as can be made possible. If we want more of what EPF brings, it can be bought on the open market at any time. Want to speed up the ramp on MUSV, go buy the other ships of the same class the current design was plucked from. Several of our Ro-Ro ships are conversions of foreign commeercial ships from the 80s. Do that again.

      Delete
  6. Davidson window gives us until 2027 for China to invade Taiwan. At the rate of 18 ships in the next 24 years, we will have approximately 2 LAWs by then which is insufficient for Company of Marines.
    The solution the Commandant seeks needs to be experimenting with contracting lift to see which ships can be adapted to the concept, rehearsing some transits and landings with Navy escorts, then giving III MEF cash to contract the required ships.

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  7. Re: facilities, heavy-lift and shore side cargo transport for seaplane re-supply. The U.S. marines could Lease space from the Chinese on their artificial islands.
    Tell them it is for ,”ecological and cultural awareness vacation tours” for “woke” Americans.
    When hostilities initiate, the Marines can doff their Hawaiian shirts, don their cammies, remove the fake wraps advertising Disney’s latest Chinese culturally sensitive movie on their 3,300 mile- range anti surface ship ballistic missiles, and proceed to sweep the seas of Chinese surface ships. Adding force multiplier phrases, ( jointness, networking, reduced manning, multi-mode, modular, fluffy-not-stuffy, ring around the collar, etc.) will ensure survivability And mission success. After the Marines have cleared the way, the Navy can then conduct the mission they have been training for, for the last three decades: search and rescue of Chinese seaman shipwreck survivors, anti-piracy, drug and illegal immigration interdiction, food distribution, freedom of navigation cruises.

    Signed,
    ACES & EIGHTS

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  8. China will have air and naval superiority in the Western Pacific during the first months of a war. American attack submarines can enter this area, but can't easily find targets. They could surface and deploy UAVs, but you don't want to risk a $3 billion sub for that. The Marines could provide subs with vital targeting intel from their coast watching, UAVs, and info gathered from aircraft and satellites, especially if positioned near narrow straits in the region. This is a practical idea, and doesn't require vehicles or big missile launchers. Minimal resupply can be provided by seaplanes, so no need for LAWs.

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    1. Or just resupply with C-130 airdrops. All they need is some food, small spare parts, and batteries.

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    2. Communicating with subs is always problematic. How do you envision transmitting near real-time data to subs? If it isn't near real-time then it's hunting data but not targeting data.

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    3. "...especially if positioned near narrow straits in the region."

      In general, sure. But specifically... What straits are actually going to see ship traffic where the Marines could actually get there and hide?? How many places are going to be useful with line of sight surveillance (or even slightly more if some tiny undetectable drones were used), and if they are, wont they be deep in enemy waters?? I understand its a great generic concept, and textbook useful, but is it actually possible?? Short of sub-inserted small units, the idea of coastwatching as a means of getting targeting intel, or really any useable intel- Im not seeing it.

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    4. My point being- I hear anout EABO and putting Marines on islands. But WHAT islands??? Where??? Id like someone to actually.pull out a map and say "these...and these...and this one" etc...
      If China moves on Taiwan, where would we ever see Chinese ship traffic?? To take Taiwan they dont need to go too far west to help defend their efforts. So what actual islands are we talking about???
      (C'mon Commandant, convince me!!)

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    5. "China will have air and naval superiority in the Western Pacific...
      "Or just resupply with C-130 airdrops."

      I see a bit of a conflict here...

      Delete
    6. My point being- I hear anout EABO and putting Marines on islands. But WHAT islands??? Where??? Id like someone to actually.pull out a map and say "these...and these...and this one" etc...

      Agreed, specifics are needed sometimes. The answer is, the mini tiny islands only visible when you zoom in which are not occuppied by China. Taiwan and Japan have many right there.

      Delete
    7. "the idea of coastwatching as a means of getting targeting intel, or really any useable intel- Im not seeing it."

      Look at a map of the region.
      https://i1.wp.com/www.dupuyinstitute.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Western-Pacific-Ocean.png

      One can't sail through the Philippines or Indonesia without coming near land. These nations are likely to remain neutral, but small coastwatcher teams could operate covertly. There are a chain of islands between Japan and the Philippines ships must sail near to transit.

      Delete
    8. Having spent quite a bit of time in the provincial Philippines, I'm not so sure how long a small coastwatcher team is going to be able to stay covert. Too many inquisitive civilians, too much experience dealing with ongoing communist and Moslem insurrections, and generally good cell service even way out in the sticks. No opinion on Indonesia, but I rather suspect the same rationale applies.

