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Wednesday, February 23, 2022

Commandant Berger on Deterrence

In a War on the Rocks website interview, Commandant Berger offered some thoughts on deterrence.  As you know, ComNavOps believes deterrence, in the form of forward deployment, is pure fantasy and a complete failure (how’s that forward presence and deterrence working out with Russia?) and we’ve proven it in repeated posts:

 

Here’s a partial list of deterrence posts:

 

“Forward Presence Deterrent Effect Disproved”

“Forward Presence – Deterrent or Provocation?”

“Not Deterred in the Least”

 

 

Now, here’s Commandant Berger’s thoughts on deterrence.[1]

 

Because from one argument, you could say that deterrence has worked. We’re not at war with China or Russia today, or Iran, so deterrence is working.[1]

 

I think that’s too simplistic a read, because if they’re advancing their objectives and ours are eroding, I would argue that deterrence is not working. It is working from a literal, “we’re not at hot war with them,” but it’s not working if their objectives are moving forward, and ours are moving backwards. I don’t think that’s winning at all.[1]

 

I disagree with Commandant Berger about, essentially, everything he’s done and is trying to do.  However, he’s not wrong about the failure of our attempts at deterrence.

 

Berger goes beyond that blindingly logical thought and poses some intriguing questions about deterrence.

 

What about deterrence by entanglement? What about deterrence by detection? What about all the different variations that we ought to think about? Those need to be debated. Those have to be discussed. Those have to be tried. What does deterrence by entanglement mean? What does deterrence by detection mean in practice? What does it mean, in the context, in other words, of not an open, hot conflict, but in gray zone every week, active campaigning … what’s going to work?[1]

 

Unfortunately, he didn’t go into any detail about these various levels and types of deterrence and how they could be implemented.  I’m inclined to believe that they are just variations on appeasement because it seems highly unlikely that we would back them up with force and, as we have demonstrated repeatedly, presence without action is pointless.  However, the questions alone are intriguing enough to warrant some thought.

 

Deterrence by entanglement?  What is that?  How would it work?  Could it be effective?

 

Deterrence by detection?  Again, what is that?  How would it work?  Could it be effective?

 

I’m intrigued.

 

Entanglement.  I have no idea what Berger thinks this means but I could imagine scenarios where we attempt to make an enemy’s actions so complex, so difficult, so consuming, that it creates a black hole for the enemy that sucks down resources and ties up their efforts to the point that they cannot disengage and their endeavor becomes net negative for them.  One could argue that this is exactly what happened to the US in Vietnam and the Global War on Terror.  Perhaps it happened to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, as well?  Is this deterrence?  Is it likely to succeed?

 

Detection.  Again, I have no idea what Berger thinks this means but I could imagine scenarios where the mere exposure of an enemy’s intent and actions might stop those actions.  For example, exposing the Chinese fishing fleet incursions in a major way – as opposed to the useless, sternly worded protests that we routinely do – might lead to cessation of the incursions.  This would likely have to involve a degree of force.  For example, a naval surface group riding to the ‘rescue’ of the Philippines in ‘repelling’ an incursion with full media coverage of the event and backed by a major military-conducted information campaign (the US military has stood up exactly this kind of media/information groups (roundly mocked by ComNavOps!) so here, perhaps, is a legitimate use for them?  Once relentlessly exposed on the world stage for the illegal, war-like act it is, China might drop the use of fishing fleet incursions.  Is this deterrence?  Is it likely to succeed?

 

As I said, I’m quite dubious about this but it is intriguing enough to warrant some serious thought.  Certainly, what we’re doing now isn’t working even a little bit so some alternative thinking is more than justified.

 

 

 

__________________________________

 

[1]https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/general-berger-on-the-marine-corps-of-the-future/


29 comments:

  1. Deterrence by detection is daft too. It assumes enemy has no counter intelligence, propaganda or other ability to counter US claims.

    It also assumes enemy is deterred by being discovered which as Ukraine or SC Sea prove, doesn't work.

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    1. "Deterrence by detection is daft too."

      Is it? Or, did we just fail to follow up. Detection alone will accomplish nothing. It has to be linked to follow up actions such as massing forces at the point of detection, publicizing the detection and countering with a massive information campaign, waging non-kinetic war against the detected force (cyber attacks, EW, etc.). Constructing obstacles to the detected force movement, and so on.

