The WWII Atlanta/Juneau classes of anti-aircraft (AA) cruisers were a fascinating development. In the initial design discussions, the ships were intended as flotilla leaders but they were quickly optimized for the anti-aircraft role as war established the primacy of aircraft. Based on additional combat experience, the initial Atlanta class was further optimized as the follow on Juneau class.
 |
| USS Juneau, CL-119 |
Typical later war weapon fits are listed in the table below.
|
|
5”/38 dual |
40 mm quad |
40 mm dual |
20 mm dual |
20 mm single |
|
Atlanta Class |
6 (12 barrels) |
|
8 (16 barrels) |
|
16 (16 barrels) |
|
Juneau Class |
6 (12 barrels) |
6 (24 barrels) |
4 (8 barrels) |
8 (16 barrels) |
|
Atlanta class had 30 gun mounts with a total of 44 gun barrels of various types.
Juneau class had 24 gun mounts with a total of 60 gun barrels of various types.
The Atlanta/Juneau classes were extremely efficient and effective anti-aircraft platforms, for the time. Battleships, of course, had far larger anti-aircraft weapon fits but they were extremely expensive and we only had a handful of those ships. The AA cruisers offered a cheaper, yet still effective, supplement to the battleships.
The anti-aircraft cruisers had what was, for the time period, a complete fit of long range (5”), medium range (40 mm), and close in (20 mm) weapons providing total coverage and, most importantly, they had large numbers of each.
 |
| USS Spokane, CL-120 |
Atlanta/Juneau and Burke Comparison
Weapon Distribution – In comparison to the Atlanta/Juneau weapon densities noted above, a modern Burke has just three defensive mounts (2x VLS clusters, 1x CIWS). Admittedly, a direct comparison of ‘mounts’ is meaningless but it does offer an impression of the density of weapon mounts on a WWII warship versus today’s barely armed ships. The number of mounts is meaningful. A single hit on one of the Burke’s two VLS clusters would eliminate 1/3 or 2/3 of the ship’s total weapons, depending on whether the forward or aft cluster was hit, and just two hits could eliminate the ship’s entire weaponry. This is unconscionable in a warship design.
More importantly, the WWII ships had a balanced and heavy distribution of long, medium, and short range defensive weapons. Contrast this to Burkes which have good fits of long (Standard) and medium (ESSM) range weapons but almost no short range (CIWS) weapons – a shocking deficiency for an anti-aircraft ship.
Armor – The Atlanta/Juneau classes had armor appropriate for their size with nearly 4” side armor and 1-3/4” deck and turret armor.
As in the larger cruisers, the belt armor was split into a wide band over machinery spaces with narrower underwater sections fore and aft over magazines. The inner bottom extended up the side to the (flat) protective deck. Magazines would be separated from the ship’s side by fuel oil aft and by a wiring passage or cofferdam forward.[1, p.233]
In contrast, the Burke class has only scattered Kevlar spall liner protection. There may be some armor surrounding the below deck VLS space, presumably intended not as protective armor but to direct VLS explosions upward rather than inward. I’ve been unable to verify this.
The obvious observation is that the WWII ships were built to stand and fight and were intended to be able to fight hurt, stay in the fight, and remain effective for as long as possible. Burkes are bordering on one-hit mission kills, if not outright sinkings, and have little hope of staying in a fight and fighting hurt. In fact, the experience of the Port Royal Aegis cruiser grounding strongly suggests that the radar array and VLS alignments are so delicate that a single low intensity vibration (explosion shock … or gentle grounding) is enough to render the equipment unusable. See, “Port Royal Grounding Lessons”.
Survivability – As noted, both the presence of significant armor and the weapons density offered a much greater chance of ship survival than the Burke’s nearly non-existent armor and only three weapon mounts. The sheer number of weapon mounts, fire control directors, and local backups on the WWII cruisers guaranteed that the ship could continue fighting effectively even after absorbing multiple hits. In contrast, a single hit on either of the Burke’s VLS clusters will likely render the entire cluster unusable resulting in the instantaneous loss of 1/3 or 2/3 of the ship’s weapons, depending on whether the forward or aft cluster was hit.
On a related note, testing the effects of a typical anti-ship cruise missile on a VLS cluster is one of the many realistic tests the Navy desperately needs to conduct to get a handle on the true combat-worthiness of today’s ship designs.
Conceptual Design – The AA cruisers were the epitome of a focused, single function ship. They were intended to shoot down aircraft and that was all. As the war progressed, extraneous equipment such as depth charges, sonar, and torpedo tubes were generally removed and replaced with additional guns. In comparison, the Burkes are the epitome of do-everything design with the attendant corollaries of do nothing well and cost a lot. In a sense, the Burkes are the epitome of a failed and flawed, unfocused design philosophy.
Conceptual Anti-Aircraft Ship
Let’s take the lessons of the Atlanta/Juneau anti-aircraft cruiser and apply them to a modern, conceptual anti-aircraft ship design and see what we get.
First, what is the job of an anti-aircraft ship? This is not a trick question. The answer is simple … it’s anti-air warfare! It’s not anti-submarine. It’s not land attack or deep strike. It’s not helo operations. It’s not amphibious attack or logistics or harbor tug. It’s anti-air warfare. Pure and simple. One function. Do it and do it exquisitely well. Be optimized for it.
With that single function focus firmly in mind, here’s the weapons and sensors such a ship would have:
- 4x 16-VLS clusters (disperse the risk) with 32 quad packed ESSM (128 total ESSM) plus 32 Standard
- 6x SeaRAM
- 8x CIWS
- 4” side and 2” deck armor[2]
- 2x main fire control radars (TRS-4D or similar)
- 4x backup fire control radars (SPQ-8B or similar)
- Electro-optical back up fire control systems
This conceptual design provides long, medium, and short range anti-air weapons and offers the ability to stand and fight, even when hurt. It emphatically addresses the flaw (well, one of the flaws) in the Burke class which is the near total lack of close in defensive weapons.
