The Marine’s Amphibious Assault Vehicle, AAV, is now just the Vehicle, V. The amphibious part is gone as the Marines have announced that the AAVs will no longer be used for water operations.
… given the current state of the amphibious vehicle program, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has decided the AAV will no longer serve as part of regularly scheduled deployments or train in the water during military exercises; AAVs will only return to operating in the water if needed for crisis response. … The AAV will continue to operate on land; 76 percent of its tasks are land-based. [1]
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| AAV - Now Just 'V' |
Well, they always have the new ACV, right? Well, no, at least not at the moment.
The ACVs are under their own restrictions from waterborne operations. [1]
The Marine Corps in early September announced the pause to ACV water operations due to the problem with the towing mechanism. [1]
ACVs were temporarily suspended from open ocean waterborne operations as we worked to solve an issue that was identified with the towing mechanism. We expect that issue to be resolved soon and for ACVs to return to the water early in the New Year. [1]
So, currently the Marines have no means to get ashore in an assault since the LCAC is doctrinally excluded from initial assaults and has been relegated to follow on support. Of course, the Marines have stated that they’re out of the amphibious assault business so I guess this isn’t really a problem.
This does, however, lead to a potentially serious question.
Is the AAV the best vehicle for land tasks? Presumably, the newer ACV also has the same 76% land tasks so the same question applies. The AAV/ACV is not an armored personnel carrier (APC) like the Israeli Namer nor an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) like the Bradley so what tasks is it being asked to perform?
Land combat vehicles are intended to go in harm’s way and are armed and armored appropriately. The AAV/ACV is not. As best I can tell – not being a land combat expert – the AAV/ACV was intended as a poor man’s APC, though without the armor – thus making it a very lightly armored personnel carrier. As such, it is unsuited for modern battlefield combat. It could, perhaps, function as a rear area personnel carrier but does that role justify the expenditure on the new ACV? I would think not.
The amphibious nature of the AAV/ACV led to a compromised vehicle that is optimized for neither water nor land tasks. This was possibly acceptable if the Marines were going to conduct amphibious assaults (no, it really wasn’t but we’ll set that issue aside for now). Now, since the Marines are abandoning landings from the sea they should seriously re-evaluate whether the AAV/ACV is suited for strictly land tasks.
The AAV/ACV seems to have no role in the new Marine Corps so why are they continuing to purchase ACVs?
On the bright side, the Marines have no viable mission so I guess none of this matters but, wow, this is some top notch embarrassing fumbling and incompetence on display for the world to see. China has to be wetting themselves laughing about this.
________________________________
[1]USNI News website, “Marines Keeping AAVs Out of the Water Permanently”, Sam LaGrone, 15-Dec-2021,
https://news.usni.org/2021/12/15/breaking-marines-keeping-aavs-out-of-the-water-permanently
What is wrong with China's Type 05 family of amphibious vehicles?
ReplyDeleteHow hard would they be to replicate?
Nothing wrong with it! We tried and failed to produce something very similar, the EFV.
DeleteOf course, we don't really need anything since we appear to be totally out of the amphibious assault business. This also has to make one wonder why we have, and continue to build, amphibious ships.
Just a note, the Chinese Type 05 family is designed for amphibious fighting NOT FOR LAND COMBAT. It is very light and very lighted armored (protection against 12.7mm). That's perfectly appropriate for the initial amphibious landing but is not suited for subsequent land combat against true HAPCs, MBTs, IFVs, anti-tank weaponry, etc. It's a beachhead vehicle. The same is true of the AAV/ACV except now we're going to use them as land-only combat vehicles and that's just going to get people killed because they aren't land combat vehicles. This is another example of the US insistence on do-everything assets instead of just single function.
The Type 05 is reported around 25 tons. The ACV is reported around 35 tons.
"Nothing wrong with it! We tried and failed to produce something very similar, the EFV."
DeleteBut how hard did we really try just to replicate it, and how much was, "Oh, we could add this thing-a-ma-jig on and make it do this, too. And we could add this other doo-dad on and make it do that, too"? We should know enough about the Type 05 from what's in the public domain to reverse engineer a reasonable clone. And that's really all we need.
The EFV began development at least a decade prior to the Type 05 family so there was nothing for us to copy from the 05. EFV development began in the late 1980's and continued until its cancellation in 2011.
DeleteSo they started after us and got something in the water before us? That's a pretty startling indictment of somebody or something. I think we know what.
Delete"On the bright side, the Marines have no viable mission so I guess none of this matters but, wow, this is some top notch embarrassing fumbling and incompetence on display for the world to see. China has to be wetting themselves laughing about this."
ReplyDeleteAs someone who used to haul Marines around for a living in the Gator Navy, back wen Marines meant something, I find this very painful to watch.
You might want to turn your head until this Commandant's term is done and we see what his successor is like.
DeleteOf course, what are the chances that his successor is going to be any different?
DeleteWell, if he gets to hand pick his successor then, obviously, nothing will change. However, I get rumors of lots of discontent in the Corps. There is nowhere near 100% buy in. So, there's a good chance things go back to normal although a great deal of damage has already been done and it won't be easy to undo.
DeleteThe position is a Presidential appointment but I just don't know enough about how a Commandant nominee is really selected. So, part of this depends on who the President is at the time.
I think a lot of this goes back to picking the wrong way to skin the cat. Now they just accept the bad outcome. More well deck with more connectors pre-loaded may have been an answer. It would still require taking the weight of the M-1 out of the equation so the connectors could be designed differently for spreading the weight around a bit more.
ReplyDelete"weight of the M-1"
DeleteThe M1 has always been the key to an amphibious assault. Either you need to find a way to get a tank ashore in the initial wave or you need to find a replacement for that firepower. We've done neither.
Of course, it's now a moot point since the Marines have abandoned amphibious assault.
Yet somehow the Russians and French managed to design effective sub 60-metric-ton MBTs.
DeleteI'm truly baffled by the Navy and Marine viewpoint in regard to amphibious operations.
ReplyDeleteThe argument seems to be that amphibious landings can no longer be done against a peer enemy.
But when has that ever been possible?
In the Pacific in WWII, we typically had air and sea dominance to execute the landings (at least locally).
Even against the Germans at Normandy, the Germans being a peer enemy, the landings were conducted with air and sea dominance.
The German navy attacked with a handful of torpedo boats and sank a Norwegian destroyer. And I believe that the Luftwaffe only managed to get two (2) planes over the landing beaches.
The Allied landing forces weren't fighting off the Bismark and Tirpitz, or battling waves of Luftwaffe bombers.
An amphibious operation requires that you have air and sea superiority, at least locally, to even consider a landing.
If I understand this, surely the professionals do as well.
So I have to ask myself, what is their thinking here?
Do they just want to get out of the amphibious business altogether?
If so, why do we even have a Marine Corps? What purpose wouldn't be served by just having an army?
Why do we have all the amphibious support ships? Why are we building new ones?
None of this makes any sense to me.
Lutefisk
And I forgot to mention, during the landings in Normandy the Allies weren't trying to get off the beach while battling German panzers either.
DeleteLutefisk
It can be done without air and even naval superiority... I would be studying the German invasion of Norway and the US Guadalcanal campaign. If you really want to go high risk, study Crete. Now here is the big but.... they are tremendously risky and expensive and ships, lives and material.
Delete"German invasion of Norway"
DeleteUm … The Germans had complete air superiority and local naval superiority.
The US had complete superiority for the invasion of Guadalcanal. Later, of course, the Japanese rallied forces and attempted to retake the island but for the assault itself, the US had total superiority.
As far as Crete goes, the Germans had total air superiority but lacked sea control. Recognizing this, they used a mainly paratroop assault, thus bypassing their lack of sea control problem.
In each example, you cited the attacker had the requisite superiority for the assault to succeed.
Honestly we lost the ability to stage amphibious assaults with the retirement and lack of replacement of battleships and heavy cruisers. Without ships capable of remaining combat effective while taking severe battle damage and providing direct fire support for the assault there is no point in trying against a dug in enemy with modern weapons.
