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Tuesday, December 28, 2021

War and Ship Design Philosophy

Do we have enough ships, currently, to conduct a war with China?  Not even close!  Consider that we operated a fleet of some six thousand ships during WWII.  There’s no way we can fight a war with China with only the 180 or so combat ships we have today.  So, we need to build several hundred more ships, right?  Wrong!  We can’t afford that.  Well … we can if we’d spend wisely but that’s not the current reality.  Further, we can’t maintain a fleet of several hundred ships.  Heck, we can’t maintain today’s fleet of 180 combat ships!  Finally, we can’t crew several hundred ships despite the fact that we actually did that during the Cold War.  So, what do we do?  Well, if we can’t build hundreds of ships prior to a war then the only answer is to build hundreds or thousands of ships during the war, as we did in WWII.

 

But – and this is the big but – it takes 5-10+ years to get a ship built and into the fleet today.  That’s simply not going to work during a war.  We can’t wait 5-10+ years for new ships.  In comparison, China has demonstrated that they have several times the shipbuilding capacity and speed that we do.  That would seem to suggest that China will, inevitably, win the naval war simply because they can out-build us.  That’s not good. 

 

So, what can we do about it?  Aside from the obvious solutions such as increasing the number of shipyards and maintenance facilities, which we’ve previously discussed but acknowledged would be very difficult to do without sweeping regulatory reforms, there is one other blindingly obvious and easy solution and that is to change the way we design and build ships.

 

If our current ship designs and construction practices don’t allow us to build ships quickly then we have no choice but to change the designs and practices.  However, before we talk about design changes, let’s first make sure we understand exactly what’s wrong with our current designs as they relate to construction speed.  Yes, we all know that our current designs are woefully deficient in armor, weapons, sensors, separation, redundancy, etc. but those don’t really impact ship construction speed.  Other aspects of ship design have a much greater impact on construction speed.  For example,

 

 

Materials – We need to stick with simpler materials from a construction perspective.  For example, aluminum welding is a tricky art and requires a great deal of experience and technique.  There are relatively few welders with expertise in this skill and training of new welders is a difficult and time consuming task which slows down ship construction time.  Sticking with common steel makes more welders available which speeds up construction time.

 

Similarly, complex composites and layered materials are difficult to fabricate, handle, and integrate into construction.  For example, the Zumwalt’s giant superstructure panels (a complex layered wood, resin, and composite design) are very difficult to fabricate and install.  In fact, the Navy abandoned the material after the first two Zumwalts.

 

During war, many exotic raw materials will be in short supply.  The current automobile shortage which is due to the lack of computer chips is a chilling example.  When we try to build ships during a war and face critical shortages of the raw materials used in radars, computers, sensors, etc., we’ll quickly realize that we should have designed simpler systems using more common and readily available materials.  That exotic moonbeamium nitride radar that can see through the curvature of the earth and detect a bacteria is great but it won’t be available in war and a simple mechanical, rotating radar will be a better choice.  We need to redesign our systems using raw materials we can count on during war.

 

Let’s stick with common, simple materials, as much as possible, in our designs.

 

Complexity – Complex systems are harder to install and take much more time.  For example, the delicate, precise, time-consuming alignments required for radar array faces and VLS cells preclude rapid construction.  Simpler systems that can be ‘slapped’ into place would speed up construction.  The Ford’s elevators are an example of an overly complex system that is very difficult (thus far, impossible!) to install and offers no actual combat benefits and may well be a combat deficiency when it comes to alignment and repair at sea.

 

Let’s avoid complexity like a rattlesnake.

 

Concurrency – Concurrency has repeatedly been shown to cause construction delays as previously installed systems have to be removed, reworked, and reinstalled.  Large sections of the Ford’s decks have had to be removed to allow the installation and modification of systems that were not ready during initial construction.

 

Concurrency must be completely eliminated.

 

Size – This goes without saying but we’ll say it anyway.  The larger a ship is, the longer it takes to build.  We need to focus on smaller ships by ending our idiotic obsession with cramming every weapon, sensor, and system we can into every ship we build.  We need to build smaller, cheaper, single function ships.  For example, the AAW Burke doesn’t need a flight deck, hangar, helo support facilities, sonar, towed array, and so forth.  Imagine how much smaller such a Burke would be and how much quicker it would be to build … and it would still be fully capable of its main role which is AAW.

 

Let’s build smaller, single function ships.

 

New Technology - Radically new systems inevitably require a great deal of time to figure out how to manufacture and install.  For example, the elevators on the Ford offered no overall improvement in carrier air power and yet have wrought havoc on construction times.  The Zumwalt hull form and superstructure offer no discernible combat advantages over conventional forms and yet required a great deal of time to figure out how to manufacture and assemble.  The Zumwalt superstructure panels required the development of entirely new manufacturing techniques and, indeed, the Navy wound up abandoning the composite resin panels in favor of traditional steel plates (albeit massive ones!).

 

Let’s keep new technology in the lab until it’s mature and can be routinely manufactured, installed, and operated.

 

 

 

Now that we understand the various factors that negatively impact construction speed and know to avoid them, what positive measures can we take to increase construction speed? 