There would be no flight deck and hangar as AAW does not require aviation capability. On the Burke, for example, aviation facilities comprise a solid third of the ship’s length (!) and represent significant size, weight, and cost.
There would also be no hull mounted sonar, stern towed array sonar, or ASW function. Eliminating those functions further reduces the size, weight, and cost of the ship.
Being physically smaller, the ship can’t help but be stealthier and some judicious shaping and repackaging (à la Visby) could make it even more stealthy which would make it more survivable and effective in its role. You see how easy ship design should be? All you have to do is pick a primary function, stick with it (and only it !), and the rest is easy. But, I digress …
So, our conceptual anti-aircraft ship will be 2/3 the length of a Burke, have more weapons, and cost a third less! What’s not to like?
___________________________________
[1]Friedman, Norman, “U.S. Cruisers, An Illustrated Design History”, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1984
[2]Armor recommendation is for whatever a modern equivalent to WWII armor thicknesses would be.
Very interesting, even if it seems a bit unbalanced towards short range AAA.
ReplyDeleteMaybe could be build as a ship in 6000-7000 tons range or less like Spanish F-100 (48 VLS cluster + ASW + hangar)
I'm not sure about nowadays armour affectivity, but without doubt massive redundancy should be a must.
JM
"it seems a bit unbalanced towards short range AAA"
DeleteNot at all. Short range defense requires the greatest rapidity and density of fire, hence, more weapons are needed. It's the last chance of the ship's defense. Fail at this point and you die. You want as many weapons as possible. If anything, the design needs more short range weapons, if they could fit.
"48 VLS cluster + ASW + hangar"
This violates multiple design rules. You want to disperse the risk to weapons rather than have large clusters of VLS. The ship's function is anti-air, not ASW. ASW and flight/hangar increases the ship size and cost and dilutes the ship's focus and expertise.
We already have a ship such as you describe. It's called a Burke and it's too big, too expensive, and a poor ASW platform.
"I'm not sure about nowadays armour"
Then, before you comment, read the definitive armor post:
"Armor for Dummies"
A mix of the shorter range antiair and longer range would seem to be in order. Longer range to thin the herd and massively capable short range to kill the stragglers. Defense in depth.
DeleteCNO: I put "48 VLS cluster + ASW + hangar" only as an example of what can be fit in 6.000 tons, so putting all the weapons you suggest seems doable.
DeleteJM
Fair enough!
DeleteNot an expert. Wondering about the omission of the 5in gun. Is that not effective at anti air?
ReplyDelete"5in gun"
DeleteIt has no demonstrable effect in anti-missile mode. It's rate of fire is far too slow and its accuracy is non-existent relative to a maneuvering missile.
"Wondering about the omission of the 5in gun. Is that not effective at anti air?"
DeleteManufacturers say it works.
Of course, manufacturers say a lot of things...
"Of course, manufacturers say a lot of things..."
DeleteQuite right. I would note that, to the best of my knowledge, there has never been an actual test of a 5" gun against a missile, presumably because the manufacturers know how it would turn out.
"It has no demonstrable effect in anti-missile mode. It's rate of fire is far too slow and its accuracy is non-existent relative to a maneuvering missile."
DeleteIn your "Return of the Broadside", the 16" guns were fired simultaneously with airbursting shot shells to create a grid in front of incoming anti-ship missiles.
Could the 5" gun be used in a similar role?
A twin-gun 5"/62 mount could fire 40 shots in a minute. Would it be possible fire shots several miles out to burst in the projected path of an incoming missile?
Lutefisk
Lutefisk, part of the problem with the suggestion of a hypothetical dual mounted 5"/62 would seem to be the inherent response time issue to equal a single 16" shell. At a hypothetical 20 rpmpg, with 2 barrels, your mount will fire approx 2800 pounds of shells per minute, but it will also take that entire minute to generate that volume of fire. Contrast that with a hypothetical airbursting 16" shell (which, as far as I know, was never seriously attempted as a purpose design except by the Japanese) which would generate somewhere in excess of 2000 pounds, possibly up to approx 2700 (the weight of Iowa's AP shells, for instance) in a single shot, with a fire rate potentially much better than 1 rpm, if we use historical examples. 40 rounds per burst would also eat a significant percentage of internal magazine volume, given that a Burke only carries 680 rounds.
DeleteAlso, to respond to your question further down the thread, as to magazine capacity of the current CIWS system on US Navy ships: there's not a technical reason, but a practical one. The design of the Phalanx works with a linkless feed system that sits underneath the gun mounting itself. To increase the capacity of the magazine would either mean increasing the length or the diameter of the ammunition housing. Presumably, there's a point at which either the size, or the weight, becomes too much for the allowable maximum dimensions of the mounting.
Gray
(not Gray S, who sometimes comments on this same blog, and appears to share a familiar name/handle)
"Could the 5" gun be used in a similar role?"
DeleteNo. The 16" gun fires 2200 lb shells or thereabouts. The 5" gun fires 60-70 lb shells. The amount of shrapnel produced by the 5" gun is woefully insufficient.
A 9-gun salvo from a BB would throw 19,800 lb of shell/shrapnel in the path of a missile. A 9-gun salvo from a DDG would thrown 585 lb of shell/shrapnel and that's assuming you could coordinate the simultaneous firing of 9 ships, each with their SINGLE 5" gun.
The fact that a 5" gun can fire a dozen or more rounds per minute is irrelevant because the target missile is constantly moving and at supersonic or near supersonic speeds. Thus, the 5" gun would never be able to 'build' a wall of shrapnel. The wall has to be instantaneous.
I don't know if anyone is still looking at this post, but thanks to CNO and Gray for responding to my post.
DeleteIn regards to the 5" gun, I'm not advocating making a linear wall of shot as described in "Return of the Broadside".
