The US military is betting its future on intelligence: networks, data, artificial intelligence, and so on. Our omniscient intel and situational awareness will overcome the enemy’s superior firepower and numbers. Data will rule the battlefield. We’ll be adroitly maneuvering through the multi-domains while the enemy cowers, stunned and confused, in the corner wondering what’s happening.
On a seemingly unrelated note, here’s Gen. Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on the near instantaneous collapse of the Afghan government and military,
There was nothing that I or anyone else saw that indicated a collapse of this army and this government in eleven days. (1)
Wait a minute! Gen. Milley, you had total total information dominance in Afghanistan and you had no inkling that this was coming? You had networks, people on the ground, data being crunched by computers, UAV overflights, total sensor awareness, and joint all-domain dominance. In short, you had the perfect information dominance situation that you say we need to ensure future military dominance and yet you got fooled by armed rabble?
And you want to base our entire military future on more of the same?
Are you an idiot or are you being paid by some foreign government to sabotage our military?
We just discussed this and proved that information dominance does NOT ensure victory (see, “Information Dominance – Proof of Failure”) and this is yet another proof of failure of the concept … but we’re going to continue down this path as our foundation for future war? There is not a single example of information dominance winning a war and many examples of losing wars despite having information dominance and yet we’re going to continue down this path?
Note: Feel free to comment but we are not going to discuss the politics of Afghanistan.
______________________________________
(1)Red State website, “Mark Milley Afghanistan Press Conference Had the Qualities of a James Bond Martini”, steiff, 18-Aug-2021,
I think you nailed it on this one. Plus all this information dominance stuff is still focused on the hammer striking nails and no further. There is no future where you can separate the fiting from every other aspect of intelligence and soft power that eaither lead or don't lead to a kenetic aspect of war. That's all that blowing stuff up actually is. One aspect of war. An important one, but only part. This Afghan situation is just another example. The failed result starts anew every time we fail to teach these lessons from birth and don't lavish our children with what is needed to become critical thinkers.
ReplyDeleteThe General said he didn't hear anything that said the Afghan Army was going to collapse in eleven days. I take him at his word. I suspect his information was that it would take at least fourteen or twenty-one days.
ReplyDelete" I take him at his word."
DeleteI have no reason to believe he's lying. I take him at his word, as well. The point is that all our vaunted multi-domain, networked, integrated sensor, information dominance utterly failed to provide an accurate picture for the General. It likely provided that failed picture at computer enhanced, light-speed which allowed us to operate inside the Taliban's OODA loop … … except that our information was dead wrong and, therefore, our lightning fast decision making was dead wrong. Garbage in, garbage out.
The fantasy of omniscient, information dominance is just mental masturbation (pardon the crudity but it aptly describes the military mindset) to make us feel good while the Chinese build overwhelming firepower.
Illustrating the point, the defenders of Crete in the Second World War had something pretty close to information dominance, as well. Foreknowledge of the assault date and formations involved were no substitute for fighting spirit and the proper disposition of firepower.
ReplyDeleteJohn Keegan's Intelligence in War should be required reading on this topic. It's a series of case studies that demonstrate that good intelligence is often necessary but never sufficient for victory on the battlefield.
The current obsessions of "Information Dominance" and "Reduced Manning or Unmanned Ships" remind me of the French obsession with the Maginot Line before WWII. At some point, the idea becomes so important that the organization doesn't allow dissent or criticism of it. It was even the French Colonel Charles De Gaulle who wrote a book proposing the modern armored brigade 1934, but the his own army didn't accept the idea because it contradicted their static defense dogma. He did find a receptive audience in the German army, who bought hundreds of copies. Sometimes it takes the battlefield to settle these debates. I hope that's not the case with us.
ReplyDelete"Sometimes it takes the battlefield to settle these debates. I hope that's not the case with us."
DeleteThe really frustrating - and frankly, baffling - part is that the battlefield has already settled the debate with example after example of intel/information failing to win wars. There is no debate left and yet the US military is ignoring the proof of history in its quest for easy victory rather than brutally hard work.