 

 

Prototype – We need to try out lots of different ship types so that when war needs arise, we will have already worked out the developmental bugs and will have ready-to-produce designs sitting on the shelves.  I cannot overemphasize the importance of this.  We must have debugged, ready to produce designs so that we don’t waste time debugging designs during a war.

 

Simplify – Nothing speeds up construction like simplified designs.  The LCS, for example, used a complex combining gear that has been nothing but trouble and for what?  It offered no improvement in combat capability, just a possible fuel cost saving by allowing multiple power sources to be used.  The combining gear is larger, more complex, harder to install, harder to operate, weighs more, and takes longer to build and install.  A simplified design would use a single power source and accept the fuel penalty (who cares about fuel cost savings in war?).

 

Simplification applies equally to individual systems.  For example, the VLS system desperately needs to be redesigned, not because of any performance deficiency, but because they are very delicate and difficult to install.  We need a new VLS design/redesign) that is robust and can be ‘slapped’ into place quickly and without requiring exquisite alignment.

 

Standardize - Weapons, sensors, and electronics which are, themselves, simplified, need to be standardized.  Having dozens of ‘flavors’ of Aegis software is idiotic.  Having multiple navigation systems is inefficient and, indeed, contributed directly to the Burke and Avenger collisions and groundings.  Consider the number of different types of radars we currently use:  SPY-x, AMDR, Dual Band Radar, Enterprise Air Search Radar, TRS-xx, SPS-48, SPS-49, SPQ-9, and so many others.  We need to pick a high end radar and a low end and call it a day.  How many different computer systems do we operate?  How many different ship combat software systems do we operate?  And so on.  We need to settle on some standards and be done with it so that we can mass produce the chosen systems and eliminate the current multitude of different configuration and installations.

 

Pre-qualify – We need to have shipyards ready to build standardized designs.  After we implement the preceding steps we need to qualify shipyards by having them build one example of each ship type they’ll be asked to build to debug and prove out the manufacturing process and have production lines ready to go.  Yes, this will cost money to maintain idle or very limited production lines but since when is national security and war production a money making venture?  Paying to maintain production lines may seem inefficient but will be worth every penny when war comes.

 

 

 

Summary

 

In addition to the many ship construction problems such as lack of shipyards, shrinking industrial labor pool, insufficient trades development, regulatory requirements, aged facilities, etc., it is painfully obvious that our current ship designs, themselves, are a major source of the construction delays we encounter today.  These designs are overly complex and simply cannot be produced in a useful time frame during war.

 

In addition to better designs, we need proven, debugged designs that are ready to be put into production.  This requires an extensive prototyping effort during peacetime.  We need to build lots of prototypes to develop and debug both the designs and the manufacturing processes.  It is just as important to debug the manufacturing as the design but this is always ignored.


57 comments:

  1. CNO, it sounds like you want to build ships to fight a war.

    That's just crazy talk.

    I don't see that approach helping any admirals land a cushy defense contractor gig after retirement.

    Lutefisk

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  2. "Let’s build smaller, single function ships."

    I disagree with this. Smaller ships are inevitably limited in range and endurance- meaning how many days they can sail before they require replenishment of onboard stores (including the crews' food supply), AND how many hits they can take before they're out of a fight. The larger ships necessary to perform the missions the USN currently has in mind for itself, will inevitably draw more attention- and enemy attacks, as a direct consequence- requiring more weapons for self-defense, more varieties of weapons to defend themselves from a variety of enemy attacks, and more sensors so they'll know what's coming and so they can counterattack.

    If you agree the Navy should adopt a CONOPS in which the limited endurance would not be too great a liability- e.g., say we abandon all thought of "force projection" and "forward deployment," and simply base these small ships on American shores, where they'll only defend American territorial waters, each mission taking no longer than a couple days- then I can agree.

    "We need to pick a high end radar and a low end and call it a day."

    Are the companies currently manufacturing radars for our warships, capable of manufacturing them in sufficient numbers, e.g., can Raytheon manufacture enough AESA radar arrays to equip all our Aegis Combat System-equipped ships? This possible manufacturing limitation may be why we have so many different models in service. It may help if we could have a company license its design to other manufacturers, the way Grumman licensed the F4F Wildcat to General Motors (as the FM), so the Navy would have something to fly off its escort carriers during WWII; then greater standardization should be possible.

    "Yes, this will cost money to maintain idle or very limited production lines but since when is national security and war production a money making venture? Paying to maintain production lines may seem inefficient but will be worth every penny when war comes."

    I wholeheartedly agree with this. Letting production lines close down, is the reason we can't and won't have any battleships in service- at least not until we spend YEARS building new factories to manufacture large caliber guns, shells for those large caliber guns, and armor to protect these ships when the enemy inevitably tries to sink them before they can launch their own attacks.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. "Smaller ships are inevitably limited in range and endurance-"

      If you study actual WWII vessels, you'll see that's not true; at least not in the sense that you're trying to argue. For example, the 376'x39' Fletcher class had a range of 5500 nm @ 15 kts versus today's much larger Burke at 509'x66' and an equal range of 4400 nm @ 20kts. I don't have the range speed curves but it's obvious that 5 more knots won't reduce the Fletcher below the Burke. So, yes we can build smaller, single function ships with the same range/endurance. It's all about designing the desired characteristics in from the start. We've forgotten what was once possible.