      I'm far from believing that deterrence of any sort can work but the idea of deterrence by detection is interesting enough to warrant some serious examination and consideration.

      Another requirement for any kind of deterrence to work is the willpower to apply significant follow up actions. Unfortunately, the current administration made it clear that there would be no serious consequences so no form of deterrence had any chance of succeeding.

      Delete
  2. Deterrence is literally not working as we speak.

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    1. Ukraine is a spectacular failure of deterrence but does that mean deterrence can't work under any circumstance or is this an isolated failure?

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    2. Deterrence can work if people take you seriously.
      And that's not the case of the current US/EU ruling class.

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    3. "Deterrence can work if people take you seriously."

      How do you get people to take you seriously?

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    4. It depends on who you're trying to deter, of course.

      The first thing to do is to avoid looking ridiculous in their eyes.

      For example, one big problem (out of many) with the US "engaging" in the Mideast is that those populations are never going to take you seriously if your leadership (both civilian and military) involves women, homosexuals, blacks, men who shave their beards, transvestites and whatnot.

      They may obey, for a while, because nobody wants to argue with a Space Alien rifle pointed to his head, but they aren't going to respect you.

      Likewise, why would the Russian or Chinese take US/EU leadership seriously?
      They see those people as weird, corruptible, perverted and spineless, obsessed with bizarre ideologies and generally all talk and no action.

      (Such analysis isn't entirely wrong, by the way.)

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    5. Okay, so what's the solution? If we eliminate all the people you listed from government service, who's left?

      Delete
    6. "How do you get people to take you seriously?"

      I think in todays world, and especially with our history, thats simple. Draw a line. Any line. About almost anything. Outline the consequences for crossing it, and absolutely ALWAYS deliver those consequences, every time. No negotiation, surrender, quarter, etc...

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    7. " Outline the consequences for crossing it, and absolutely ALWAYS deliver those consequences"

      That's fine in the abstract but what practical consequences would you suggest that we would even remotely consider implementing and that would have any significant impact on anyone?

      Delete
    8. I know! We should have very bearded, very hairy manly men hyped up and pumped up on the latest and most potent steroids we can get them as our leaders and movers and shakers!!! With their big manly muscles thanks to the latest drugs (illegal or otherwise, hey, we need to be manly) they would bring glory to our nation!!! And terror to our enemies!!! Those who drop dead from the steroids are unworthy anyway, so we should not worry about that.

      The practical consequences for anyone who cross the line, or lines, (I know it is hard to think clearly on steroids, but hey! At least we have none of the people "Lonfo" listed) we make is instant death to the forces in question, either from any nearby SSBN hidden nearby, or failing that, from our land based bombers who will bomb them to dust!!!

      On a more serious note: tell that incompetent Commandant Berger, or even better his replacement, to bring back M1A2 or better tanks to the Marine Corps that if used correctly and correctly supported: a group of the latest American tanks can do like below:

      https://www.wearethemighty.com/mighty-history/one-french-tank-slaughtered-panzer-company/

      Use our superior tanks, after all the Russians and Chinese are using them: to stop or even ram the enemy. After all our tanks had been proven to be able to do so in the last two Gulf Wars...

      The existence of the tanks ready to roll out should act as an effective line in the sand (better than a bunch of hopelessly outgunned and underequipped people spread around too thin to do anything) after all look at the how the Tirpitz Nazi battleship tied up resources during World War 2 despite not doing much:

      https://allthatsinteresting.com/tirpitz

      And unlike the Tirpitz: we already have lots of tanks in storage. Bring those tanks out of storage, load them up and actually use them the way they are supposed to be used and blow up some enemies here and there would work.

