There’s an old saying that Generals are always preparing to fight the last war.
Historically, there’s always been an element of truth to that although perhaps not as much as popularly believed. For example, the popular notion is that the Germans perfected tanks and ‘invented’ tank warfare leading into WWII while the French were caught preparing WWI trenches (the Maginot Line) and that this was demonstrated by Germany’s armored divisions rolling over and around the French defenses. The reality is that the French had some excellent tank designs, bolstered by innovations in production (casting), steering, armor, and tracks and had produced 6,126 tanks by June 1940.(1) They certainly correctly foresaw the importance of tanks in the coming war.
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| French Char B1 bis Tank |
Where they failed was in the utilization of their tanks. They focused on a defensive doctrine, epitomized by the Maginot Line and derived from the trench warfare model of WWI. Thus, they envisioned tanks as infantry support assets – essentially, slightly mobile pillboxes rather than highly mobile strike forces. Just as importantly – or more so - the French tanks lacked radio communications with only command tanks possessing long range radio gear. This hindered their ability to coordinate their tank actions. Again, this was the result of doctrinally consigning tanks to distributed infantry support positions. Of course, failed logistic support and the lack of air cover were also important factors.
Conversely, the Germans envisioned highly mobile tanks with mobility being preferred over armor. Communications and coordination were seen as key to the effective use of tanks.
The point is that it is not enough to recognize that the next war will be different or even to correctly foresee which assets or technology will become major factors, as the French did with tanks; it is also necessary to devise effective means of utilizing the anticipated assets. Thus, we see, yet again, that doctrine and tactics are more important than equipment.
The US military has, correctly, recognized that the next war will be different. They may even have correctly anticipated some technologies that will emerge as major factors. However, it is quite evident that they have failed utterly to recognize the doctrine and tactics that will allow those assets to succeed.
For example, the US military has correctly identified that networks and unmanned vehicles (of all types) will assume major roles in the next war but they have failed to grasp the proper uses of those capabilities.
The US military is not preparing to fight the last war but neither are they correctly preparing to fight the next. They are focused on the equipment rather than the doctrine and tactics to successfully use the equipment. How many times have we heard an Admiral say, ‘we need to get hulls in the water so that the sailors can figure out what to do with them’? Hey, you’re an admiral. YOU’RE supposed to be the one to set the doctrine and tell the sailors, not the other way around.
This leads – as so many posts do – back to the role of firepower. The last war (2) was Desert Storm whose main characteristic firepower … overwhelming firepower. Since then, we’ve set out on a path of networks and unmanned assets as a substitute for firepower which illustrates the military’s recognition that the next war will be different but also illustrates the military’s incorrect understanding of how to correctly apply the anticipated changes. Networks and unmanned assets should be supplementing and complementing firepower, not replacing it.
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(1)https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/france/ww2_french_tanks.php
(2)The designation of the ‘last war’ is a debatable point which hinges on what one considers to be a war. Desert Storm was, clearly, a war albeit a geographically limited one against a third rate opponent. The various Iraq/Afghanistan conflicts are less wars and more some kind of ill-conceived police action combined with nation building.
Desert Storm was the war the Army (NTC), Marines (CAX) and Air Force (Red Flag) had been preparing for, for the prior 20 years.
ReplyDeleteThe 11th ACR was at the time the finest trained Motorized Guards regiment in the world, they were the OpFor at NTC. Iraq's military was a battle tested but third rate copy of that unit.
The current Marine Commandant has convinced himself remote missile trucks and rifle squads will win against China. The army is ready to reoccupy the middle east, and I have no idea what the navy is thinking at all--networking sounds great but they need some missile cells somewhere in the new ships because they are war ships... and America already has a coast guard.
Agree with the firepower vs networking issue completely. I veiw a China-US conflict as a near-certainty. The "when?" is the only question.
ReplyDeleteSo considering that, and looking at the shipbuilding plan, budgets current and projected, and the firepower gap current and projected(growing), what do we do?? Without diving into notional fleets, and dealing in the "now", I think one important thing we can do is to preserve what we have. Assuming that new construction continues "as-is", I think some massive and sweeping changes in the Navys management of its assets are crucial. A few of my thoughts include:
* A pullback on deployments. Return the majority of the fleet to CONUS, including the "easy target" Japan-deployed CVN. Stop using the ships odometers as fans. Weekly training cruises, battle exercises, and Fleet Problems are all they should be doing.