ReplyDeleteSitting at stand off ranges with cruise missiles in not a real option for immediate fire support needs. You are looking at minutes of response time for a missile to service a target compared to seconds for a ship with guns sitting right off of the shore.
Magazine capacity for missiles vs guns is also an issue. A contested shoreline is likely to have a lot of point targets from machinegun and ATGM nests up to anti-air and anti-ship batteries
DeleteAlong with mortars and tube artillery, which would be great targets for NGFS.
DeleteLutefisk
Agreed... NGFS, Or lack of it in my mind, is where the reality of amphib efforts start to die. While opening moves might start with missiles, the brute force of area bombardment, and the nearly instant on-call availibility of major caliber gunfire is what can make or break a landing.
Delete"the Marines have no viable mission" ????
ReplyDeleteOh come on! Once they get the LAWS program up and running, which totally won't turn into a black hole of suck like the LCS, Those slow little unseaworthy, unstealthy, unprotected, undefended craft will flit around the SCS and first island chain, totally not being low-hanging fruit for Chinese patrol aircraft, corvettes, frigates and SSKs.....depositing platoons of Marines on islands with batteries of Naval Strike Missiles....that absolutly won't come under intense counter-battery fire the moment they launch a missile or emit anything.......
When amateurs like us put more effort into military matters than ACTUAL MILITARY OFFICERS, that says VERY BAD THINGS about the state of the US military.
DeleteRight?? Between the regulars and CNO, theres at least 50-60hrs a week of naval-oriented thought going on here. Which Im pretty sure is lots more than the whole Admirlty puts in... And we have better ideas and conclusions!!🤣
Delete"Between the regulars and CNO, theres at least 50-60hrs a week of naval-oriented thought going on here. Which Im pretty sure is lots more than the whole Admiralty puts in..."
DeleteWhat scares me is that I don't think it is more. I think they are working as hard as they can, they're just stupid.
"And we have better ideas and conclusions!!"
Absolutely. Even when I disagree with people, and I've certainly had my tangles with ComNavOps and others, I think their ideas are way, way better than the Navy's--and even more so, better than the Marines'.
Or maybe not stupid, just more concerned with diversity, inclusion, and equality (D-I-E, the acronym is more appropriate that way, IMO) than with winning wars.
Delete"just more concerned with diversity, inclusion, and equality "
DeleteThere's certainly an element of that and far too much of it, however, there's more at the root than just that. For example, when it comes time to design a ship (or aircraft or weapon system or whatever), I really don't think anyone is thinking how can we make a more inclusive ship. No, someone is designing a ship and not worrying about those social factors, at that point, and yet the whole thing runs off the rails anyway.
As always, follow the money. Budget protection is the service's priority and that explains a large chunk of the problem. For instance, the LCS and 'littoral' was concocted purely as a budget protection scheme because the Navy felt threatened by the demise of the Soviet Union and had to create a new threat to justify continued - or increased! - budget. It didn't matter what the design was since combat was never the purpose of the program; budget protection was. Hence, we wound up with a useless ship. The Zumwalt was a similar example. The Ford was yet another. None were needed to support any military strategy, they were just budget protection programs.
"I think they are working as hard as they can, they're just stupid."
DeleteDespite making a non-stop series of stupid decisions, they're not stupid people. You can't get through Annapolis if you're actually stupid. You can, however, get through totally devoid of common sense, integrity, and dedication to a higher purpose.
I think one of the major problems we face is that our officers/flag daily lives are consumed by irrelevant tasks. No one has time to contemplate strategy, operations, and tactics and they have even less time (none, actually) to try out any thoughts they might have in actual exercises.
Hand-in-hand with this is a demonstrable failure to study history which is the foundation of wisdom and the base upon which the future is built. Our naval leaders completely ignore the lessons of history and, as a result, we keep repeating history's mistakes. For example, we learned the folly of assuming that dogfighting would never happen again and we built the Navy's F-4 Phantoms without a gun. Having learned that lesson the hard way, we've now gone and built the Navy's F-35B/C without a gun. The list of our failures to heed history's lessons is nearly endless and I won't bore you with a recitation. The point is that, clearly, we aren't effectively teaching history, learning history, analyzing history, or applying history. The past is where you learn about the future. If you refuse to learn history's lessons, you won't make good decisions for the future.
"No one has time to contemplate strategy, operations, and tactics and they have even less time (none, actually) to try out any thoughts they might have in actual exercises."
DeleteThey would have time for those things if they made time for them. But that's not where their priorities are. The biggest failing of all may be failure to have realistic training exercises.
"Hand-in-hand with this is a demonstrable failure to study history which is the foundation of wisdom and the base upon which the future is built. ... The point is that, clearly, we aren't effectively teaching history, learning history, analyzing history, or applying history."
There is precious little study and training in history, strategy, and tactics at all levels. Senior officers may get little, while junior officers get none. And a wise man once said that those who do not learn about the mistakes of the past are condemned to repeat them.
AAV, such as AAV7, was designed for amphibious assaults which means under some sort of enemy's fires. US may have gained air superiority but not supremacy thus an enemy can still fire on Marine thus AAV provide necessary protections.
ReplyDeleteI think that Pentagon has realized this is not practical anymore, especially face another powerful nation.
Many nations have light missiles (like Javelin equivalent) can be fired by individuals. Air strike cannot remove them all. This kind of missiles can easily destroy an AAV7. Not to mention, enemy may have some even larger missiles. Therefore, Amphibious Assault has become a thing of past. Amphibious landing can happen only after US has achieved air supremacy and secured shore (only few sporadic individual with missiles but no many). At that point, vehicles and ships with high load than armoured ones make more sense.
"I think that Pentagon has realized this is not practical anymore, especially face another powerful nation"
DeleteIn our current state thats likely true. But stupid choices and idiocy in procurement got us here. The Navy lost sight of what the Marines did, and what they needed. Abandoning NGFS, simpler troop ships and landing craft got us here. Multi-purpose, high-end ships too valuable to risk inshore got us here. The Marines trying to be an air force, and the Navy allowing it got us here. And giving away their armor was probably the last nail in the coffin.
"The Navy lost sight of what the Marines did, and what they needed. Abandoning NGFS, simpler troop ships and landing craft got us here. Multi-purpose, high-end ships too valuable to risk inshore got us here. The Marines trying to be an air force, and the Navy allowing it got us here. And giving away their armor was probably the last nail in the coffin."
DeleteExactly. 100% agreement with you there.
I think it can still be recovered, but there is a need to get started ASAP. Otherwise, at some point the Marines will get absorbed into the Army and Marine Air into the Air Force.
Yup!!! A full on rethink, and direction change yesterday.is needed. The Commandant needs neutered- maybe someone should point.out that his paycheck says "Department of the Navy" on top. A revisit of what works, and how to get there quick is needed. The questioning of the need for the Marines at this point is valid. If they dont get back to their roots, then frankly there may not be a future for them. This modern vision for them is absurd and a waste...
DeleteI think a lot of the Marines' problems are encapsulated by a question that someone said his child asked him, "Daddy, why does the Navy's Army need an Air Force?"
Delete"Daddy, why does the Navy's Army need an Air Force?"
DeleteThats hilarious!!!🤣😂🤣
...and a bit sad when a child is asking questions adults cant answer!!!
The AAV isn't suitable for land tasks under under combat conditions in any capacity.
ReplyDeleteTheir slow, large, poorly armoured, and poorly armed. Without escorting tanks, which the marine corp elected to get rid of, the only suitable job they can is as ship-shore connectors.
Hmmm I've always wondered why is it that prior the 1990s nations could design and produce so many fighting vehicles and then suddenly these days it's always "they are very expensive thus we can only design and produce a handful every other lifetime"..
ReplyDeleteI can see why now... All that wasted resources...
Loc
A local Vancouver company is building landing craft for the Army. Not sure how compatible they'd be with our amphibs at 100ft long, but they can carry an Abrams and two trucks at 15kts with a 350 mile range. It seems the Army is more serious about seaborne assault than the Marines!!!
