USNI News had an article about Australia acquiring asymmetric military capabilities to help deter China. Unfortunately, the article was just a useless collection of vague babbling by John Lee (former national security advisor to Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, 2016-18) who clearly has no idea what asymmetric means. For example, he cited ‘unmanned and undersea technologies’ as examples of asymmetric capabilities, apparently unaware that unmanned equipment is pretty much standard by now and hardly constitutes ‘asymmetric’. I have no idea what he meant by ‘undersea technologies’; presumably unmanned undersea vehicles which, again, are now commonplace.
There was, however, one good thought in the article which appeared to reference Australia’s nuclear submarine acquisition desire:
“Leasing has to be an option” to fill the timeline gap in undersea readiness, but the submarine does not necessarily have to be an American Virginia-class boat. “We need to learn how to operate them” and maintain them, he said. [1]
Now, I’m not sure what, exactly, the leasing reference was to … perhaps SSKs? perhaps a nuclear sub from some country? perhaps training simulators or facilities? Regardless, this raises the intriguing possibility of Australia acquiring an early-retired Los Angeles class submarine … of which we have many.
The LA class subs would provide valuable nuclear submarine and nuclear power plant operating experience. While the subs may not have thirty more years of operational life left, that’s not a requirement for a country that first needs to simply learn how to operate the subs and their reactors.
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| Los Angeles Class Submarine |
Of course, there are practical considerations to deal with:
- You don’t become a [safe] nuclear capable navy overnight. Australia has no nuclear plant operating expertise that I’m aware of. It would require years to build up that level of [safe] competency. This is also not something that can be done on a part-time, occasional basis which leads directly to the next consideration …
- Nuclear subs require fairly substantial crews and long term, sustained expert manning. This is not something that can be done using one-enlistment term sailors. I’m thinking now about the difficulty Australia has had manning the few conventional subs that they have.[2] Where are the needed long term, professional nuclear organizations and personnel going to come from?
- It’s not enough to train a crew to operate a nuclear sub. It also requires a substantial shore-side nuclear support organization for specialized maintenance, inspection, repair, refueling, etc. Again, given Australia’s manning challenges, where will the shore support people come from?
- Assuming an Australian nuclear submarine force would operate much closer to China than is currently the case for Australian submarines, this would require substantial open ocean and first island chain oceanography/mapping support. Perhaps the US Navy would share their data but, if not, Australia would have to generate their own which requires a large investment and effort.
- Nuclear submarines are a major commitment. I hope the Australian military/navy has carefully thought out the CONOPS for a [very?] small force of nuclear subs and thought through how these fit into, and support, the country’s overall geopolitical and military strategies. If not, it will be a massive waste of resources and effort. I hope this isn’t just a knee-jerk reaction to something … you know, the way the US Navy does things. Given that the desire for nuclear subs seems to have appeared out of nowhere, this is a concern.
- Finally, operating nuclear powered ships does impact political interactions in the region. New Zealand, for example, bans ships with nuclear weapons or power from their waters.
Assuming Australia can successfully address the various concerns, acquiring an LA class sub(s) would provide a rapid (on a relative basis) route to nuclear submarine operations and is well worth pursuing. However, this is not something to be entered into lightly. It requires a massive commitment of people and resources and needs to be carefully thought out prior to acting.
Note: I am not well versed on Australian naval matters so some of the preceding may be inaccurate and, if so, feel free to [politely!] offer corrections.
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[1]USNI News website, “Australia Needs Asymmetric Capabilities to Counter China in Indo-Pacific, Former Australian Official Says”, John Grady, 26-Nov-2021,
[2]The Guardian website, “Crew shortage could leave Australia's new submarines high and dry – report”, Lisa Martin, 8-Oct-2018,
I agree, Australia's strange desire for nuclear subs is madness. The justification is the extra range to operate for weeks in the south China Sea. Why? They would be vulnerable to attack from the air from China. They can buy and operate conventional subs for one quarter the price that can wisely lurk near Indonesia to form a blockade.
ReplyDeleteThis is the CONOPS issue. Where do a few nuclear subs fit into Australia's geopolitical and military strategies? I don't know what Australia's strategy is but I have to say that I don't see the benefits of a few nuclear subs … at least not sufficient benefits to justify the cost.
DeleteAustralia needs to keep firmly in mind that the US is/would flood the region with US nuclear subs in the event of war so what will a few Australian nuclear subs accomplish or contribute to a war with China? On the flip side, Australian nuclear subs in the region would increase the chance of blue-on-blue incidents unless the two countries operate under a single unified command.
Perhaps the nuclear subs are intended as peacetime 'threats' more so than a war time capability? If so, I don't see - and never have - the deterrent effect of submarines and, if that is the plan, it would seem that SSKs would be just as effective in that role and, as you point out, much more cost effective.
"Australia needs to keep firmly in mind that the US is/would flood the region with US nuclear subs in the event of war so what will a few Australian nuclear subs accomplish or contribute to a war with China?"
DeleteMaybe they doubt US commitment?
I'd say they could benefit from an SSN just due to the size of their country, let alone working successfully with their allies across the Pacific and Indian Oceans. As for the plan, I bet we hear our 5 LA boats being refueled will go there way in next year's budget. Now will we ramp production, I doubt it. Anyway, my bet is they move the Astute line down there and build those out to replace the LA boats as they age out. The plan is those boats will age out based on number of dives in 10 years. Here is my bet on a plan. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ziBgGlI9ShASJMadEuEb4FMfLdr3gI-WOxMKErNXaV8/edit?usp=sharing
Delete"Maybe they doubt US commitment?"
DeleteQuite possibly. This is where our nebulous and always changing geopolitical goals hurts us. Our on again, off again posture towards China can't be interpreted any other way than weakness.