It seems the info-dom system doesn't have a Morale O' Meter. The Corsican Ogre said “In war, the moral is to the physical as ten to one.”
DeleteIf your guys won't fight, it doesn't matter how much firepower they have.
Quick question: What good does 'Information Dominance' do if there is no 'will' to fight?
ReplyDeleteI am refering to this:
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-position-taiwan-unchanged-despite-biden-comment-official-2021-08-19/
And this: "Why the US will abandon island of Taiwan eventually" https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202108/1231877.shtml
We had "informational dominance" in WW2 in the form of having broken the enemy codes. Having broken the Japanese codes did not prevent Pear Harbor and breaking the German Enigma machines did not prevent us from being taken surprise by the Ardennes Offensive (the Bulge). In Vietnam we had seismic sensors, SIGINT, Recon aircraft, SOG teams behind lines, and all kinds of intel.
ReplyDeleteIt is not ACESS to information that grants victory. It is JUDGEMENT on how to interpret the information you have.
Our challenge is not Informational Dominance. Our challenge is sound judgement.
It is not information
(Don McCollor)...A withdrawal (retreat) is the most difficult military maneuver to carry out (without it turning into a rout). Forget intel estimates and rely on gut feeling. Plan for the worst, and hope for anything better...
ReplyDeleteOf course, the easiest way to avoid a rout is to eliminate the enemy prior to withdrawing. We not only did not do so but we never seriously attempted to (allowing the Taliban safe haven in Pakistan, for example).
Delete"Our omniscient intel and situational awareness will overcome the enemy’s superior firepower and numbers"
ReplyDeleteIs that really how "the US military" envisions information dominance will work? As a substitute for firepower? Obviously not, sensors and data are meant to be complementary to firepower. So the real question is surely not the false equivalency that is suggested (exaggerated or not), but whether we are focusing too much of our resources on acquiring information dominance as opposed to firepower. And that leads me to the following:
A) Simply coming up with examples where information dominance/investments in sensors & data failed doesn't tell us anything of the what the right mix between firepower and information investment should be. I could come up with plenty of examples where firepower failed too (e.g. we targeted the wrong place), but that doesn't tell us that firepower is useless! What we need is some sort of careful cost/benefit analysis.
B) The example you gave (Afghanistan) was of a strategic intelligence failure. But the instances of information technology that you mentioned seemed to be more tactical in nature. So it wouldn't make sense to use the example of our information technology failing at a strategic level, as somehow indicative of a potential failure at the tactical level.
In other words, just because we poorly understood the morale of the Afghan army doesn't mean that advanced sensors are not worthwhile investments for the battlefield.
"Is that really how "the US military" envisions information dominance will work?"
DeleteYes. It is. Read statement after statement from military leaders and … yes … that's exactly what they believe.
" Obviously not, sensors and data are meant to be complementary to firepower."
That may be your vision (and it might be mine, too!) but, again, it's not the military's.
"false equivalency that is suggested"
It's not a false equivalency, it's what the military believes. Before you bother to pound out a reply, do some deep digging on the Third Offset Strategy (you can start with the blog archives). It is pure networks, data, and AI. It is NOT about firepower.
If the Third Offset Strategy is valid (and it's not!) then I should not be able to cite example after example of information dominance while losing a war and yet I can. History is quite clear that information dominance is NOT the foundation for victory. Unfortunately, our military leaders are basing our entire future on exactly that while largely ignoring firepower. You may agree or disagree and think the idea is right or wrong but there's no denying that information dominance is what our military is betting 'all in' on despite the examples of history that disprove the concept.
"doesn't mean that advanced sensors are not worthwhile investments for the battlefield."
Did someone say that sensors are not a worthwhile investment for the battlefield? If so, they're an idiot.
We are blurring a few claims here. There is a difference between:
DeleteA) We don't need any firepower to win wars; information is sufficient
B) We don't need to make much (if any) advances in firepower; we should concentrate our future investments solely in securing an information dominance gap while retaining (and maybe even doing away with some) present firepower
C) Achieving information dominance is the best way to implement an offset (create a gap) between our military and our peer competitors like China and Russia
D) We should invest in information dominance technologies (like AI, networks, etc...)