This would be 5" shots fired along the predicted axis of flight of the missile.
Honestly, I don't know if it would work.
But it should be fairly simple math for a computer.
The direction and speed of the missile is observed, the trajectory of the round is computed, and the round is fired to explode in the predicted future location of the missile.
Of course, the missile might be programmed to maneuver to avoid this type of interception, but it still might get a missile running into the spread of pellets.
That seems to be within the capabilities of the 5" gun, radars, and computational abilities of software.
Since no one agrees with this, I must be missing something, but I'm not sure what it is.
Lutefisk
"Since no one agrees with this, I must be missing something, but I'm not sure what it is."
DeleteYou're correct that, IN THEORY, a single 5" gun should be able to defeat a missile with a single shot. Thus, a ship would not need Standard missiles, ESSM missiles, SeaRAM, or CIWS ... just a single 5" gun with about twenty shells should suffice to completely defeat any attack.
The reality is that the standard 5" gun is wildly inaccurate.
For example, in the Vincennes incident, the Vincennes attempted to engage multiple Boghammer type boats and fired around 70-100 shells. In comparison to a near supersonic missile, a boat is almost a fixed target. Care to guess how many hits were achieved? You guessed it ... zero.
Similarly, the Mk110 57mm gun should also be 100% accurate. However, as documented in DOT&E reports, it can't hit anything!
Again, similarly, the CIWS should only need a single bullet to take out a single missile but, instead, it needs a steady stream of bullets to try to get a hit.
Have you ever watched any of the videos on YouTube that show gunnery exercises? They can't hit anything without LOTS of shells! It doesn't matter what caliber of gun.
Now consider what you're asking a 5" gun to do. You want to engage at several miles which is a long travel time (on a relative basis) ... time for gravity, wind, missile maneuvers, minute deflections of the shell, an overheated (or underheated!) gun barrel, imperfections in the barrel, a constantly pitching and rolling gun platform (no, stabilization is not that good), etc. to all exert just enough influence on the gun shell to throw the aim off just a bit ... and you miss. The reason a CIWS works is because you compensate for the minute deviations with overwhelming rate of fire!
I apologize that I don't have enough time to go into greater detail about this but suffice it to say that the 5" gun has zero chance of a hit, barring dumb luck. Of course, if I had a missile coming at me and had a 5" gun, I'd shoot the entire way because dumb luck just might happen! The preferred approach, however, is to have ESSM, SeaRAM, and CIWS which are designed for the anti-missile role.
"I apologize that I don't have enough time to go into greater detail about this"
DeleteAre you kidding? That was a great explanation.
To summarize for my own understanding....the limitation is the capabilities of the 5" gun.
It's not accurate enough for this job, and the round isn't big enough to compensate for the inaccuracy.
That makes sense.
Thanks!
Lutefisk
"It's not accurate enough for this job"
DeleteAND ... the rate of fire is far too slow to compensate for lack of accuracy. CIWS rate of fire is 4500 rds/min. Compare that to the 5" gun rate of fire which is around 15 rds/min !!!!!
Also, bear in mind (strongly!) the sheer number of factors that affect the accurate travel of a gun shell. We have no software that can handle all those factors correctly. For example, barrel temperature is important. We know that. However, the barrel temp changes with every shot and is continuously cooling and heating. Also, it's interrelated with other factors. Sometimes it may be very important and sometimes less so. We have no understanding of how to dynamically weight the temperature factor.
Our best fire control software is just an approximation of an aim point. We like to think it's perfect but it's ridiculously far from that. That's why good CIWS systems use a closed loop radar system that EMPIRICALLY (NOT CALCULATED) brings the outgoing shells and incoming missile together to achieve a hit.
Consider all the factors that have to be accounted for:
humidity
barrel age
barrel imperfections
barrel temperature
ambient temperation
pitch/roll
air density
projectile shape/weight/imperfections/drag
precise powder charge
shell friction in air
projectile weight balance
barrel movement (stabilization is dynamic not static)
shell fuse variations
barrel pressure profile
and a hundred more!
We do the best we can to account for the major factors but that still leaves a pretty big +/- on the aim point. If you can fire shells fast enough you can compensate for this lack of accuracy with overwhelming coverage all around the aim point but that requires rates of fire of thousands of rounds per minute not 15 rounds per minute. Consider how far a supersonic or near supersonic missile can travel even in the few to several seconds between 5" gun shots.
Now, take all of the above and add it the movements, both intentional (evasive actions) and unintentional (wind, friction, drag, etc.) of the target missile which further reduces the apparent accuracy of the 5" gun. Hopefully, you're beginning to see that a 5" gun hitting a missile would just be dumb luck.
Silly rabbit -- a lot of people are being paid good money to force the Navy to only use the 57mm Mk 100 (anti-tank) gun for air defense. GET WITH THE PROGRAM ! Learn while you earn.
ReplyDeleteThe 5"38 gave an air defense range for a small part of the on-board weapons, of 5 miles.
ReplyDeleteThe Baka Bomb had a range 6 times that far. If the war had lasted until 1946 America would have been in real trouble anywhere that the Big Blue Blanket did not cover 100%.
We have the same issue today, where the Chinese missiles have a range of 10x the Americans, and if Russia ever perfect their version of the Pluto cruise missile they will have a range 1,000x, and will get crew kills on ships by just flying near.
But we are well up on clean oil and diversity training, so who is the real victor of WWIII?
"Chinese missiles have a range of 10x"
DeleteYou need to study the targeting issue before making this kind of statement.
RORSAT, ELINTsat, wide view optical and narrow view, high gain optical. If you can keep this cluster operational, the targeting problem is smaller. This applies both to the aggressor and defender.
DeleteThe lack of ASW capability is an obvious shortfall - and only makes sense if you make up that difference somehow (pair with a dedicated ASW ship, more P-8As, etc.)