We need to establish an aggressive, permanent, confrontational stance towards China and then work to bring other countries in the region into our philosophy.
I suspect that a large factor in the choice of SSN vs SSK is that it was, in part, a choice of which country they are beholden to, rather than a choice of propulsion system.
DeleteThe RAN has operated submarines from 1914 until the present day. All their historical classes have been based on non-Australian designs, always UK designs until the current Collins class (based on a Swedish design). They have always been dependent on agreements with the country-of-origin of their design, especially so with the travails they had with the Collins class. Their next class of submarine will be no less complex than the Collins class and will no doubt require much greater levels of country-of-origin cooperation.
I imagine that 1990's Sweden was a relatively undemanding partner. However, in the face of growing international competition and conflict I suspect that buying a class of overseas-designed ships in the current age means buying into, not just an alliance, but a strategic dependency that lasts for decades and cannot be exited quickly. I am certain that this was a factor in the Type 45 frigate choice by Australia and Canada as well.
If Australia has to choose which leader to follow, cosying upto the UK/US is much more in keeping with the current AU government's strategic goals than France/EU.
The problem is that the UK/US don't have any existing SSK designs, which no doubt helped tilt the scales in favour of nuclear propulsion.
This is not a real military issue but an Australian election political wedge issue. It will go away once the Australian election is over and the enormorous cost of nuclear subs threatens to consume Australia's entire discretionary spending.
DeleteWhile everything Ive read serms to the Aussies obtaining UK subs, certainly we will have lots of participation and assistance roles, and we certainly have the quality equipment and operation history to share. I think the sharing of older 688s would be a big step to helping them reach their goals, although I agree that those goals are a bit nebulous and possibly a bit extreme. On the other hand, I applaud their wanting to "Level Up" in their countering of, and concern about China, as well as running away from their deal with the French, which from all accounts, was horrific...
ReplyDeleteI'll add some info to each of ConNavOps' points.
ReplyDelete1. We had several research reactors all at Lucas Heights about 10 km away. It is not a power plant but makes stuff such as medical isotopes.
2. Australia doesn't rely on single term sailors. However our mining industry competes for people who are technical and can handle being cooped up. A lot of effort was put into manning the subs. 4 of 5 sub commanders were poached from foreign navies.
4. The SSN will do what the SSKs do now. It quadruples time on station.
6. New Zealand has already said they are not welcome.
Re in comments WHY?
Australia lacks long range strike. When the F-111 retired there was nothing available to replace them. That is still the case. We bought FA-18Fs. So this is one way to get range.
The RAN and RAAF are designed to slot in to USN task forces and USAF task forces.
If we cast our minds back to the 1000 ship navy this is an example. It ups the USN's SSN forces in the pacific by 8. Remembering that all USN SSN can't be in the pacific because of Russia.
"Australia lacks long range strike. When the F-111 retired there was nothing available to replace them. That is still the case. We bought FA-18Fs. So this is one way to get range."
DeleteYou think cruise missile-armed nuclear submarines can replace those F-111s? Won't it take forever for them to get to the strike zone, considering an SSN's max speed of approx. 30 knots is a fraction of the F-111's cruising speed?
"Won't it take forever for them to get to the strike zone, considering an SSN's max speed of approx. 30 knots is a fraction of the F-111's cruising speed?"
DeleteCome on, now, think operationally. Speed of approach to a target is almost irrelevant. In war, a mission is planned, resources are assembled, they move into position, execute, and retire. The overall process takes somewhere between many days and weeks. The actual speed of approach is immaterial. You plan for, and arrange for, the strike assets to be in position at the planned time.
Also both Australia and Japan have stated war is likely over Taiwan and we would probably get involved.
ReplyDeleteWith regards Point 6. The last US submarine to enter a NZ port was in 1979, previously there had been about 5 USN/RN ship/sub visits per year. An SSN would be denied food resupply in any crisis under the threshold for NZ to revisit it's position.
ReplyDeleteThat is not to say that SSN's do not operate in NZ waters. The NZ government neither confirms nor denies knowledge of allied/non-allied SSN's in it's waters, and Official Information Act requests from the public have been denied on the basis of records destroyed or not kept. At the very least tacit understanding of some kind exists.
The manning issue suggests to me that the British Astute design might be better for Australia than the American Virginia design. It requires a smaller crew.
ReplyDeleteInteresting hearing questioning of RADM Greg Sammut by Senator Pauline Hanson.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYF08jJi9Hg
I routinely discourage links with no accompanying analysis. Please provide some value-added commentary. What was noteworthy? What did you get from it? Thanks.
DeleteI think it speaks for itself, but the point is the lack of understanding of basic concepts by the politicians who are voting on these things.
DeleteAs all the questions about how Australia could possibly afford, support, or man anyone's nuclear submarines show (hint- they can't do any of the three, much less all of them) the US-Australia sub deal has nothing really to do with submarines. It is just a RUSE to allow the US to base nuclear weapons in western Australia to threaten the Chinese with, circumventing existing government and treaty bans (USN provides "possibly"-nuclear armed US nuclear subs with US officers and partial or total US crews flying the Australian flag to provide nuclear sub patrols for the Aussies -- such a deal).
ReplyDeleteAh … … … the US Navy can operate nuclear subs from Pearl Harbor, Guam, and elsewhere. Why would they need to concoct some kind of clandestine Australia operating location?
DeleteRedundancy? I mean given the really pathetic Air and Missile defenses deployed at Guam now (certainly not up to a small saturation attack). Every and any Port in the storm is worth it.
DeleteEven if the end result is slow in coming I suspect the immediate political result was important. From the US and UK perspective Australia is bound militarily more tight to the US/UK. For Australia its a deal that is harder to be waved away down the road when administrations or governments change.
