The Navy abhors testing. The only thing the Navy hates more than testing is realistic testing (and Congressional oversight but that’s for another post).
To everyone but the Navy, testing seems like an obvious and excellent idea; the more the better and the more realistic the better. So, if it’s that obvious and that good an idea, why is the Navy so resistant to testing? Well, from the Navy’s warped perspective we get the following reasons:
Cost – Every test costs money and the Navy has so skewed the budget to shiny new ships that they’ve allocated almost nothing for testing and they begrudge every penny that goes to testing. Testing, even for a good program, always reveals problems and problems require more money to correct and re-test. This process eats into the budget and reduces funding for more shiny new ships.
Time – Tests take time and the Navy wants to push weapon programs down the acquisition path as fast as possible so that no one has the opportunity to question a program and so that they can get on to the next acquisition program as quickly as possible before anyone realizes what’s wrong with the last one.
Congress – The Navy is deathly afraid of (and resents!) Congressional oversight. Every test opens the possibility for Congressional oversight and questions and oversight potentially threatens funding. The Navy would much rather push on with a defective product than stop and give up the funding.
Embarrassment – Every negative test is viewed (incorrectly) by the Navy as embarrassment for the institution of the Navy and the individuals responsible for the problems/failures.
So, now we know the Navy’s reasons for wanting to avoid testing. Why then, from their warped perspective, would the Navy want to test and test realistically? Is there any reason, from the Navy’s perspective, to conduct testing? The answer is, yes … or at least it should be. Let’s take a quick look at the reasons that ought to motivate the Navy to want to conduct testing.
Combat Effectiveness - Testing increases combat effectiveness by identifying the strong and weak points of each weapon system. A military will be more combat effective if it has a clear understanding of what works, what doesn’t, and under what circumstances.
Tactics and Doctrine - Testing informs tactics and doctrine. Tactics depend on weapon capabilities and you can’t know what the weapon system capabilities are without extensive and realistic testing. If you want effective tactics you need thorough testing. This was graphically demonstrated by the British in the Falklands. Their anti-air defensive tactics turned out to be wrong because they didn’t test their Sea Dart missile system enough to understand that it was not effective against low level targets and it cost them dearly.
Survivability - Testing informs survivability by identifying shortcomings in shock hardening, electronic emissions (EMCON), and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) hardening. In addition, ships and aircraft should be tested for weapon penetration.
Design - Testing feeds back into the design process. This is the old ‘test a little, learn a lot’ philosophy that feeds test results back into design evolution before a program advances too far along a flawed path.
Credibility - Testing increases the Navy’s credibility either by demonstrating that the Navy knows how to manage a program and effectively deal with the inevitable problems or by demonstrating that the Navy knows when to cut their losses and terminate a poor performing program. Either way, it makes Congress more likely to trust (and fund!) the Navy. This is, arguably, the biggest reason why the Navy should embrace testing. Note, this is not the best reason, just the biggest in terms of furthering the Navy’s goal of bigger budgets.
Conclusion
So, if we have plenty of compelling reasons why the Navy should want to conduct testing, why aren’t they? Well, sadly, the reason is linked to what the Navy’s purpose is. All of us outside the Navy understand that the Navy’s purpose is to control the seas in war and peace. Unfortunately, Navy leadership believes their purpose is to protect and expand their budget slice by building new ships. Once we understand the fundamentally warped view that the Navy has, we are able to understand – but not approve of – the Navy’s attitude towards testing. In the Navy’s view, testing does not further their quest for expanded budgets. Therefore, they don’t want to do it for all the reasons cited above. So, the Navy ought to enthusiastically embrace testing as the shining path to greater combat effectiveness but their twisted concept of their purpose pushes them down a diametrically opposed path.
By failing to embrace testing, Navy leadership is abandoning their true purpose and betraying the trust of the sailors of the Navy and the citizens of our country.
Senior naval officers have basically become good bureaucrats, and have bought into the bureaucrat mantra hook, line, and sinker. A good bureaucrat has three priorities, in order:
ReplyDelete1) My career
2) Making my agency look good
3) Doing the job I am supposed to do
The possibility a true test might produce a bad result pretty much violates numbers 1 and 2, and number 3 is a very distant third.
All of which makes EVERY decision by Navy leadership suspect and, as documented in this blog, most decisions are, in fact, wrong.
DeleteAbsolutely. The question is, what to do about it. Firing everybody with stars may be harsh, but it may be necessary.
DeleteBeing promoted to Flag level requires you toeing the company line. Outliers will never see stars.
DeleteUntil we get into an actual war and figure out that we need the outliers to win the war.
DeleteSo can we give a pat on the back to whomever tested the AGS and found it wanting. Otherwise we have 20? Zumwalts with useless guns to go with our fleet of LCSs.
DeleteBZ Nameless Bureaucrat.
"AGS"
DeleteYes, thank goodness it was cancelled. However, before you go and give too much credit to Nameless Bureaucrat (what mother would name their son that?), note that the AGS was cancelled not because of performance issues but because of price. The LRLAP was approaching $1M per round. After the fact, the Navy also happened to mention that the AGS never quite achieved its technical claims, either, but that was not why the project was cancelled. It was purely monetary.
