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Wednesday, April 27, 2022

Navy 30 Year Shipbuilding Plan

After ignoring the law for the last few years and not providing Congress with an annual, 30 year shipbuilding plan as mandated in Section 231 of Title 10, United States Code, the Navy has finally delivered a plan to Congress.  The Navy’s blatant and illegal disregard for the law is both appalling and criminal although, disappointingly, no criminal penalties are specified in the legislation.  But, I digress …

 

Let’s take a look at the plan.

 

The first thing that jumps out is that the Navy couldn’t even come up with a plan.  Instead, they’ve submitted a group of three alternative shipbuilding paths.  Two are predicated on constant shipbuilding budgets in terms of real growth and one is predicated on substantial real growth.  Apparently, despite taking multiple years to produce this plan, the Navy couldn’t even settle on a single plan.  So, instead of a plan we have nebulous optional paths.  That’s pathetic that our professional warriors couldn’t even map out a shipbuilding plan.  Instead, they’ve opted for options, presumably, so as to avoid having to commit to an actual plan.  There’s no responsibility if there’s no actual plan, is there?  Way to avoid responsibility, Navy.

 

All three plans share a common first five years (2023-27, the so called Five Year Defense Plan or FYDP period).  Since the out years (beyond the five year FYDP period) are just pure fiction, let’s take a look at the five year FYDP period.

 

 

FYDP

 

New Construction

 

Per Table A1-2 in the plan, the FYDP period calls for the construction of 50 new ships (32 combat vessels plus 3 SSBN plus 15 logistics and support vessels).  That’s an average of 10 new vessels per year.  The new construction type breakdown is:

 

Decommissionings by year:

 

2023  24

2024  13

2025  13

2026  14

2027  13

 

Total  77

 

That's an average of over 15 per year versus the construction rate of 10 per year.


Of the decommissionings, 31 of the 77 will be early retirements.

 

The retirements include, among others, 2 carriers (Nimitz, Eisenhower), 17 Ticonderoga class Aegis cruisers, 11 LCS (9 Freedom and 2 Independence), the entire remaining Avenger class MCM vessels, 10 of the remaining 11 Whidbey Island and Harper’s Ferry class LSDs which carry the bulk of our LCAC landing craft and well deck capacity, 3 of the 4 SSGNs which are the most potent offensive assets in the Navy, 7 Henry J. Kaiser class T-AO oilers, and assorted other logistic and support ships.

 

So, over the next five years we’re decommissioning 77 ships and building 50 new ones for a net decrease of 27 ships.  Anyone see a problem, here?

 

Unmanned

 

Here’s the Navy vision for unmanned vessels:

 

… unmanned platforms will achieve 89-149 platforms in FY2045 … [1, p.8]

 

As you can see, with no proof of concept, the Navy has already committed to a significant portion of the fleet being small, unmanned vessels.

 

 

Sealift Capacity

 

The report cites a current requirement for 85 sealift ships versus a current inventory of 71 ships for a net deficit of 14 ships.  The Navy plans to address the deficit by acquiring 22 used ships for conversion to sealift at a total cost of $1.011B (average $46M per ship).

 

 

Summary

 

The plan random paths offered by the Navy paint a clear picture of a Navy that is floundering, unable to even offer a coherent, single plan.  We are retiring, and will continue to retire, ships at twice the rate we’re building new ones.  Worse, the ships we’re shedding are large and powerful and are being numerically replaced by small, nearly defenseless, unmanned vessels.  As we’ve demonstrated in previous posts, the Navy VLS inventory is going to shrink drastically along with a shortfall of submarines.

 

This so-called 30 year plan is both a joke and a horrifying nightmare demonstration of incompetence on a scale that leads to the inexorable conclusion that our nation’s maritime security is in great danger.

 

 

 

_________________________________

 

[1]Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023”, Apr-2022

 

40 comments:

  1. "Instead, they’ve submitted a group of three alternative shipbuilding paths."

    What is this, a video game?

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  2. A thought that it reflects the failure of Navy never to look back at their own history for the other possible options to increase the size of the fleet, they just seem to be stuck in a time wrap as costs continue to rise of their current policy of multi-function ship designs, consequently fleet gets ever smaller and Congress (and the informed navy press) never question and put pressure on the Navy to come up with answers.

    One possible solution is single function ships you so strongly advocate and for me additionally the nuclear powered CVN's, nuclear to me just a big black hole to pour money down when there's a viable option, conventionally powered.