      You may disagree with the notion of smaller, single function ships but it can't be on the basis of inability to meet range/endurance requirements.

      Delete
    2. The Arleigh Burke class have far more powerful radars, which must then consume far more electric power to function; the more powerful radar is necessary to their role as air defense platforms. What are you willing to sacrifice to reduce a warship's energy requirements and extend their range as a direct consequence?

      Delete
    3. ???? Energy requirements have no significant impact on range. Energy is just a matter of having sufficient generators. While generators have some small weight (relative to the ship's total weight), it's insignificant compared to the ship's total weight and would have very little impact on range.

      As noted on the Fleet Structure page of the blog, an AAW escort would, conceptually, be a Burke without the flight deck, hangar, helos, aviation det crew, aviation shops, aviation fuel storage, aviation magazines, towed array, and so on. This would also reduce total crew, hotel services, utility demand, fresh water storage, etc., all of which reduce the ship's weight significantly.

      Beyond that, you design long range into the ship by including larger bunkerage, a longer ship length:width ratio which reduces resistance, etc. We knew how to do this in WWII. As yet another example, the Atlanta class cruiser was close to the Burke in length (541' vs. 509') and narrower (52' vs 66') and had markedly better range (8500 nm @ 15 kts) for the same size ship - just a better design in terms of being optimized for range, armor, and firepower … what a combat ship should have.

      Even the iconic but very small Buckley class DE at 307' long (versus the Burke at 509') had range equal to the Burke at 5500 nm @ 15 kts versus the Burke's 4400 nm @ 20kts.

      You seem to think that it's not possible to design small, single function ships with good range/endurance and yet WWII ship designs demonstrated that it was perfectly and easily achievable. We've just forgotten what we once routinely did. Today's designs are so bad that we've come to believe they're state of the art and pushing the limits of design despite the fact that WWII ship designs prove that belief is a joke. We've just forgotten.

      Delete
    4. "Energy requirements have no significant impact on range. Energy is just a matter of having sufficient generators."

      Don't the ship's engines provide electrical power? Or are they separate units, i.e., if an onboard engine is connected to a propeller, it won't be connected to an electric generator, and vice versa?

      Delete
    5. - I admit, I have been confused how both Navy and Coast Guard think usung TRS-3D/4D and Sea Giraffe is okay. Move to 1 design and fixed panels for small ships 1 notch below EASR.

      - AMDR/EASR production can cut itself up into more, smaller ships. 1 EASR fixed panel could be 3 rotating. 1 AMDR would be 5 and a half fixed panel EASR sets.

      - I like Vard taking a stab at turning the OPC into a warship. They need some help, but range is there. Separating the engine rooms with a hull stretch. They now have 2 concepts.

      https://vardmarine.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/VARD-7-125-NGOPV.pdf

      https://vardmarine.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/VARD-7-115-NGOPV-Infographic.pdf

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    6. Gearing class I was on could transit from NorVa to Rota in 5 days at 15 kts without refueling. Forrest Sherman and Adams would transit non stop to Pearl, refuel and on to Subic.
      Engines do not provide electrical services. Typical engineering layout of all the above classes were two firerooms with two boilers each, two engine rooms with one main engine, two generators and a single evaporator each.

      Delete
    7. "Don't the ship's engines provide electrical power?"

      Actually, no … or only partially, depending on the ship class. Ships tend to have dedicated generators, often diesel, for providing ship's utility power needs. Separate turbines (the ubiquitous LM 2500) provide the propulsion power. If turbines are intended to provide both utility and motive power then the turbines are simply sized appropriately.

      For example, in the Burke class,

      "Each shaft is tied to 2 LM2500 gas turbines (GTMs), which have just 2 speeds: off, and on. Another 3 ship service turbine-generators (GTGs) provide electrical power, with the 3rd designed as a redundant back-up."

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    8. @Aim9snake

      Even if the engines were powering the radars the amount of fuel used is insignificant.

      The amount of fuel burned to move a 10k tonne ship at 20-30 knots is immense they could power the radar for days on the fuel consumed by the ship to move for an hour.

      Delete
    9. "Let’s build smaller, single function ships."

      It's not just cost/ quantity of ships that is of issue on the multifunction ships. Both individuals and units only have so many resources (time, money, training areas and partners). The more functions you add the less time train on any specific one. Both the equipment and the level of training are ceilings to what a unit or individual is capable of. While the thrust of this article is quantity and quality of the fleet. It also has bearing on the maximum level of trained in competence of our crews.

      Delete
    10. @SRB Norfolk to Rota in 5 days??? Ugh, that was a ten day trip for us. But it gave us lots of time to paint and make her pretty for the homecoming after a Med cruise!!😂

      Delete
    11. @Jjabatie. was a ten day transit on PugetSound(AD-38). twelve day transit from Charleston to Trondheim Norway on Charleston (LKA-113). real nice weather in the middle of november.