I hope we can agree that A is clearly not true; if that were the case the US military would disband all weapon systems, and we would be equipping our infantry with telescopes instead of rifles.
It seems to me you are trying to claim that the US military leadership believes in B, and is trying to proactively implement B. That's how I interpret this, "our military leaders are basing our entire future on exactly that (information) while largely ignoring firepower."
I think that the US military leadership clearly believes in D (as they should), and largely adheres to C. I interpret strategies like the third offset to be mainly about C; that, after all, is what "offset" means. It doesn't mean we shouldn't be investing in or upgrading firepower, which the military is actively doing with things like hypersonics etc...
By the way, the second offset towards the end of the cold war was mainly about precision guided munitions. But just because the US military invested heavily in such an area does not imply that they neglected others, and the same holds true with the third offset.
I took a brief look through some of your posts and couldn't find anything that would suggest otherwise. But this actually wasn't my main point; I'm not here to defend the position that the US military isn't trying to enact the ethos of premise B.
Instead, I was actually pointing out that your argument in the above post, and the accompanying post that was tagged in it (Information dominance- Proof of failure) does not in any way refute B, even if B were a true representation of the US military viewpoint.
The examples of failures only refutes A. If, for instance, I need ammo to shoot my gun, and I'm steadily running out of bullets while engaged in a firefight, it follows that I should "invest" heavily in getting bullets for my gun. Bullets are so vital that I should maybe do so even at the expense of much of everything else. Coming up with examples where I was in a firefight with a gun and still lost does not refute the above.
Like I said, we need to make a careful cost/benefit analysis as to the right balance of future investment in information technology vs. firepower.
"I interpret strategies like the third offset to be mainly about C; that, after all, is what "offset" means."
DeleteI - and history! - have demonstrated conclusively that your option 'C' is invalid. That is the point of my post(s). Trying to establish an offset (I've also posted that there is no such thing as an offset in any practical sense) based on a fundamentally incorrect and flawed premise is insane and yet that's exactly what we're trying to do.
"I hope we can agree that A is clearly not true;"
Your 'A' is not what the military is attempting to implement but they are somewhat leaning in that direction. The Marines have dropped all tanks, greatly reduced artillery, dropped some mortars, etc. The Army has emphasized JLTVs as the battlefield vehicle instead of APCs. The Navy is eliminating large, powerful vessels in favor of small, individually weak, unmanned vessels. And so on. In other words, the US military is consciously reducing its firepower. That's not option A but it's leaning in that direction! The US military is assuming that information will compensate for reduced firepower and, again, I and history have proven the fallacy of that approach.
I would hope that you've read the various posts clearly enough to understand that I'm not saying there is no place for battlefield intelligence. Of course there is! HOWEVER, information is a SUPPLEMENT to firepower not a SUBSTITUTE for it and the US military is currently on a path of substituting information for firepower and that is insanity.
"The Marines have dropped all tanks, greatly reduced artillery, dropped some mortars, etc"
DeleteThis doesn't seem to me such a great example. It seems the recent philosophical transformation that has gripped the marine corps is more about replacing one kind of firepower with another. Yes they are abandoning all those things, but they are also planning to invest in other kind of more mobile forms of firepower, like NSM's, tomahawks etc...
"information is a SUPPLEMENT to firepower not a SUBSTITUTE for it and the US military is currently on a path of substituting information"
I think that statement sounds nice but isn't really a meaningful refutation of the current military doctrine/third offset. Unless you're trying to argue that the US military really plans on abandoning ALL firepower and transform itself into the peace corps.
Otherwise it will always be true that we are going to have to make some sacrifices in firepower to invest in information technology.
"I'm not saying there is no place for battlefield intelligence"
Whatever degree of resources you think should be proportionally invested in information vs firepower (let's call it I/F); we can always imagine a military that has invested even more disproportionately in firepower at the expense of I. That hypothetical military, by your own definition of I/F (whatever you think it is) being the optimum ratio, should abandon some investment in firepower in exchange for information technology.