ReplyDeleteTHIS IS AN ANTI-AIR SHIP!!!!!!!!!!! It's not an ASW ship. You don't pair it with anything. It operates as part of a complete escort group.
DeleteWhy are we trying to make this something it's not? That will just make it bigger and more expensive.
All for for different roles for different ships. One item I have noticed is CLK Norfolk was real close to the same hull size and displacement to these cruisers. The Atlantas and Juneaus had for armor:
DeleteBelt 3.75 - 1.1/1.8
Armor 1.25
Bulkhead 3.75
Gunhouse 1.25
Conning 2.5/1.25 roof
I also would like some real thought on changing our direct fire gear. Up Phalanx to 30mm, go with the 76mm Sovraponte, declare mk110 a CIWS and not a main gun. If we get 4 on a large surface combatant and call it a win.
ReplyDelete"Up Phalanx to 30mm"
DeleteWhy? What gain in performance is there?
One of the weaknesses of CIWS is that it has a very small ammo supply. Changing to 30mm (a larger size shell) will decrease this already small ammo supply.
"Why? What gain in performance is there?"
DeleteSlightly greater range and punch?
Is there a technical/mechanical reason that the CIWS can't accommodate a larger magazine containing more rounds?
Lutefisk
"Is there a technical/mechanical reason that the CIWS can't accommodate a larger magazine containing more rounds?"
DeleteYes. Look at a photo of a CIWS. There is no room for a bigger ammo drum without totally redesigning the weapon. It's a physical space limitation.
"Slightly greater range and punch?"
DeleteSetting aside the loss of ammo inventory, larger shells mean slower rate of fire which is not a good thing in close in defense.
1190 vs 1550 rounds between Goalkeeper and Phalanx 1B. Goalkeepper had the edge on earlier models og Phalanx.
DeleteGoalkeeper also had the earlier advantage in rate of fire but surrently sets at 4200 vs 4500 rpm.
I want whatever keeps parts of the missile from reaching the ship is the point. If it needs a guided round, so be it.
"I want whatever keeps parts of the missile from reaching the ship"
DeleteYou may be missing the point and purpose of a close in weapon system. It is, by definition, the last, ultimate, final chance to prevent an intact, live missile from hitting and exploding on/in the ship. The job of the close in weapon system is to inactivate the attacking missile so that it cannot explode on/in the ship. Ideally, that will be as a result of the destruction of the attacking missile. Less ideal, but perfectly acceptable given the alternative, is destruction of the warhead. If some scattered, slower, debris impacts the ship that's far preferable to an intact, exploding missile hitting.
Among naval commentators, this concept of debris striking the ship has taken on mythic proportions. I know of no real world or exercise example of such an occurrence. The theoretical possibility exists but I've seen nothing to suggest it's a significant danger. In fact, there are a few documented exercise examples of CIWS re-engaging debris.
Even a theoretical consideration of the debris strike scenario suggests that it is unlikely. With the main body of the attacking missile hit and destroyed to the point of generating sizable debris, the physics of the scenario suggests that the debris is far more likely to have been blasted into an altered path, upward, downward, or sideways. The likelihood of debris coming out of an explosion an continuing on the exact same previous path is remote.
Further, any debris, by definition, will be misshapen, unpowered, and no longer aerodynamic. That means that whatever path it's on it will quickly lose speed and gravity will further alter its path downward, away from the ship.
To sum up, the job of a close in weapon system is not to vaporize an attacking missile but to render it non-explosive and, to the extent possible, as physically degraded as possible.
While the use of larger caliber rounds would increase lethality, it also decreases ammo inventory and firing rate. Given how little it takes to destroy a warhead and alter the path of the main missile body, the gain in lethality does not justify the loss of ammo inventory and firing rate.
I love this idea for this AAW ship.
ReplyDeleteI've thought that it would be good to replace the Tico's with a Cleveland class ship.
But I think that this ship could do the job at 60% the size of the Cleveland.
However, I do have a clarification question.
Would this ship be used along with a Burke/Ticonderoga type ship that has an AEGIS style phased array radar, or would it simply replace those ships altogether?
Would the TRS-4D radar replace the phased array on the Burkes?
Would it complement the Burkes?
Maybe a future idea for a blog-post could be a 'Radar for Dummies' similar to the 'Armor for Dummies' post?
I may not be the only one who doesn't really understand how all of these radars work, and complement each other.
Lutefisk
"But I think that this ship could do the job at 60% the size of the Cleveland."
DeleteAs described in the post,
"So, our conceptual anti-aircraft ship will be 2/3 the length of a Burke ..."
"Would the TRS-4D radar replace the phased array on the Burkes?
DeleteWould it complement the Burkes?"
The SPY-xx Aegis radar arrays are optimized for very long distance engagements which I've demonstrated will be very rare. The arrays are vast overkill for the horizon range engagements that will most likely occur.
The TRS-3D/4D is fine for horizon range engagements. So, in that sense, they're equal to the Burke radars.
What we truly need is a radar OPTIMIZED for horizon-and-less range engagements. We need a radar that can discriminate a target from a sky full of shrapnel and debris.
While a large armored vessel like this may be quite tough, you might scale it down to destroyer or big frigate size to afford more of them. That way, when one AA ship needs to retire to rearm or due to damage, another one still has most of it's missile load to provide area defense.
ReplyDeleteYou noted that the conceptual anti-air cruiser in the post was described as 2/3 the length of a Burke, right? That makes it smaller than the current Constellation class frigate.
DeleteIT'S ALREADY SCALED DOWN!
The CNO design philosophy of single mission ships to enable building a large fleet within current budget of effective ships, not mentioned in the Conceptual Anti-Aircraft Ship is operating and support costs, GAO notes only 30% procurement, 70% for operations and support, would argue just as important to bring the O&S costs down to fund the higher numbers of single mission ships of fleet operational.