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  3. Lest I forget. Gensets burn gas too.

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  4. Good candidates for 'mass' production would be dedicated ASW ships.

    Dedicated ASW with only point defense AAW, btw.

    High end ship for escorting battle groups:
    Base it on the Perry class. Upgrade to 5000 tons to accommodate strengthening, kevlar armor, full ASW weapons suite, and two ASW helicopters.

    Low end blue water ASW corvette based on a Fletcher hull:
    No helos but full ASW weapons suite and coming in at about 2500 tons.

    The Navy could use about 50 of each of those.

    Follow CNO's process and make evolutionary improvements.

    Lutefisk

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    Replies
    1. "Dedicated ASW with only point defense AAW, btw."

      Multiple nations build- and then export- submarines that can launch antiship missiles from underwater. Limiting a dedicated ASW ship to point defense, is asking for a sub to hammer her with antiship missiles from beyond her ASW weapons' engagement range.

      As technology progresses, the definition of "low end" rises and rises.

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    2. Submarine launched anti-ship missiles are few and cannot be simultaneously salvoed. Thus, even a basic point defense stands a good chance to defend itself against the few missiles a SSK would carry.

      Would a sub waste a precious anti-ship missile against a small ASW vessel? Possibly but likely not. Small size confers a degree of 'immunity' to submarine attack. A sub rather bypass a small ASW corvette than to waste a weapon and reveal its presence. Remember, that it's not a one-on-one engagement. It's a sub versus all the ASW assets in the area. Revealing itself by sinking a lowly ASW corvette is generally a poor tactical decision when there are other ASW assets around.

      The main function of small ASW vessels is to force the sub to keep its head down which makes it a mission kill. The small ASW vessel's main 'weapon' is presence.

      You're got to think operationally, not one-on-one.

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    3. So when an enemy nation decides to deal with these ASW ships by having land-based planes launch air strikes with antiship missiles, your solution is to either have an aircraft carrier accompany these ASW ships and provide air support, or have the ASW ships flee?

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    4. If you are doing ASW within reach of enemy air then yes, you either accept loss or bring some AAW.

      Delete
    5. "your solution is to either have an aircraft carrier accompany these ASW ships and provide air support, or have the ASW ships flee?"

      Come on, now. You surely know how naval combat works. If you anticipate enemy air support and you want to do ASW then you provide air defense (Burkes, FFGs, land based air, carrier air).

      Why would you think for even a moment that someone would send a lone ASW vessel against enemy air? Are you just looking for an argument or do you really not know this?

      One of the requirements of this blog is that readers have at least a basic grasp of naval combat operations and tactics.

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    6. "Why would you think for even a moment that someone would send a lone ASW vessel against enemy air?"

      Because the USN REPEATEDLY sent lone vessels on such missions, e.g., the "freedom of navigation operations" for which the USS Fitzgerald was preparing for, when she collided with the ACX Crystal. I also saw no mention of air defense warships accompanying the USS Stark when an Iraqi aircraft shot two Exocet antiship missiles at her, in her Wikipedia article; do you have more information on that incident?

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    7. Are you being deliberately obtuse? FON ops, the Burke collisions, and the Stark were all peacetime actions/incidents. The USN does NOT repeatedly send lone vessels on war missions. That would be insane. I know you know this so stop whatever point you're trying to win and get back to useful, informative, helpful comments.

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    8. "FON ops, the Burke collisions, and the Stark were all peacetime actions/incidents. The USN does NOT repeatedly send lone vessels on war missions."

      In the Army (my service), they said, "Train like you fight, fight like you train." Is that not the case in the Navy? Should the FONOPS NOT be conducted with the expectation enemy attacks are a real possibility, if they're conducted at all (I recall you opining they're useless)?

      Delete
    9. "Train like you fight, fight like you train." Is that not the case in the Navy?"

      Not even a little bit! The Navy makes no attempt, whatsoever, to train like they'll fight.

      "Should the FONOPS NOT be conducted with the expectation enemy attacks are a real possibility"

      First, it would be impossible to conduct a FON as if attack were imminent because it would require at least a 4-carrier group and 30 escorts to have the slightest hope of repelling an attack in enemy waters. That assembly of force for a 30 minute mission is just not feasible.

      More to the point, FON is worse than worthless because it legitimizes the Chinese territorial claim. The logic is that if the territorial claim is false (which it is) then there is no need to conduct a FON. By conducting an FON, we're implicitly acknowledging that the territorial claim is legitimate - the opposite of what we want to achieve. If we truly want to demonstrate that the claim is invalid then we should anchor a ship immediately offshore and conduct combat training or, better yet, send troops ashore since if the Chinese don't own the island then we have just as much right as they do to be on the island.

      By following UNCLOS Innocent Passage requirements we acknowledge the claim. We're idiots.

      The Army, by the way, does not train like they'll fight, either. For example, the Army has stated that they do not employ any significant electronic warfare against themselves because it would be too disruptive. Well, isn't that exactly what will happen in combat? Of course it is. The Russians are demonstrating this daily in Ukraine and elsewhere. So, the Army is not training like they'll fight. I did a post on this.