    A current example of Navy thinking is the proposed design of the new multi-function DDG(X) with its new expensive IPES propulsion system needed for future proofing it for DEW power requirements, ship will be larger than a Burke and expect cost 50+% if not more, would also mention the Navy mentality when it classifies Constellation a near 7,500t ship as a "small" surface combatant.

    PS "Pentagon Needs Realistic Experimentation for Emerging Tech, Says Navy Scientist" James Stewart, chief electro-magnetic warfare scientist at the Navy’s Surface Warfare Center in Crane, Ind. "The Pentagon needs a realistic experimentation program built in to evaluate emerging technologies like Joint All Domain Command and Control and hypersonic or directed energy weapons // “You can’t just assume things are going to work when you go out to the field,” Stewart said."

    From

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  3. Just the ships being early-retired in the next five years constitute a more powerful navy than most other major powers own. Don't count the LCSs and think of what you could accomplish with a task force made up of those ships!

    What's worse, their ostensible replacements will generally be less capable. Ford's problems are well known and the plan seems to be to ignore them rather than fix them, the Constellations won't do anything like the job of a Tico, etc.

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  4. As should be expected, the two parts that I would find most interesting are not released to the public--Estimated Total Cost of Construction for Each Ship (limited distribution) and Capabilities of the Future Force (classified). I am sure there are good and prudent reasons for limiting the distribution and classification of those sections, respectively. But parts of me wonder if this isn't a reprise of the old Vietnam-era joke that classification exists to protect the stupidity of the originator.

    Without having access to those sections, I am still pretty sure that I can summarize them pretty succinctly:
    Cost--a ludicrous dream, detached from reality.
    Capability--an even more ludicrous dream.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "Estimated Total Cost of Construction for Each Ship:

      The total costs are shown in various graphs in the report and are further broken out by ship type. The FYDP section has additional, more detailed costs shown. Now, the costs are Navy estimates so they're worthless but they're there.

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    2. "The total costs are shown in various graphs in the report and are further broken out by ship type. The FYDP section has additional, more detailed costs shown. Now, the costs are Navy estimates so they're worthless but they're there."

      Oh, I know. I just find it interesting that they limited the distribution of what would appear to be a more direct statement of costs, rather than having to break it out of graphs and summary data. Agree 100% that Navy estimates are worthless.

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    3. Table A1-1, p.13 of the report has the costs for each individual ship type tabulated. Are you looking for something different? I'll be happy to try to help you find whatever you're looking for but that report is pretty complete, setting aside the questionable nature of the numbers.

      Delete
    4. I'm just wondering what merits "Limited Distribution" treatment given the information in the publicly distributed part of the report.

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    5. If everything that is in the limited distribution section is in the public report, why have a limited distribution section. If it isn't, what's different and why?

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    6. I'm not sure what limited distribution you're referring to. The only reference to restricted information that I recall in the 30 year plan was related to ship/fleet performance metrics. I may have missed something but I don't recall any restricted cost information.

      In other documents, I've seen references to restricted cost information for reasons of corporate trade secrets and proprietary information security but that's not the case here.

      I'd be happy to help you but I'm really not sure what you're specifically concerned with. Give me some more information to work with.

      Delete
  5. I think we need an overall strategic goal for the military to guide future strategy, tactics, force structure, and procurement. I am sort of partial to JFK's "two and one-half wars" concept, based on fighting full-scale wars on two fronts (Russia in Europe and China in Asia/Pacific) plus a rogue nation (Iran?) or terror group (al-Qaeda?) simultaneously. To do that from the naval perspective would probably require 600-ish ships. They can't have an average procurement cost of $2.8B/ship, like current USN shipbuilding plans (and even that number is probably unreasonably optimistic). Building a few of the ships the Navy wants (but limiting them to existing proved technology, unlike the Fords) and fleshing out the numbers with cheaper single-purpose ships could cut the cost/ship in half. That would permit a 600-ship fleet to be built over 30 years for a construction cost of $28B/year in 2022 dollars, or over 40 years for $21B/year. The latter is basically current levels, and the former might be sellable to congress with the right approach.

