The Navy’s concept of distributed lethality envisions individual, or very small groups, of ships operating on their own, deep inside enemy waters, confounding the enemy’s operational and strategic thinking and paralyzing the enemy with indecision while our ships operate with impunity, springing forth to rain death and destruction on the hapless enemy and then vanishing from sight and sensor to do it all again.
So, let’s recall the historical precedents of ships operating alone or in small groups in enemy waters.
- Force Z (Repulse, Prince of Wales)
- Bismarck
- Graf Spee
- Pueblo
- Asiatic Fleet
- General Belgrano
And the list goes on. I’m not going to describe the outcome of each case. You can investigate them on your own if you’re not already thoroughly familiar with them. Suffice it to say that each ship(s) led a very short, ineffectual life. In fact, I can’t, offhand, think of a single example of a ship successfully operating alone in enemy waters and having any significant impact. There may be one but the successes are extremely few, if any.
The US Navy is in the process of building a future fleet based on distributed lethality? Why do we think that will work when the totality of history demonstrates otherwise?
The military leaders who couldn’t win in Afghanistan after two decades are the ones changing our fleet structure and we’re supposed to believe that they know what they’re doing?
Didn't small groups or even single subs operating in the South China Sea and adjacent areas cripple the Japanese economy in the early 40's, to the point that the Imperial Navy was stuck in port due to a lack of fuel?
ReplyDeleteWe're talking about surface ships, as in the Navy's distributed lethality concept.
DeleteWWI, Imperial German merchant raiders.
ReplyDeleteSMS Wolf, 14 ships sunk or taken as prizes and 13 sunk by mines laid by the Wolf.
SMS Mowe, captured or sank 40 ships, laid mines which accounted for two more ships and a capital warship.
While interesting, those examples are not really applicable or relevant as examples of distributed lethality. Tell me why not.
Delete(Don McCollor)...I believe that there is something about the advantages of concentration of force in the military literature (along with he who tries to defend everything can defend nothing). WW2 submarines were kind of an exception. At first, the US had lone patrols because there was nothing else...
ReplyDeleteI did not discuss submarines because the Navy's distributed lethality concept involves only surface ships.
DeleteQuick note on submarines.
DeleteThe Japanese, for the most part, did not do convoys. Distributed lethality works well with distributed targets.
The germans however, had to concentrate more and more submarines into attacks in order to launch successful attacks on convoys.
I don't think this is original, but I believe the only hope for this type of policy is if we really do develop a ubiquitous, all-encompassing, high bandwidth network connecting all these ships which is also invulnerable to jamming and other forms of compromise.
ReplyDeleteThat might allow a concentration of effects even if the ships themselves are not concentrated.
I do agree with CNO that it is "optimistic" to assume that this will happen.
Oh, almost forgot. The network also has to be "stealthy", so that the emissions cannot be tracked to source !!
ReplyDeleteThis!!
DeleteThough obviously you could have a lot of fun setting up spoof transmitters as part of the distributed lethality network which could significantly compromise the enemy's ability to use communication to target individual nodes.
What I want to know is how all this stuff works when the bad guys start jamming, and what we have done to test that.
ReplyDeleteJamming is just one method for attacking the network. False signal injection, cyber attacks, physical destruction, etc. will also occur. The cyber vulnerabilities, in particular, described in the DOT&E reports make for grim reading.
DeleteOne of the worrisome aspects of the modern radars is their ability to act as communications - both sending AND RECEIVING - nodes. If it can receive, it can be cyber attacked. Our vaunted radars are open doors to the network. There is no 'air gap' when the system is designed to accept incoming signals.
Bingo Mr CNO!
DeleteAny antenna connected to a network is as much a security threat as a fiber optic or telephone line.
Our neglect of security is criminal.
Where do you source the DTO&E reports. The stuff I could find on their pages was pretty generic.
DeleteI start to see where this was just a surface community search for relevance and leadership trying to deal with the fact the world needs resources in more places than an ESG/CSG are designed to support and they really had no new vision to execute. Other than basic missiles on LCS they did nothing to actually realize "If it floats, it fights." Actual distributed lethality as best practiced today seems to be China and Russia. Russia can put the Tomahawk launch capability on small diesel subs and corvettes of only 800 tonnes. All heavily armed and can get the target data from other distributed platforms and sensors. China actually has their type 56 to run down subs. Manned, but cheap, numerous, sonars in water, helos can embark when the hunt is on. If we enacted similar concepts they would be unique for our needs, but there is a path. No reason the sonar needs to be where the ballistic missile defense radar is. No reason for the shooter and the sensor to be in the exact same place either. LOS might be more relevant.
ReplyDeleteWhat an interesting comment.