      The Army is likely better than the Navy about training but let's not pretend that they are doing it right.

      Delete
    10. I agree, a dedicated ASW ship will be a good candidate for mass production. Have the hull just large enough for a specific range, a single 76mm gun, a single CIWS or SeaRAM whatever is standard now and dedicate everything else to the pursuit of ASW.

      I reckon it will be a ship of about 100M long, around 2000 tons in displacement, fitted with the recently discussed azimuth thrusters along with prairie-masker system. Sensors will be very basic navigational and multi purpose surface/air search radar along with bow and towed sonar array.

      For the ASW weapons suite, it'll probably be better to go with a box launcher with manual reloads. The Mk 16 box launcher if they are still available or can be produced will be ideal. A pair of the ubiquitous mk 32 torpedo tubes round out the ASW weapons.

      It's basically a lighter, simplified Perry class frigate with no provision for helicopters meant to work in an ASW hunt group centered around an ASW Helicopter carrier. It should not be very expensive or complicated to operate.

      I wonder how viable is it if we took the Freedom class LCS and replace the troublesome engines/machinery with simpler ones and supplement with Azimuth thrusters, add prairie-masker, remove the hangar and associated container modularity bits and chuck on the weapons and sensors as mentioned above. Will it save time and cost as opposed to a new design?

      Loc

      Delete
    11. "I wonder how viable is it if we took the Freedom class LCS"

      That's a reasonable thought, however, the LCS has inherent limitations and flaws that make it unsuitable: short range, critical stability, insufficient crew and no capacity to take on more crew, no armor, no hull mounted sonar capability due to shallow draft and self-noise, etc. Modifications, such as you've suggested, can help the LCS but no amount of changes can make it a good vessel. I'd much rather put the money and time into designing an actual, good ASW vessel.

      Delete
  5. I wonder where the Navy is at with their long term commitment to MT30 turbines? With Freedoms as short timers and Zumwalt at 3 hulls I think the need starts to disapate a bit. With railguns out the power will be needed for radars, lasers and other electromagnetic needs. That won't need as much juice as the gun from what I've seen.They could probably scale down LM2500s. They were working on a 25MW genset which by the math would be based on an LM2500+. A 58MW IEP ship I am guessing will be about the size of the new Italian destroyer or the Japanese and Korean ships.

    ReplyDelete
  6. Good candidates for 'mass' production would be dedicated ASW ships.

    Dedicated ASW with only point defense AAW, btw.

    High end ship for escorting battle groups:
    Base it on the Perry class. Upgrade to 5000 tons to accommodate strengthening, kevlar armor, full ASW weapons suite, and two ASW helicopters.

    Low end blue water ASW corvette based on a Fletcher hull:
    No helos but full ASW weapons suite and coming in at about 2500 tons.

    The Navy could use about 50 of each of those.

    Follow CNO's process and make evolutionary improvements.

    Lutefisk

    ReplyDelete
  7. The other advantage the Chinese have is that they are going to be much more comfortable with losses than we are (which is typically the case when facing an tyrannical gov't). As a result, the Chinese strategy already has the fact that they will take losses built into it.

    On the other hand, the US Navy operates as if it will not take any loses. This strategy will lead to losing any naval conflict with China. I believe China's strategy is very similar to what Japan's was in WWII. Set up a defensive line, draw the war out, inflict casualties, and force an exhausted enemy to the negotiating table. The difference is that China possesses the natural resources, geography, industrial base, and manpower to withstand a protracted war, while Japan did not.

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  8. Nice post but I believe you are forgetting something : software. I don't see how it can be made to fit in the approach you are describing (BTW I am a computer guy, that's my job). Basically I don't see an easy way to make software simpler without loosing some of the tactical edge it gives you, like for example in signal processing or automation. The reason is that to have these functionnalities you need to have a lot of lines of code, and the more lines you have, the likelier it is that there are bugs (FYI all software has bugs, that's a fact).

    I am not talking about all singing all dancing software like ALIS was supposed to be but thigs like sonar or radar signal processing, sensor fusion and target tracking. If you get rid of theses then you need well trained human beings to do the job, that may be possible up to a point but you can't put 10 crews on a fighter aircraft.

    There are probably some ways forward, like for example :
    - Testing in realistic conditions like you've advocated before.
    - Prototyping : don't try to stay too close to what the labs do. Operators will probably get very quickly p.. off if you give them stuff that does not work at least 99% of the time anyway.
    - Don't try to integrate everything into a single system, just build separate systems for each function and make them talk together via common sense protocols, this way you can change one part without affecting too much the other.

    I am posting this comment because I believe you tend to forget about this aspect and altough I understand well your drive for simplicity I have trouble imagining how to do it in software without throwing away functionnalities that are needed, unless you can show me that they are not needed.

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    Replies
    1. "Nice post but I believe you are forgetting something : software."

      Well, the difference with software is that, once you get it working and debugged, you can make an infinite number of copies pretty easily. Obviously the "working and debugged" part is what needs to happen during "peacetime".