I still think a AIP/diesel/electric sub makes more sense for Australia because of maintenance issues. They are going to have to build a ton of infrastructure to operate any SSNs, and they have zero domestic nuclear industry to draw upon. There is also a bit of a problem because Australia has close mutual defense arrangements with New Zealand, which does not allow nuclear powered subs to enter its territorial waters.
ReplyDeleteThe problem they have is that the area where the apparently intend to operate, the Straits of Malacca to the South China Sea, ranges from 2,000-3,000 miles from Fremantle. Therefore they need an oceangoing submarine with probably at least 10,000 miles of range to be able to operate a reasonable patrol. The German type 216 would appear to meet those needs. None have been built, but the type 218SG, based on the 216, is in production for Singapore, and the design is in the sequence with types 212 and 214, both of which are in widespread use by various European navies.
"the area where the apparently intend to operate"
DeleteIt all comes back to CONOPS, doesn't it? Always!
The type of submarine (and numbers) that they need is dependent on what their mission/CONOPS is. What are they trying to accomplish?
I hope they've put more thought into it than the US Navy does!
"It all comes back to CONOPS, doesn't it? Always!"
DeleteAlways.
The more I think about this deal, the more I wonder if the end game is to get the Brits and Americans to set up a maintenance and repair depot in the Fremantle area in order to maintain the Aussie nukes, since Australia really doesn't have the capability internally, and that facility would just happen to be so convenient for passing USN and RN SSNs, may even SSBNs.
We seriously looked at German boats but the USN had a cry about security issues. RAN intended to continue use of the same combat system on the Collins and current Mk48s.
DeleteThe requirement was for 11,000nm range.
One of the key questions not often asked is not "Why did they dump the French design", but "Why did they even go with the French design in the first place?". In the public domain there is suggestion that a factor in that choice was that the French advertised the option of switching out AIP for nuclear propulsion, not just in the design, but possibly the actual delivered submarines. The then-AU government wanted SSN's then, but felt it was politically unable to order them.
ReplyDeleteOne Source:
https://www.afr.com/companies/manufacturing/coalition-plans-nuclearpowered-submarine-fleet-over-long-term-20160429-goieal
This looks, on the surface, like falling into a "Fitted for but not with" trap. Modern navies seem to view their ships as long-term capital investments, when historically when war comes they have always been consumables. This blog's advocacy for shorter design lives and more rapid design cycles looks increasingly sensible.
The Attack class like the Collins Class a government job creation exercise first, combat capability maybe.
DeleteWhen the idea of actually using these subs in combat suddenly became a possibility, our political leaders freaked out and AUKUS is the result.
Australian subs have been a logic free zone for decades, we knew this would not change the minute Dutton said they would be built in Adelaide.
By the way, wasn't AUS supposed to buy JAP subs?
ReplyDeleteWhat happened to that?
Public domain sources can mislead, but if we assume the endurance of the Collins class was a critical specification the RAN thought they would need (17000km endurance at periscope depth in public domain), the original AIP Soryu-class had a great deal less than that as-designed. This meant that any SSK design would have to be altered for Australian requirements so the superior specifications of the Soryu on paper meant less. In retrospect, waiting for the Lithium-Ion Battery Soryu's looks like a better option than it would have done at the time.
DeleteIn addition, Australia wanted substantial local production in Australia, which Japan was much less enthusiastic on than the French.
There seem to be have been other factors also. Of interest, the Soryu-class has a stated design life of 19 years, and public domain sources suggest Australia wanted a 30 year design life.
On thinking about that more, Japan has recent form of producing small batches of ships and designing their replacements rapidly. Only 6 years separates the commissioning date of the earlier Hyuga-class and the larger Izumo-class carriers. While the process of refitting them for a small load of F-35B's is taking rather longer, it is still an example of short design cycles in action.
"This looks, on the surface, like falling into a "Fitted for but not with" trap. Modern navies seem to view their ships as long-term capital investments, when historically when war comes they have always been consumables. This blog's advocacy for shorter design lives and more rapid design cycles looks increasingly sensible." Well said.
DeleteThe whole thing is a political farce. These news boats might not come into service until 2040s at which points Collins are nearly 50 years old.
ReplyDeleteThey should have brought Soryu's but political/election issues meant local production. At the time the Australian government allowed the Australian car industry to collapse. This meant lots of job losses in Adelaide where ASC is based. So to save seats in Adelaide the Australian government announced it would build subs in Adelaide and shafted the Japanese.
Note Australia did pretty much the same thing to Japan it did to Frace.
Soryu were never an option. Their range is vastly below what Australia requires. They are fine for Japan, who is in the unenviable position of having all her strategic rivals right on her doorstop.
DeleteFor Australia, they'd never be able to get anywhere useful from their staging base in Perth.
"Soryu were never an option. Their range is vastly below what Australia requires."
DeleteDoesn't that mean that all SSKs are no good for them, then?
"Their range is vastly below what Australia requires."
DeleteThe distance from Perth to the middle of the South China Sea is 3000 miles. The distance from Darwin to the middle of the South China Sea is 2000 miles. The distance from Darwin to the various passages that would be likely operating areas is 500-1000 miles.
Diesel subs easily have the range and endurance.
WWII US Gato subs operated from Pearl Harbor to Japan, a distance of 4000 miles and conducted two and a half month patrols.
There's always at-sea refueling and replenishment.
Range is not an issue.
There are a number of AIP SSK designs that advertise ranges of 10,000 miles. That would give you a round trip to the middle of he SCS with 4-6,000 miles worth of patrol, depending on whether you left Perth or Darwin, without considering UNREP/RAS or port calls. And AIP SSKs have plenty of capability to cover choke points.