    The "600-ship Navy" program of the Reagan era included:

    1. Recommissioning the Iowa-class battleships
    2. Keeping older ships in service longer
    3. A large new construction program
    4. Stepped up production of Nimitz-class aircraft carriers

    I don't think 1 is doable any more, but a new class of battlewagons with 16-inch guns and long/medium range anti-surface missiles, including hypersonic, could be very useful.
    2 is exactly opposite what the USN is proposing to do. As cheezit notes above, just the ships being decommissioned in the next five years would constitute one of the most powerful navies in the world, and the replacements are less capable.
    3 is needed, but to get it through Congress requires giving up some pie-in-the-sky overly expensive ships based on futuristic technology and building cheaper ships based on existing technology that works.
    4 should be modified to say, stop the Fords, build more Nimitzes, and supplement with conventional carriers.

    Could we effectively crew and operate such a fleet? We did in the 1980s (up to 594 ships) so the short answer is yes. How to do it now? Cut admin/overhead costs by 25% and headcount by 50%, and maintain a significant portion of the fleet in a reserve status, deployable in 120 days or less, and you would have the money and headcount to get it done.

    It can be done, and it needs to be done, but not the way the USN is going about it.

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    Replies
    1. "I am sort of partial to JFK's "two and one-half wars" concept"

      That concept is fundamentally flawed and you're going along with it! The flaw is that you don't win a war with the military you have at the start, you win it with the military you build DURING IT. We won WWII with 6,000 ships but we started the war with just a couple hundred.

      The 2-1/2 war concept visualizes fighting wars with existing forces and that's not how it's done. The concept you should be embracing is one of wartime production. How will you build hundreds of ships per year and thousands of aircraft? How will you build a thousand missiles per month? And so on.

      The 2-1/2 war concept is an academic, feel-good exercise that is not based on a practical foundation. That foundation, of course, being the aforementioned wartime production.

      Delete
    2. "Could we effectively crew and operate such a fleet? We did in the 1980s (up to 594 ships) so the short answer is yes. How to do it now?"

      To expand on this, the FY1985 defense budget was $286.8 billion, about $766 billion in 2022 dollars (via CPI-U). The current defense budget (FY2022) is $778 billion. The total amount of cash being currently spent is not the problem - the problem is that we have foolishly spent and continue to foolishly spend the money the taxpayer forks over.

      Nb. that while the 'peace dividend' budget cuts were real, that FY85 budget was also correcting for a poor funding environment for about a decade from the early '70s through the early '80s. Ultimately the real wounds have been self-inflicted by the naval services, the results of dishonesty rooted in wishful thinking, poorly aligned incentives, overconfidence, and motivated reasoning.


      Now, to be constructive, how is it that we can start to dig out of this hole? The first step is, as you said elsewhere in the thread, to get a realistic strategic picture of what the threats are, and what we want the military in general and the naval services in particular to be able to do about them. From this strategic concept, you then derive short- and long-term force requirements.

      If the threat of a general Pacific war with China is high over the short term (as admirals have recently testified to Congress), then one thing that is certain to be a requirement is to get more *useful* hulls of certain types in the water as soon as possible. There will be political trouble here - eg. if you suggest refueling and converting each Ohio to an SSGN as a Columbia comes on line to replace it as an SSBN, somebody (probably somebody in the Block V Virginia program) will interpret that as a threat to their fiefdom and come up with a study suggesting that it will cost more and take longer to refuel and convert than it would take to build a new boat. So you need to get a knowledgeable outsider to do the study first, and when the inevitable counter-study comes you need to hit it hard if it includes a bunch of obvious nonsense (eg. whoever wants to kill the program will calculate a figure that includes gold-plating the thing, replacing the sonar with that from a Block IV/V Virginia, replacing the battle management system, etc instead of doing a straightforward conversion - I may be wrong but I think this is how certain admirals killed the Ticos by bungling the refurb program). My point here isn't "refurbing every Ohio as an SSGN to supplement the Virginias is obviously the right thing to do", btw, and it may well be the case that it's a bad idea to do so - I'm merely trying to illustrate the general point that we need to determine needed capabilities and then figure out how to cost-effectively increase those capabilities in the short term given the tools we have on hand, and vigorously defend against the bad-faith arguments that vested interests will make against whatever tack we take.

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    3. "killed the Ticos by bungling the refurb program"

      The Navy didn't bungle the Tico modernization program. Their goal was to idle the Ticos, allow them to fall into serious disrepair, and then claim they couldn't be salvaged. Though reprehensible and traitorous, the plan was brilliantly and successfully executed and the Navy is finally going to retire the Ticos, as was their intent all along.