      Delete
    2. So the need for simplicity, which in ships is to allow for faster construction, doesn't apply as much to software.

      Delete
    3. " I believe you are forgetting something "

      Forget? ForGET? FOOOORGET????? The great and powerful Oz does not forget anything! Sorry, just watched a rerun of Wizard of Oz.

      Seriously, you are forgetting that software complexity has nothing to do with physical ship construction speed unless it's so bad that it renders equipment inoperable as is the case with the Ford elevators.

      That aside, you've correctly and thoroughly answered your own question about what to do about overly complex software. You ruthlessly weed out the unnecessary functions. For example, word processors achieved complete functionality decades ago. Since then, every new version is more bloated with code for functions that have nothing to do with actual word processing and that very few users use. Now, if I type someone's name, the word processor attempts to link to a contact list, link to a map, link to dozens of other programs to show me a bunch of information about that person that I either already know or don't care about. That's unnecessary complexity.

      As you noted, you don't try to write all-encompassing, do-everything software like ALIS.

      Software should be as capable as it NEEDS TO BE but NO MORE THAN THAT. Write a sonar routine but don't try to tie that into sonar spare parts inventory for warehouses and production facilities around the world.

      If you're a 'computer guy' you know all this. Today's operating systems are bloated with all kinds of code that not one in a million users care about. The OS is trying to be all things to all people. ALIS.

      Of all the things that impact and slow down physical ship construction, software is around dead last. Now, software development delays are at the top of the list in terms of equipment development delays and that's a major problem but it's not a construction problem. What is a problem is trying to insert hardware/software into construction when it isn't ready - like the Ford elevators. We should have stuck with the old elevator system until the new one actually worked flawlessly in a land based research facility.

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    4. "What is a problem is trying to insert hardware/software into construction when it isn't ready - like the Ford elevators. We should have stuck with the old elevator system until the new one actually worked flawlessly in a land based research facility."

      I second this. China apparently avoided the headaches the USN had with the Gerald R. Ford class' EMALS, because it built land-based facilities to test its catapult designs. They are learning from our mistakes- mistakes our own military leaders refuse to learn from, and keep repeating as a direct result!

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    5. "China apparently avoided the headaches the USN had with the Gerald R. Ford class' EMALS, because it built land-based facilities to test its catapult designs. They are learning from our mistakes- mistakes our own military leaders refuse to learn from, and keep repeating as a direct result!"

      While I agree totally with the second part about our leaders' refusal to learn, I'm not entirely certain that China has truly dodged all the bullets. There are a lot of issues that don't show up on land but do at sea. The EMALS alignment problems don't show up until you get bumped around a bit. For another example, the Newport class LSTs with the over-the-bow ramps had solid state controls for the bow ramps that were mounted in the bow area. They were theoretically the electricians' gear to maintain, but I had to loan them my ETs regularly. When you took water and spray over the bow, they had major issues. One of them, I think it was LaMoure, once infamously launched its bow ramp into the parking lot at Little Creek.

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  9. I think killing off the multi-purpose superships would cure a lot of ills. Building AAW and ASW, and even gun specific ships would mean more hulls, and that would mean more production lines, maybe even new shipyards (looking at you West Coast, with your amazing shipbuilding history), maybe even some competition.
    As far as concurrency, and chasing future-tech, yes. Full stop. Yesterday!! We forgot how to test, build, test, tweak, and build!! Look at the evolution of USN ships from the early 1900 through 1945, and even up to the 70s. The "Standard" battleships were a great evolutionary line, but the cruisers and destroyers had a similar one, and by WWII, some of the best-in-class ships were building or at least on paper. I guess it could be argued that the Burkes have been evolving similarly, but the Flts vs a class of two built before at least a minor upgrade/redesign really isnt. This helps in the complexity dept also, in that basic structural and electrical layouts can be more standardized from class to class/subclass, with the upgrades often being just systems cabinets.
    Another oft-mentioned key here is shorter ship lifespans. Reducing major overhauls and modernizations (except CVNs) keeps the bills down and keeps newer, current ships in the fleet. It also would allow us to rebuild our mothball fleet with ships that wouldnt necessarily be very out of date, and worthwhile assets to reactivate if needed....

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  10. CNO thoughts on War and Ship Design Philosophy would add has the US lost the industrial capability/knowhow in shipbuilding that goes with being a successful builder of commercial ships. Why ask question is Japan, the third largest world shipbuilder, with its new 5,500t Mogami class frigates with contract awarded to Mitsubishi Aug 2017 and its Mitsui associated shipyard has launched four ships to date, the first on its sea trials and understand will be commissioned mid 2022, five years from contract award. The Mogami is a multi-mission frigate with all that implies in complexity in design, build hours and cost to build. The cost of the Mogami ~$480 million each (planning for 22 ships in class), you do wonder what cost would fall to if the IJN had specified it as single function ship as advocated by CNO, which totally agree with.