DeleteThey would really only need nukes to operate in the mid-Pacific, and I have a hard time figuring out what strategic interests they would have there. I think the ability to cover choke points with numbers (which nuke boats will restrict because of cost) is the most important thing they need, both to defend their homeland and to contribute to the greater allied strategic mission.
" the most important thing they need"
DeleteWell summarized position and quite reasonable. I wonder what Australia's position - meaning, strategy - actually is? Whatever it is, I suspect it's different from what we might view as reasonable.
Perth is abput 5,000 km from the South China Sea.
Delete10,000 round trip.
Soryu's maximum range at 6 knots is 11,000km.
The point is that any sub would spend many days to get to there then would only have a couple days on station before having to leave.
Additionally they need to surface repeatedly throughout.
Nuke subs remove these constraints.
Why do we need to get to the South China Sea?
Primarily intelligence gathering.
The idea would be to detect the movement of hostile forces moving southward before they get to the choke points (the straits that separate Australia's northern maritime approaches from the South China and/or Phillipines Sea).
The idea would then be to set ambushes within those straits with a combination of air attack (this is difficult because of range - only a handful of aircraft could extend that far through a series of refuellings) and naval attack (SSNs are a key part of this strategy, but could be supported by naval mines and surface ship borne anti-ship missile support).
Aukus isn't just about nuke boats - it's also abput a variety of tolsto extend Australia's reach to these straits. It includes tech transfers to support multi-billion dollar investments in long range missiles, hypersonic and otherwise, long range drones for loiter and undersea drones to increase the ability to detect and or interdict hostile forces.
Australia also has a reasonably extensive undersea sensor network which extends to all straits in question and which the government is currently spending billions to enhance.
This reference is an Australian report on their submarine program from March 2020. It suggests doubts about the "Attack" class submarines (the previous diesel electric plan):
ReplyDeletehttps://submarinesforaustralia.com.au/sea/wp-content/uploads/Australias-Future-Submarine-Insight-Economics-report-11-March-2020.pdf
The report suggests that major missions for Australian submarines are ASW in wartime and ISR all the time. And that plans call for Australian ships (including submarines) to be coordinating with US fleets in high threat areas.
Typically, this means the South China Sea, which is far from Australian bases and accessed through a bunch of rather narrow passages.
Australian submarine operations are unique among countries with conventional submarines, since they typically involve long (70 days) missions at distances far removed from their bases. Because of the slow speed of diesel electric subs, much of the mission time is spent in transit rather than on patrol, which makes it difficult to maintain a significant force on patrol.
In addition, the current plan (that was just cancelled) called for a submarine that does not have either AIP (Air Independent Propulsion) OR energy dense modern battery technology. This means that the Attack class would require frequent "snorting" (running the diesels either on the surface or through snorkeling) in a high threat area. Since the diesels make a lot of noise, this significantly increases the likelihood that the submarine will be detected.
An additional limitation of conventional submarines is that they can only operate at high speed for a very limited time (about 1 hour). Which means that, if detected, they will be much less able to evade than a nuclear submarine.
The report suggests that the planned conventional submarines would likely not be fit for purpose by the time they actually enter the fleet.
The reference you cite has some questionable statements. For example:
Delete" nearly half of a RAN submarine’s 70-day operation is spent in transit."
This is false. Even at a 10 kt transit speed, the travel time to the center of the South China Sea (3500 miles as quoted in the report) is only 14.5 days for a total of 29 days transit time which is not 'nearly half' the 70 day operation period cited in the report. At a higher speed of, say, 15 kts, the one-way transit time is 9.7 days.
Further, a higher transit speed is readily supported by providing an interim refueling point, either at-sea or some friendly port, if there is one.
The report seems to have been written to support a pre-determined position and some of the facts have been manipulated to support that position.
"Australian submarine operations are unique among countries with conventional submarines, since they typically involve long (70 days)"
In WWII, the US routinely operated Gato class subs around Japan, based out of Pearl Harbor. The patrols were typically around 75 days. The distances and endurance we're discussing were routine. We've just forgotten what was once routine and think the requirements are somehow new and unachievable.
The report is also focused on cost, risk, and local manufacturing far more than combat capabilities. As we've noted on this blog, repeatedly, combat capabilities must be the first consideration with all other factors being a distant second. To do otherwise ensures you wind up with a sub-optimal asset (LCS, Zumwalt, Ford, F-35, etc.). I hope Australis is not setting itself up to duplicate the US mistakes!
"The report is also focused on cost, risk, and local manufacturing far more than combat capabilities"
DeleteIt's true that there was a lot of talk on cost and risk, but I was focusing mostly on Chapter 3, which focused on whether the submarine is fit for purpose. Almost entirely military stuff. Over 15 pages out of a report totaling about 60 pages. I don't think that's insignificant.
"Chapter 3, which focused on whether the submarine is fit for purpose."
DeleteThe report made it crystal clear that the author has no first hand knowledge about the submarine's intended purpose. Indeed, the first half of the chapter 3 talked only about US submarine operations (7 of 15 pages). The author then made the highly questionable leap in logic to assume that Australian requirements would be essentially identical - a premise that I find very unlikely. The rest of the chapter then goes on to denigrate SSKs, in general, by criticizing the specifics of SSKs - not just the proposed Attack class - AS THEY RELATED TO CARRYING OUT AMERICAN SUB MISSIONS. There was no attempt to discuss the strengths of SSKs and how that would likely impact strategy and doctrine. The main criticism seemed to be the transit time issue which we've already addressed by noting that the author's statements and arithmetic on the subject are incorrect and ignore the two blindingly obvious mitigating actions: refueling and substantial surfaced transit (even thought the author acknowledged that the previous class of subs did, in fact, transit surfaced). Again, his statements and conclusions are totally unsupported by any official policies, statements, strategies, or doctrine.
