Note: Credit for this post goes directly to reader ‘Christo’ who brought this up in a comment on the “High Speed Transport” post.
As we consider the Marine Commandant’s concept of Light Amphibious Warfare (LAW) ships flitting about the Chinese first island chain, we can look to yet another historical example of the concept (see, “High Speed Transport” for a discussion of the US APD). In WWII, the Japanese several times attempted to resupply their forward bases using destroyers as APDs. Some of the APDs were purpose built, the T1 class (1), and others were simply ad hoc destroyers pressed into transport duty.
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| Japanese T1 High Speed Transport |
The point is that they used small, fast vessels to attempt clandestine resupply just as the Marine’s believe they’ll use LAWs to attempt resupply of forward bases. The difference, however, is that the Japanese APDs were fast and well armed. In contrast the Marine’s LAW is small, slow, non-stealthy, and defenseless.
So, how did the Japanese APDs perform?
Guadancanal – The Japanese first attempted to conduct resupply using conventional troop transports but suffered significant losses as the transports were easily spotted and attacked. As a result, they switched to using fast destroyers as troop and cargo transports in an effort dubbed the ‘Tokyo Express’. Troop laden destroyers would conduct night voyages down the Slot to deliver troops. Lacking any cargo handling equipment, the destroyers would often dump barrels of supplies into the ocean where troops on the island would attempt to retrieve them with only marginal success.
The resupply effort was an overall failure and many valuable destroyers were lost in the attempt. Even the successes were pyrrhic in nature since the quantity of troops and cargo delivered did not come anywhere near justifying the ship losses.
US APD vs. Japanese APD
In general, the US APDs enjoyed some success while the Japanese did not even though the ships were functionally identical. Why the difference in outcome?
The US APDs were used for special operations such as raids and were not generally used on a predictable basis or schedule and operated in widespread areas on an almost random basis. In contrast, the Japanese APDs were used in a very predictable manner and in a very localized area where even the ‘eyeball’ sensors of the time were sufficient to detect them. Once detected, individual ships were routinely damaged and destroyed.
Conclusion
Despite the lack of modern sensors and night movement, the Japanese ships were generally spotted and attacked. If fast ships, moving at night, against an enemy with no significant sensors other than eyes could be routinely spotted, how do the Marines believe that the slow, non-stealthy, defenseless LAWs will be able to routinely come and go among the first island chain without being spotted by modern Chinese radar, sonar arrays, EO, IR, air patrols, etc.?
It is important to note the key difference between the US and Japanese APDs and that is their Concept of Operations (CONOPS). As we continually harp on – and the US Navy continually ignores! – a viable CONOPS is the key to ship design and operational success. The Japanese CONOPS had the APDs operating in a fairly confined area on a predictable basis with an absolutely known destination – a recipe for detection and destruction. The US CONOPS used the APDs as almost random raiders in unpredictable locations and at unpredictable times.
Now, let’s consider the Marines intended use of the LAWs. They’re intended to operate in predictable locations (with no due respect to the Marine’s wild claims of thousands of islands to operate from, there are only a relatively few worthwhile and feasible locations for the kinds of bases they want to establish), on regular resupply schedules. Does that sound an awful lot like the Japanese CONOPS? Yes, it does. So, why do the Marines expect a totally different outcome? Same CONOPS … different outcome? That sounds suspiciously close to the definition of insanity (same set of actions and expecting a different outcome)! On top of that, the WWII APDs were heavily armed, for their size, and quite fast. In contrast, the Marine’s LAWs are unarmed and slow.
History is telling us everything we need to know about small, isolated transports but the Marine’s aren’t listening.
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(1)http://www.combinedfleet.com/Dai1Yusokan.htm
CONOPS for the LAW maybe even worse. The equipment they are slated to transport is large, expensive and harder to replace than infantry and some fuel drums. The missile and drone systems also require more supplies to support. The Japanese were banking on being able to support operations on a shoestring. That won't even remotely be possibility for us.
ReplyDeleteThe best response I got when commenting on this on a different site (if I dare call it the best comment!) was that LAW was so small or insignificant that China wouldn't bother hunting them and killing them! That is one strange rational for a weapon system being developed, probably unique in history!
ReplyDeleteAt least at the beginning of LCS, it seemed it has some usefulness, it was only after it was in the water generally felt to be useless, USN and USMC now BUILDING IN uselessness from the start!
Just makes no sense, if the Berger concept hurts the Chinese, hell yes they will hunt these LAWs down and sink them and destroy the bases. There's no fall back plan and little to no defensive capability so its a waste of time. USMC can't stand and fight. If the concept doesn't work because of bad ISR, no targeting, not enough punch,China just bypasses!,etc,then it was a waste of time and money. USMC then is just sitting on a island doing nothing.
Finally, hate the mindset where we believe that China won't bother, why?!? "Just because" shouldn't be a strategy. USA would seem to already have a defensive mindset and giving up the offensive mindset to China before the battle even starts!
As I said before, forget the war games, I fully expect when we get some declassification, this whole boondoggle was being pushed by defense industry....because its just so plain stupid only contractors could really want this.
"when commenting on this on a different site"
DeleteDifferent site???? Well that sounds like a waste of time! :)
I'd like to start with the fact that Chinas amphibious forces are completely mechanized. This means that every company sized marine group landed by the LAWs will be armed mainly with infantry weapons, some light mortars, some antitank systems and large anti ship missiles.
ReplyDeleteThese small units will'probably be nothing more than speedbumps in a serious fight. Due to the large distances in the Pacific and coupled with distributed lethality in many cases this units will have very limited to no external support (fire support, supplies). The concept of leaving no one behind will be dead, in many cases extraction or reinforcement will simply become impossible, abbandoning those forces to their fates.