* Older ships (looking at you, Ticos, and older Burkes) need to be preserved. Maintenance needs to be accelerated, and capable ships need to be retained, regardless of age, until replaced on a one for one basis. Even after that, they need to be mothballed until theyre ridiculously out of date. While more expensive, the practice of doing upgrades and intensive maintenance just before putting a ship in reserve needs to be reinstated.
*In keeping ships potentially longer than their planned life, Id look at somthing extreme and novel with the crews. Maybe a blue/gold crewing of active ships, in order to have a crew trained and ready to move to a sister ship thats in reserve when needed. Rotating ships in and out of reserve, in order to even out the "mileage" across them is another way to avoid not only wear on active ships, but the deterioration of the reserve ships as well.
*Ships approaching their end need to be used sparingly. For instance, the SSGNs and 688s. Instead of driving them hard to the end, put them in reserve with a couple of years of life left. That way they are available for some war service when needed, instead of being "used up" on worthless peacetime deployments. This is especially relevant to nuclear ships. It could certainly affect force levels and upset things short term, but its worth the risk.
* Ships deemed too old/expensive to upgrade shouldnt be discarded. Ie; If we start losing ships in conflict tomorrow, wouldnt it be nice to have, for example, a few twin-arm Ticos handy, in spite of their supposed "obsolescence"??? All the cries of "its too expensive" will be irrelevant on Day One of a shooting war, and every platform we no longer have will be missed.
As we look forward at the impending retirement of Ticos, early Burkes, a bunch of the 688s, and even the first Nimitz, I think we need some sweeping and massive reforms in how we treat and utilize our older assets. By not completely discarding older platforms, we maintain firepower...
"I veiw a China-US conflict as a near-certainty."
DeleteWhy do you think so?
China has nothing to gain from starting a real war any time soon and the US is definitely not going to shoot first.
"China has nothing to gain from starting a real war"
DeleteWar is inevitable. The only question is when. For the reasoning, a good place to start is with this post:
War With China - Part 1
Well, although recent headlines probably over-hype the China/Taiwan tensions, I believe sooner or later, there will be conflict there. The new AUKUS alliance is a collaboration clearly aimed at China, and Id expect it to be active against a forcible Taiwan "reunification". If China had no designs on expansion, then it wouldn't be charging ahead on such a huge buildup. If they were strictly concerned with home defense, they wouldn't, for instance, be building an amphib fleet. Theres nothing defensive about amphibs. And while you could look at their carrier buildup as defensive in nature, in order to help hold the USN at arms length, the only need to do that is after they've done somthing agressive and the US responds. Or, alternatively, they could be building huge blue water capabilities in order to push their influence and will outside the westPac. CNO has brought up many examples of how we may already be "at war". The agressive nature of Chinese actions, including island building/fortification, in defiance of international laws shows that at best, theyre a bad neighbor, and at worst, preparing for some local forcible expansion. As they have had no real pushback, those kind of efforts will continue. Taiwan, islands contested by Japan or the Phillipines, etc will sooner or later cause conflict, even if inadvertently. The willingness to ignore international treatys, agreements, borders, judgements, and norms makes it pretty clear that they have less than honorable intentions. With the US still acting as world police, we're kind of stuck in the first responder role to their expansionism. And sadly, the cliche' about the two biggest kids on the block always fighting has a lot of historical support.
DeleteI know we want to save ships because we don't have a build plan, but there is no history of successfully making those ship types serve longer successfully. We should plan a fleet based on 35 years major surface combatants and stop inventing fiction for ourselves. Our challenge is the dip we've created for ourselves happening now. Except 2 Burkes a year w/ 96 cells, 1 x 32 cell FFG a year, because it will be a long time if they ever prove they can build 2 a year. Then build those minimally manned MUSVs. You'll never get that surface number back to to its all time high, but when you build 2 SSN a year w 4 tobe and a 40 year reactor you end up with more sub cells and make up the difference, and making that volume stealthier.
DeleteIf we're talking about Cold War 2, there's nothing to discuss since we're already in it.
DeleteBut a full-fledged 'hot' peer war? I don't really see that happening anytime soon.
The war with the Soviets stayed cold and I believe this one will too, although of course proxy wars around the world might very well happen if the US decides to commit to those.
Now, mind you, I'm not saying China is not a threat.
In fact, ComNavOps said that China is aiming for world domination, and I agree with him on that.
To put it simply, China plays the long game, and has no reason to start a risky war with America (war has not been kind at all to China, historically!), when they can get what they want by other, safer means.