      Delete
    4. As I have stated in previous postings, the ship repair industry is having a hard time keeping up with repairs to ships now...let alone with a larger fleet. Sailors no longer do maintenance on ships...period. When I get a tasking to repair a file cabinet? And it had to pass from the work center on the ship, through the 3MC, to the ships Port Engineer, and get farmed out to a contractor to repair? I am saying "repair" not install new.
      Something is systematically broken in the Navy and it is the reliance on shipyards and ship repair contractors to fix every little thing on their ships. The average age of the workers in one of the largest ship repair yards in Hampton Roads area was 57 years old....and that was 10 years ago. Most of those guys are now retired. And who is taking their place? Young people do not want these jobs..they are hot, dirty, and smelly.
      Parts availability is another issue. Most of these 30 year old ships were built using parts from small businesses. Most of them are no longer in business. And did the Navy buy the technical drawings that went with these parts? Why ever would you think that. So parts are taking anywhere from 1-6 months or longer to get and then they come at a premium cost.
      The ship repair industry is hurting and there is no relief in sight.

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    5. Just to add to what you said, there is also the issue of shipboard maintenance facilities, meaning shops. Ships used to have machining shops to make their own parts, if necessary, along with pipefitting, electrical, HVAC, etc. shops. A ship and crew had the equipment and facilities to do their own repairs. We're designing ships without those shops, now. I can't blame the crew if they have no facilities and tools (and training).

      This is just another manifestation of the Navy's misguided and foolish movement towards contractor and shore maintenance instead of onboard maintenance. I'm not sure how the Navy thinks a ship, at sea and damaged in combat, will conduct repairs when contractors and shore facilities are nowhere around?

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    6. "The flaw is that you don't win a war with the military you have at the start, you win it with the military you build DURING IT. We won WWII with 6,000 ships but we started the war with just a couple hundred."

      Well, if I need 6,000 ships to win a war, I'd rather start with 600 than 200. Particularly since probably the best way to get the wartime shipyard capacity needed is to ramp up peacetime production and get more yards involved.

      "The 2-1/2 war concept visualizes fighting wars with existing forces and that's not how it's done. The concept you should be embracing is one of wartime production. How will you build hundreds of ships per year and thousands of aircraft? How will you build a thousand missiles per month?"

      Well, we start day 1 with existing forces. And we'd better be able to hold the fort with them until more arrive. The key to all of this is ramping up wartime production capability. And you don't just flip a switch and it happens. You have to ramp up peacetime capability, and that doesn't happen without more shipyards.

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    7. "if I need 6,000 ships to win a war, I'd rather start with 600 than 200."

      You're missing the concept. We could have built 50 Pennsylvania class superdreadnaughts prior to WWII but that would have just given us 50 obsolete BBs instead of the 15 or so we had and we would have had a lot less cash for the war. Every ship you build before a war is one more obsolete ship to start the war.

      What you want to focus on is wartime production. Yes, more shipyards are a part of that but only a minor part. The really important part is to have basic, simple, single function ship designs in hand and ready to go along with assured raw material supply lines and a robust supporting industrial capacity.

      For example, today, we totally lack the rare earths needed for all of our sensors (among other items). We won't be able to make ANY sensors when war comes. Our computer chip supply is severely limited and we won't be able to make ... well ... anything when war comes.

      If we'll need 6000 ships, the answer is not to build 600 before the war, it's to build our supply lines and industrial capacities while developing simple, easily produced ship/aircraft designs. We need F6F Hellcat designs ready to go, not hybrid battlecruiser-helicopter ships that are going to soak up all our funding that should be going to supply line development.

      You're so focused on the spreadsheet and accounting aspects of all this that you aren't seeing the bigger issues. How do you win a war? It's not with existing ships and aircraft, it's with wartime production which is about raw materials, processing, and supply lines, not number of shipyards. We could have a hundred shipyards but if we have no computer chips those shipyards won't build a single ship.

      Are you grasping this?

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    8. "It's not with existing ships and aircraft, it's with wartime production which is about raw materials, processing, and supply lines, not number of shipyards.

      Are you grasping this?"

      Absolutely. But you don't start a war with the fleet you can build in 4 years. You start it with the fleet you have in existence, in the water, on day 1. And if we start WW3 behind the 8-ball, we probably won't have 4 years to fix it.

      I guess I don't understand exactly where you are coming from. You start the thread complaining about the inadequacy of the Navy shipbuilding program, but now you seem to be saying it doesn't matter what you build now, it's what you can build in the future. If you are taking a devil's advocate position, then I can understand, but sometimes I get the feeling that you are being contrary just to be contrary.