DeleteJust a slight quibble … Distributed lethality, AS THE NAVY DEFINES IT, is strictly an offensive, forward deployed doctrine - think the WWII PT boat concept on stupid steroids. You've adapted and broadened it to what you think would be a more reasonable concept such as defensive ASW.
"but there is a path"
This is the really fascinating part of your comment. You're suggesting that there is a viable, effective distributed lethality concept for the US Navy. You've read the post and seen all the historical examples where the Navy's version of DL has failed repeatedly. With that menacing historical reminder firmly in mind, what do you see as a viable DL concept? What kind of vessels? How/where deployed? TARGETING source? How to provide forward logistical support in contested waters? And so on.
I really am intrigued by this so please expand on your thought!
"LOS might be more relevant."
Of course, this violates the Navy's vision of individual ships, widely dispersed. Still … as part of your concept it would be fascinating to see how you tie it in. LOS also means more vessels in a given area and more vessels means a greater likelihood of detection. It also requires more communications and that also increases the risk of detection.
"type 56"
A better example of Chinese DL might be the Type 022 missile boats: small, expendable, lethal, numerous.
The Swedes(?) have a 120mm gun in a 20ft container, agm88er can be fired from a 20ft container, various cruise missiles, ciws and assorted other weapons could be similarly mounted. This could have some interesting applications for vessels like the Arafura OPV.
DeleteWhat ship will be the first lost to China, while operating alone or in a widely spaced out duo?
ReplyDeleteI think most people will say a Burke, but I think it will be a Puller arrested by a Chinese Coast Guard ship.
I like that pick in that its not too sensitive and offers a chance to save face. They might be thinking LCS, but that would invite us waking up and getting our act together. Getting a sub to surface and nab would be the technically challenging option. It would also likely be picking war.
DeleteOn the day a conflict starts, my bet is that the Chinese use the Japanese WWII playbook, and wait for an opportunity for a Pearl Harbor II. So Ill bet on a CVN as a first loss, at least mission killed. The political ramifications may or may not preclude it happening in a Japanese port, but either way, the forward deployed carrier, although not a huge threat on its own, will probably be their priority target. By watching open source deployment and location data, they can choose a time when any other groups are furthest away, buying them the most time to consolidate whatever moves (like Taiwan) they make...
Delete"opportunity for a Pearl Harbor II. So Ill bet on a CVN as a first loss"
DeletePossibly, however, there are many more targets that would cripple our war effort far more than the loss of a single carrier. As you recall, one of the major failures of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was their failure to hit the fuel storage facilities which would have crippled the US fleet regardless of whether any ships were sunk. Similarly, destroying our precious few drydocks or large cranes would cripple our repair and construction capabilities for decades. I posted on this:
The Next Pearl Harbor
Oh absolutely!!! Thing is when I look at possible scenarios for the conflict, I usually envision the Chinese going about it wisely. As such, they'd want to get it over as rapidly as possible in order to normalize commerce and trade again, including with the US. I think they're very aware of the consequences of enraging the American population, and might limit attacks to Guam, otherwise containing the conflict to the China and Philippine Seas. Strikes on Hawaii or the mainland are a whole other level, and not somthing Joe Citizen would let slide without screaming for blood. Of course thats all moot since the "sleeping giant" cant be rewoke, and/or if we literally cant defeat them. And, I could be way off here, and they just wouldnt give a damn. But I completely envision them waiting for a Pearl Harbor opportunity, albeit one that is minimally inflaming. My hypothesis last year of an EMP attack that mission kills a CVBG with zero casualties is a good hypothetical example.
DeleteHistory says that DL and EABO are nothing more than plans to write glorious, sacrificial stories about ships, sailors, and Marines in the future. Think Wake Island, with the Bismarck being the attatched naval component!!
ReplyDeleteInitially, I did consider German commerce raiders (of both WW) as counterpoints to the post, but with further thought, they dont offer an accurate comparison, as they were highly mobile, not truly operating in "enemy dominated" areas per se (or limited in their area of operation), and most of them were as well armed and capable as their contemporary enemies.
"not truly operating in "enemy dominated" areas"
DeleteYou got it! That's why they aren't applicable to the Navy's vision of DL. The Navy envisions the DL ships operating forward in enemy controlled waters. Commerce raiders were scattered around the world, far from enemy controlled waters. Further, the Navy envisions DL ships being used to engage enemy warships, not merchant ships (though I'm sure they'd gladly take one if it came along).
Navy admirals have publicly and literally stated that the LCS as a DL asset is today's PT boat. I've documented this in posts.
"The Navy envisions the DL ships operating forward in enemy controlled waters."