The chapter also contains additional incorrect statements. The more I read the report, the more disappointed I am with the degree of rigor applied by the author.
Finally, I note that the report was published by an organization called "Insight Economics" which appears to be an economic think tank or consultant. I was not able to find much information about the company and what little I could suggested no background in naval/submarine operations. This likely explains the focus on economic issues in the report and the utter lack of any official military strategic references. Also, the report was commissioned and paid for by a website called "Submarines for Australia" which, undoubtedly, had an agenda that was clearly communicated to Insight Economics. In other words, the report was bought and paid for and likely concluded what the purchaser wished to hear.
I do not find the report either credible or informative due to the lack of expertise and official references/sources and the many incorrect statements scattered throughout.
Very briefly (because I don't have much time at the moment), the primary motivating factor (a CONOPs of sorts) is range.
ReplyDeleteAustralia has an enormous area to patrol and defend.
In terms of strategic defence, the goal would be to interdict any hostile force passing through one of the many straits that separate Australia from the South China Sea or phillipine sea.
To do this requires significant range. Diesel subs simply don't have the required range.
With the retirement of the F-111, the RAAG will struggle to attack fleets within those straits. SSNs would be able to do the job, at least in theory.
It's why the new AUKUS treaty also emphasises the development of long range hypersonic missiles. It's about creating Australia's own version of A2/AD in her Northern maritime approaches.
It's also a political message to China. Auatralia is trying to make herself too difficult for China to mess with. This is part of that goal.
In terms of the challenges - they are massive. It's going to be very difficult. The subs can't really be built in Auatralian yet and both the US and UK are almost at full industrial capacity in terms of their ability to produce new submarines.
I like the idea of 2 or 3 LA class boats being refuelled and kept in RAN commission for a decade or two while new subs are manufactured.
I honestly don't think it's likely though.
"range"
DeleteJust to be clear, as you note, range is a factor that would impact CONOPS but is not, itself, a CONOPS. A CONOPS would be more like your subsequent description of interdicting passages.
" Diesel subs simply don't have the required range."
WWII Gato subs had a range of 11,000 nm @ 10 kts surfaced and an endurance of 75 days. WWII German Type X subs had a range of 18,500 nm @ 10 kts surfaced. The modern German Type 212 has a range of 8,000 nm at 8 kts and an endurance of 84 days.
The distance to the passages you're describing is on the order of 500-1000 nm depending on exactly where, so diesel subs have plenty of range.
"It's about creating Australia's own version of A2/AD in her Northern maritime approaches."
That would be fascinating, if true. I don't follow Australian matters closely enough so I haven't heard that. Do you have a reference to a policy/strategy document stating that?
"US and UK are almost at full industrial capacity "
Very good observation. Regardless of manufacturing capacity, the US would never make Virginia class subs available. The Navy won't even allow Virginias to exercise with allied navies for fear of giving away capabilities. This does, however, make a strong case for transferring retired LA class subs … assuming the Navy would allow it.
"'It's about creating Australia's own version of A2/AD in her Northern maritime approaches.'
DeleteThat would be fascinating, if true. I don't follow Australian matters closely enough so I haven't heard that. Do you have a reference to a policy/strategy document stating that?"
That could actually be a useful strategy, and one consistent with Australia's historic fears and concerns. It would also just conveniently happen that developing that capability would significantly increase the severity of China's Malacca strategic problem.
I don't think they need nukes to implement that. I think AIP SSKs would do just fine, and would have the advantage that cost would allow them to be built and deployed in greater numbers.
I still don't see a justification for building nuke subs for a country that has no nuke infrastructure to support them--unless it is a backdoor plan to have USN and RN build and operate the support facility, which would then be available for use by USN/RN subs as well.
"a backdoor plan to have USN and RN build and operate the support facility"
DeleteThat's possible, I guess, but if the US wants an Australian SSN base - and there would be no reason why it would be nuclear in any respect, just submarine support in general - I would think they'd just ask for it an negotiate an arrangement. Is there some reason why Australia would object to a base/lease arrangement? We already base troops there so ...
Our subs travel submerged.
DeleteRE IADS
Hypersonics
In Australia - https://www.airforce.gov.au/our-mission/scifire-hypersonics
In USA - https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/media-releases/australia-and-us-partner-spearhead-precision-strike-missile
IADS - https://www.defence.gov.au/project/medium-range-ground-based-air-defence
IADS - https://www.defence.gov.au/project/short-range-ground-based-air-defence
Local manufacture - https://www.defence.gov.au/project/sovereign-guided-weapons-and-explosive-ordnance-enterprise
Mines - https://www.defence.gov.au/project/maritime-mining
Plus space tracking (with the US) and land based ASM.
I don't mind links, at all, but I discourage links with no value-added analysis. What about the various links you cited is noteworthy? What conclusions do you draw from them? Give me some commentary/analysis. Thanks.
DeleteYou asked Cdr Chip
Delete"That would be fascinating, if true. I don't follow Australian matters closely enough so I haven't heard that. Do you have a reference to a policy/strategy document stating that?"
And they are the references.
"And they are the references."
DeleteAt a quick glance, the articles discuss capabilities rather than strategies. Again, at a quick skim, I could find no mention of strategies. Was there a specific link that discussed Australian A2/AD strategy?
On reading and thinking about this topic further, I agree that it all comes back to "What do we want our submarines to do?", or CONOPS. At every step since at least 1987, AUS prioritised range, which drove the degree of modification the Collins class required, and thus arguably drove the technical challenges they faced with their current submarines, and thus their next submarines.
DeleteThe other key decision was "Where do we want to build them", which is relevant but left out for necessary brevity.