ReplyDeleteThe lessons from the Danish Iver Huitfeldt class frigates applicable enabling higher operational availability and less time in dockyards for maintenance, IH were designed by OMT the design house of Maersk the largest container shipping company and it shows, IH were all diesel, naval diesels, not slow as hit 31 knots in trials, long range >9,000 nm. The graphic of the new DDG(X) showing Zumwalt complicated/expensive IPS/IPES to give 50% greater range, 120% more time on station using 25% less fuel, an indictment of the gas guzzling nature of GTs used in the Burkes, but straight diesels would give even longer range at less cost.
Amongst other very smart thinking by OMT was the use of isolated suspended decks shock proofing its electronic kit to enable it to meet naval survivability standards, saving a fortune as enabling commercial kit to be used where ever possible instead of military standard which cost 100s % more as each has to be individually shock proofed.
Would note exception for ASW mission as straight diesel propulsion not suitable, preferably HED, shaft mounted electric motors and silenced DGs for minimal self generated noise.
"70% for operations"
DeleteThis is one of those made up numbers. You can make operating costs be anything you want by choosing what to include or exclude.
For example, are ship's fuel costs part of the operating cost? Most of us would say yes.
Are crew salaries part of the operating cost? Most of us would say yes.
Are the Admiral and staff planning costs part of the ship's operating cost? Depends whether you want high numbers or low numbers.
Are the crew's long term medical insurance/care costs part of the ship's operating costs? Depends whether you want a high number or a low number.
Are the crew's retirement pensions part of the ship's operating costs? Depends whether you want high numbers or low numbers.
Are the home port operating costs part of the ship's operating cost? Depends whether you want high numbers or low numbers.
Are the shore support medical and dental costs part of the ship's operating costs? Depends whether you want high numbers or low numbers.
And so on.
I cannot definitively prove it because I've not seen any public detailed breakdown of what goes into the ship's operating costs but I believe the numbers are vastly inflated. If you make reasonable assumptions about just the fuel and the crew's salaries, you get a hugely smaller operating cost. I would normally say you should include maintenance costs but the Navy has all but abandoned maintenance so that can't be a significant cost.
FWIW the GAO Feb 2022 report 22-105387
DeleteTable 4: Operating and Support Costs for Littoral Combat Ships, Operating and support (O&S) cost elements for Seaframes only (2009 – 2019) in $millions
Unit-level personnel 567.2
Unit operations 391.9
Maintenance 1,470.6
Sustaining support 254.1
Continuing system improvements 187.5
Total 2,871.3
If the Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database is correct and the numbers have not been massaged the figures accurate will support GAO contention overall Navy ship costs 70% in O&S and only 30% procurement. Also would help if the various categories explained eg what is the difference between sustaining support vs maintenance etc
Understand LCS is an extreme case but of total O&S just over 50% spent on maintenance spend, which takes me back to my basic argument with priority for better platform design with low O&S built in as with OMT design of the IH enabling low at sea maintenance hours, diesels etc so that Navy would be able to fund operations of the higher number of ships at current levels of funding.
Let's examine some of these:
DeleteUnit-level personnel - don't know what that is but let's assume it's crew salaries; we're funding two crews per ship which is idiotic and returning to one crew per ship would cut that number in half
Unit operations - ?? no idea what that is; fuel maybe?
Maintenance - does that include the administrative costs of all the people in the logistics supply chain? does it include the building leases and depreciation for all the parts storage warehouses? does it include dock/pier maintenance costs? and so on
Sustaining support - no idea what this is
Continuing system improvements - how can research for possible future ship improvements be a ship operating cost?
I have no doubt that the figures are arithmetically correct. The question is whether they include legitimate costs. The Navy is trying to justify very early retirement of the LCS so you can bet they're piling every cost they can think of into these numbers to make their case look better.
Let me illustrate ... Let's crudely calculate the crew cost (unit level personnel, presumably). An LCS crew is 70. Assume a salary and immediate benefits of $150,000 per year. 70 x $150,000 = $10.5M. For the 24 LCS in commission this day, that's a total of $10.5M x 24 = $252M. Compare that to the $567.2M the Navy cites. What else are they including that we aren't?
We have double crews for some of the ships but not all. Say half. That would increase the total crew cost to $378M. Still nowhere near the Navy's $567M.
You see my point? You can make the operating costs anything you want by what you choose to include.
Maybe the Navy is including squadron commander and staff salaries, admiral salaries, and the entire non-ship chain of command? Maybe they're including the helo det personnel salaries (is that a legitimate ship operating cost or is it the helo squadron's cost?)? Maybe they're including the janitor's cost for shore barracks? Who knows?
The Navy's math is correct but they're inclusions are highly suspect. Of course, without a detailed breakdown, we can't know.
"IH were designed by OMT the design house of Maersk the largest container shipping company and it shows"
DeleteI'd be real cautious about calling that a positive. The Norwegian Helge Ingstad frigate had various cost savings design measures included but it resulted in a ship that sank far too easily and was found to have severe design flaws. This approach may be acceptable for merchant ships that will never suffer battle damage but warships require far more rigorous standards.
Operating efficiency is the LAST criteria to apply to a warship design. Combat efficiency is the driving design force. Make the design exquisitely combat effective and survivable and then, and only then, see if you can apply any cost efficiencies (probably not!). That's how you design a warship.
I would not equate the Navantia Norwegian Helge frigates with the OMT IH frigates, OMT have the culture of designing commercial container ships built up over 50+ years (shades of the old BuShips) that have to operate 365 days a year reliably with no breakdowns and applying that same professionalism to the combat efficiency and survivability required of a naval frigate, the IH class
ReplyDeleteThere's a huge difference between operating reliably with no breakdowns in a very non-stressful environment and operating in combat and being able to withstand damage. I have no idea whether IH frigates are combat-tough or not but I'm leery of designing from a warship using a commercial perspective. Everyone had a very positive opinion of the Navantia frigates until one sank in a heartbeat from relatively minor damage. It's a warning not to latch onto commercial practices in a warship.