I assume we all agree that Biden or whoever will follow him will not shoot first, so barring the unlikely event of two parts accidentally stumbling into war (and there would be plenty of opportunities to de-escalate), either China starts a peer war or it doesn't happen.
Their "aggressive actions" are carefully calibrated to avoid triggering a conflict they'd likely lose, and that's working great for them.
Consider, for example, that Pakistan is now a Chinese puppet/vassal, and that has been accomplished without bombing the hell out of the place.
Other countries like Philippines are also being "puppeted" this way, or will be in the near future.
Furthermore, time is on China's side right now, and has been for a while.
In 1980, the US Navy was large and strong, while China had nothing.
In 2000, USN was smaller and less effective, but China was still not even comparable.
In 2020, USN has weakened further, while China has now a comparable navy: weaker still, but definitely comparable.
At this rate, by 2040 is at least possible that USN will be matched or passed by China: why start a war now, from their view?
I cannot exclude that China will behave irrationally, of course, and the military should be preparing for a war anyway since it's their job, but I do not believe there's going to be a peer war anytime soon.
It might happen in a more distant future, perhaps beyond 2050, but that's a different story.
"there is no history of successfully making those ship types serve longer successfully."
DeleteMy goodness, history is replete with examples of 'obsolete' ships serving well past their prime. An outstanding example is the Lend-Lease program that provided obsolete 4-stacker destroyers to England. Another example is the Perry class FFGs that have been sold to various countries and continue to serve despite being considered obsolete by the US Navy. Another example is WWII LSTs that continue serving around the world even today. The list of obsolete ships that served well past their prime is nearly endless.
But not in first use by the US. Plus those destroyers for the Brits were old, but not as old as we talk about for our ships now. Many were completed after WWI.
DeleteDon't try to be a sea lawyer. It's obvious that there is a long history of ships serving well past their prime. Just acknowledge a misspeak and move on. It happens. No big deal unless you try to 'lawyer' it.
DeleteI'm planning a fleet with a strong foundation. That won't happen with ships the current bureaucracy has had its hands on for the past 30 years. Most of ships in the heart of the cold war couldn't make that age. Why assume better now? http://doerry.org/norbert/references/Ship%20Service%20Life%20and%20Naval%20Force%20Structure_Koenig-Nalchajian-Hootman_ASNE%20Naval%20Engineers%20Journal,%20Volume%20121,%20Number%201,%201%20March%202009,%20pp.%2069-77.pdf
Delete"doctrine and tactics are more important than equipment"
ReplyDeleteSo what should the doctrines and tactics be? Since the only real challenge is China, the focus should be there:
1) Prevent Chinese amphibious assaults. China threatens at least Taiwan and Japan. We need our version of an area denial strategy to address this.
2) Blockade China. China may be a part of continental Asia, but it is highly dependent on energy, food, raw materials and commerce in general through sea trade. The land routes are too slow, small and undeveloped. China isn't too different than WW2 Japan in its dependence on sea lanes.
If we could agree on goals like these, we could move on to how to do it, and what equipment would contribute to these efforts.
There's a common misunderstanding of the differences between strategy, doctrine, and tactics. Simplistically,
DeleteStrategy is the overarching goals and methods. Military strategy derives from our US geopolitical strategy.
Doctrine is the standardized set of actions that a military unit would take. Doctrine derives from our military strategy.
Tactics are the specific ways to use units and equipment. Tactics derive from our doctrine.
What you described is strategy. What are our goals for China? How do we want to deal with China? Broadly, how should we go about accomplishing our strategic goals?
Doctrine would be things like, how should a carrier group configure its escorts.
Tactics would be how should an aircraft engage an enemy aircraft. There is some overlap between doctrine and tactics but we'll ignore that.
None of this changes anything in your comment. I just offer it as clarification of terminology.
Now, without either agreeing or disagreeing, how would you, in broad terms, accomplish what you've laid out?
I appreciate the clarification. I bring up the 2 strategy goals as they should drive doctrine and tactics.
DeletePreventing amphibious attacks involves area denial. That means being able to deny China the use of the sea (and ideally but not realistically, air) around these islands, far from secure US bases.
• Submarines could directly threaten larger amphibious ships, transports, and significant naval combatants with torpedoes (but not small paramilitary boats). They could also lay mines if we had them.
• Carriers should achieve temporary local air superiority to enable surface strikes against ships, ports and potentially airfields. Those strikes would be conducted by cruise missiles launched by subs, ships and Air Force bombers.
• Local air forces and land based anti-ship missiles could support that, but anything that spends too much time near China (lingering surface forces...) won't be operational for long.