On reading more about the Collins class, they seem more capable than I had thought from the controversy and criticism. They failed to meet their ambitious goals, but they were triple the size of their predecessor (the Vastergotland class), as compared to Japan laying down a new slightly-larger class every 7-13 years. They were delivered in workable state quickly and seemed (I am willing to be proved wrong here) to have good performance when they worked. If they failed, then their failings were arguably goal failures rather than technical failures.
As others have said, there is a lot of talk about specifications and industrial matters in the public domain, but little about doctrine, or CONOPS. But we can glean some information.
RAN calls their current submarines "Guided Missile Submarines (SSG)", they wish to emphasise roles other than sitting in one place in a choke point.
During project development, the RAN criticised the Soryu class for it's relatively cramped living spaces, they want to emphasise long patrols, as opposed to there-and-back-again missions.
While using the Oberon-class (17000km range on surface), the RAN planned on using them as part of an "Offensive Maritime Doctrine". They wished less "indiscretion ratio" for their Oberon successor, ie greater submerged range, not necessarily greater range. They had determined the range they wanted back in the 1970's or 1980's.
The 11-year old public domain 2010 "Australian Maritime Doctrine" states "With their inherent stealth, long-range endurance, formidable striking power and advanced intelligence gathering capabilities, submarines have a significant impact on high-level maritime warfare." Which implies a desire to have the capability to offensively strike (ie South China Sea range) rather than hold choke points (Singapore strait range).
https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Amd2010.pdf
In conclusion, there should be public domaain discussion of CONOPS. The choice of CONOPS had significant time and expense consequences with the Collins class, and will no doubt have even greater consequences this time around.
"there should be public domain discussion of CONOPS."
DeleteAnd you've offered a nice start on it. Good comment. Now, I'd like to explore some of your thoughts.
"RAN calls their current submarines "Guided Missile Submarines (SSG)", they wish to emphasise roles other than sitting in one place in a choke point."
I assume you mean that this indicates that the operating CONOPS would place the subs in the SCS as opposed to sitting on a choke point. If so, that's a leap of logic that may be appealing but may not be correct. Being able to launch missiles may or may not be related to the area of operation. For instance, if the missiles are Tomahawks or some other land attack cruise missile then the launch point can be anywhere within a thousand mile radius from the target, including sitting on a choke point. If, on the other hand, the missiles are short range anti-ship missiles (short range because a sub does not possess long range sensors) then the distinction may be pertinent but, again, might equally indicate a desire to sit on a choke point, just with more weapon options.
"The 11-year old public domain 2010 "Australian Maritime Doctrine" states"
Again, it is a leap to take a generic, vague description of a submarine's capabilities and extrapolate that to a specific CONOPS. Your conclusion that it implies an offensive, middle-of-the-SCS CONOPS may or may not be correct and warranted. Equally, it could describe the perfect choke point 'ambusher' which would be a SSK.
Moving on from your comments, we have to consider the impact of numbers. Australia lacks the budget and manpower to crew and operate more than a handful of subs - likely around 6-8 and, if SSNs, even fewer. Recognizing that constraint, common sense suggests that the most strategically effective use of limited numbers would be to close off choke points thus bottling Chinese naval forces inside the SCS and ending the flow of merchant shipping to China. The alternative, trying to operate offensively inside the SCS would see, at most, one or two subs at any given moment in the entire area. Is this really the most strategically effective use? I would suggest not.
I am absolutely not arguing with your conclusions and trying to win some point but, instead, expanding on your thoughts and offering some alternative thinking as a means of furthering the public discussion you correctly called for. So, with that in mind, what do you think? Does any of this alter any of your thinking or suggest additional possibilities?
"Does any of this alter any of your thinking or suggest additional possibilities?"
DeleteI appreciate your feedback. My primary concern is the apparent waste and inefficiency in western military procurement, and the price our children and grandchildren may pay for this.
There is very little about CONOPS in the public domain, so I was really scraping the bottom of the barrel for any hints of AUS intentions.
History suggests that pushing a new SSK design further than a certain amount causes substantial delay and expense and the eventual judgement of having failed. If I assume this, nuclear propulsion makes sense if you want to go further than a moderately-improved current-design SSK can go. Also, the USN has large numbers of SSN's and no SSK's, so looking at the wider perspective, offering the alliance a SSK option has increased value, like the Western European SSK's during the Cold War.
One estimate is that the cost of the Collins replacement will be USD 64B for the program and hardware, plus USD 103B for whole-of-life sustainment.
https://www.defenseworld.net/news/26898/Australia_to_spend__90B_for_12_Attack_class_Submarines#.YaV8zbrRXRl
That is a large sum of money. If we want to compare submarines to a land-based equivalent, the public domain range of the Block V Tomahawk is (at least) 1400 km, at a public domain unit cost of USD 1.5M. NW Australian coast to Singapore is 3000 km. So we can get half of the way to the southern exit of the SCS without leaving home.
Submarines can provide detection and tracking for surface/air craft, but historically work best keeping quiet and doing their own thing. So we want them to maximise their own thing. If we want mass then we want the simplest machine that can do the job. The main limitation on a submarine's range is food (for SSN and SSK) and fuel/energy (for SSK). It is more discrete to carry these onboard the submarine, but this is not absolutely essential. As has been said, and is currently done, resupply can be done. Countries such as Indonesia or the Phillipines are probably more willing to turn a blind eye to ships and subs sailing past (certainly NZ does as I stated above) than hosting land-based tomahawk missiles.
Perhaps AUS can use shorter-range submarines than it thinks, with ways of mitigating the vulnerability of surface resupply ships and rendezvous. Container-based equipment offers the option of requisitioning a random cargo ship or four during conflict, rather than pre-built resupply ships that advertise to opponents which ships to keep an eye on. The pay-off is that the machinery at the front-end is as simple, small and replaceable as possible, with fewer crew at risk.