      I see two needs to address:

      1) Have a fleet (and army and air force and marines) in place that can at least hold their own from the start of a worst-case conflict.

      2) Identify and put in place solutions to the raw materials, processing, supply lines, and shipyards issues to be encountered in any kind of massive buildup.

      It seems to me that building up now is a way to at least begin to address both those needs. If WW3 is a quick strike event, then we need to be able to deliver that quick strike and counter that of any enemy. If it is to be a war of attrition, then we are going to need the functional equivalent of the Kaiser coffins to win it. I think we need to be ready for both. Jeep carriers in large numbers were truly needed to win WW2, But they would have been in a world of hurt without the fleet carriers

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    9. "I guess I don't understand exactly where you are coming from."

      The point I'm trying to convey to you is that you don't design a fleet to win 2-1/2 wars or whatever criteria you choose. That's a flawed concept. You design a wartime production capability to win wars. As you correctly note, you also need a fleet sufficient to begin a war and hold its own until your production can ramp up. So, my concerns are twofold:

      1. Designing a peacetime fleet to a flawed XX number of wars.
      2. Maintaining an adequate fleet to meet the initial war demands.

      Currently, the US is doing neither. You're in danger of falling into the Navy way of thinking which is more ships for the sake of ships (that's a spreadsheet exercise) without reasoning through how they'll be useful in an overall strategic and operational context.

      "building up now is a way to at least begin to address both those needs."

      This path is fraught with peril and, beyond a certain point, is counterproductive as it will result in large numbers of obsolete ships (French tanks, American battleships) and all the ships will be poorly maintained.

      Delete
    10. "that can at least hold their own"

      Now, is that requirement really met by the fleet you have in mind? Holding is a defensive posture. Is the fleet you've designed the one that is best suited for that or have you designed a 'win XX wars fleet' that is not ideal for holding?

      I don't have an answer or opinion about that because the strategy of holding is not one I've carefully thought through to any satisfying conclusion, yet.

      Delete
    11. I can tell you this. The LHD's have all the shops on board to to most any repair to systems while underway. There are motor rewind shops, full machine shops, weld shops, valve rebuild shops......the sailor, with the exception of a very few that care, do not know how to do any of those things. I was working on one of the aircraft elevators and needed ships force to perform a function for testing. We had to delay for 5 days while the sailor who knew how to do it, a 3rd Class Petty Officer, was on leave that week. Unless the individual sailor takes the time to read the pubs and walk the systems and learn, they have no idea. I ran into this issue time and time again...a/c plants, refers, elevators....
      The Navy has had a fundamental shift from operator/maintainer to operator only. I have opened up controllers for equipment and seen so many jumpers..there were jumpers on jumpers. They just do enough to get it to work and turn in a job for contractors to figure out.
      We have no Tenders anymore, we have no SIMA's, we have no place for sailors to learn those advanced skill sets that will be required when the lead content of the air gets high.

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    12. I am going to have to take exception to a few comments.

      “You're missing the concept. We could have built 50 Pennsylvania class superdreadnaughts prior to WWII but that would have just given us 50 obsolete BBs instead of the 15 or so we had and we would have had a lot less cash for the war. Every ship you build before a war is one more obsolete ship to start the war.”

      If we build obsolete ships, yes. But I’m not talking about building anything like Pennsylvania-class superdreadnoughts or their modern equivalents, so I’m not sure where you are getting this from.

      “What you want to focus on is wartime production. Yes, more shipyards are a part of that but only a minor part. The really important part is to have basic, simple, single function ship designs in hand and ready to go along with assured raw material supply lines and a robust supporting industrial capacity.”

      Where have I said that I’m not focused on those things? I’ve talked repeatedly about shipyards (which are one key) and about supply chains. And we have both proposed fleet designs, and I think mine contains more of those basic, simple, single-purpose ships than yours does.

      “If we'll need 6000 ships, the answer is not to build 600 before the war, it's to build our supply lines and industrial capacities while developing simple, easily produced ship/aircraft designs.”

      I am totally onboard with that. What makes you think that I’m not? Whenever I’ve talked about fleet structure, I’ve thought in terms of supply chains and facilities to build and maintain. One of the reasons I have considered so many foreign designs is thinking that with the promise of longer production runs, perhaps we could attract more foreign yards to invest here and revitalize our own shipbuilding industry.