DeleteAnd this right here... Maybe Im misinformed, but I always thought the Navy, and its reason for existence, was to shrink/eliminate "enemy controlled waters"!!! (Not skulk around in target-sized units within them!!)
"shrink/eliminate "enemy controlled waters"!!! (Not skulk around in target-sized units within them!"
DeleteThis is one of the fundamental problems with the Navy concept. You're describing a 'rollback' war where we gradually eliminate enemy holdings. This is how you win a war. The Navy, on the other hand, is limited to a war of annoyance, at best. A handful of DL ships 'skulking' around enemy waters CAN'T WIN A WAR (consider the PT boat example). The most they can do is provide a minor annoyance for the enemy.
It's the difference between having a vision to win a war versus having a vision to just participate in a war but not in any serious way (trying not to lose a war). The Navy has no strategy for winning a war - just bits of disconnected concepts.
Do you want to win or just try not to lose? The Navy has opted for trying not to lose and even that probably gives them too much credit. The Navy's actual focus is current budget battles not future war battles. They just don't see war with China as being a realistic possibility. This is denial of reality to the maximum degree.
I strongly agree with "just bits of disconnected concepts".
DeleteThe US military has a long history of advocating "a strategy of tactics". They come up with some nifty idea at the tactical level/platform level, and it then becomes the "strategy". Tank destroyers in WW2 are an excellent example. LCS would be a good example for the Navy.
The other tell for this sort of thinking is the assumption that combat will work in a predictable way and that the enemy will not adapt to our tactics.
Our strategy should be to practice defeating ourselves constantly and getting so good we fail every time.
Delete"Our strategy should be to practice defeating ourselves"
DeleteI understand what you're saying but, of course, that's not desirable in the long run since we would never fight ourselves. Just as Top Gun had a cadre of instructor pilots and technicians who studied ENEMY tactics and taught students how to defeat the ENEMY, so too, we must practice defeating the enemy not ourselves. We need a ship/sub Top Gun who lives, breathes, and studies the enemy weapons, sensors, doctrine, and tactics 24/7 and then teaches us how to defeat them.
The Navy has, from time to time, claimed to have a ship equivalent to Top Gun but it is not even remotely like what I've described and what the aircraft Top Gun originally was. As with all Navy attempts, it is a pale imitation of the original, if even that.
We need a standing ship OpFor - wouldn't those carriers we just sold for scrap and the various ships that we've retired early be great for that?! - that is trained in enemy tactics and that we can exercise against.
"the enemy weapons, sensors, doctrine, and tactics"
DeleteI think that's a MASSIVE hole in US military knowledge.
Why is there no discussion of Chinese doctrine/tactics/etc.?
Do they expect China to just sit still and do nothing? (Yes.)
"Do they expect China to just sit still and do nothing? (Yes.)"
DeleteYou're posing a rhetorical, sarcastic question but the answer really is 'yes', just as you've indicated. Over and over I've demonstrated how our military's/Navy's various schemes REQUIRE the enemy to take no action in order to be successful. As just one example, our belief that we can fly large UAVs over a battlefield and not have them shot down in seconds is pure fantasy! And the list goes on and on.
"Distributed lethality" in my mind is attack submarines torpedoing the enemy's merchant fleet around the globe. That is just me.
ReplyDeleteApparently the USN definition of dist-lethal,
Deleteis USN attackers are able to achieve time on target, yet far enough apart to preclude mutual defence.
The USN seems to be unaware of the the land warfare
concept "defeat in detail".
Does the USS Sims qualify for your list What about Taffy 3?
ReplyDeleteI think they're throwing the baby out with the bath water.
ReplyDeleteDistributed lethality has role in terms of supporting ops in peripheral combat zones - eg merchant raiders whose modus operandi is same as submarines ie stealth.
But I don't think it has a role in the major operational areas where the enemy will have high density forces.
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ReplyDelete* "Therefore, advanced nations, include US, no longer concentrate tanks together."
Delete* "It is sensible to split fleets into small groups."
Have to disagree with both points. What were the Soviets planned methods, and the NATO defense?? Armor. Lots of it. And not dispersed. Just because that particular threat has died off, doesnt mean that the offensive and defensive tactics and formations arent valid. Large armor formations arent necessarily any more vulnerable to a peer opponent then they were back when the Fulda Gap was a focus... And having said that, the same applies at sea. Forces piecemeal deployed alone or thinly, will be destroyed, well...piecemeal. The strength in numbers adage isnt dead. Larger groups can not only conduct stronger offensive operations, but will inherently have a stronger defense. These tiny DL forces DONT have "lethal firepower" by any stretch, amd will honestly be lucky to defend themselves.
"Distributed Lethality" means fire power delivered from different locations to the same target."
Pretty sure thats not the case. It would be self contradicting and pointless if that was the case...