And that's why statements like "the US military is currently on a path of substituting information for firepower" are meaningless outside of the proper context.
So it seems like you are making two arguments here, one being against C and another against some extreme version of B where the military is dropping a lot of firepower in favour of information technology.
I disagree about the extent of the latter, I think a lot of your predictions about what the Navy is planning and focusing on are a bit off the mark and basically assumes the worst possible scenario.
But all of that is neither here nor there. What I have been trying to say all along is this: To argue against that (extreme case of) B you would need to show that the military has the investment ratio between I/F all wrong (too much I). Simply saying that we shouldn't substitute information for firepower doesn't show that and really means nothing in this context.
Also, using examples like intelligence failures in Afghanistan to argue against the third offset strategy (C) working against China and Russia is not enough. Like I said, just because,
1) X failed a bunch of times, doesn't mean that X isn't the best strategy to adopt. Maybe I failed to shoot people while in a firefight a bunch of times, but it doesn't follow that me using a gun is not a good (or the best) strategy!
2) The specific example of Afghanistan is rather disanalogous (as I pointed out in the strategic vs tactical picture). Just because information dominance was mostly useless in Afghanistan doesn't mean it's not the most important offset for China and Russia. Anymore than showing that our nuclear fast attack submarines were useless in the Afghanistan conflict would demonstrate the same for China and Russia.
I have no doubt that you may have written extensively on this topic and have other (better) arguments against such strategies; my point is that what you have written in your posts seems woefully insufficient.
"I think a lot of your predictions about what the Navy is planning and focusing on are a bit off the mark and basically assumes the worst possible scenario."
DeleteYou can certainly entertain a different view but everything I've seen is slowly but steadily confirming my view. We've reduced carrier air wings in size and cut the number of wings to 9. We're trying to retire our most powerful ships and replace them with individually weak unmanned vessels. We've reduced both the number of SSBNs and the number of missiles they carry. We've almost completely abandoned MCM. Our ASW is woefully lacking. I can go on listing the reductions in firepower all night. At the same time, we're investing in all manner of network related information technology. My contention is quite well supported. You may wish it was a different situation but the reality is what it is. I'm quite comfortable that I've adequately proven my contention. Feel free to have the last word, if you wish.
Hey,
DeleteI certainly agree that we are reducing firepower in many areas. I just disagree with you on the full extent of this collapse of firepower.
"You can certainly entertain a different view but everything I've seen is slowly but steadily confirming my view"
That wasn't actually my main point; which was about your argument against the information dominance approach being a bad idea.
Here in the comments you've mostly been pointing out why you think the US military IS implementing such a drastic approach. Whereas your main post was mostly about WHY implementing this approach is a bad idea.
The main thrust of my above comments was against that contention, because I don't think the arguments in your post (and your other post which is linked) adequately refute that contention. The stuff you quoted was just a small side discussion.
Good day.
"I just disagree with you on the full extent of this collapse of firepower."
DeleteIn other words, not every statement I've seen you've made is just a statement of fact (that we all agree on) like those in your last comment. I've also seen you write things like "the navy is planning on abandoning all future large surface combatants (!) in favour of small unmanned vessels". That's what I meant by your basically assuming the worst case scenario. Anyways, like I said that's a discussion for another topic.
For the case, problem is not information but analysts who analyze information made wrong judgement.
ReplyDeleteThis has in my opinion nothing to do with data. It has been clear that the afgan security forces would be able to fight the Talibans without active foreign support. The writing was on the wall since at least January and out for everyone to see.
ReplyDeleteThe problem is that the reality on the ground was in conflict with the narrative supported by the White House and the Pentagon. So it seems tht it was decided to ignore reality in favour of the political narrative.
There is little point in the work of a lot of analysts, intelligence fusion, information dominance and others when leaders and their cronies decide to ignore the data because it doesn'fit the political agenda.
Information is always important. Problems arise when information is not used or misused either do to problems along the way or it is willingly ignored.