      “You're so focused on the spreadsheet and accounting aspects of all this that you aren't seeing the bigger issues. How do you win a war? It's not with existing ships and aircraft, it's with wartime production which is about raw materials, processing, and supply lines, not number of shipyards. We could have a hundred shipyards but if we have no computer chips those shipyards won't build a single ship.”

      I have used spreadsheets as helpful presentation tools, but that’s not my approach. Everything I’ve done has started from how to win a war, what does winning look like, and how do we make that happen. I’ve actually produced the only fleet plans that roll forward into what ships go where to implement war plans when the balloon goes up. I’ve seen a lot of oh, we need so many of these and so many of those, but very little that actually plugs it in to implementing a war plan (perhaps because we don’t really have any war plans). Yes, there will be casualties, and numbers will need to be replaced/augmented, but the closer you start to having a plan and being able to plug the pieces into a war plan on day 1, the better off you are certain to be.

      I agree that the USA has almost always won wars by outproducing our enemies rather than by out strategizing them. But there are no guarantees, and considerable doubts, that WW3 will last long enough for that. So we had better line up everything from the start.

      What is our grand strategy?
      What needs to happen to implement that strategy?
      What do we need to make those things happen?
      How do we get them?

      That is my approach, and the one I think we need to take. That is not the approach that I think the USN is taking, because I don’t see how you end up with Fords or LHAs/LHDs or LPD-17s or LCSs or Zumwalts with that approach.

      Delete
    13. "If we build obsolete ships, yes."

      We're building obsolete ships right now! The Burkes are well past prime service. They lack modern stealth, power, self-defense SeaRAM/CIWS, etc.

      Delete
    14. "The point I'm trying to convey to you is that you don't design a fleet to win 2-1/2 wars or whatever criteria you choose. That's a flawed concept. You design a wartime production capability to win wars. As you correctly note, you also need a fleet sufficient to begin a war and hold its own until your production can ramp up. So, my concerns are twofold:
      1. Designing a peacetime fleet to a flawed XX number of wars."

      Well, you have to start out designing a fleet to do something. Otherwise you are just accumulating assets of questionable value, which is what the USN seems to be doing. We can debate the merits of whether "2-1/2 wars" is an appropriate standard, and I'd be happy to engage in that discussion if you'd like, but I don't see how you can do anything without some goal--peacetime and/or wartime--in mind.. I'm certainly not weded to 2-1/2 wars, but see it as more a starting point from which to discuss needs and resources.

      "2. Maintaining an adequate fleet to meet the initial war demands."

      I'm not quite certain how to distinguish this from the first point. I do think the thing that is important and being overlooked is the development of a wartime sustainment production capability. I don't know a better way to build that than to start now building up the fleet, and using the lessons learned from that buildup to drive plans and decisions for wartime production. It is almost certainly easier to take a facility that is building say, 4-5 escorts a year and ramp it up to 10-20 escorts/year than it is to identify currently non-existent or idle facility and bring it online at those levels.

      "Currently, the US is doing neither. You're in danger of falling into the Navy way of thinking which is more ships for the sake of ships (that's a spreadsheet exercise) without reasoning through how they'll be useful in an overall strategic and operational context."

      Actually, no, and the fact that you interpret my comments this way implies that either I am not doing an effective job of communicating or you are not doing a thorough job of understanding my comments. My approach is define the strategy first, determine what things have to happen in order to achieve that strategy, identify what resources are needed to make those things happen, and then figure out the best way to get them given time and resource constraints. It ends up on a spreadsheet, to be sure, because that is the most straightforward way to present the data, but the spreadsheet is the final product, not the analysis. By the way, I find it interesting that you characterize it as spreadsheet analysis when I don't believe I have ever shown you any of my spreadsheets.

      "This path is fraught with peril and, beyond a certain point, is counterproductive as it will result in large numbers of obsolete ships (French tanks, American battleships) and all the ships will be poorly maintained."

      That is what I'm trying to avoid very strictly. Don't build obsolete ships or obsolete anything else. Figure out what the next war is going to require (the advantage of the Fleet Problems between WWI and WWII), decide what you need to win that war, test it in live training evolutions, refine and perfect.

      I don't think the people making the decisions are properly focused on what those decisions mean for the next war. Perhaps "2-1/2 wars" is not the optimum approach to determining needs. But it is better than nothing, and that is what USN seems to have now.