    An example of near single function ship is the three Danish Iver Huitfeldt AAW class frigates built for less than a $1billion, they were designed to the principles mentioned by CNO by Odense Maritime Technology (OMT) the design house of Maersk which think the world's largest container shipping company. An example of the OMT design philosophy was the least expensive propulsion system, all diesel plus DGs, ship achieved 31 knots in North Sea trials and its range ~9,000 nm, twice that of a Burke.

    Would note both ships above might need mods to meet Navy survivability standards eg Mogami doesn't have longitudinally displaced engine rooms.

    PS The Navy specifying a very expensive Integrated Power System for the DDG(X) similar to Zumwalt's, all in the name of power for the totally unproven and hyped lasers, lasers have been in development for the last 40 to 50 years and yet not one weapon system has made it into production. CNO Adm Gilday said on Twitter that “directed energy is the future of our Navy” following the test from USS Portland laser that took out an unpowered stationary target in the sea at a couple ships lengths, LOL.

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    1. ODIN is now on multiple ships that are being deployed. What's wierd with that is that its the one system we don't know as much detail on. Power output, etc.

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    2. "ODIN"

      I have been unable to find any data on range or dwell time, the two key performance characteristics of a laser system.

      Worryingly, the laser systems appear to be developing outside of DOT&E testing which makes them very suspect since the Navy has never met a weapon system that wasn't deemed flawless. One small example: the Navy never even tested the LCS RAM system! They simply bypassed testing altogether! Amazing.

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    3. By RAM, are you referring to radar absorbent materials used to make the ship "stealthy" (sarcastic quotation marks included, as I doubt much thought was out into making the ships quieter, so enemy subs have difficulty targeting them with sonar), or Rolling Airframe Missiles used for point defense?

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  11. America needs no warships.

    Once the Commandant has GOP insurrection stamped out of the ranks and the proper political loyalty officers installed--

    The overly heavy infantry rifles in the hands of companies with no artillery or tanks, but equipped with remote control missile trucks, will easily defeat the medium armor and arty of the PLANMC and the literal cloud of PLAN destroyers and frigates.

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    1. I don't mind a bit of hyperbole and the occasional rant but give us something constructive while you're at it.

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    2. It is going to be funny when the Marines have more missiles on their remote control trucks than the Navy does on their new glorified coast guard cutters and LCSes put together.

      My constructive suggestion is the navy adopt a ship design that is cheap, less manning intensive, and holds a lot of missiles. Bonus if it has disposable sensor platform RPVs to find targets. 20 knots is plenty fast if it has enough missiles and large enough engagement envelope.

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    3. I don't think there's much manning left to cut, if any.

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    4. "suggestion is the navy adopt a ship design that is cheap, less manning intensive, and holds a lot of missiles."

      The Navy already attempted/did that. It's the LCS. It was supposed to cost $200M, have a core crew of 30-40 or so, and have lots of NLOS missile munitions. Of course, you know what happened. So, with that example in mind, what size ship do you envision, how many crew, and how many missiles?

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    5. Philly Shipyard MT-50, with 160 cells, the rest of the hull filled with foam, and radar, Rolling, sonar, and ASW grafted on. Grafting CIC and maintainers for the military equipment onto the current manning, less than 100 people for a lot of missiles.

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    6. "I don't think there's much manning left to cut, if any."

      Not on ships or other operational units, but plenty to cut on the admin/overhead side. The Navy needs more people in combat and combat support slots, and fewer in admin/overhead slots

      Delete
  12. New and forgotten battleship design. https://forum.worldofwarships.eu/topic/5797-the-streamlined-battleships/

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  13. What is very strange about the USN's lack of concern about naval parity is their continual pursuit of naval provocations:

    https://www.cato.org/commentary/four-western-provocations-led-us-russia-crisis-today

    Not content with this, the US tries to create new problems in the Arctic by complaining about the NorthEast Passage being entirely in Russian territorial waters (while ignoring that the corresponding NorthWest Passage is entirely in Canadian territorial waters) and arguing that the US should be able to conduct FONOP operations against the Russians in the Arctic. So, why are we trying to start wars when we know that our fleet is inadequate to successfully prosecute them. Any idea, CONOPS?

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  14. FONOPs are recklessly proactive especially when the Russians and Chinese have local escalation dominance. What can the US/USN do if the Russians or Chinese decide to end these provocations by attacking a FONOPs ship? Attack Russian or Chinese naval ships or bastions and start WW3? Not hardly! What will happen is FONOPS will come to an abrupt end and the careers of those who thought it was a good idea to do some gratuitous FONOPs penis waving in Russian and China’s back yards will be put through the shredder. Ditto recklessly dangerous aerial missions with USAF/USN nuclear capable aircraft that routinely practice “kicking in the doors” of Russian and Chinese air defense zones. FONOPS are simply missions where the risks far outweigh any benefits of the principle.

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    1. "What can the US/USN do if the Russians or Chinese decide to end these provocations by attacking a FONOPs ship? Attack Russian or Chinese naval ships or bastions and start WW3? "

      This is the epitome of frightened, flawed logic. You state that China can pre-emptively attack a US ship with, apparently, no fear whatsoever of starting WW3 but if the US were to retaliate it would start WW3. This is illogic taken to its ultimate conclusion.