ReplyDeleteMaybe those semi-submersible AFSBs should carry some of those to a landing area where they can be mated with the Marines to go ashore?? Of course I think the new LSVs arent intended for contested landings, more like for reinforcing a beachhead, but still...
A neat historical footnote: Those new landing craft are being built at the periphery of what used to be the WWII Kaiser Vancouver yard, where 50 escort carriers were built, along with a myriad of other ships...
DeleteDoes anyone know about this claim now six months old:
ReplyDelete"ACVs were temporarily suspended from open ocean waterborne operations as we worked to solve an issue that was identified with the towing mechanism."
That sounds like a simple fix. I suspect its a cover story for a more serious issue.
I have no further information. Every report I've seen mentions tow disconnect problems and/or sudden loss of tow mechanism. I'm not sure why this would prohibit all water operations.
DeleteI've also seen reports that the Marines are quite concerned with the speed of emergency egress from the vehicle in the event of floundering. This may be a larger reason for not quickly returning to water operations especially after the recent AAV sinking. That's just speculation on my part.
The Army should grab these AAAVs and form a couple battalions to conduct opposed river crossings, a capability it lacks today. Their current doctrine is rubber boats! Rivers aren't as dangerous to AAAVs compared to oceans with swells and wavers.
ReplyDeleteThat's potentially a good thought. The downside is that AAVs have no place on a modern battlefield so they'd have to be 'carried along' as extra gear against the possible need for a river crossing. On the other hand, we carry lots of special use equipment so it's just a logistics issue, albeit a large one.
DeleteAAAVs can do other things. In an exercise in Norway they set up defenses along coastal roads, and were shocked when AAAVs crossed fjords to bypass them. In Vietnam the French used them in swampy areas where APCs and Armor could not operate. I wrote about this long ago.
Deletehttps://www.g2mil.com/amphibians.htm
I just realized crafty Army Generals might do this. Get some AAAVs and tanks on their Army LCUs and do some amphib ops with the Navy, as they did often in World War II. Congress would soon wonder why we have a Marine Corps.
DeleteThis is an excellent idea as the U.S. Army seems to be oblivious to the need to cross rivers.
DeleteThe USA also should buy something like the M3 Amphibious Bridging and Ferrying System.
The US army isn't really oblivious to the need to cross rivers, it just dosen't come up as a problem that often.
DeleteIf the US army needs to cross a river, there's probably already a bridge there. If not, we still have and employ the Bailey Bridge. I remember seeing several Bailey Bridges in Iraq, some from the the intial 2003 invasion.
I forget to mention the scissor bridge tanks, which typically used first and then replaced by pontoon or Bailey bridge.
Delete@Purple Calico
DeleteMy comments were taken in the context of a war against a peer adversary. The number of bridges that can actually support the weight/width of MBTs or Fuel HEMTTs is small, and most of those will be destroyed on day one of a conflict. A portable bridge will not span even a small river - it might work for sections of a destroyed bridge. Russian and PLA tanks generally weigh 5-20 tons less than Western MBTs, so they can chose to leave bridges that support their AFVs, but not ours.
GAB
Marines can still land aboard bullet proof LCUs that were the primary method during World War II. I prefer these over ACVs that will be ducks in a shooting gallery for modern anti-tank missiles. LCUs can absorb several hits from them and keep on ticking. That also have far more range.
ReplyDeleteThey can also carry tanks that can fire from LCUs with minor mods.
https://www.g2mil.com/lcugunboats.htm
Not if the Marines don't have tanks.
DeleteThe USA and USMC have serious issues designing troop carrying AFVs - the last 'effective' design, given its doctrinal role, was arguably the M113 (and I am not related to Mike Sparks) based purely on the incredible number produced ~100,000 and the number of successful variants like mortar carriers. Look at the mountains of treasure spent on the failed GCV, ACV, EFV, MPV programs and their ilk. Although the M2 Bradley IFV is not an amphib, its replacement suffers from some of the same design confusion issues affecting the EFV/MPC; it is little wonder that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis suggested that the best course of action was to either buy German Puma IFVs or IDF Namers ‘HAPCs’. See the excellent: ‘The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program and Alternatives’ https://www.cbo.gov/publication/44044
ReplyDeleteThe common issue, and a dramatically under-criticized problem, with all these designs is the failure to move tactically relevant sizes of troops, resulting in massively under-strength infantry components at the battalion level and beyond. Simply adding numbers of AFVs does not really work when you look at span of control, and logistics issues. Considering that the job of these AFVs is to move troops, this is a serious and under reported issue.
The second issue is the demand for extreme levels of protection that drive up the size of these vehicles (65-tons+ for the GCV), competing with, or surpassing MBTs. Crossing bridges, canals, or other obstacles has been a serious issue for decades – now it is worse. Active protection may provide a lot of relief from direct fire weapons, particularly direct attack weapons.
The next issue is the call for ‘tank-like’ fire power that results in turrets and other drivers of cost, complexity, training, and logistical issues. The argument is for these AFVs to ‘support the troops’ they transport, but a $13 million Puma IFV basically buys you an auto-cannon, a machinegun and a couple of ATGMs – if you want more, you have to reduce the number of dismounted infantry, which is already limited. Worse, we understood even back in WW2 that real direct-fire infantry support requires accurately placing 1.5 – 10lbs of HE into a bunker/building/trench, which is far beyond the capability of automatic cannon, and squarely in the domain of 75mm to 105mm (tank/MBT) guns.
I think:
- Recall that the USA in WW2 Europe lost about 1,100 infantry KIA every day on average: the threat to unprotected infantry is at least an order of magnitude greater today due to mines and advanced cluster munitions that are employed by our adversaries.
- We must pay close attention to how many dismounted infantry we can move in a particular AFV formation and use that as a factor, instead of looking at an individual vehicle. A company sized unit forming the vanguard of a formation should have enough bayonet strength to easily brush aside similar enemy sized unit occupying a roadblock.
- Large USMC squads (12/13 man) are unsupportable by realistically protected AFVs, unless we are willing to break them down into Fire Teams. Then Capt. USMC James Web wrote about his large squads with six-man FTs in Vietnam, so perhaps this is a solution as many modern IFVs can support 5-8 dismounts.
- Air-burst autocannon are neat, but a single 10lb (4.5kg) M889 HE 81mm mortar round cost less than $1,000, but is much more effective, delivers enough HE to wreck a small house (and occupying infantry), and covers a lot more area with lethal fragmentation than a 3-5 round burst of advanced autocannon ammunition with a few ounces of explosive filler, and cost upwards of $2-3,000 per round!
- The IFV concept remains untested in large scale peer combat; I think we may be putting too much emphasis on the turreted autocannon, particularly the larger 30-50mm sized weapons in fashion today. It may be more prudent, economical, and effective to employ heavily protected APC/HAPCs and attach tank units to support them; than to invest in turreted IFVs that carry a price tag similar to low-end MBTs.
GAB
"We must pay close attention to how many dismounted infantry we can move in a particular AFV formation and use that as a factor, instead of looking at an individual vehicle."
DeleteThis seems incredibly important and yet totally overlooked. I'm speaking now as a non-land combat person so bear that in mind. The ability for the transport element (APC, JLTV, IFV, whatever) to deposit troops in coherent, combat effective units when they dismount is paramount. Having squads dispersed into non-tactically useful groups is idiotic.
Either troops have to be transported in whole units (a whole squad) or the troops have to be trained to fight as disaggregated, scattered elements with no cohesion or mutual support between them which then leads one to wonder what the purpose of a squad is.
Hand in hand with this is the seemingly ignored relation between the transport and the troops. Will the two fight together? If so, how? What tactics? Under what conditions? What weapons can the transport vehicle carry that will effectively support the dismounted troops? Or, will the transport drop and retire?
I would think these answers would dictate the design of the transport.
It would seem that the transport and troop relationship should be almost symbiotic. I'm not sure that's the case since I never hear it discussed. Again, I'm not a land combat guy so ...