"make a strong case for transferring retired LA class subs … assuming the Navy would allow it."
ReplyDeleteSeems like the best option. It would allow if Australia can muster the long term crews now to start training in the LA class and in land support positions as well. I suppose the Astute have slightly smaller crew but does the UK have excess capacity to build?
Add found this:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2800266/australian-submarine-force-a-checkered-past-and-an-uncertain-future/
So retired Commodore Singh of the Indian Navy also seems to think leased LA class boats are likely the only way to make this work in the short run.
Whatever happened with the French-Australian deal (and it looks to me like the biggest problem was on the French—their inability to deliver the promised product for the promised price), we are left with a very unhappy France and Naval Group. And unhappy Frenchmen can make things uncomfortable for their supposed allies—see de Gaulle, Charles. So some sort of concession to France and Naval Group would seem to be prudent from a diplomatic standpoint.
ReplyDeleteAustralia probably would do better with a long-range AIP SSK than a nuke, particularly if A2/AD in their northern and western approaches is their primary concern. That seems to be a reasonable objective and also one consistent with their history, dating at least back to the post-WWII “ten pound poms,” Europeans who were given passage and land for a nominal fee in order to beef up their European-origin population as a buffer against Asian incursion. They clearly don’t seem too worried about the east and south, which makes sense because neither the Kiwis nor the Antarcticans (whoever they are) seem to be harboring any thoughts of aggression. Nukes seem only to make sense if they are trying to take on some strategic mission in the mid-Pacific, and it is just hard to imagine what that might be.
The USA and UK seem to be looking for the Aussie navy to take some of the burden off them, plus I still think this may be some sort of back-door way to get an operating base for USN and RN nuke subs somewhere in Australia. The USN is also facing a shortfall in submarine numbers for the next 20 or so years, and the start of the Columbias will strain the capability to produce Virginias and delay the start of new SSGNs even more, so the USN could clearly use some way to increase numbers.
So here are my thoughts about trying to address all those needs.
1) USN propose this to France/Naval Group—You buy or build an additional nuke-submarine-capable shipyard in the USA (perhaps on the west coast), either on your own or with a USA partner, and build 30 Barracudas. It’s the same deal they did with Brazil/ICN for the Riachuelos and Alvaro Alberto, only on a much larger scale. OK, I get that Barracudas are less capable than Virginias, but they are way more capable than holes in the water, and right now the alternative is not more Virginias but holes in the water. That should make them happy and also address our SSN shortage.
2) Quit decommissioning the Los Angeles boats before the expiration of their service lives. Those two steps should keep our submarine numbers respectable through the 2020s and 2030s.
3) To further increase USN sub numbers, contract with HDW to do a USA shipyard deal similar to Naval Group/Brazil/ICN to build 30 Type 216 AIP SSKs for use in littoral and choke point areas, thus freeing the SSNs for blue water missions. USN ultimately gets 60 more subs (30 nuke, 30 AIP) and two more shipyards to support growth in sub and overall fleet numbers.
4) What Australia really needs is a long-range AIP SSK. Type 216 fills that need pretty squarely. So also have HDW build or joint venture with an Aussie yard to build a bunch of them down under. If HDW was reluctant to do this before, the USN deal should sweeten the pot enough to bring them onboard. If the approach is to build a yard in either the Darwin or Perth area (probably Perth), then at the end of the production run, the USN and RN could buy the yard from HDW and convert it to a forward support base for USN/RN nuke boats and other ships.
5) If the Brits are unhappy about losing possible Astute class sales to the Aussies, then do an Brazil/ICN deal with BAE as well, to get another US shipyard into business/back into business building some Astutes for us. Adding three submarine shipyards (2 nuke, 1 AIP) should also provide a source to build some SSGNs (which should be our primary conventional strike assets) a lot sooner than the current plan to wait until the Columbia production run is over.
OK, that’s the outline. Shoot holes in it.
Point 4 Cdr Chip.
DeleteAIP takes up space for diesel fuel. It cuts the range a lot.
Although I think with lithium batteries and German fuel cell tech one could get close to SSN performance for short periods.
Most European subs are too small to carry the fuel required.
"AIP takes up space for diesel fuel. It cuts the range a lot."
DeleteNot really. The German Type 216 is a diesel-electric/AIP with a range of 10,400 nm at 10 kts and an endurance of 120 days. What more is needed?
PS Our IADS and A2AD will be deployable. We intend to defend forward not our coast.
DeleteThe type 216 doesn't actually exist. It is a concept. It range appears to be it's surface range not it's underwater range. For the Collins' class from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine
Delete11,500 nautical miles (21,300 km; 13,200 mi) at 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph) surfaced
9,000 nmi (17,000 km; 10,000 mi) at 10 kn (19 km/h; 12 mph) periscope
"The type 216 doesn't actually exist. It is a concept."
DeleteOkay … the Type 214 does exist and has a range of 12,000 nm (speed not specified) and endurance of 84 days.
Underwater range is irrelevant. Most of a transit could/would be surfaced, submerging near the operating area, as the threat warrants. Once in the operating area, the sub would be stationary, on a relative basis, operating in a limited area.
Again, what more is needed?
"3) To further increase USN sub numbers, contract with HDW to do a USA shipyard deal similar to Naval Group/Brazil/ICN to build 30 Type 216 AIP SSKs for use in littoral and choke point areas, thus freeing the SSNs for blue water missions. "
DeleteThey already have a deal with Fincantieri to deliver 212s to the Italians. Expand it to 216s and build em in Wisconsin at Fincantieri Marinette Marine.
Unclear how much work would be needed to integrate US combat systems and weapons though.