DeleteThat's not to say that there are not some commercial practices that could be beneficial in warship design but those practices need to be very carefully and suspiciously evaluated before accepting them.
ComNavOps,
ReplyDeleteIf it's alright with you, I am going two new posts that will purely focus on the substance of my arguments, in an attempt to achieve a "restart". I will leave out any of the fine details that occupied the contents of your previous, and in this way, there will be no way to construe my comments as contravening your blog policy. Please feel free to delete my previous posts to tidy up the place, as I will summarize all the main arguments I was making here. You don't have to engage in the following arguments if you don't want to. But I hope you will allow these posts to stand so it is clear to the reader what my main objections are.
Disclaimer:
The below discussions are general and are not meant to attack the hypothetical AAW ship conceived by ComNavOps, although of course any lessons drawn here are very much applicable to this case.
Armor:
Armor is expensive and generally doesn't pass the cost/benefit ratio test. That's because you could have the best armored ship in the world, but that's not going to prevent a harpoon from mission killing you by taking out one of your radar mounts or some other unarmored sensitive electronic areas (like ELINT arrays). A small number of ASM's can completely crimple all of a hypothetical ships main radar arrays, and armor is useless there. Why? Because radar arrays cannot be covered by armor, as they would be opaque.
In response, ComNavOps issued an interesting proposal (in previous posts) that would see the main radar being protected by an armored sliding mechanism, which can "open up" when the radar is needed, and "close back up" while under attack.
Unfortunately, this is not a realistic proposal, because:
A) Radars need to be high up on the superstructure to work effectively, and that's already a lot of weight. Adding armor in that area, in the form of a sliding mechanism, would be impractical and too top heavy in modern ships.
B) Having this kind of pop-out armor defeats the whole purpose of the radar, which is needed precisely when coming under attack
C) Any introduction of a sliding armored mechanism will take up space required by the radar, which reduces the aperture width and length
In regard to B, ComNavOps has pointed out how CIWS mounts have their own radar installations, and that the ship is not defenseless when its main radar arrays are covered. This is true, but as we will see, CIWS mounts like the phalanx are not ideal for SHORAD defense and have intrinsic operational and physical limitations which make them deficient in comparison to the VLS alternatives (like ESSM). It's only if you start from the assumption that CIWS can form an effective defense that is somewhat comparable to the VLS alternatives, that it might make sense to introduce ComNavOp's armored mechanism proposal (ignoring the problems of the physical limitations).
But even if that was true, you still might need the main radar array during a defense which requires SHORAD. What if, for instance, you also come under a ballistic missile attack at the same time? In the next post, I address the efficacy of the Phalanx vs VLS alternatives for SHORAD.
SHORAD:
DeleteCIWS mounts like phalanx are not ideal for SHORAD. Why? Because a modern phalanx CIWS has a range of around 1.5-2 miles, but the actual effective range might be half that. That means that even against subsonic missiles, a single CIWS might be lucky to take out one in a salvo; there's simply not enough time to put out a 2-3 second burst, verify a target kill, and then acquisition and target another missile in the same volley. A supersonic missile by contrast moving at Mach 2 will cover that 1.5 mile distance in about 3 seconds. If the effective distance is just 3/4 of a mile by contrast, that would put the missile in the engagement envelope for less than 2 seconds. Therefore, even a battery of CIWS might struggle to reliably take out such a supersonic missile in such a short time, and even if it impacted it, at that range you're likely to experience serious damage from shrapnel.
By contrast, an ESSM can provide air defense anywhere from 1-2 miles all the way out to the horizon for sea skimming defense. An Arleigh burke for example can output 18 ESSM's at a time via datalink. These can target 9 missiles provided they were sufficiently dispersed in time/space so as to not require the use of more than the 3 spg-62 FCR's at a time. The new ESSM Blk II's which have active radar seekers, will not need to be dispersed in this way. Furthermore, depending on the speed of the incoming missiles and reaction times, it might be possible to fire multiple salvoes of ESSM in the overall firing cycle.
Contrast this with a phalanx CIWS which will get only one very short window to engage its target. That means, in ideal conditions, a ship with 8x mounts with overlapping 360 degree coverage might only be able to target 8 missiles in a volley just once, (assuming they were all coming it at once to saturate). If a phalanx had a 50% PK rate (for example) that means 4 missiles on average might be taken out in this ideal scenario. By contrast, ESSM's can target more missile and multiple times (multiple missiles per target in multiple salvoes). Further, this hypothetical large battery CIWS defense is mutually exclusive to the AEGIS (or something comparable to AEGIS) design. That's because being able to provide AEGIS defense requires a large superstructure radar array which obstructs the space for mounting CIWS. So you can't fit that many CIWS mounts on something like an Arleigh Burke.
To sum up,
1) Relying on CIWS mounts like the Phalanx puts you at a disadvantage against sea skimmers relative to modern missile defense systems which utilize the VLS system.
2) This disadvantage is more pronounced if your large battery of Phalanx requires the elimination of the large radar array superstructure, because the latter is needed to provide other categories of high-end AAW defense (which might be required at the same time as SHORAD).
3) This further reduces the motivation behind introducing ComNavOp's hypothetical radar armor installation to a hypothetical radar superstructure (ignoring the physical limitation problems).
4) This means that effective high-end AAW defense requires that the radar array be used during active defense, negating the use of the armor.
5) If your large and essential radar arrays are unarmored, it won't matter much if your ship is unsinkable because it has 60 inches of invincible magic armor; it's still going to be just as vulnerable to being mission killed.
Most of what you've just written is either incorrect or ignores various realities. You clearly have no interest in actually learning anything so I won't attempt to discuss anything.
