Marine Commandant Berger has torn apart the United States Marine Corps with a series of controversial decisions and actions.
Best case, Berger is a genius who sees what no one else does but has failed to convey that vision in a persuasive manner and, as a result, is struggling to find support and get buy-in.
Worst case, Berger is a bona-fide idiot who hasn’t got a clue what he’s doing and the communications deficiencies simply reflect that general ineptitude.
Whether you believe his vision to be a change for the better or for the worse is up to you (hint: it’s for the worse, by a huge amount !)
With that as a backdrop, Breaking Defense has presented an article analyzing the latest Marine Corps Force Design 2030 update document. Let’s see what gems are offered.
Concurrency - One of the issues that just leaps off the pages of the 2030 update is that the design has no defined end state. It is an unfinished product with no defined end state that is constantly evolving as the changes are being enacted. If this were a ship, do you know what we’d call this? That’s right … concurrency. Berger is designing as he’s building. We’ve documented the abject failures that every attempt at concurrency has produced. Why would applying concurrency to FD2030 be any different or produce a better result than concurrency applied to a ship? It wouldn’t … and yet we’re knowingly and intentionally doing it. The US military adamantly refuses to learn lessons even when the lessons are etched on a board and then the board is used to smack the military leadership across the forehead.
Marine Littoral Regiment - From the article,
The update also notes that “We focused the MLR [Marine Littoral Regiment] too much on lethality and not enough on sensing.”[1]
Hasn’t ComNavOps been harping for years on targeting being far more important than weapons? For years! And Berger and the Marines are just now beginning to vaguely grasp this fundamental concept? The highest ranking Marine in the Corps didn’t have an inherent grasp of targeting? And he wants us to believe he understands everything else well enough to destroy the Marines in pursuit of his vision?
Amphibious Ships – The update repeats the need for 31 big deck amphibious ships despite the public statements that the Marines are out of the assault business. The ineptitude in the communication of this issue is emblematic of the Marine’s overall floundering communications. Are the Marines in the assault business or not? If not – as they have stated – then they have no need of any big deck amphibious ships. The logical discontinuity in this is gapingly wide!
The article offers this apt summary of amphibious force planning,
… the “dumpster fire” that constitutes amphibious fleet planning today … [1]
Also of note,
One minor change is that the light amphibious warfare program is now being referred to as the landing ship, medium (LSM).[1]
This is the kind of change for the sake of change that permeates today’s military (and, to be fair, industry!). This is just unproductive churn in search of a public relations gain.
Wargames – Part of the reason Berger can’t get any buy-in for his vision is that he’s released almost no supporting information so that people could look at it and understand his rationale. While insisting that it’s all based on exhaustive wargaming, there has been zero information about those games. Apparently, -and perhaps recognizing the communications problem – the Marines are going to release some wargame summaries.
The Marine Corps now plans to publish unclassified executive summaries of its wargames beginning in November 2022.[1]
This will be a welcome development if, indeed, the Marines follow through and offer something informative and substantial … I’m not counting on it. You don’t generally go from paranoid secrecy to openness. I expect the summaries to be bereft of useful information and to read like a sales brochure extolling the virtues of the game and the Marine’s masterful vision … but we’ll see.
Focus – One of the [many] criticisms of Berger’s strategy is that it seems myopically focused on China and ignores the rest of the world. Stung by that criticism, FD2030 is now being referred to as a global strategy despite nothing about it having changed. That’s reprehensible marketing spin that is disingenuous, at best, and fraudulent, more accurately. Changing the name doesn’t change the concept. It’s still a one-theater, single enemy strategy.
Logistics – A major weakness/flaw in Berger’s concept is logistics. The belief that we can establish large footprint units (yes, those missile launching trucks, supporting trucks, machinery, supplies, etc. automatically constitute a large footprint) and keep them resupplied pushes the limits of credulity and the Marines still have not addressed the issue.
… the update identifies logistics as the major unresolved issue since resupplying widely distributed units inside an adversary’s defensive zone is extremely challenging.[1]
Hey, Berger … logistics is the very first issue you should have addressed. Remember the saying about professionals practice logistics? What does the fact that logistics remains unresolved say about your professionalism? Why are you proceeding with a concept that has unresolved logistics issues and no defined end state?