"Air-burst autocannon are neat, but a single 10lb (4.5kg) M889 HE 81mm mortar round..."
DeleteAre direct fire support vehicles out of fashion these days? They've been necessary from the 1940s with examples as the German Panzer IV designed specifically for direct fire support, although necessity dictates that it swapped roles with the younger sibling, Panzer III later in the war. The Sherman design resisted the upgrade to the 76mm anti tank gun because the 75mm provided much better direct fire effect. In the cold war there was the Russian BMP-1 and now BMP-3, the British Scorpion, the Aussies even created the M113 FSV.
Surely there is enough evidence that direct fire support with a simple, cheap, dumb high explosive shell solves a lot of problems.
Perhaps having some of these dedicated variants attached to mechanized infantry might make more sense, and cheaper to boot, than having an IFV that can almost do all. Then perhaps the weight saved could be utilized for either more space or more armour.
Loc
I keep reaching the conclusion that the vehicle with protection and the unit need to be one and the same and smaller than either the Army or Marines plans. Vehicles have to fit the logistics of the world built around them with urban warfare a more likely scenario.
Delete@Loc: "Surely there is enough evidence that direct fire support with a simple, cheap, dumb high explosive shell solves a lot of problems."
DeleteOne would think so, but the lessons of history are forgotten and it is easier to get promoted, or for a company to make money by designing something "new"...
The British tried a 20mm cannon in the Centurion tank, but crews ignored it and consistently engaged targets with the main gun, because why screw around when you can serve up HE or HESH (HEP) and know you eliminated the threat.
GAB
@GAB, "It may be more prudent, economical, and effective to employ heavily protected APC/HAPCs and attach tank units to support them; than to invest in turreted IFVs that carry a price tag similar to low-end MBTs."
DeleteThat CBO report listed the Namer HAPC as more expensive than either an upgraded Bradley or the Puma IFV.
"That CBO report listed the Namer HAPC as more expensive than either an upgraded Bradley or the Puma IFV."
DeleteAssuming you're referring to Table 2-2, it compared the cost of developing and purchasing NEW HAPCs to the cost of upgrading existing Bradleys. GAB appears to be comparing new purchase costs of IFVs and MBTs.
@B. Smitty: in 2021 the price of Puma is over €17.14 million, not only due to inflation, added gold plating/add-on capabilities (JTF2023/ system panzer grenadier). and the usual western cost overruns, but the 'death spirally' associated with a dramatic slash in the number of Pumas Germany is going to buy. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/f-a-z-exklusiv-schuetzenpanzer-puma-endlich-einsatztauglich-17251869.html
DeleteI always caution on prices, because unit price is not the same as acquisition cost, which is not the same as total cost of ownership. This goes double for foreign systems, because the usage rates, spare parts stockage, deployment scenarios of the Germans are guaranteed to be much different that that of the USA.
GAB
@CNO: Correct: CBO identified four alternatives, and option 2 was a re-manufactured and upgraded Bradley.
DeleteAlmost all of these dramatic increases in the price of AFVs is linked to the costs of electronic systems: fire control, sensors, communications, data links, protection systems, and so forth.
As more than one article has pointed out, the SPz Puma IFV is in every way superior to the SPz Marder IFV it replaces, but how much better is hard to quantify. Reliability of these new systems is hard to quantify. New vulnerabilities of systems to enemy exploitation is equally hard to judge.
Some force on force training between USA and German troops was decidedly one sided in favor of the Germans as reported by our troops out spotted, and engaged first. Of course the real test is against Russian systems.
Without hoping for yet another Arab-Israeli war, it would be of immense help to see the IDF employ its Namer HAPCs to get a better sense of the morass that is AFVs.
GAB
@GAB. I agree. The CBO should have noted this in their analysis. Still, the difference between a HAPC like Namer and a new or upgraded Bradley may not be all that much. Tank-derived HAPCs have a higher overall logistics footprint but may still have a lower cost of ownership without the turret.
DeleteRight now we have mech infantry in Bradleys, Stryker infantry and leg infantry. Seems like a useful mix.
Mech infantry may not have as many dismounts, but you could augment with the other two types, when needed. Let the armor/mech infantry punch through the resistance, and the Stryker and leg infantry follow up to clear and hold.
This is essentially how it was done in the Second battle of Fallujah, but with Army cav and mech infantry punching through and Marines serving as the clear and hold force.
Maybe mech infantry doesn't need to do everything regular infantry can do, and thus can get by with fewer dismounts.
"it would be of immense help to see the IDF employ its Namer HAPCs"
DeleteOf course, Israel designed and, presumably, intends to employ its Namers in a completely different manner than the US would in a peer war. The Namer was built to address the urban fights that Israel seems to repeatedly engage in. How a Namer, or HAPC in general, would function in a peer war is not understood … at least, not by me.
Does the HAPC act as the vanguard for tanks and IFVs? Does it deposit troops behind the armor? Does it travel behind screening tanks/IFVs and then pass through to drop troops when the enemy is encountered? Does it drop and retire or does it stick around and provide fire support?
I would hope that the Army has thought all this through, however, since we don't have any HAPCs (or any APCs, for that matter; ?Stryker?), perhaps none of the tactical and operating doctrine has been considered and developed.
It may seem simplistic to say, but the value of an HAPC depends on how one wants to use it and I'm not sure we know that. I don't follow land combat all that closely but I don't see much (any?) evidence of training to integrate armor and infantry into combined operations. They seem to co-exist on the battlefield without really interacting in a coordinated fashion.
@CNO
DeleteIf there was one unit that begs for an HAPC it is Combat Engineers - amazing how sapper squads are ~10-men even in the USMC.
And that is the heart of the matter: the USMC has fought tooth and nail to maintain the 13-man squad until quite recently, and that is just too big to load into a reasonably sized AFV, even into some rotary wing assets. The EFV was designed to deliver a reinforced rifle squad (13-man squad plus a machine gun or mortar team).
These over-sized USMC squads are justified in order to allow fire teams to ‘maneuver’ and for 'patrolling' – that works in small wars, but that seems far-fetched in dealing with a peer-enemy. Somehow British and Germans seemed to do just fine with ~10-man squads during WW2 (12 for the PzG). The Squad leader grabbed the MG team and deployed everyone else as the situation dictated.
In reality, the squad exists to support its machinegun and by Vietnam we added an RPG/Panzerfaust 3 and grenade launchers to the squad load. Historically, even a 10-man squad ended up being just 5-8 men after 24-hours of combat and they were often given with a hand cart or goat cart to carry the mountains of ammunition. I have plenty of photos of Americans troops with them too. Now I guess Boston Dynamics will supply squads with a robot.
Yet the issues remain:
1) What size dismount squad?
2) What is the threat we expect the AFV to cope with? [my vote is artillery, followed by direct-fire up to MBT, and lastly land mines.]
3) Will each AFV support dismounts in combat, or does it delivery troops and go back pick up more troops?
4) Will the AFV have additional missions? Example, an HAPC is a big powerful tractor that has a lot of potential secondary uses like pushing a mine rake or towing an assault bridge. An IFV potentially has longer range AT weapons than an MBT.
5) How do we organize these AFVS? Should they be assigned to the troops they support? Should they be assigned to their own unit? Do we expect the infantry to help maintain them? Should they be part of a tank battalion that has the logistics support, maintenance shops and recovery vehicles to administer them (idea Sven Ortman)? Should they be a battalion, brigade, or corps level asset?
Everything flows from the answers to these questions.
GAB
@GAB, there are pros and cons to each of your options. Why not have a mix, as we currently do?
Delete@B. Smitty
DeleteOptions? I am not following you.
There is nothing inherently 'wrong' with a mix of vehicles, but you may over complicate supply and maintenance, and you lose efficiencies of production and cost savings. So different vehicles must be absolutely justified.
If you are talking about a mix of squad sizes, well the issue is only the 9-man Army Mech Infantry squad works with a the M2, USMC and CE engineer squads do not play well.