"Problems arise when information is not used or misused either do to problems along the way or it is willingly ignored. "
DeleteYou are so close to understanding the problem! You are correct that information will ALWAYS be misinterpreted, at best, or willfully ignored, at worst. That being the case, why would any sane person build an entire military based on information dominance as the route to victory? That's insanity! We're building our military on a foundation that is GUARANTEED (by your own statement … which I happen to agree with) to fail. Is that sane?
Information dominance is insane. It's been sold as a war winning asset to politicians. It appears that with it wars could be won without firing a shot and without losses.
DeleteThis is clearly insane, I don't see information pulling triggers or fighting battles. But still it appeals to elected officials that are happy to give funding to a concept that creates the illusion that not one of their constituents will ever again come home in a box.
Information is always important as PART of every decision making process. Information forms the basis for decision making together with many other factors. The decisions adopted in the process lead to acts. The outcome of those acts is new information that will form the basis for a new decision making. It's the start and the outcome.
But information will never be the act itself with 2 exceptions:
1. It's all printed in hardcopy and dropped on someones head killing by sheer weight.
2. It's compiled together in a nice deadly power point to kill our on forces.
Information can be divided in the following blocks:
- gathering
- filtering and analysing
- distribution
- reevaluation
Information gathering has taken on a massive scale especially on the ELINT and cyber front which brings in an incalculable amount of data, probably too much.
The hardest part remains filtering and analyzing, that means throwing out the garbage and putting together a coherent analysis to pass on for the decision making.
This phase bears the greatest risk, mainly by institutional factors. Too often decision makers dictate a desired outcome from analysis ('give me something i can use') which renders the filtering process blind to other relevant data which could have a real impact on the global analysis of the specified issue. In other cases analyst will omit data, which they consider relevant because they now from experience that the decision makers can be very unpleasant when the outcome of the analysis is not what they wanted.
I'll make an example: something happens and there could be primarilly to types of requests by the decision makers:
1. Find the responibles!
2. Try to pin it on someone!
The first approach will bring a more rational analysis, while the second one will be much more biased corrupting the eventual analysis. A broad approach will work with much more data to create a more complex but more belivable analysis. A narrow and biased approach if possibile will create the desired outcome, but in this case they could hire some creative writers, ignoring a large amount of information that doesn't fit the request. It creates mainly headlines down the line.
The next hurdle can be distribution. Who should recieve which data and for what usage? Many important informations can be lost here, as they simply they don't reach the relevant bodies for fruther analysis and fusion with infomation with other sources. Some will be lost in the sheer amount of information. Biased data will end up in headlines/leaks as it more appealing than nonbiased analysis that has a more realisitic approach and more hypothetical results. The latter kind is so much boring.
The reevaluation should be even more important. Based on the outcome, positive or negative, of the acts acted upon the base information, information should always be reevaluated. Ther could be flaws, there could be information that was considered irrelvant that coupled with the information from the outcome could lead to a much clearer picture.
This phase could lead to a large amount of problems for those who anlyze and decide. For example the act leads to a headline: hut bombed, large number killed, operation succssful. But the hut was not large enough to house said number of people, or the targeted hut was still standing and the neighbouring school/hospital was a large pile of ruble and similar outcomes. Probably in many cases reevaluating the information can cause serious problems for all those involved.
And don't get me started on sources...
While this isnt "firepower vs tech" specific, this is the kind of thing where we see money and tech thrown at somthing for no reason. For at least a hundred years, officers and NCOs have writren watchbills and scheduled their sailors duty. But now, we need a connected widget to help them?? I can't make this up...
ReplyDeleteHeres the title and link to a Stars n Stripes article...
Behold!!
"Navy pilot program uses wearable smart devices in effort to prevent sleep deprivation among sailors"
https://www.stripes.com/branches/navy/2021-08-19/navy-sleep-pilot-program-sailors-fitzgerald-mccain-2607983.html
Seriously??
The fact that we even have somthing called the "Naval Health Research Center", and that we have "human performance and research physiologist"s on the payroll is disturbing to me. Another example of "lets collect data" thats unnecessary and wasteful. Common sense says if we have X watchstanding requirements, and Y sailors, they're working 18 hr days, and nobody's sleeping enough, the ship needs more sailors. Minimal manning be damned.