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    9. "...what practical consequences would you suggest..."
      Well, obviously thats situational, and would have to be decided on at a national level (where are all those predetermined War Plans??). But we could/should have responses in mind for most things. For instance, small boats harassing warships, maybe a certain distance "bubble", once breached, always results in opening fire. A drone shootdown results in the destruction on an enemy asset of, say,10X value. My thought here is to use force in an amount that leads to regret by the initiator. Make any move too costly, because our response will always be out of proportion. Now on a grander scale, for instance Taiwan, we have to be very clear that we would become completely involved, and make it publically known. Do so by recognizing them officially, and then sign a defense pact. Right now our commitment isnt clear at all. But if it was, to me, that in itself would hold more potential deterrent value than the Japan-based CVBG. Now as far as the hot topic Ukraine, and deterring Russia, thats a tougher one. I don't think thats somewhere we need to venture militarilly, and I don't think the puny sanctions so far mean much. This is imho somthing the Europeans should be taking point on, and we have no real leverage or deterrence value in this situation...

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    10. "This is imho somthing the Europeans should be taking point on"

      Okay. That leads to the question, why do we have troops stationed in Europe?

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    11. Theyre cold war leftovers... I don't think theres any need for them to be there. Maybe leave prepositioned equipment. But there's do need to have 90k troops there.

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  3. Ukraine is probably one of the hardest places on earth for the USA to try to deter anybody (Georgia may be harder). It is a home court game for Russia. There is virtually no way to exert effective naval power because the Montreux Convention precludes our putting carriers into the Black Sea. As far as air, we either put airplanes and crews into the heart of danger, or fly in from bases 400-500 miles away in Poland or Romania. And any ground troops we try to put in would be at the end of a long and dicey supply chain. \As far as trying to use sanctions, as long as Germany and western Europe are so heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas, I'm not sure how meaningful sanctions can be applied. Ukraine strikes me as one of those situations that has to be handled with diplomacy. It is just not a great place for the USA to try to fight.

    Maybe not quite as hard a row to hoe as it would be for Russia to try to fight us in Iowa, but it's darned close.

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    1. Deterrence proponents remain undeterred by deterrence failure!

      The human capacity to rationalize away anything is actually kind of amazing.

      " precludes our putting carriers into the Black Sea."

      So, Europe is literally packed with all manner of land, air, and naval forces of many countries and yet deterrence failed because of the lack of a carrier in the Black Sea?????? Wow.

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    2. When Russian violates international law by invading another why would we be violating a treaty by entering the Black Sea. That would be like the US keeping itself to a handful of battleships in WW2 so as not to break the Washington Treaty of 1922.
      This is the advantage aggressive dictators always make use of--have republics which believe in the rule of law obey them while they blatantly break them.
      Putin basically rephrased Hitler's justification for invading Czechoslovakia and marched in. China's claim for its insanely huge EEZ was declared illegal by the World Court. They have simply ignored it.
      Treaties only work when it is to the advantage of all the signatories.

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    3. "So, Europe is literally packed with all manner of land, air, and naval forces of many countries and yet deterrence failed because of the lack of a carrier in the Black Sea?????? Wow."

      The problem is getting them to the point of attack, and maintaining logistics supply chains once they are there.

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    4. "So, Europe is literally packed with all manner of land, air, and naval forces of many countries and yet deterrence failed because of the lack of a carrier in the Black Sea?????? Wow."

      So, let the Europeans take care of it. It affects them way more than it affects us.

      Delete
  4. Detection only translates into deterrence when people are willing to act on the detection. Hitler was careful in covering the absorption of Austria via election. He started the same with Sudetenland and then ripped the veil off when he saw the West was not willing to act. Lastly he only hesitated on Poland until he got the Soviet Union to agree to share in the spoils.

    The French and British people were still traumatized by the 4 years of losses in WWI. They had no desire to visualize a situation where they had to go through that again. Short sighted of course, because they suffered war again (but not the brutal over the top senseless losses - 80,000 men in 3 days), but it takes alot to recover from trauma.

    The Administration has shared ALOT of sensitive intelligence indicating what Putin would do and his mindset and goals. Yet people in the West have not geared up to deal with it in a meaningful way to deter Putin.

    The question to ask is Ukraine the new Sudetenland? Or the new Japanese desire to expand before 1941? In either case people could not support actions that might have precluded 6 years of world war.

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    1. Not Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia or Poland. Putin is using the same justification Hitler did just saying he is helping ethnic Russians instead of Germans. Poland in that he pretends that Ukraine and NATO are the aggressors.
      And deterrence by detection didn't work with Japan very well. They invaded, murdered, and raped (literally) their way across China. That might have been a clue. In fact to be fair the pre-WW2 Navy expected Japan to be a major foe.