      Delete
    15. "Well, you have to start out designing a fleet to do something. ... We can debate the merits of whether "2-1/2 wars" is an appropriate standard,"

      It's a non-sensical standard. The only rational standard is the ability to fight and win a global war regardless of how many countries are fighting against us and where they're fighting.

      " I don't know a better way to build that than to start now building up the fleet,"

      Of course there's a better way! The better way is to analyze the raw material requirements for each piece of equipment you need and then work on building and securing the supply line of each of those raw materials.

      After you've secured your raw materials, then you begin working on production capacity (factories). Identify production quantity requirements and ensure that you have the production facilities capable of meeting that requirement. That doesn't necessarily mean building factories that will stand idle, waiting for war (although that might be necessary in many cases). It may mean identifying industries (like the auto industry) that can quickly converted to wartime production needs. Stockpile specialized machinery that might be needed.

      Work on developing simple, basic, easily produced ship, weapon, and aircraft designs and then build a few prototypes of each to prove out the design. Then, put the designs into storage, ready to go when needed.

      THAT'S HOW YOU PREPARE FOR A GLOBAL WAR! Did you note what was not included in that description? Hint: it's the very foundation of your approach. It's actually building a fleet! Building a fleet is NOT NEEDED to prepare for war!

      Of course, we do need a fleet to begin a war but that's a different topic.

      "the fact that you interpret my comments this way implies that"

      The only implication is that you don't understand and recognize your own methodology!

      "That is what I'm trying to avoid very strictly. Don't build obsolete ships or obsolete anything else."

      You say this and then you turn around do the exact opposite! Every existing ship will be obsolete when war comes. The only question being to what degree. When you call for forty or fifty year ship lives, you're ensuring the obsolescence of the ships. Upgrades either never happen, happen only partially, or the fundamental ship can't be upgraded (for example, you can't make a Perry into a stealthy ship no matter what you do so having a fleet of 50 of them ensures they'll be obsolete when war comes). Calling for massive, complex, hybrid, cross-battlecruiser-helo amalgamations just absolutely guarantees they'll be obsolete. For a fleet that's just meant to hold, initially, keep the ships single function and basic. They're going to be replaced anyway, when war comes. Pour the money into production preparations not mega-multi-function ships.

      "spreadsheets"

      Your fixation on a spreadsheet approach is evident from the nice neat, easily and evenly divisible packets of ships that you call for. Naval operations are, always have been, and always will be, a disorganized, ad hoc affair. You need to recognize and accept that.

      Do you see the difference between our approaches, now?

      Delete
  6. I don't know where to even begin to comment on this one. I will face palm myself, twice. Losing the Tico's and their VLS cells royally sucks but the ships as a whole have seen better days, which leaves the Burke's as the only substantial platform to launch Tomahawks, particularly the Block V's or TASM (?). Even then, how many SM-2/3/6's would the Navy sacrifice to make loading a decent number of Tomahawks in their place? With the smaller number of escorts in a CSG, I think it would be preferable to have more AAW capability than land attack. Is it plausible to design a DD based on the Burke DDG to fill the role that the Sprucans did and leave the Burke's to air defense like the Tico's?

    The BB idea is a great one. I am pretty sure we have some decent number of 16-inch shells still sitting somewhere. I think the funding is there, I just don't think the ability to spend it wisely is.

    If I recall correctly in a past blog discussion, a ship being constructed for a 20-year service life, was a more practical and realistic time frame. At least this way at the 10-year mark, you can start looking at the follow on design and incorporate any newer technologies or systems that may be available.

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    1. "how many SM-2/3/6's would the Navy sacrifice to make loading a decent number of Tomahawks in their place? "

      None! The wise naval operations planner wouldn't sacrifice a single anti-air VLS to a Tomahawk. Instead, he would assemble all the anti-air escorts he felt were needed AND THEN ADD ADDITIONAL BURKES LOADED WITH NOTHING BUT TOMAHAWKS. Thus, the 'shooter' Burkes become the high value offensive assets while the anti-air Burkes go about their business unaffected by VLS load out concerns.

      "With the smaller number of escorts in a CSG"

      This is a peacetime phenomenon. When war comes, the Navy will quickly learn that today's two or there escorts are woefully inadequate and they'll return to a combat-effective two or three dozen escorts.

      Delete
    2. Thank you! That is what I was looking for, a sensible answer.

      Delete
    3. "ADDITIONAL BURKES LOADED WITH NOTHING BUT TOMAHAWK"

      So, 2bn USD arsenal ships?