GAB
Last I checked, we had 11 ABCTs, 7 SBCTs and 13 IBCTs in the active force. All currently use 9-man squads, though the ABCTs split them awkwardly across four vehicles per platoon.
DeleteI guess my question is, is it really that important for ABCTs to mimic the dismount sizes of other Army units? Maybe instead we should just live with the constraints of our vehicles and develop TTPs for a 6-7 man Bradley dismount section, understanding they just won't be able to do all of the same things as SBCT or IBCT squads.
If an ABCT needs more infantry for an operation, augment them with SBCT or IBCT units.
IMHO, a bigger problem in the current force model is the IBCT. It's just too light and too immobile to make up the largest number of the three BCT types.
I proposed using the thousands of M-ATVs we have laying around to motorize some of the IBCTs.
https://interestedamateur.blogspot.com/2016/12/pimp-my-ibct.html
I also proposed converting some of the M1s we have in storage into HAPCs and organize them as HAPC Transport Battalions, with one HAPC battalion able to transport the infantry of a full IBCT.
https://interestedamateur.blogspot.com/2021/01/pimp-my-bct-budget-hapc-transport.html
Keeping them separate from the IBCTs means you don't have to have a 1-to-1 ratio of IBCTs and transport battalions.
Could do the same with the M-ATVs, just organize them as M-ATV transport battalions.
Maybe build 3 HAPC transport battalions and 5 M-ATV transport battalions, allowing us to fully armor or motorize 8 of the 13 IBCTs. Then we have options. We could deploy IBCTs on their own, with their light footprint, or add an HAPC or M-ATV battalion to up-armor them, depending on the situation.
Obviously there are some drawbacks. Nine separate transport battalions will cost money to buy and operate and take up billets to man them. IBCTs won't necessarily have habitual relationships with the vehicles and their crews, but this could be mitigated with regular training.
I think this addresses a far more glaring hole in the Army force structure than whether the IFV has 7 or 9 dismounts.
Just MHO.
"I proposed using the thousands of M-ATVs we have laying around to motorize some of the IBCTs."
DeleteFor pure, uncontested transportation purposes this might have some merit. However, as the basis for actual combat vehicles this seems like an incredibly suspect idea. We've forgotten just how destructive a peer war battlefield is and there is every reason to believe today's battlefield will be even more lethal. Infantry riding around, packed together (concentration of risk instead of the logical dispersal of risk!), in thin skin, glorified jeeps is a recipe for mammoth casualties and defeat. If used in combat, these vehicles will face tanks, IFVs, artillery, mortars, machine guns, and veritable clouds of shrapnel … none of which they are equipped to handle. The notion that we can blithely drive around a battlefield with some sort of firepower strapped to the roof of a jeep is insane. Conducting assaults with jeeps is one step above a human wave attack in terms of survivability for the attackers.
The US military and observers keep trying to substitute technology, and the associated wishful thinking that assumes the enemy will do nothing to hinder or contest us, for armor and firepower and it's an idiotic notion.
The Navy has done the same thing with ships that are designed to be abandoned after one hit or have so little armor, separation, and redundancy that they'll have to be abandoned after one hit (to say nothing of the lack of crew for attrition and damage control!).
On a related note, the two things that are always in short supply on the battlefield are ammo and fuel. Where will the fuel and fuel transportation come from to support these thousands of jeeps?
"However, as the basis for actual combat vehicles this seems like an incredibly suspect idea. "
DeleteIn MCO, they wouldn't be used as combat vehicles. They're essentially wheeled APCs. They deliver infantry close to the battle, but the infantry fights dismounted. Not unlike the halftracks of WWII or the more recent M113.
The M-ATV is a significant step up from the current, primary IBCT transports: the soldier's boot and unarmored truck. At least the M-ATV has protection against small-arms, shell fragments, mines and IEDs, and has a protected, crew-served weapon mount.
Both types of transport battalion would include fuelers, wreckers and other support components.
As I said before, in MCOs, you'd use them to augment ABCTs with additional infantry, and for things like route security, and in areas unsuited for heavy vehicles.
As it stands, the IBCTs only have a handful of M1117s in their cav squadrons, and a smattering of trucks and HMMWVs. Not even enough to move the entire brigade in one lift, let alone under any sort of armor.
The M-ATV would be a cost effective upgrade, given that the Army already owns thousands. Converting some to the Assault variant will be orders of magnitude cheaper than buying new APCs, HAPCs, or IFVs for these units.
" they wouldn't be used as combat vehicles"
DeleteOkay.
"Converting some to the Assault variant"
Ah … so they will be used as combat vehicles.
Which is it? Yes they will or no they won't?
"They deliver infantry close to the battle"
On the modern, fluid, mobile, maneuvering battlefield, what's 'close'? The enemy is developing deep fires, long range artillery, precision fires, etc. just like we are. How far from the 'front' is non-combat? Look, if we want armored personnel carriers (APC) or heavy armored personnel carriers (HAPC) then let's get them and not screw around with ineffective half measures.
On the other hand, if all you want is transport that will drop the troops off far from the battle then simple trucks will do the job much more efficiently and effectively.
So, again, which is it? Combat vehicle or not?
You're proposing creating entire new transport battalions with vehicles, 'fuelers, wreckers and other support components', as well as administration and command structures, all to accomplish what? Create a non-survivable combat (or not combat?) vehicle that can only survive in a very low end (non-existent) threat environment? We need to get serious about combat and not play around with half-measures that look and sound cool (mounting all manner of weapons on top of jeeps) but aren't effective, practical, or survivable.
"At least the M-ATV has protection against small-arms, shell fragments"
DeleteDoes it? I don't know that. My understanding (maybe not correct?) is that they have less protection than the Stryker which is protected only against small arms and up to 14.5 mm with bolt on ceramic/steel armor. So, less protection than that puts it at almost unprotected. Do you know what the armor rating for the vehicle's main body is?
"They're essentially wheeled APCs."
Delete"At least the M-ATV has protection against small-arms, shell fragments"
Does it? I don't know that. My understanding (maybe not correct?) is that they have less protection than the Stryker which is protected only against small arms and up to 14.5 mm with bolt on ceramic/steel armor. So, less protection than that puts it at almost unprotected. Do you know what the armor rating for the vehicle's main body is?
The 'A' in APC stands for 'armored'. To equate the all terrain vehicle to an APC seems incorrect.
As a comparison, the Patria AMV, a true APC, has frontal armor rated up to 30 mm and all around protection against 14.5 mm.
"Assault" is Oshkosh's marketing term, not mine. It's just an extended wheelbase M-ATV designed to carry a full squad.
DeleteI haven't seen specifics on the direct fire protection, but I imagine it's similar to up-armored HMMWVs (i.e. 7.62mm MG and "shell splinters").
The Patria AMV is certainly better protected, as well as a LOT more expensive and even thirstier than an M-ATV. New M-ATVs only cost around $4-500k. A new vehicle in the AMV class is probably more like $5-6M each. Plus, we already own 5,600 M-ATVs, so conversion costs are probably closer $100k each. If true, then we could outfit a battalion of infantry with M-ATVs for the cost of ONE AMV.
As we've seen in the past 20 years, not every enemy has ATGMs, tanks and IFVs. But EVERY ONE has AKMs, RPKs, and the like. M-ATVs are an inexpensive way to move infantry and protect them against these threats. We have ABCTs to handle the high end stuff.
"we could outfit a battalion of infantry with M-ATVs for the cost"
DeleteYou get that war and combat is not a cost accounting exercise, right? We could have 5,000 free jeeps and if they got everyone killed and lost the war, it wouldn't be a bargain, would it?
While we can't totally ignore cost, too many people get too focused on cost accounting instead of combat effectiveness.
We should focus less on cost and far, far more on combat effectiveness which includes MINIMIZING capabilities to just those required for the actual task (CONOPS, to use the Navy term).
We've also lost sight of the primary responsibility of armed forces and that is to fight and win existential, peer wars. Anything less can be handled easily by a subset of those capabilities. We need to stop designing our forces for low end, peacetime threats. The high end can handle the low. The low end CANNOT handle the high. For the last two+ decades we've gotten that backwards.