Conclusion
FD2030 is an undefined concept that lacks targeting concepts and a viable logistics support plan. Targeting and logistics are the two fundamental pillars of any force/operation design and neither have a viable solution. Despite those fundamental deficiencies, Commandant Berger is pushing ahead and concurrently designing as he goes which never turns out well.
FD2030 should never have seen the light of day.
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[1]Breaking Defense, “Analyzing the biggest changes in the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 update”, Mark Cancian, 14-Jun-2022,
You're putting more thought into this than the Commandant. You should get published on Navy Times, Task & Purpose, and other outlets so our current and future military leaders will be forced to THINK.
ReplyDeleteOther outlets????? This is the only one I know!
ReplyDeleteBerger's operational concept is being tested right now on Snake Island. Russian forces have held on to the island because Ukraine doesn't have much amphibious or airborne assault capability and lacks proper modern airpower but get pounded pretty regularly.
ReplyDeleteNow apply to a strategically important but uninhabited island in Pacific that's close enough to target Chinese area of operations.
Berger assumes:
1. China will ignore the island completely.
2. His forces will be able to infiltrate in their slow defenceless LAW (now LSMs) and then lob missiles at Chinese warships and even submarines.
3. Chinese will not respond let alone retaliate.
Yet we're seeing from Snake Island that a fourth rate power (Ukraine) can strike such islands at will against a better equipped third rate power (Russia).
So now replicate to Chinese/Pacific scenario:
1. Unlike Ukraine, China has a well developed navy including lots of small surface combatants ala Type 056 corvettes and diesel electric subs that are ideal for patrol work and intercepting enemy watercraft.
2. Unlike Ukraine, China has a very well developed land attack capability including land and ship based weapons as well as significant air power.
3. Unlike Ukraine, China also has growing amphibious assault capability with over 60 ships ranging from 700t Type 074s to 4800t Type 072s to 25,000t Type 071s to 40,000t Type 075s. Ukraine had 2 before war, largest of which was 1192t.
4. Ukraine only had a couple of naval infantry battalions which were used in conventional ground warfare (including Mauripol), whereas China has its own marine corps with 40,000 men.
5. China has an extensive and growing naval surveillance network including powerful Over The Horizon radars, maritime patrol aircraft, many patrol and surveillance aircraft whereas Ukraine had only a limited capability (newly established with Bayraktar TB2 drones).
6. And then that Chinese threat the Americans pretend doesn't exist - sea mines. China has huge numbers of them (possibly over 100,000). These would probably be used to protect critical approaches. And with USN MCM fleet near extinct and capability severely diminished, the Marines will struggle operating at will.
Forgot to mention, if Berger's operational concept requires USN, USMC airpower and USAF assets to blast a path open for his LSMs to infiltrate, then the Marines are redundant.
ReplyDeleteSinking enemy ships and subs so you can infiltrate small group of Marines to sink odd ships and subs is stupid. Better then to invest in more frigates, destroyers and combat aircraft.
A decade ago, retired Marine Corps General Paul Van Riper said: "There's an unfortunate culture developing in the American military that maybe should make you nervous. I don't see the rich intellectual discussions that we had after Vietnam. I see mostly slogans, clichés and unreadable materials."
ReplyDelete"logistics is the very first issue you should have addressed. Remember the saying about professionals practice logistics? What does the fact that logistics remains unresolved say about your professionalism? Why are you proceeding with a concept that has unresolved logistics issues and no defined end state?"
ReplyDeleteI am glad you called them out on this. So far, everything I have read (and I have read it all) is that he plans on Marines being secretly placed on islands within the range of enemies missiles, and somehow fling missiles at ships without them figuring out where they come from. To do this they will use slow ass ships in an area where diesel subs lurk. Supplying the Marines counts on technologies and systems we do not have and are not even looking at. I do not believe he has even seriously though of the logistics part of this.....and if he has...how has he war gamed it?
How did this guy become Commandant?
"Marines being secretly placed on islands"
DeleteLogistics aside, this is the most puzzling aspect of Berger's plan. How he thinks he'll insert platoon/company size units with large missile-carrying trucks and all their supporting gear on moderately sized, glacially slow, non-stealthy transports is a mystery to me. This would be equivalent to an enemy placing combat forces in the Gulf of Mexico and us not seeing it. It's simply not a viable scenario. I'd really like him to explain how the Chinese, in their home waters, won't see these transports slowly making their way to various islands, stopping, and unloading.
The degree of fantasy you have to inject into this concept to make it work is astounding.