      Delete
    4. If you truly want to be disgusted with the US Navy, wander down to Piers One thru Four at NOB in Norfolk. Look at the decrepit cruisers that seem to be welded to the pier there. The Navy literally gave up on them years ago. From the looks of them, the CO's and the crews have too. If any potential adversary saw them....they would wonder why they are worried about the US Navy. Right next to them are DDG's. I have to ask myself how a Commanding Officer can walk down the pier with pride every morning looking at the running rust and pink paint covering them.

      Delete
  7. Navy needs new designs such as DDG(X) than keep old ones running to meet challenges of future. Take Tico as an example, it cannot be upgraded with new powerful radars since it cannot generate enough electricity. To generate more electricity, you need to upgrade its power system. This means a series of upgrade costs just like build a new ship.

    Even China has stopped type 055 after built 8. They spend time to study and design next generation ships than keep building seemingly best destroyers.

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  8. Can only say that I, personally, never counted the LCS in USN numbers, so the net decrease in ships is a bit less than written by CNO imho. I also disregard the Zumwalts too, being just 3, and , until recently, only having 2 x 30 mm guns, the worlds largest patrol boat.

    So USN number have been perilous for over 10 years now, imho.

    Andrew

    Andrew

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  9. All this talk of the bow wave soaking up money in the 2020s as Columbia's get built, but they won't be wrapping up annual buys until 2035 and won't all be delivered until 2042 even if there is no delay. When you realize Perrys and Los Angeles were already in their stride, Spruance mostly built, Tarawa's basically done. The Reagan build up had a lot to do with extending service lives of existing ships. Forget the Navy, we need a national shipbuilding strategy. The Navy has to figure out how to work with commercial shipbuilding while also learning how to design their own ships again.

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  10. So can we hope to see ComNavOps' idea for a 30 year building plan posted soon? You have done so in various chunks over the years including your clear cut force structure tab on this page.
    But what would you order, retire, etc. of existing ships in the pipeline were you suddenly give the authority? This is probably a big request since you would want to do it right.

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  11. "The Navy has to figure out how to work with commercial shipbuilding [...]."

    Do you mean foreign commercial shipbuilding, or is step zero of your plan "bootstrap a domestic shipbuilding industry?"
    I ask because, sadly, the US no longer has a commercial shipbuilding industry to speak of - it's gone. Over the last fifty years, our commercial shipbuilders have declined from over thirty percent of the global shipbuilding industry to less than half a percent. The decline was concentrated in the first half of that period: by the mid-'90s the industry had already dwindled to the point where total production comprised half a dozen "Jones Act" ships for domestic routes per year, and now it's even less. We probably haven't sold one real commercial ship overseas in years.

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    1. Yeah, I'm talking about the bootstrap approach to domestic shipbuilding, but I'd say use foreign yard collaboration a nd work with commercial fleets to know what really works and why, then bring it to the fleet. Plus use what's left better than we do. In essence, avoid requirements that introduce design risk.
      - Why 2 engine types, jet types, transmission types on LCS-2 just to try for 40 knots. You can watch what the ship does in its commercial fleet. That still would have been a major step up, could have been done cheaper. There are very few aluminum fast ferries that have needed gas turbines.
      - EPF - If it was to leverage a commercial design, why not pick the design that actually kept the commerrcial design rather than the major modification adopted? Incat's design and existing experience were the far better bet at the time. Politics won the day.
      - LCS-1 I think many would have said early on this ship was the better way to go vs LCS-2 class as it had more familiar Navy ship attributes like the combat system and steel hull. We didn't have the best view of the gas tank and again, radical propulsion decision.

      Plenty can still get built in the US. We need the Navy to have its own design house to compete with industry. No way to do diligence on commercial designs without it. This will take a generation.

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  12. The 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for early-retiring LSDs pronto, and the Commandant wants the Marines out of the amphibious business.

    Meanwhile, EURCOM asks for the 22nd MEU/Kearsarge ARG to rapidly deploy to Europe in light of the Russo-Ukrainian war and they can't do it. No wonder we want to quit playing this game - we forgot how!

    Cf. https://news.usni.org/2022/04/26/marines-couldnt-meet-request-to-surge-to-europe-due-to-strain-on-amphibious-fleet

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    1. A MEU/ARG uses three amphibious ships. We have a fleet of 31 amphibious ships. We couldn't muster 3 ships out of 31? There's more to this story that we haven't heard, yet.

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