      One can legitimately debate the value and wisdom of FONOPS (I think they're worse than useless) but not on this utterly illogical and one-sided basis.

      I would normally delete a comment this illogical but it serves as a good object lesson of what happens when fear totally consumes our thinking.

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  15. Smaller ships are usually not as seaworthy, as larger vessels, if they are designed for minimum drag. The following article is about a deep-vee design that increases the sea state that the ship can safely sail with minimal fuel efficiency penalty.
    I think this concept could serve as a starting point for a rational hull design that would allow smaller combatants to operate in the same sea state as the larger combatants.
    The article is from 1987 but is a nice read.

    THE DEEP- VEE HULL FORM — IMPROVES SEAKEEPING AND COMBAT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 

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  16. ComNavOps,

    You and I have gone round and round about the issue of expensive, multi-purpose ships like the USN seems to want to build exclusively, versus cheaper, single-purpose ships which you advocate. I don’t want another round, but I do want to clarify a couple of things. My approach, which you seem to want to characterize as being the same as the Navy’s, is not. I see a need for some top-of-the-line multi-purpose ships, but like ADM Elmo Zumwalt, I favor a high/low mix (although we may define the mix parameters differently). I have proposed a 600-ship fleet for a lower total cost than the USN’s 350-ship or so planned fleet, by cutting the average cost/ship in half, from about $2.8B to about $1.4B. That cannot be done without including a bunch of low-cost single-purpose ships, specifically:

    - 80 ASW frigates, basically the same as you have proposed
    - 120 coastal/littoral combatants (ASW corvettes, missile patrol boats, mine countermeasures ships, and SSKs), basically CAPT Wayne Hughes’s NNFM
    - 60 smaller and cheaper amphibious ships (smaller LHA.LHD, LPH, LPD/LSD, LST, LPA/LKA, Land attack frigate) which can be built for less in total than the do-anything-but-put-tanks-artillery-and-heavy-equipment-ashore “big deck amphibs” that the Navy wants (although amphibs are inherently so versatile that describing any of them as single-purpose may be a misnomer); to be candid, as an old Gator Navy sailor, a lot of my thinking is driven by the travesty that our amphibious forces (and by extension the Marines) have become
    - 30 cheaper SSNs (I have suggested the French Barracuda as a model, but others exist)

    Yes, I have also included some high-end ships, because I think some are necessary. These would include:

    - 12 nuclear aircraft carriers, although like you I have used the Nimitz class rather than the Ford class as the model
    - 8 battleships (based on the 1980s battlecarrier proposal) and 20 cruisers (based on the WWII flight deck cruiser proposal), each of them with big guns (16”/8”), lots of missiles (including some big hypersonic/ballistic land attack/anti-ship missiles), and some air capability (STOVL for the battlecarrier, UAV for the cruiser); these would be able to dominate the surface against anything but land-based air or supercarriers, and since we have the only supercarriers, then basically against anybody
    - 12 Columbia SSBNs, based on current USN plans, which I don’t think can be changed

    I’m not sure whether you would classify the following as high or low, kind of high-end capability with cost savings versus what the USN plans:

    - 20 SSGNs based on Ohios rather than the Columbias (like you), to save money and allow building more as primary strike platforms
    - Keeping 40 Burkes as the primary AAW escort, because they are decent ships, and we already have them
    - 12 conventional CVs based on something between the Midways and Kitty Hawks, to enable twelve 2-carrier CVBGs for about the cost of 12 Fords (could form six 4-carrier CTFs if needed), with Lightning Carrier conversions of existing LHAs/LHDs to fill the gap until those start joining the fleet
    - 60 GP escorts based on the GP FREMMs rather than the way the USN has overkilled the design to get AEGIS onboard
    - 30 Virginia VPM as secondary strike platforms
    - 8 ASW helo carriers
    - 12 ABM/BMD conversions of the existing San Antonio design, to protect Guam, Sasebo, Yokosuka, Pearl, Rota, Naples, and major USA ports

    No, we do not agree on everything, but we agree on a lot, and a lot of my thoughts came from you. I think you have mischaracterized my views, perhaps for the sake of argument, and I want to try to set the record straight. I don’t really want or expect a response, and if you do respond then I probably won’t answer, but I just wanted to put this out there.

    I do very much appreciate the forum you provide for thoughtful discussion of important issues. I look forward to continuing to read and respond, and I wish you and all posters on here a most happy and prosperous 2022.

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  17. CNO you mentioned that the VLS needs to be redesigned due to an overly delicate installation process. What about something like the StanFlex? On paper it seem to be exactly what you propose, ease of installation and standardized.

    May I know what your preferred VLS is like as compared to what exist? I apologize if this has already been covered in a much earlier post.

    Loc

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    1. Stanflex is not a VLS system. It is a standardized modular system similar to the LCS concept and can encompass any function. VLS may be one of the Stanflex modules but I know nothing about the robustness of the module so I have no opinion about it.

      As you've already read, my preferred VLS would be an armored system, broken into small chunks for separation and built with ruggedness and resilience as design criteria, among other characteristics. I'm unaware of any existing system that meets those requirements.

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