DeleteI'll allow these two comments to stand in an effort to bend over backward to be fair. Consider this your freebie. HOWEVER, I will not allow a similarly poor comment to stand in the future. Bear that in mind as you decide whether to comment in the future.
I understand that it wouldn't make sense to make this an ASW ship, but I wonder if it wouldn't make sense to have enough sonar capability to recognize an incoming torpedo, to allow the ship to launch decoys and countermeasures?
ReplyDeleteI get you. I understand. I, too, wonder if it wouldn't make sense to install a complete SPY-1D or SPY-6 AESA 3D radar array and complete Aegis BMD suite just to sense incoming ballistic missiles and launch decoys and countermeasures. I also wonder if it wouldn't make sense to have a flight deck and hangar with helos for ASW and search and rescue. We'd hate to have, say, downed aircrew or overboard sailors and not be able to rescue them. And, if a sub does get through our outer escort screen then we'd want an inner helo for ASW, I'm thinking. And, as long as we're adding just a little bit that makes sense, a 5" gun (or a brand new 155mm naval gun?) is just common sense, wouldn't you agree? I can't believe I overlooked that! And if a sub does get through our screen, a pair of the standard anti-sub triple torpedo tubes just makes sense. I don't think anyone could argue with that. If we're going to have a flight deck, we ought to make it big enough to handle a couple of MV-22 for resupply or lily pad operations, right? Of course, the one thing that I really regret having left out is a good spread of large launch tubes for hypersonic missiles since they're the wave of the future. I should have thought of that. I'm less sure about this but I'm thinking I should have added a well deck to operate some of the extra LCS mine counter-measure equipment that the Navy said they wanted to operate from 'vessels of opportunity'. Plus, any ship might be called on to conduct boarding and search/seizure ops so a well deck would just make sense multiple ways. And, if we're going to have a well deck anyway, it would only make sense to be able to berth and deploy Marine units; company size, maybe, to act as raiders or special ops? Of course, Marines would need UAV support - that goes without saying - so we'd have to add UAV storage, support, catapults, and recovery equipment. I mean, that's only logical. And we'll need enhanced communications facilities for command and control of the Marines and control of the UAVs. That's no big deal. It's just a half dozen or so extra compartments, advanced comm gear, and various antennae.
DeleteAll of this makes good sense and wouldn't add more than a couple hundred feet to the ship size and a couple billion dollars to the cost.
Have I made my point?
I don't mean this in a mean way, at all, but you are the perfect example of why our ships are do-everything, are unaffordable, and our fleet is steadily shrinking. Every admiral, captain, and program manager in the Navy has their little pet ideas that seem perfectly reasonable and they insist on adding them in to each program.
DeleteI'll have to keep hammering on this. You design ships to the MINIMUM requirement for their mission, not the maximum.
Well, you've said yourself (in other posts) that platforms should be optimized for a single function, AND that it's ok to have secondary functions as long as (1) they don't compromise the primary function and (2) they don't add too much cost. That's my view too.
DeleteAll the items you mentioned clearly violate this rule. However, anti-torpedo decoys typically aren't particularly large or (I believe) particularly costly, relative to the size and cost of a ship. Whether it's possible to get enough information about a torpedo at close range to target the countermeasures without having a full ASW suite is something I just don't know. If you need a whole ASW suite for that, it's probably not worth it.
I don't think that's at all the same as trying to make it a "do everything" ship.
"All the items you mentioned clearly violate this rule. However, anti-torpedo decoys typically aren't particularly large or (I believe) particularly costly"
DeleteFor starters, I'm completely unsure what torpedo decoys you have in mind. I'm unaware of any effective decoys deployed from surface ships.
That aside, you mention a sonar. That requires specialized equipment (like the sonar!) such as computer systems, extra compartments to house them, and analyst stations. You also need extra crew (half a dozen or so?) for the sonar function which, in turn, requires extra berthing, extra food storage extra fresh water generation and storage, and so on.
When you start drilling down, these small extras always turn out to be, and cost, more than most people realize. This seems to have too much of an impact of the cost but it would be interesting if you spec'ed out what's needed and what it would cost. Maybe it's no big impact. Figure it out and let me know.
Would this ship handle anti-ship ballistic missiles (and upcoming hyper sonic missiles? Or would that be a separate anti-missile ship?
ReplyDeleteWe have an entire class of Burke destroyers whose job is to handle BMD. So, should we add more equipment and cost to this notional anti-air ship to handle BMD? You tell me.
DeleteOnce I have some idea of what is required to deal with hypersonic missiles (which no one knows, at the moment, and the Navy is not testing), I'll let you know about that.
Ah .... Somehow I got the impression that these ships would be INSTEAD of the Burke, not IN ADDITION to the Burke. My bad.
DeleteClearly, if there are Burkes in the battle group, then these ships don't also need to do ballistic missile defense.
"Somehow I got the impression that these ships would be INSTEAD of the Burke,"
DeleteThis is a follow on to the Atlanta/Juneau concept. Those ships were lower cost complements and supplements to battleships and heavy cruisers. Similarly, this conceptual anti-air ship would be a complement and supplement to Burkes.
Of course, if we did want to completely replace the Burkes we'd have to add some more capability and upgrade the radar (maybe?) but eliminating all the other unnecessary Burke functions (helo, hangar, flight deck, ASW, strike, etc.) would still yield a smaller, cheaper, more effective ship than the Burke.
CNO, I like this concept very much. I think Admiral King would have approved (he was part of the reason why USN ships in WW2 bristled with the best AA suites in the world…. which were still not enough when the Kamikazes came on the scene). The lesson is, you can never have enough, especially now that ASMs are robot Kamikazes and are everywhere. I like the laser focus on one mission, redundancy, and resilience, which were present on WW2 ships, but not today. I wish we had more people in the Pentagon/Navy Brass who thought like this. I’ll write in a few parts some thoughts on specific parts of the concept, and I hope you’ll respond with your own.