ReplyDeleteOver at the Warhall at warontherocks.com, there are a bunch of Marine JO's gushing about how great FD2030 and EABO are. I have tried to get them to address ComNavOps's concerns (and mine) but they just brush them off. They just keep talking about how this is somehow a return to the Marines' roots. It's like talking to Jim Jones followers. I hope they meet a better end.
Berger may not have great ideas, but he has obviously sold them to his troops if not to anybody else.
"JO's"
DeleteBy definition, JO's have not been around long enough to have experienced any other system so, of course they'd think this was great. It's all they've ever known.
Best I can tell this littoral regiment will consist of one infantry battalion broken down into platoon size security teams to act as coast watchers with Stinger air defense. They will protect a few ultra-expensive anti-ship missile trucks that can hit ships up 100 miles from the coast. For this to work, the Corps needs to establish two dozen 180-day supply caches in key areas in the Pacific. Otherwise the supplies won't be in theater to support this regiment nor the means to move them. The V-22s lack the payload, speed, and range to be useful intra-theater. The C-130s need huge airfields. They also need something bigger than a Stinger for air defense.
ReplyDeleteSetting aside the logistics challenge which no one has yet explained, the other 'stopper' problem is targeting. As I remining people, a million mile missile is useless if you only have horizon range targeting. These tiny, platoon size units have no viable means to target 100+ miles away. To believe a clandestine sensor and communication targeting network can be set up in the first island chain, undetected and unhindered by the Chinese, is pure fantasy. The small detachments can't provide/produce their own targeting beyond the visual horizon unless they try to operate UAVs which will lead the Chinese straight back to the hidden bases, assuming they miraculously managed to establish themselves without the Chinese noticing.
DeleteThis concept has multiple, serious flaws that have not been publicly addressed and until they are, I (and dozens of retired Generals !) can't support it.
If they would consult with me, I'd say get some Mark VI patrol boats, which have been modified to operate UAVs. Modify others to carry two old Harpoons. Hide in coves and move around often and can even island hop at night. And you can dash out of cover to extend range when needed. Also great for pilot CSAR.
ReplyDeleteAlso, each amphib can fit four Mark VIs in her well deck, so they can deploy them from a safe distance.
Deletehttps://a.disquscdn.com/uploads/mediaembed/images/3667/5488/original.jpg
Hey, I found a role for the huge amphibs! The Corps should give me a medal. So long as someone doesn't say, shouldn't this be a navy role.
Why doesn't the USMC "cut out the middleman" and simply use those amphibious assault ships as "islands" that can move to bring enemy targets within range of the missile launchers they can station aboard, and then move out-of-range of enemy counterattacks?Yes, the Navy will then ask, "We can already do that with our guided missile cruisers and destroyers. What will we need you for?" but at least that means we can get some use out of all those amphibious assault ships the USMC had the Navy build for it, at ruinous cost.
Delete"Also, each amphib can fit four Mark VIs in her well deck"
DeleteAmphibs vary, but a Whidbey Island can actually carry EIGHT Mark 6's !!
I noticed that. Instead of retiring all these, refit a couple as patrol boat tenders. That would be a cost free added capability for lots of situations.
Deletethe whole concept is so detrimental, it removes the corps from significantly taking on anything other than the island chain role. Remove all tanks and use Ukraine as the tank is dead argument, no, maybe Russian tanks are dead, but bad equipment is bad equipment. What if we had say a Middle Eastern nation loaded with Leopard II's, or Abrams, for that matter? Corps need not apply. And China can simply be using MacArthur's island hopping campaign. How'd that work out for Japan as the defender? At times it feels like Berger felt the easiest path to deal with resistance to funding is not fight for the appropriate funding needed to do the tasks needed, but make a light, aka cheap, force loaded down with ASUW missiles, trucks, and in theory cheap- but new- LST clones, not that he has tanks. But yet he needs the gator navy to do exactly what? In the end, it feels like he should have adapted to the fast transport small ships the Navy already had for sending them between islands (slow and disguised=sunk, like any ship going in the Black Sea these days), kept his large gator ships for staging assaults on the least defended areas, and kept himself flexible. By not being flexible on force composition, he could put it in a corner he won't get it out of, or his next 20 successors, that is if it can get out of it. The logistics will simply alone leave his guys to be stranded, bypassed, or simply punished and crushed by MRBM's on those islands.
ReplyDelete