Buying and maintaining a military is very much a cost accounting exercise.
DeleteIf you can convince Congress to pony up the cash to convert all of those IBCTs to ABCTs or buy whatever AFVs you want for them, more power too you.
I'm looking for modest wins in an era of flat or declining Army budgets.
@B.Smitty: “… we had 11 ABCTs, 7 SBCTs and 13 IBCTs in the active force. All currently use 9-man squads, though the ABCTs split them awkwardly across four vehicles per platoon.”
DeleteWe are confusing multiple issues here, but the M2/M3s and Strykers are designed with the clear intent to support troops in contact as evidenced by assigning the AFV crews to the squad. This is the worst of all worlds, the actual dismount strength of these units is poor (the entire point of having infantry), the AFVs are incredibly vulnerable to peer AFVs, nor can the AFVs follow the dismounts they are tasked with protecting into closed terrain, and all this comes at staggering cost.
I could buy into a simple 8-wheel vehicle for motorized infantry, but the vanguard of any formation facing a Russians or Chinese better be equipped with powerful, well protected armor and weaponry.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
I am not a fan of the IBCTs or the 9-man squad, note how few pure infantry units are in the Russian, German, Chinese, Taiwanese, etc. armies. I think the two realistic options for mech/motorized infantry are the 10-man squad (will work with MBT based HAPCs), or the James Webb 19-man squad (x2 per platoon) built of 6-man Fire Teams (will work with IFVs).
"Buying and maintaining a military is very much a cost accounting exercise."
DeleteAbsolutely not … although it has become that today. It doesn't matter how cost efficient a military is if it isn't combat effective. We've lost sight of that. We tried to build a LCS to a cost-constrained, business case instead of a combat-effective case and you see how that turned out. We built the F-18 Hornet to a cost-constrained, business case instead of a combat-effective case and now we have a Hornet that is short legged and combat compromised. And the list goes on.
Where cost enters the process of military acquisition is to filter out boondoggles like a $15B Ford carrier that offers no capability that a $8B Nimitz doesn't. Or, eliminating an entire Zumwalt program that has no viable CONOPS and never did. And the list goes on. Do that and we'd have all the money we could want for worthwhile programs like HAPCs or IFVs or whatever instead of glorified assault jeeps.
@GAB, the SBCT infantry strength isn't much different from the IBCT. The ABCT is the small one.
DeleteDismounts per platoon (not counting HQ or attachments)
ABCT - 27
SBCT - 32
IBCT - 36
The SBCT just gives up the two anti armor teams in the weapons section, instead giving a Javelin to each squad.
@B. Smitty
DeleteYou missed the point: an infantry brigade is dead meat in a peer war. It really is not suitable for employment as a brigade, it works as an administrative formation. For this reason, pure infantry units above regimental size in most peer armies is an anachronism outside of a few mountain and airborne formations.
And yes, the dismount strength of mech infantry platoon is appallingly low. 24 hours of high intensity combat and those platoons will be the size of reinforced rifle squads.
I am not arguing for no infantry, I am arguing for mech infantry and in formations that when required to dismount, are capable of performing tasks and missions associated with traditional infantry units of equivalent size (e.g. company).
GAB
" formations that when required to dismount"
DeleteDo you see them dismounting under fire (which would suggest the need for HAPCs) or away from fire and moving on foot to the fire?
@CNO: "Do you see them dismounting under fire..."
DeleteThe situation dictates; ideally infantry should be allowed to infiltrate a target undetected, but I think most actions will tend to be movement to contact. Historically, mech infantry generally executed hasty counter-attacks and these had to be resolved quickly.
The HAPC is obviously a better solution for the later situation.
"For the cost of converting one IBCT to an ABCT, it's possible to field multiple transport battalions and thus upgrade multiple IBCTs."
DeleteThis presupposes that an IBCT - however mobilized - is worth anything on the modern battlefield. All indications are that the modern, peer battlefield will be a very lethal place and only the strong (armed and armored) will survive. It does not good to up-mobilize multiple IBCTs if they can't be survivable and EFFECTIVE on the battlefield. In other words, quantity, alone, has no value. It has to be quantity with value.
Now, you probably think I'm suggesting that an IBCT has no combat value. Well, I'm not. I'm just asking the question, where do we rank an IBCT on the combat value scale and, therefore, how many do we need? Before we jump into mobilizing, increasing numbers, forming lots of new transport battalions, etc., let's make sure that the result will be a positive on the battlefield.
To make up numbers, if we could up-mobilize five IBCTs for the cost of one new ABCT but that one new ABCT was tens time as effective as an IBCT, we'd want the one ABCT instead of five IBCTs.
I'm just posing the question. It needs to be asked an answered before we delve into numbers and costs. Combat effectiveness first … everything else second. We too often put accounting first and that's backward.
That's certainly true, but I don't think you can just assign a single "combat value" to an IBCT. It depends on the circumstances. Offensive combat on open plains favors ABCTs. Combat in urban areas requires lots of infantry (as well as lots of everything else). In OIF, IBCTs followed the ABCTs, providing route security. Motorized infantry units are far more cost effective for this than using tanks and IFVs.
DeleteI certainly think we need to shift some IBCTs to ABCTs, but we'll still have a lot of IBCTs left.
Here's the current breakdown.
Armored Brigade Combat Teams
Active component 12
National Guard 5
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
Active component 7
National Guard 2
Infantry Brigade Combat Teams
Active component 13
National Guard 21
Total Brigade Combat Teams
Active component 32
National Guard 28
If we had the money, I'd consider shifting up to 8 IBCTs to ABCTs (3 active, 5 reserve). That would still leave us with 26 IBCTs total.
We could consider getting rid of some to pay for the upgrades, but that has its own political difficulties.
@B. Smitty: “… A WHOPPING 56% of the Army's BCTs are IBCTs. I'm trying to find ways to make them more relevant without massive budget increases, rather than focusing on tweaks to the ABCT's IFV component.”
Delete“You cannot modernize the force by hanging on to force structure…” Frank Kendall, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; at a briefing for GAO when asked why the U.S. Army could not afford to replace its aging family of trucks.
My reply is that the Army has skewed its force structure dramatically in the wrong direction in response to endless, and largely pointless “small wars.”
If you think that AFVs are expensive, you have never actually read any NDAA, the $$$ in every Armed Service’s budget is overwhelmingly in manpower, not acquisition.
Almost every peer army on the face of the earth has minimal pure infantry components for a reason – the U.S. Army. needs to adjust to that reality.
Moreover, almost every allied nation (Taiwan, South Korea, Poland, Germany) can mobilize more infantry and train them in the same time period than we can send IBCTs. The Poles alone have ~7.5 million men aged 18-44 they should be able to easily mobilize more men than the current active-duty strength of the U.S. Army. We seem to forget that Germany alone had a cold war tank strength almost a third that of the entire USA.
These countries do not need infantry, they need lethal combat power capable of defeating Russian or Chinese tank or motor rifle brigades, which are a challenge even for our own armored brigades.
GAB
@B. Smitty: “… A WHOPPING 56% of the Army's BCTs are IBCTs. I'm trying to find ways to make them more relevant without massive budget increases, rather than focusing on tweaks to the ABCT's IFV component.”
Delete“You cannot modernize the force by hanging on to force structure…” Frank Kendall, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; at a briefing for GAO when asked why the U.S. Army could not afford to replace its aging family of trucks.
My reply is that the Army has skewed its force structure dramatically in the wrong direction in response to endless, and largely pointless “small wars.”
If you think that AFVs are expensive, you have never actually read any NDAA, the $$$ in every Armed Service’s budget is overwhelmingly in manpower, not acquisition.
Almost every peer army on the face of the earth has minimal pure infantry components for a reason – the U.S. Army. needs to adjust to that reality.