Re: The AGS, my question has always been: Why do you design a gun around a common (155mm) caliber without making it possible to use common ammunition in it.
DeleteI realize that the goal was to have it use some super duper long range advanced shell. But why couldn't that shell have been designed to be compatible with shells used in other 155mm artillery?
The AGS fiasco will remain one of the great mysteries of the universe. What seems so blindingly obvious to us but was ignored by the Navy is a real puzzle.
DeleteA small note that may or may not be relevant is that the AGS munition was NOT a shell. It was a rocket, fired from a gun. How (if at all) this impacted the decision to create a non-standard 155 mm gun is unknown. Perhaps it had to do with rifling? The AGS is not rifled, as I understand it (supported by NavWeaps website data) presumably because a guided rocket does not require rifling. Thus, when the LRLAP failed, there was no rifled AGS for conventional 155 mm shells which DO require rifling. Maybe someone knows more about this and can chime in?
If my understanding is correct, could it not have been possible to design a rifled AGS that could still fire the LRLAP rockets but would have also been able to fire conventional shells? I would think so but perhaps there is a technical reason why it couldn't? Someone knows but it's not me.
@CDR Chip
DeleteBit of Cheap shot at 'bureaucrats' what you consider such to be?
"Bit of Cheap shot at 'bureaucrats' what you consider such to be?"
DeleteCheap or not, I think entirely warranted.
"If my understanding is correct, could it not have been possible to design a rifled AGS that could still fire the LRLAP rockets but would have also been able to fire conventional shells?"
DeleteMy understanding is "yes, but with somewhat reduced range".
To elaborate, the AGS counted on a combination of several technologies, most of which were already mature, to achieve* its required range and accuracy:
1) A relatively long barrel, 62 calibers long, to maximize muzzle velocity for a given propellant charge. This "tech" has obviously been around more or less forever.
2) A smooth bore, similar to what's found in most modern tank cannons. In that context, it helps to achieve maximum muzzle velocity when firing modern APFSDS rounds (increases in muzzle velocity for a given amount of powder diminish sharply for rifled guns firing APDS around 1300 or 1400 m/s, whereas the smoothbore firing APFSDS you can get north of 1800 m/s). What puzzles me here is that I don't think the LRLAP was a saboted projectile, or at least I can't find hard documentation on it.
3) A rocket Rocket-assisted artillery projectile, to further increase range. This is a mature technology: cf. the M549 155mm shell, which extends range of a given 155mm rifled gun system by about 33% over a conventional (non base-bleed) shell ceteris paribus, and the XM1113 155mm shell, which gives about a 45% increase over conventional 155mm shells.
4) A projectile with fins and at least some 'smart' control over them to achieve a glide-assisted trajectory (fins become lifting surfaces and you fire at a shallower angle than you would in a pure ballistic trajectory), to further increase range. This again has been done before, and successfully (eg. in the M982 155mm shell), and has been done in a way that is compatible with existing 155mm rifled guns.
5) Precision guidance, so you can hit something at the extreme ranges the gun is supposed to shoot at. Done before in M712 and M982 155mm shells, and several bolt-on kits for conventional 155mm shells.
The thing that killed the compatibility with existing ammo had to be the smooth bore. Were they really trying to get the round going that fast? And was the need for speed what killed the whole thing? I struggle to see where the technical risk was - everything here's been done before, and most combinations of things here have been done before.
Looking at existing land-based artillery systems and applying the 'standard' increases in range from longer barrels, 2nd-generation rocket assisted projectiles, glide trajectories, etc, and you probably could have made a 155mm rifled AGS with an effective range of about 45 nm. This is shorter than the longest documented shot that the AGS/LRLAP did (a 59 nm shot very early in the development process, circa 2004), and much shorter than the 83nm range objective for the AGS, but the design also would have been lower-risk and able to use absolutely dirt cheap training rounds. There also would have been economies of scale, seeing as a common rocket-assisted GPS-guided projectile could have been used in this gun and in Army and USMC 155mm artillery pieces, bringing volume up and cost down for everyone - obviously the shell doesn't care whether it's being fired from a barrel with a 155mm bore that's 39 calibers, 52 calibers or 62 calibers long.
Good summary. Thanks.
DeleteOne of the things that strikes me about this is the extreme disconnect between the stated objective range and the actual, achieved test ranges. Depending on the source, I've seen stated objective ranges of 70-100 nm. The actual test ranges were 45 -59 nm. Now, it's possible that the test ranges were not maximum attempts but were intentionally constrained by unknown factors. It's also possible that the stated objectives were Navy fantasy wish list figures unsupported by actual calculated projections. However, when the LRLAP was cancelled, the Navy stated that, in addition to cost, the projectile was never able to achieve its range or accuracy. That suggests that they did try to achieve max range and couldn't. Again, someone knowledgeable in the field should have been able to estimate a much more realistic range than the discrepancy that actually seems to have occurred.
I'd love to read a detailed, inside history of the AGS/LRLAP program. I hope someone writes it someday.