This is all about addressing the acute, immediate problem of an active amphibious attack.
In a broader conflict, blockading China causes the country's economy (and ability to project power) to grind to a halt. Being able to credibly threaten this may prevent a conflict. A blockade would be best accomplished across the Indo-Pacific region. The same rules apply: keep vulnerable forces as far from China as possible.
• Oil can be interdicted in the Indian Ocean using subs, land-based standoff missile equipped bombers, and potentially even surface forces (because they'd be far from China).
• We wouldn't sell food. Australia would stop shipping iron. (embargos matter)
• Closer, subs and sub deployed mines sinking ships near ports further tighten the noose.
• Air (standoff missile or stealth bomber) attacks against key pipelines and bridges destroy the few land logistical routes.
• And again, carriers could create temporary local air superiority to enable cruise missile attacks on key infrastructure and forces.
It's not too different than how we approached WW2 Japan, just with some different weapons and no plans for a ground invasion.
As I read this, there seems to be capability gaps in both equipment and training:
• Subs (we don't have enough)
• Mines (almost non-existent capability)
• Standoff cruise missiles (more needed, ideally stealthy)
• Carriers creating local air superiority for cruise missile attacks (we don't agree on this concept yet, let alone train/optimize it)
• The long supply line and huge distances from the US to Asia are a challenge
o Supply ships will need escorts
o Bases will need hardening
o Aircraft and ships would benefit from longer endurances
Not much of a role for 40 Marines on jungle islands. Drones could help provide situational awareness for carrier/strike groups without radiating (if done right). A few gun-focused ships could make an impact (shells are cheap), and China has lots of juicy targets with 10nm of the coast, but I don't see how they survive that close.
How's this for a start?
As I read this, there seems to be capability gaps in both equipment and training:
Delete- Subs (we don't have enough)
- Mines (almost non-existent capability)
- Standoff cruise missiles (more needed, ideally stealthy)
- Carriers creating local air superiority for cruise missile attacks (we don't agree on this concept yet, let alone train/optimize it)
- The long supply line and huge distances from the US to Asia are a challenge: Supply ships will need escorts, bases will need hardening and aircraft/ships would benefit from longer endurances
Not much of a role for 40 Marines on jungle islands. Drones could help provide situational awareness for carrier/strike groups without radiating (if done right). A few gun-focused ships could make an impact (shells are cheap), and China has lots of juicy targets with 10nm of the coast, but I don't see how they survive that close.
How's this for a start?
"My reply keeps disappearing"
DeleteYour comments all went into the spam folder. This has been happening to a handful of people recently for no reason that I can discern. I have no control over this other than to keep checking the spam folder as frequently as I can and then moving the comment from spam to active.
In the future, if you post a comment and it doesn't appear, it probably went into spam and it will appear as soon as I check it.
Sorry, but as I said, I have not control and do not see why it's happening. You might check if there's anything unusual at your end that might trigger a spam classification.
Oh no! Any chance you could please delete the duplicates?
DeleteI don't want to clutter your blog. I'll know not to repeat in the future.
Done!
DeleteI've often wondered about a claymore at sea. Whole they can be rigged as mine they are, in Australian use anyway, command detonated. A mk46 Captor doesn't seem to have the goods for a warship, but a command operated mk48 Captor flooding the Taiwan straits would pose a significant problem for China surely?
DeleteAnother thought. Bring back a ww2 doodlebug missile. Really embarrassingly simple tech and cost. As it nears the end of the flight it pops up releasing three small mines which fly different distances, arming once they hit the water. Mass produced and fired en masse at the beginning of hostilities to close Chinese ports thereby slowing the invasion, sucking up a large number of Chinese SAMs and presenting an actual threat.
DeleteSome thing similar to the Manta mine. These could also be deployed by uuv's but dodgy cruise missiles would be far faster.
Delete"I've often wondered about a claymore at sea."
Delete???? Are you referring to their directional characteristic? If you're referring to command detonation, that already exists though it has obvious drawbacks.
"mk48 Captor flooding the Taiwan straits"
Captors have been discontinued and no longer exist although it wouldn't be too hard to produce new ones. That aside, how would Taiwan 'flood' the strait with the mines? The moment China saw them beginning to lay mines, they'd destroy the mine laying platform. How do you see the emplacement working?
My understanding is that you cannot lay sea minefields before the war is begun. The Australian army isn't allowed to use M18 claymores as mines but is fine using them if a human is in the loop - Command detonated. Perhaps you could get around the law on sea mines in a similar fashion?