ReplyDeleteCIWS:: I like the concept of having multiple, redundant CIWS, both missile (SeaRAM) and gun (Phalanx) in separate mounts, to cover each other’s weaknesses and to deal with saturation attacks. I like the fact that these are self contained, except power. Mount them on shockproof mounts so they still function if the ship is hit. Provide a self-contained backup power source that can keep each mount active for a couple of hours if power is lost, so the ship is defended while power is restored.
ReplyDeletePut them on the ships network and write SW so they automatically ’deconflict’ their fire… they don’t all shoot multiple missiles at the first incoming target and ignore the second and third, for instance. But write it so if that link goes down, they still engage and don’t ‘wait’ for a command that never comes. (Or better yet, write the SW so they are each biased to prioritize targets in certain arcs, so they automatically deconflict). (Why do I focus on this? Phalanx and SeaRAM control systems are probably not designed to have multiple systems covering the same arcs of fire. Preparing them for this is part of preparing for a real war, just like tooling up to build 40mm Bofors or initiating development of proximity fuses was in 1940).
Develop a way to rapidly rearm the Phalanx from below through deck (or behind, through bulkhead), so they can be reloaded quickly ‘in battle’ if need be. Now you have a ship that is well defended from saturation attacks, and can keep defending itself, even if hit once.
ECM/Decoys:: Don’t forget the ECM; a huge force multiplier. Put the latest SEWIP version on a shockproof mount, and don’t forget to shockproof the computers that control it (and have them deep in the ship behind armor). If SEWIP is too expensive and heavy for this ship, design a smaller/lighter version. It needs ECM. Also, don’t forget the decoys. Double the usual Chaff/flare installation. Create a small drone with a fiber optic connection that can fly 1000yds away from the ship and generate a jamming signal/false target, like a Super Hornet or F-35’s Fiber Optic Towed Decoy.
ReplyDeleteEO/IR and laser:: The reduced radar signature of your concept, along with the ECM and decoys, are necessary to counter radar targeting and radar guided missiles. Now, we must deal with modern imaging -IR missiles, which these things don’t affect, and which easily reject flares. This is where we need two relatively low powered laser turrets (a small, hardened main EO/IR turret front and rear with a laser that can blind/destroy the seeker of an incoming ASM). This is where the Navy’s laser program should be focused right now-on delivering a useful and urgently needed capability to the fleet that is within their capacity to deliver, Now. The SeaRAM and CIWS can shoot down the missiles; we just need the laser to blind any that will get through. I love your concept of also having other small/backup EO/IR systems around the superstructure to back these up and constantly scan for targets so the ship will not likely be surprised, even by drones.
ReplyDeleteVLS:: I like the inclusion of this, and the number of cells (and the quad pack concept of ESSM makes the numbers really viable). Your concept of spreading out the VLS groups is spot-on. I believe this was the concept behind the Peripheral VLS on Zumwalt. Put the VLS on the perimeter of the ship, with a layered armor scheme: a smaller amount (1”?) on the outside for shrapnel protection, then the 2x4 =8 missile VLS cells spread out along the side, then the main armor belt (2-3”?) inside of these, which keeps most things out of the hull, and directs any VLS magazine explosion outward through thinner splinter protection, saving the ship. Put Kevlar spall protection behind this, to contain splinters, and between each 8-cell VLS module, to contain the fire and shrapnel to the unit that was directly hit. Penetrating warheads can still get through this, but this will provide maximum protection for the ship and crew on a reasonable displacement, while still allowing most of the VLS to remain active even after one hit. Oh, and don’t forget to put each VLS module on a shockproof mount.
ReplyDeleteSensors/fire control: Here is where I differ most from your concept. The ‘staring’ PESA radar of Aegis was created for the very purpose this ship is designed for… air defense against anything up to and including saturation attacks. And now, Active (AESA) radars are another step better, but also should provide a lot more fault tolerance if designed correctly and put on shockproof mounts. These radars are self contained (except power and cooling), and can be directly mounted in a shockproof way to the superstructure. If the SW is designed in a fault tolerant way, and if it has built in ‘self-calibrating’ features, there is no reason it can’t keep functioning after a hit to the ship, as long as it has power and cooling. There should be no reason for what happened to Port Royal taking down the radar due to ‘misalignment’ after a hit; the SW should be able to auto-correct for this. Even if some modules are damaged by fragments of a nearby hit, if designed correctly, the undamaged modules in that AESA panel should still be able to operate, meaning that sector is still covered, if in a degraded way (maybe it doesn’t detect a mosquito at 400NM, but a Bear at 100NM is still detectable for early warning). Each modular RMA section of modules should have its own redundant power and cooling. Don’t forget the lessons on air defense from WW2 that led eventually to Aegis (i.e., keep the concept of fixed planar arrays), but do remember the forgotten lessons of shockproofing and redundancy from WW2. We also still need to guide the missiles (remember how this was the limiting factor before Aegis and SM2). The main array can do this, but give the ship some SPQ 55s or their replacement for backup. Also, give the ship another rotating 3-d or AESA (EASR?) radar as a backup. If one array of the main radar is hit, rotate that EASR to that quadrant and park it to provide radar coverage there.
ReplyDeleteIf the full SPY 6 is too much $ or weight for this ship, use the smaller 9-RMA version (it’s supposed to be modular).
Finally: Tooling. We need to support this ship. Ammunition is going to be a problem in a real war. How many of these can we arm with full ESSM (128) and SeaRAM (6x11=66), even ignoring SeaRAM reloads? Double production of these missiles, but more importantly, create tooling and stockpile critical components in order to rapidly increase production by a factor of 10 in a 3 month period, in case we really need it. Not to mention, shipyards and dry docks to support the ships themselves. That is one of the key forgotten lessons of WW2.
ReplyDelete