DeleteI cringe to think how much money is wasted on somthing like this, when it obviously has a simple and common sense issue. But...tech and data!!!
The US military doesn't even do "information dominance", which would at least be useful, it does technology for technology's sake, which is much worse.
ReplyDeleteChina had better information. In late June, China issued warning to all her citizens to leave Afghan:
Deletehttps://ariananews.af/china-urges-its-citizens-to-leave-afghanistan-amid-rising-violence/
In early July, they have organized flights to evacuate citizens:
https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/china-evacuates-citizens-from-afghanistan-as-us-withdraws-troops-1.1625910927694
One error in this approach is that we are using only part of the information that is potentially available. All of our satellites and drones and any other forms of surveillance may be able to tell us what is happening on the ground. But since the mid-1970s we have paid IMO insufficient attention to human intelligence (humint), which tells us what is going on in people's minds. A lot of this is apparently because to get good humint you have to deal with some pretty unsavory characters, and we decided that was somehow beneath us. We clearly missed the ball on 9/11 because we were missing a huge piece of humint. When we basically dismantled our humint in the 1970s, we hung a lot of our resources out to dry, so 30 years later it was hard to develop the necessary credibility to put those networks back together. I am afraid that one bad consequence of the last few days in Afghanistan is that by abandoning our sources, we have again destroyed the credibility needed to establish humint networks. Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me. It may be virtually impossible to restore any significant humint capability in the Mideast for decades.
ReplyDeleteExcellent observation!
DeleteThe problem here is that we select careerists for higher positions. These people have no spine other than to feather their own rise to the top. They will not give bad news, or take a stand that might displease their boss. Furthermore, the ones at the top do not want to be told ANYTHING that might impinge on their view of themselves getting promoted. So did they never hear? Yes because they never listen nor figure out how to cultivate a culture where the truth gets told.
ReplyDeleteWhile I agree completely that it was time to get out, this execution fiasco is what comes of having careerists in charge. I remember General Walt saying we were leaving the South Vietnamese with the ability to defend themselves, and now what is that city called? Saigon oh nope Ho Chi Minh City.
"I understand why Austin can't be fired"
ReplyDeleteComments deleted. Politics and race are outside the scope of this blog.
Thoroughly Modern Milley needs to be fired.
ReplyDeleteOut of a cannon.
Into the sun.
Lutefisk
I'm not sure it can really be said that there was information dominance in Afghanistan, when the 300,000 man figure for the ANSDF was taken at face value; in reality it appears to have been a fraction of that, between 10,000 to 30,000 troops in total. You see Corps that on paper are 20,000 men strong, actually numbering 3,000-4,000 when surrendering to the Taliban. Add in the atrocious supply situation, ghost soldiers, commanders stealing their soldiers' pay, troops in combat with no food and ammo, commanders ordering their forces to surrender*, Kabul's utter disconnect from the reality of the situation on the ground... I would argue that Afghanistan is the opposite example, that there was no information dominance there - especially on the GIRoA side, with Ghani weakening the warlords and ignoring the north, allowing the Taliban an easier time of capturing the country, or the utterly unrealistic killcounts being reported by government propaganda mouthpieces.
ReplyDeleteCredit must be given where credit is due: the Taliban displayed a greater command of operational art than GIRoA forces - as one example, attacking Laskar Gah in Helmand, drawing the full GIRoA focus on an inconsequential provincial capital, and then seizing the now-defenseless, more valuable provincial capital of Zaranj and its border crossing, cutting off supply lines to Kabul and funneling customs fees to the Taliban's warchest.
*It's been alleged by the Afghan resistance that Pakistani and Chinese agents were bankrolling the Taliban in bribing ANA commanders to surrender.
You're conflating information dominance by the US military with some kind of Afg operational and strategic failings. Information dominance by the US military is the total domination of the electromagnetic spectrum, cyber domain, and sensor saturation … exactly what the US military envisions its information and network offset to be! And yet we failed. Information dominance did not produce victory even thought the US military is claiming that's what will ensure victory in future wars. History proves the concept wrong and yet we're still pursuing it.
Delete