The LAWs will be very exposed during the whole cruise and will certainly need escorts to give them a chance to reach their targets and unload. And we need to consider that the number of escorts isnt enough to properly protect capital ships.The first action the chinese will take before a formal conflict will be sailing their subs outside the island chains. While in many cases they pose no direct threat to escorts and capital ship they pose a serious threat to shipping and auxilliaries like the LAWs.
As to the predicted cost the LAWs are not expendable, to be expendable they should be very basic and barebone, 10-15ish milion apiece, built to commercial standards (a hit by a missile or bomb would probably break them indipendently from the build standards, considering the amount of ammunition and explosives carried). The number of these ships (24-35) allows to deploy a limited number of company sized elements, buth in the end those forces will pobably be not relevant in a larger conflict. Consider then that as the chinese aren't stupid and they will have a clear idea regarding the deployment areas of the distributed forces(mainly by geography and spying) allowing them to make plans to deny these areas or to take them first. Sabotage by units hiding in the large chinese populations of many asian countries should be a no brainer.
It would render the whole proposed concept moot, the dedicated marine units and the new ships probaly useless.
The fact is that the reform of the USMC lacks a real concept, th same goes for the new ship.
@Grey. Agreed. At 20 to 30 build buy, even if "cheap" money wise, it's really not enough, my guess you would need more than 50 ships to say we could afford to lose some and still fight although you would need a corresponding increase number of ASM launchers and associated gear to also afford to lose some and still fight. As Troy said, USMC concept is a lot more heavy and complicated to move than Japanese WW2 troops and some fuel barrels. We lose a couple of ASM launchers and really the whole concept falls apart, as I said, there's really no fall back plan and other options, without the ASMs, what's the point of Berger concept?!?
DeleteWell considering that the are working with an estimated cost of 100-150 mil a piece, while I think that with gold plating, creature comforts and similar things 200 mil could be a realistic (even if completely unreasonable) price.
DeleteWe'll se but I think a lot of money we'll be wasted without much to show for it and the Marines will be a much reduced and less capable fighting force.
"The concept of leaving no one behind will be dead, in many cases extraction or reinforcement will simply become impossible, abbandoning those forces to their fates."
DeleteIn my opinion, this is the most disturbing FACT of Commandant Berger's concept. If or when the deployment fails- and I think the latter is far more likely, and worse, will occur far sooner than US political and military leaders predict- how will we evacuate the men and equipment we already dumped on those islands?
The recent withdrawal from Afghanistan does NOT inspire confidence, and it's being done while the enemy is REFRAINING from shooting at our transports or otherwise delaying the latter's departure, as they want us gone! The Chinese, on the other hand, may attempt to take prisoners they can then use as hostages to force peace on their terms, meaning our transports WILL be under attack.
@Aim9snake. If I were the Chinese, do my best to knock out the ASM launchers BUT I wouldn't touch the rest of the USMC troops on the island or take them prisoner.Hell no!!! Let the USMC/USN have to rescue them, supply them or leave them there,etc, this is the "Guadalcanal" scenario BUT where we are the JAPANESE stuck on the island and don't know quite what to do and end up losing strength! And the Chinese forces are a lot closer to the USA in WW2 position. They can sit back and pick us off when the US forces get close to the static none stealth position and we end up losing more forces trying to keep that USMC position resupplied or attempt to evacuate.
Delete"this is the "Guadalcanal" scenario"
DeleteA major difference between this and the Guadalcanal scenario for the US is that Guadalcanal was worth fighting for because it was an OFFENSIVE effort. It was an offensive base from which we would launch further offensive efforts. In contrast, the Marine's 'secret' base (it won't be! but, I digress) if purely defensive. It would offer us no point from which to launch offensive strikes or initiate further offensive efforts.
That being the case, is it really worth fighting for and becoming a bottomless pit into which we'd pour resources? I don't think the Marines have thought this through.
"That being the case, is it really worth fighting for and becoming a bottomless pit into which we'd pour resources? I don't think the Marines have thought this through."
DeleteThank you ! This is really what I was alluding to and why I thought the Chinese shouldn't take prisoners and let the USMC keep the island and let US military decide what to do and my guess is our reaction will be to keep and reinforce an island that really has no strategic value and just waste resources the way Japan did over Guadalcanal. Can't think right now of the title but there was a Japanese memoir from a Captain that was part of the resupply team and he asked a few awkward questions and came to the conclusion that the Admirals had no valid military reason to keep fighting for Guadalcanal and were not keeping into account any of the losses, the US troops were there and they just wanted to keep fighting them on Guadalcanal! All military calculations went out the window and I'm afraid that China could very easily put the US military in the same scenario where we reinforce for no reason.
Note, though, that the Japanese DID have a strategic reason to want to keep Guadalcanal or at least deny it to the US. The airfield commanded the region for a few hundred miles around and provided a stepping off point for future US offensive ops so the Japanese did have a valid reason to fight for it. Whether the reason was sufficiently strong, strategically, to warrant the enormous resources the Japanese poured into the campaign is a good question and one I don't have an answer for.
DeleteThe Japanese were going to have to fight for some island, somewhere, at some point if they wanted to keep their Pacific gains and Guadalcanal was the US' weakest effort. Every US operation after that was only going to get stronger as the US industry geared up and the US military gained experience so taking a stand on Guadalcanal might have been their best chance for success, in the Japanese view. Just speculating on my part and none of this invalidates your thought - just adding some additional perspective on Guadalcanal from the Japanese point of view.