"To further increase USN sub numbers, contract with HDW"
DeleteI have no problem with your various options but I would offer some additional thoughts to factor in:
1. One of the underlying assumptions you're working with is that it is possible for the US to purchase multiple SSKs for the price of a single SSN. While undoubtedly true TO AN EXTENT, I suspect the degree of savings is less than imagined for two reasons:
a) A foreign facility operating in the US, paying US labor rates, and abiding by US OSHA and myriad other rules and regulations will cost substantially more than the advertised, overseas price. Conceptually, the price will double.
b) Integrating custom US sensors, weapons, combat software, etc. will, again, conceptually double the price. 'Custom' always increases the price.
The net result is whatever the imagined ratio of SSK to SSN is, it will be substantially less.
By way of proof - aside from the simple logic of it all - consider the advertised foreign costs for the FREMM frigate versus the US cost (which is only going to continue to go up!).
Just food for thought.
"Quit decommissioning the Los Angeles boats before the expiration of their service lives."
DeleteAlready seems to have been done. It's true that many LA boats were retired early in the past, but the last such retirement with less than 30 years service was in 2009. More recent retirements all seem to be at or after the normal service life. The only exception is USS Miami, which was retired after suffering a major fire while in the shipyard.
"By way of proof - aside from the simple logic of it all - consider the advertised foreign costs for the FREMM frigate versus the US cost (which is only going to continue to go up!).
DeleteJust food for thought."
But the US "frigate" is not a FREMM. It's a baby (emphasis on "baby") Tico.
Totally agree with your basic premise. Cost control is going to be a huge problem for any USN build, at least until the acquisition system can be totally reformed.
AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
ReplyDelete• Australia’s region, the Indo-Pacific, is in the midst
of the most consequential strategic realignment
since World War II.
• Strategic competition, primarily between the
United States and China, will be the principal driver
of strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific.
• Though still remote, the prospect of high intensity
military conflict in the Indo-Pacific is less remote
than in the past.
• Australia can no longer assume a ten-year
strategic warning time is an appropriate basis for
defence planning.
• Grey-zone activities – such as the use of para
military forces and coercive economic levers – are
being applied in ways which challenge sovereignty
and habits of cooperation.
• Threats to human security, such as the
Coronavirus pandemic and natural disasters,
mean disaster response and resilience measures
demand a higher priority in Defence planning.
OUR RESPONSE
• The 2020 Defence Strategic Update sets out the
Government’s response to our changing environment.
• Our environment is now more complex, with Australian
interests being more directly challenged than in the past, and sharper prioritisation is required.
• The Government has set three new strategic objectives to guide all Defence planning, including force structure, force generation, international engagement and operations:
Š to shape Australia’s strategic environment;
Š to deter actions against Australia’s interests; and
Š to respond with credible military force, when required.
• The Government has also directed Defence to:
Š prioritise our immediate region for the ADF’s geographical focus the area ranging from the north-eastern Indian Ocean through maritime and mainland South East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific;
Š grow the ADF’s self-reliance for delivering deterrent effects;
Š expand Defence’s capability to respond to grey-zone
activities;
Š enhance the lethality of the ADF for high-intensity
operations;
Šmaintain the ADF’s ability to deploy forces globally; and
enhance Defence’s capacity to support civil authorities in response to natural disasters and crises
Above from 2020 Defence Strategic Update https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf
CAPABILITIES
While all capabilities in this Plan contribute to delivering Defence
priorities, the following are key examples.
• Enhanced posture and partnerships in the region
Š Arafura and Guardian class patrol vessels, a new vessel to support the Pacific Step-Up, an expanded replacement for the C-130J fleet and new amphibious landing craft.
• More potent capabilities to hold adversary forces and
infrastructure at risk further from Australia
Š
Attack class submarines, advanced strike systems, remotely piloted combat aircraft, sea-mining and offensive cyber capabilities.
• More durable supply chain and strengthened sovereign
industrial capabilities to enhance the ADF’s self-reliance
Increased weapons inventories, options for expanded
domestic munitions manufacturing, additional fuel storage an increased domestic industry participation.
• Improved capacity to respond to grey-zone activities,
including cyber and information operation
• Enhanced Special Forces capabilities, strengthened
operational cyber capabilities, integrated intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance, and increased space
tracking and sovereign satellite systems.
• Enhanced ADF support to civil authorities in response to national crises and natural disasters
Š• Expanded deployable health care and combat engineering
capabilities and future multi-role sealift and replenishment
vessels
From 2020 Force Structure Plan https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/Factsheet_Force_Structure.pdf
"From 2020 Force Structure Plan"
DeleteIt contained a lot of vague, generalized statements (like similar US documents!) but says nothing of value. What value or relevance do you see in it, if any?
If you know Australia a bit, you can find out that only chance for the AUKUS' nuclear submarine project to be success ---- Australia buy either UK's Astute Class or US' Virginia Class outright. However, this is politically impossible in that nation. Therefore, the project will end badly.
ReplyDeleteYou can google the web to find out that Australia has only one large shipyard (near Aldelaide) which relies on Australia navy to survived. No one in the world would ask them to build either commercial or military ships. Therefore, Australian government keeps asking ships to be built there. The shipyard's union is very militant thus very low efficient.
It is votes, you know. So, the nuclear submarine projects will end badly. Australia is not USA, it doesn't have too much money to burn.
The only way I can see it working (and this may be impracticable), is for the US or UK to build the nuclear bit (back) and Aus to build the front and "mate" the two halves. The UK has built our Carriers and T45 Destroyers in blocks and then moved them to a final build site. As both UK and US have full order books for Subs, not sure if AUS could build front halves for "export" so overall more subs are built for everyone? I suspect the US would not go down this route on principle although F35 is built from sub assemblies fro around the world and even assembled around the world.
ReplyDelete