Moreover, almost every allied nation (Taiwan, South Korea, Poland, Germany) can mobilize more infantry and train them in the same time period than we can send IBCTs. The Poles alone have ~7.5 million men aged 18-44 they should be able to easily mobilize more men than the current active-duty strength of the U.S. Army. We seem to forget that Germany alone had a cold war tank strength almost a third that of the entire USA.
These countries do not need infantry, they need lethal combat power capable of defeating Russian or Chinese tank or motor rifle brigades, which are a challenge even for our own armored brigades.
"It depends on the circumstances."
DeleteOf course! And that's where a strategy comes in. You measure equipment, units, tactics, etc. against your strategy. Further, we need multiple strategies: one for Russia, one for China, one for Iran, one for NKorea, and so on. In none of those, by the way, is there any legitimate need to fight in urban areas but, I digress …
Unfortunately, we appear to lack any strategy so it makes evaluation of equipment difficult … but not impossible. We can make pretty good guesses. I can't make those assessments; I don't know enough about land combat. However, anyone who is arguing for or against any specific force structure ought to be making and justifying those assessments. So, since you're making an argument for up-mobilized IBCTs, you ought to have a combat-justification. Do you?
We also need to clearly differentiate between peripheral tasks like route security, population control, patrolling, etc, and high end combat. While the peripheral tasks are necessary and may establish some degree of force structure requirements, they are NOT the determining factor in our force structure design. High end combat is. We need to clearly bear that in mind.
ComNavOps, not directly linked to this but the Taiwan sub deal sounds like a good topic for a post to me.
ReplyDeleteSo is this action based on poor maintenance or too expensive maintenance to keep these AAVs in operating condition? Becuase when maintained they worked for many years with few deaths. Or is this the bad PR avoidance and we can use this as a reason to get funding for another vehicle that probably will be like the EFV. Remember the same people will be managing and building the next vehicle and they couldn't the faults in the EFV.
ReplyDeleteForget whether the AAV provides enough protection small arms (less than .59 cal) is all the AAV could protect against. But stopping machine gun 7.62mm rounds is a big plus when trying to get to the beaches. The vehcile has to float with about 20 people in it and some armaments. One reason the AAV has an Aluminum hull. Armor may be impossible to put on (even on just the top) becuase of weight and balance.
Bottom line something worked fairly well (in peacetime at least) why the cancellation now?
"So is this action based on … "
DeleteThe decision to terminate water operations for the AAV fleet is purely an after-the-fact attempt to cover their butts and deflect responsibility.
The reasons for the AAV sinking are clearly laid in the various report summations and are the usual assembly of ignored standards, non-existent maintenance, blind can-do attitudes that ignore reality, poor training, and incompetent leadership.
The most interesting fact related the sinking incident is that the entire AAV fleet was apparently inspected after the incident and almost all failed the inspection. This may be part of the rationale for terminating water operations.
The reports indicated that the vehicles were taken off the neglect storage lot and were briefly worked on but had massive issues. The issues were known, during the event. Marine officers failed to ensure the ship even knew the AAVs were out, much less request a safety boat.
ReplyDeleteThe platoon leader and PS bravely decided to stay on the island.
The enlisted were terrorized so much by the culture of oppression for losing any gear, much less a rifle, that they were unable to evacuate. That is once the buffoonish and ill trained vehicle commander decided to get them out when it was mostly too late.
The officer most responsible for the mess was promoted to Marine Inspector General. It took the media screaming at congress to get him relieved.
Do you think the Chinese generals chuckle, or do they suspect this is some bizarre long con of total incompetence by the navy and Marine leadership?
@ComNavOps:
ReplyDelete"As best I can tell – not being a land combat expert – the AAV/ACV was intended as a poor man’s APC, though without the armor – thus making it a very lightly armored personnel carrier."
Armored personnel carriers aren't as protected as their name suggests. The ACV is about as protected as other APCs on the market: armored against 155mm artillery splinters, 14.5mm heavy machinegun and 40mm grenade fire. Note that this is the same protection specification for the M2 Bradley IFV in base configuration*, and it surpasses the protection provided by the M113 APC (which could be penetrated by .50 BGM and 14.5mm Soviet). It's not appreciably less protected than other wheeled or tracked APCs.
Gotta disagree. Consider the following APC examples:
DeletePatria AMV-XP is armored against 30mm AP in the frontal arc, 14.5mm on the rest, mine protection, and is rated against RPG-7.
Piranha V has protection against 25mm AP frontal, 14.5mm AP on the rest, mine protection, and can be uparmored for all around 25mm AP protection.
LAV 6 has protection against 30 mm frontal, 14.5 mm remaining, cage armor for anti-missile/rocket protection, and mine protection.
Boxer has protection against 30 mm frontal and 14.5 mm remaining as well as mine protection.
In addition, the above appear to all have spall liners for internal protection.
I agree that wheeled APCs have less protection than tracked IFVs, but I wouldn't call that being lightly protected, not when the mainstay M113 APC was only protected against 7.62mm. Consider the Army's Stryker APC, which has 14.5mm frontal protection, and can be uparmored for allround 14.5mm protection and an RPG cage, or the LAV 3 family, or the BTR series. At this level of protection, the ACV and other wheeled APCs are protected against an enemy rifle squad's rifles. They can still be suppressed by the rifle squad's light AT weapons, but there's only so many RPGs or LAWS a rifle squad is carrying.
DeleteThe thing to take into account though, is that your examples are getting that protection with addon armor, and all addon armor gives you a weight penalty that's a negative to your amphibious ability - the Bradley BUSK upgrade gives it allround protection against 30mm Russian and RPG, but it also makes it so heavy that it can no longer swim. (Which is an acceptable tradeoff in Iraq where Bradleys aren't doing river crossings all the time.)
It's worth noting that the ACV is a variant of the Iveco SuperAV, which has addon armor available to it.
Something to note with Boxer and LAV VI, they're packing that level of protection as a complement to autocannon armament, because their operators are using them as IFVs, not APCs. They're carrying additional armor because they're expected to stay on the objective and fight like IFVs, not be battle taxi APCs.
To segue a bit and talk a little about doctrine...
When we look at the historical trends, IFVs have trended to have more armor than APCs, because their doctrinal use is different. The APC is protected against machinegun fire (GPMG up to HMG) and artillery splinters, and has limited protection against RPG/light AT. The APC is used to ferry the infantry squad into combat: it drops the squad close to the objective, within range of the squad's weapons (200-300 meters). The APC then retreats, while the squad crosses that distance to assault the objective, and the APC can be suppressed by the organic weapons of a rifle squad on the defensive: stationary HMG, light AT (e.g. RPG-7, M72 LAWS).
Contrast that with the IFV, which is protected against heavy machinegun fire and artillery splinters, and is today uparmored against autocannon and light AT weapons. The IFV fights its way to the objective, drops its squad, and then remains on the objective, supporting its squad with the autocannon and ATGM, and as the IFV is protected against the organic weapons of a rifle squad, suppressing it requires heavy AT weapons (Carl Gustav, AT4, man-portable & vehicle ATGM) - weapons which are not organic to the rifle squad, which are platoon and company-level assets, which are also needed to deal with enemy tanks.
An enemy rifle squad can suppress an APC and drive it off; an IFV suppresses and defeats the enemy rifle squad.
Now, that being said, the line between IFV and APC is blurring a lot in the modern day, especially with how people are making wheeled IFVs out of wheeled APCs by putting autocannon on them. In Russian thought, a vehicle becomes an IFV when it carries an autocannon, and has enough firepower to stay and fight and support its embarked squad - hence the Russian distinction of APC and IFV variants of the BTR-80 and Bumerang, despite both being wheeled vehicles (and the IFV BTR not carrying appreciably heavier armor than the APC variant). Talking with several Russian acquaintances, they've said that Russian thought is that the autocannon is the more crucial piece of the IFV pie, because the gun has a more decisive effect as a force multiplier, on account of being able to shoot people and stop them from shooting you.
Anyway, this wasn't really a intended as a rebuttal, rather more as as a discussion of the concepts.