DeleteMk48 or other similar heavy torpedoes (or perhaps a purpose designed weapon with half the fuel and twice the warhead?) could be deployed in a case and hardwired back to the mainland. At the first sign of hostilities someone kicks them into "live" mode.
"Perhaps you could get around the law on sea mines in a similar fashion?"
DeleteI don't know about the legalities of it but in practical terms, laying mines is an act of war. Do you really think China would stand idly by while Taiwan lays a minefield in the strait? That would trigger the war, without a doubt.
Just a reminder, the bulk of the strait is international waters. The world should not allow anyone to mine international waters, whether command detonated or not.
"They are focused on the equipment rather than the doctrine and tactics to successfully use the equipment."
ReplyDeleteFor past two decades, Pentagon focused on fighting regional powers and terrorist groups. Only recently, China has become their main focus. They need to spend time to think what to do on doctrine and tactics face China. For instance, now to support land invasion, Navy may have to break a strong fleet in front of them.
Last week's Zhuhai Air Show is a major weapon show held by China to promote their defense gears for international market. Except few only for display (such as J-20), most are for sale. It covers not just air powers but also land (tanks, etc.) and sea (drone boat, etc.). You can Google the web to find details.
From weapons displayed, people can guess what China thinks about next war.
There were many types of drones been displayed for sale, too many for me to describe them here. PLA doesn't equip all of them. Many are pushed for international markets because they were failed in bidding with PLA.
Bottom line - in Chinese military's thinking, drones (air, land, sea, underwater) play very important roles in future war.
You're simply stating well know, basic, obvious bits of information. I expect better. Please provide some insight or analysis to further the discussion.
Delete"My point is that Pentagon and military schools in the nation need to think through what next wars would be. "
DeleteYou're just repeating the post. Tell me something new.
To attack China, Navy needs first to attack Chinese fleets blocking its next actions (firing cruise missiles, etc.). One possible way is saturated missile attacks to overwhelm Chinese fleets' defense. This means fire many upon many missiles from different positions. On the other hand, Navy needs to defend Chinese missiles' saturate attacks as Chinese has and continues developing long range missiles. Its massive industry capability means it will have many long range precision missiles coupling with its wireless network capabilities (this is how US tries to kill Huawei).
DeleteFor quite some time down the road, China would not be stupid enough to send their fleets to mid Pacific to fight but would fight around the first island chain so they can get supports from land based weapons while their carrier based aircrafts, ships, submarines can launch saturated missile attacks.
"There is clearly NO ONE in charge"
ReplyDeleteComment deleted. This is not a political blog. Generalized rants, while possibly therapeutic, are not productive.
Since tanks are the example, I invite the curious to read my detailed "The Tank is Dead" something army tankers find appalling. Armored vehicles are not dead, but massive 75 ton, $20 million tanks that just fire a big gun are dead. Here's the article:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.g2mil.com/Anti-armor.htm
I will say whatever armor gets used is better serving us by being able to fit on an A400, C2, and 2 on a C-17. Same way up the numbers that could ride an SSC or MSVL to 2. 3 on an LCU-1700 and C-5. Also, close to actual road weights around the world.
DeleteAs a French guy I agree with what you said about French tanks and the mistakes made by the French high command about how to use them and I would like to add some comments that are relevant to the situation you are very often talking about.
ReplyDeleteThe French tanks were quite good, the B1 and the S35 were even used by the Germans to a limited extent later but they had major flaws : they needed very well trained crews (especially the B1) which is not always possible in a conscript army. They also needed (for the B1) a lot of fuel and the logistics of the French army were not up to it, which is a bit surprising because historically Napoleon is the one who invented the logistics branch in the army, so there was some existing expertise available.
But there are two other points that were at least as important as the ones you mentioned in the defeat :
- The B1 tank was very sophisticated and therefore difficult to maintain and operate. This a failure that seems to be shared by a lot of current weapon systems (F 35 anyone ?) and this is worrying.
- The French general staff was told multiple times that the Germans were coming via the Ardennes, the air force and the troops on the ground there found this out and reported the facts correctly but the high level command stuck with the idea that it was impossible for heavy armour to pass through there, dismissed the information and carried on with their plan to stop the Germans in Belgium. This ties uncomfortably with today's emphasis on information dominance : what's the point of the grunt on the front line telling the truth if the generals don't believe him ? People are wedded more faithfully to their (preconceived) ideas than they are to their spouse and information dominance won't change this.
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