      Delete
  9. The whole EABO/LAW concept is so incredibly stupid that one wonders how any competent leader could have gotten there. One possibility is that those leaders are truly incompetent. Because the implications of that are so scary to contemplate, like Jack Ryan in Red October I tend to wonder if there is another alternative.

    There is a principle in card play called restricted choice which says that the play of one card reduces the probability that you hold an equivalent card, say playing the king reduces the probability that you hold the queen, or otherwise you might have played the equivalent queen.

    I have to wonder if the Marines are dealing with a form of restricted choice here, and they are choosing the EABO/LAW approach because they aren't being given any other options.

    ComNavOps, I know you disagree with my thinking that the Marines have been forced to accept the "big deck amphibs" LHA/LHD, from which full-scale amphibious assaults are not really possible because of the connector issues, and have kind of morphed into baby army/baby air force because they have taken whatever jobs the Army would give them. But I am stuck with either the folks in charge are blithering idiots, or their choices have been restricted. I have to believe that if a better choice were available, they would have taken it. The fact that they didn't suggests that there were no better options.

    And all of the public commentary is just lipstick on a pig.

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    1. I suspect the Commandant and other Generals realize LHA/LHDs are not relevant, but building these has become a billion dollar annual business involving big profits and lots of jobs. They refuse to speak out to upset this business, especially since most plan to earn millions working for the industry upon retirement.

      As a result, Admirals are pushing the idea of using them as CVs to fill the four carrier gap caused by the defective USS Ford program. The Ford is supposed to make a three-month mini-deployment in the Atlantic starting in September, but I've read no recent news. I plan to track this deployment to see if it sneaks back to Norfolk to repair the catapults by replacing some flywheels, which broke down in previous short outings.

      Delete
    2. I'd always pick the Atlantic in September to start my first carrier deployment. Bonkers.

      Delete
  10. Quick note about the "Davidson window", where we supposedly have until 2027 before the Chinese invade Taiwan.

    This may be obvious, but I suspect some folks may misinterpret it. This does NOT mean that there is no chance of the Chinese launching a war BEFORE 2027. It's based on intelligence analysis of Chinese capabilities and their expected change over the next few years, both of which contain a certain amount of interpretation and even guesswork. And it's also based on intelligence analysis of Chinese thinking and motives, for which we have no real knowledge since we don't know how to read minds.

    We can't assume that we have 5 years to prepare. It's just a probabilistic assessment. For all we KNOW, Mr. Xi could decide to roll the dice and attack next month, while we're still distracted by the Ukraine thing.

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    1. Actually, right now would be a good time for China to invade Taiwan. We've depleted many of our munitions sending them to Ukraine. The Navy is down to a maximum of 9 carriers (we only have 9 air wings). We have almost no anti-ship missile inventory. Guam is unprepared for war. We can't sail our ships without hitting something or running aground. We have a President who is nearly physically and mentally incapacitated and unlikely to act. We're retiring ships faster than we build new ones. And so on. China must be looking real hard at acting now.

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    2. "Actually, right now would be a good time for China to invade Taiwan"

      Agreed. And scary.

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    3. Ill second that. Of course it never hurts to wait for a few more Ticos to be decommd. Maybe even wait til the SSGNs are gone?? Those are the platforms Id fear most!!!

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  11. This makes me wish we had a full accounting of our available inventory of systems that can be bolted onto a ship in an emergency. How many CIWS might get tossed on in an emergency? What is our inventory of decoys? What do we have and consider obsolete, but might use any way in an emergency?

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    1. While the idea of maintaining systems that can be added to a ship has merit, keep in mind that modern electrical systems can't just be bolted on wherever they physically fit. For example, the Phalanx CIWS has its own radar and that radar can both cause interferences with other electrical systems (radars, sensors, EW, communications, etc.) and be subjected to interferences from other systems. This is actually a very common problem with ships. The placement of one electrical system impacts all the rest and vice versa. There is a certain amount of trial and error in electrical system placement. My suspicion from what I've read is that the odds on randomly placing an electrical system and having it cause no problems nor be subjected to problems is pretty poor.

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    2. Major cae for EO/IR for point defense to get the number of systems you advocate for. Check out the new KDX-III Batch II. Aside from the normal EO/IR you'd expect they seem to have 4 units high on the mast.

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