I'm not a land combat person and I don't want to get bogged down debating individual vehicle armor. The larger point was that if the Marines are no longer in the amphibious assault business - which they say they are not - then one has to question the purpose and suitability of the AAV/ACV. If they want an APC then they should get a dedicated APC. If they want an IFV then they should get a dedicated IFV. What they should not do is continue to purchase ACVs which offer nothing for land combat.
DeleteSaying that ACVs offer nothing for land combat is a little myopic. It's an Armored Personnel Carrier: there is a clear doctrinal niche that the APC fulfills in land combat. (I'm assuming the USMC is purely buying APC-ACVs, and does not intend to get IFV-ACVs as replacement for the LAV-25.) APC, IFV, MBT, strike fighter, tube artillery, rocket artillery, SPG, etc - these are all tools in the toolbox, with a specific niche.
DeleteThe bigger question is what is the expected CONOPS that these vehicles are being used for. If we're fully buying into Commandant Berger's vision, you don't need ACVs to setup missile batteries on islands. If, on the other hand, HQMC expects that the Forever War is going to continue, and the Marines are going to continue being used as America's Second Army, then replacing the AAVs with ACVs makes sense, as the ACV offers greater tactical mobility and protection for an infantry squad on land, vs the AAV.
But then the question to be asked is "Should the Marine Corps continue being used as America's Second Army?", because the answer to that question influences your doctrine, which is really what determines the usefulness of a vehicle.
(I'm reminded of the Leopard 1 tank; on paper, it was really terrible, had almost no armor to speak of (it could be penetrated by 20mm autocannon and had ZERO protection against RPG and ATGM of the era, let alone Soviet 125mm HEAT rounds). But that was fine for the Bundeswehr, because the West Germans always intended to fight defensively from dug-in positions instead of meeting the Soviet tank horde in a field battle; their doctrine mitigated the Leo 1's weaknesses while letting it employ its strengths.)
"Saying that ACVs offer nothing for land combat is a little myopic."
DeleteYou're being a little bit lawyer-ish on me. This is tantamount to saying that a Revolutionary War musket has value in land combat. True, under just the right circumstances it can kill an enemy but no one would want to take a musket into modern combat. You want a modern rifle.
The ACV is the very lowest end of what an APC can and should be. It lacks all the top end features you'd want if you could design an APC. So, if the Marines aren't/can't going to use them for amphibious assault, which is what they were designed for, then they should abandon them and get actual APCs or IFVs or whatever it is they think they need. This gets back to the CONOPS. Why do the Marines want a land vehicle at all? How do they envision using it? They have no articulated vision that I've come across. I can't imagine what CONOPS would result in someone saying, hey, the ACV is the perfect vehicle!
The ACV was designed for a task that is not longer possible or desired. Therefore, get a vehicle that is designed for whatever it is the Marines actually want to do.
"their doctrine mitigated the Leo 1's weaknesses"
The French doctrine was to fight from the Maginot Line. Unfortunately, the Germans failed to cooperate. Doctrine that covers weakness is fine on paper but after the enemy casts their vote, you're likely left with just weakness because few enemies will cooperate with their opponent's doctrine.
"I'm not a land combat person and I don't want to get bogged down debating individual vehicle armor."
DeleteBut you did raise the issue of individual vehicle armor first? I believe the point Ghiskey Wolf was trying to make is that what separates an APC from an IFV is armament, not protection.
"The ACV is the very lowest end of what an APC can and should be. It lacks all the top end features you'd want if you could design an APC."
But both the ACV entrants, the Iveco SuperAV and ST Engineering Terrex ICV, ARE APCs. I think you're being a little rules-lawyerish yourself, sir. You have decided that the ACV has no merit in combat, which strikes me as a little odd given how favorably you've looked on China's own ACV equivalents, and your defense of the limited armor of the ZTD family of amphibious vehicles (which are less protected than the ACV, mind you, rated for 12.7mm BMG as opposed to 14.5mm Soviet).
Both the SuperAV and Terrex, the ACV contenders, have been procured by their host nations as APCs and are already in service (there are over 430 Terrexes in use by the Singapore Army). So I find it confusing when you insist the ACV isn't an actual APC, when the ACV entrants were designed as APCs, were bought as APCs by their host nations, and are being used as APCs.
"You want a modern rifle."
DeleteThe ACV *is* that modern rifle, though. The ACV competition was essentially a contest between multiple wheeled APCs that had already been fielded by other nations, partnering with American companies for the requirement to build in America - the Iveco SuperAV (BAE), the Patria AMV (LM), the ST Engineering Terrex (SAIC) were all in active service in their originating nations when they were offered for the ACV competition. Your insistence that the ACV isn't an APC perplexes me.
"The French doctrine was to fight from the Maginot Line. Unfortunately, the Germans failed to cooperate. Doctrine that covers weakness is fine on paper but after the enemy casts their vote, you're likely left with just weakness because few enemies will cooperate with their opponent's doctrine."
As you've said before, you're not a land combat person, so you may be unaware of the full picture for tank fighting in the cold war. I'll just touch on that briefly. In between Germany and Soviet Russia is the Fulda Gap, with two corridors of lowlands that form a route by which tanks may travel in a surprise attack to gain crossings of the Rhine River. The Soviets knew they were going to charge through the Fulda Gap, the West Germans and NATO knew they were going to defend the Fulda Gap. Unlike the Maginot Line, it was a strategic target that the Soviets were never going to ignore, because if they take the Fulda Gap, it gives them a straight thrust to Frankfurt, the financial center of West Germany and the HQ of US forces in Germany.
The Leo 1 entered service in 1965; at that time, the only available armor was steel Rolled Homogenus Armor, which is vulnerable to shaped charge HEAT warheads. The handheld RPG-7, a light AT weapon introduced in 1961, could alread penetrate 20 inches of RHA. Armoring a tank with 20 inches of steel armor, even only on the front, is a nonstarter because you'd end up with a tank that was too heavy to move, a modern-day Maus. The decision was then made that since armor was not effective, it would be traded away for firepower and mobility (we see this also with the French AMX-13 and AMX-30 tanks). The Leopard 1 therefore was intended to fight from dug in fighting positions (because packed soil does help against shaped charges), shooting down at the horde of Soviet tanks charging the Fulda Gap, and using its tactical mobility to perform a fighting retreat to the next set of fighting positions.
On Armor: Once Explosive Reactive Armor and ceramic laminates were developed, many Leopard 1 operators purchased addon armor for their tanks, and armor made a comeback on later tanks (LeClerc, Leopard 2, Abrams, Challenger 2, T-72, etc), because now you had an effective protection scheme.
The Soviets, meanwhile, knew that they were rushing through a killing field that they had no choice but to take, which is why their doctrine emphasised concentration of force, and on a strategic level, essentially frontloading all their wartime production, which bankrupted them - the Soviets believed they would not have time for their industry to replace their combat losses, and as a result, the Soviet tank horde consisted of combat tanks and replacements for combat losses. Unlike NATO, which would try to salvage tanks and return them to service, the Soviets intended to treat their tanks as disposable; the crew would fight until the tank was too shot up, then switch to a provided replacement tank. This is also why Soviet doctrine chose 3-man crews instead of the 4-man crews NATO doctrine chose: for 12 men, NATO gets 3 tanks; for 12 men, the Soviets got 4 tanks.
Now, to be sure, the Fulda Gap was not the only expected avenue of approach by the Soviets, and those other approaches were indeed defended. But it did form the cornerstone of thinking for fighting the Cold War.
@Ghiskey Wolf: "The APC is protected against machinegun fire (GPMG up to HMG) and artillery splinters..."
DeleteICM (cluster) munitions have made protection against artillery very dubious for legacy IFVs and APCs for decades already. Almost all artillery fire in the first Gulf War was cargo/cluster type ICM.
GAB
Wait a minute - The Japanese are using AAV7A1s alongside the Marines in an exercise right now. If theirs are safe why can't ours be? Is it upgrades, training, maintenance, operators? Are they drastically ignoring safety protocols? I doubt it. Any excuse to get a new toy that is more expensive and giving up capability to make it an URGENT NEED.
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