"Cheap or not, I think entirely warranted"
DeleteStill not sure unless I understand what you mean as a bureaucrat
Sorry not edit feature - ugg. But your list works even better for say corporate executives in many cases.
DeleteFor comparison, take a look at the discussion of testing for the first block of the AIM-54C in the FY81 defense appropriations hearings. I don't think I can put a link in a comment without Blogspot rejecting it, but it's in the congressional record under the hearings for H.R. 6495, pages 1241 through 1243. The Navy had to justify why it wanted to spend money on so many live-fire tests to congress instead of running simulations or doing captive-carry tests - and if you look at the test plan, they weren't softballs, with only a few easy/simple tests to verify that the simulations used during development were valid and basic functionality hadn't been broken in the transition from an analog to a digital sensor front-end (among other things). From there, missile functionality was tested in every mode, against a variety of targets at different altitudes, speeds, and aspects, performing a variety of maneuvers, and against a variety of different simulated jammers. Other sources mention that the limiting factor in eventually carrying out this test plan was the limited availability of realistic target drones for some of the shot parameters.
ReplyDeleteI have no problem with Congress exercising oversight and asking questions and demanding justification for testing because the answers and justifications should be very easy to supply and overwhelmingly justified. The Navy just needs to stand firm, be honest, and offer solid logic. Justifying why a combat system needs to be thoroughly tested is easy.
DeleteIt's one thing to skip a few tests of a coffee maker. The possible negative consequences aren't life and death. However, weapon systems that guarantee the security of the nation are not the place to skimp on testing.
DOT&E establishes test programs for our weapon systems and those programs are statistically designed. Statistical test design is a specialized discipline of statistics and ensures maximum test information from minimum number of tests. It doesn't get any better than that. Despite that, the Navy is constantly trying to avoid testing. As part of their oversight, Congress should be asking why the Navy isn't doing MORE testing!
Right, my point was that in ~40 years we've gone from the Navy trying to convince Congress to let them do more and more thorough and difficult testing to the Navy trying to convince Congress to let them do less and easier testing (or trying to do an end-run around Congressional oversight entirely). That is, we have gone from the behavior one would expect from an organization that takes its duties seriously to its opposite.
DeleteThe root of the change in observed behavior is a change in mindset within the leadership of the organization. We used to have leadership who, despite their faults, valued having systems that worked and that we knew worked over saving face; we no longer do. Without a peer threat that can very obviously obliterate us if we get complacent, admirals and generals become mandarins jockeying for position within an obviously-decaying system.
The problem, of course, is how to fix it. Based on the aftermath of Adm. Davidson's testimony - namely, a shipbuilding plan that shrinks the fleet rapidly during the window he said an invasion of Taiwan was likely to occur in, no improvement in weapons development/procurement, etc - it seems like the mindset is very resistant to change. I don't know how to fix it outside of very blunt measures that realistically will never happen (eg. "fire everyone above O-5 and read everyone else the riot act"). Losing a war would probably do the trick, but I'd like to avoid that if we can swing it.
Clearly the navy is not currently a serious organization.
ReplyDeleteThroughout the cold war the navy had a real opponent and also still had the fading echoes of the WW2 experience (and to a lesser extent Korea and Vietnam) to maintain focus.
After the demise of the Soviet Union and their fleet, the navy's biggest challenge was how to maintain their slice of the nation's budget expenditures.
We now have career navy officers who have never served in a navy where that isn't the highest priority.
I fear that the only cure to this is an epic humiliation by a foreign power.
I'd like the navy to prove me wrong on this though.
Lutefisk
Currently US is lucky China's navy is still largely a green water force without much power projection capability. Though that US advantage will potentially erode over time.
Delete"Every negative test is viewed (incorrectly) by the Navy as embarrassment."
ReplyDeleteTo be 100% fair, the modern press is trash and would absolutely attack the Navy for any less-than-ideal test result.
This doesn't justify this kind of behaviour, but partially explains it.
"To be 100% fair, the modern press is trash and would absolutely attack the Navy for any less-than-ideal test result."
DeleteThis can be easily dealt with. For starters, you don't trot out shills to hype the weapon as the greatest invention in the history of mankind thereby creating unrealistic expectations that the press will latch onto when failure occurs, as it will. Instead, you explain to the press that every new system has problems and you're determined to find them with rigorous testing so that sailors don't die needlessly in combat (appeal to the 'feelings' that dominate modern society).
Then, when testing reveals problems, as it will, you forthrightly describe them and describe what you're going to do to fix them. You don't try to cover up failings. You say that you're happy to have found the problems early.
You also emphasize that the weapon is a prototype and that you wisely DIDN'T commit to a concurrent production run before testing.
Do all this and you won't have any trouble with the press.
I read where the engineering power plant for the constellation frigate will be tested on land.
ReplyDeleteThere is another much worse reason why USN doesn't like testing - it highlights problems with products provided by the officers' future employers ie defence contractors.
ReplyDeleteYou don't get lucrative post-retirement jobs with defence contractors if you are there putting holes in their badly designed products due to evidence based test data.