      Detection works only if there is Deterrence By Consequence in the package. For years people complained about the US nuclear arsenal and how it would inevitably lead a nuclear war. It didn't. Because no one on either side of the Cold War had any doubts about the consequences. We forget that nearly every president during the Cold War was either a WW2 vet or at least alive during that period, as were their Soviet counterparts. Even someone as peace loving and anti nuke as Jimmy Carter was still someone they were afraid might use the nuclear option if they invaded Western Europe.
      But since end of the Cold War, its generations that have grown up in peace and aren't interested in a real world war. And this goes for both political parties and the military. Notice how quiet the military leadership has been since the Ukraine has invaded? They are happy to talk about equity and gender because they have nothing to do with war.
      Its not a odd that Berger poses intriguing questions, but has foolish ideas about Marines as ASW. He is smart enough to know there's a problem but can't get out of his post-cold war mindset. Mentioning things like the Sudetenland is fine for us armchair admirals but I have yet to see any major leader make the comparison.

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  5. I believe it was Henry Kissinger who once said that deterrence is the PRODUCT (not sum) of three things: capability, the will to use that capability, and the other side's belief about our capability and our will to use it.

    Since it's a product, if any of those is zero, then deterrence is zero.

    I think our adversaries have decided that our will is zero, so they're not deterred.

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  6. The real issue is that America has a really big stick but is completely risk averse to using it except against low hanging fruit.

    Eg 9-11 - instead of striking at critical Al Qaeda supporters in Pakistan, KSA etc, the US went for Afghanistan because it was much easier.

    SC Sea - the US refuses to use its force to prevent Chinese takeover

    Iran - US has never engaged in decisive action against Iran. It's just literal skirmishes.

    Ukraine - again, US did nothing really.

    North Korea - including sinking a South Korean corvette - US/allies did nothing.

    Western democracy has become crippled and averse to serious application of force. If you applied the same mindset to 1939-45 we'd all be speaking German or Japanese now.

    Westerners are happy as long as they get their daily fill of cheap slave labour produced consumer goods. No more war or anything hard for us.

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    1. "Western democracy has become crippled and averse to serious application of force."

      I believe the root of the problem is that US government and US military reflect society, at large. Our society has feminized itself and stamped out aggression. Once upon a time, schoolyard fights were a right of passage. Not now. Every disagreement must be mediated by adults and end in hugs. Once upon a time, two men could fight to settle differences, if it came to that, but now the courts are the arbiter. Once upon a time, men exerted their rights and will and accepted the responsibilities that went with that. Now, we depend on the government for everything. Nothing is our fault. Nothing is our responsibility.

      We have become feminized and feminization is not a survival trait out in the world.

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    2. I think consumerism, cultural fragmentation (be it gender or ethnicity or religion or sexuality or favourite type of donut) and hyper individualism (ME ME ME!) don't help.

      Whilst once we were citizens, we are now consumers or customers with an endless drive for self gratification..

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  7. One upside from the Ukrainian War is that the Russians have proven themselves relatively inept in the whole thing:

    1. Didn't destroy Ukrainian air power - Ukrainian air force back in action within hours of initial strike.
    2. Unable to progress from Russian border, having been blocked by Ukraine
    3. Completely primitive tactics eg sending helicopters without fighter support or SEAD, thus resulting in many lost.
    4. Poor coordination of forces -eg paratroopers inserted at Kiev airport without any support who were then wiped out.


    NATO doesn't have much to fear from the bear. In fact I wouldn't be surprised if this is the Russian army's last hurrah.

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    1. Which is precisely why our military needs to start practicing actually going to war. We would probably make similar mistakes, and we need to learn those lessons when it's not for real.

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  8. The only deterrence that works is the opponent's belief that not only CAN you fight them, but that you WILL fight them over whatever is being contested. If China or Russia fundamentally don't believe NATO will actually start fighting them then there is no deterrence, and it's pretty obvious to every mildly interested lay person that virtually no one in the west actually has any interested in going to fight the Russians or Chinese on behalf of another country.

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  9. And of course; how much of a "deterrence" you have has to be weight against how badly the opponent feels that the cost of their actions is worth it. Sometimes certain things are of such importance to the national interests that acting and paying those costs are still worth it.

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