The Navy’s mismanagement has hit a new low.
As widely reported and as documented in the Navy’s 2022 budget highlights book, the Navy is requesting funding to build 8 ships for 2022. Assuming a service life of 35 years, a build rate of 8 ships per year equates to a fleet of 280 ships. Given that the Navy has been trumpeting a goal of 355 ships, this is both disappointing and baffling. However, the situation is not even as positive as this sad state of affairs would imply since half of the 8 proposed ships are non-combat. Only 4 warships are proposed. The requested ship list is shown below:
Requested Warships:
- 2x Virginia class submarines
- 1x Burke class destroyer
- 1x Constellation class frigate
Requested Non-Combat Ships:
- 1x John Lewis class fleet replenishment oiler
- 1x ocean surveillance ship
- 2x Navajo class towing, salvage, and rescue ships
So … just 4 warships. A build rate of 4 warships per year equates to a combat fleet of only 140 ships!
In contrast to the 8 proposed new ships, the Navy is proposing to retire 15 ships including 7 cruisers, 4 LCS, and various logistics vessels.(1) In addition, the Navy has announced they’re retiring all 12 of the new Mk VI riverine patrol boats.
ComNavOps has stated that the Navy has finally admitted to itself that the LCS class is a failure and will look to quietly retire the entire LCS fleet as soon as possible. Two LCS (LCS-1 and LCS-2) have already been retired with formal decommissioning dates later this year and now the Navy is proposing to retire 4 more LCS in 2022. The names and service lives of the four are listed below:
USS Coronado (LCS-4, commissioned 2014, service life = 8 yrs)
USS Fort Worth (LCS-3, commissioned 2012, service life = 10 yrs)
USS Detroit (LCS-7, commissioned 2016, service life = 6 yrs)
USS Little Rock (LCS-9, commissioned 2017, service life = 5 yrs)
That would make a total of 6 LCS retired, all well before their 25 year design service life.
If these ships are retired in 2022 as the Navy is proposing, they will be taking early retirement to a whole new level. I fear it’s just a matter of time before a LCS is retired before it’s commissioned!
At a time when our Navy is struggling just to maintain its fleet numbers, let alone increase, the decision to retire 7 Aegis cruisers borders on criminal. We’re early retiring the most powerful ships on the planet while replacing them – to a limited extent – with small, weak unmanned vessels. In what alternate reality is this a good thing?
Navy leadership clearly has no idea what they’re doing. Congress needs to place a moratorium on Navy shipbuilding, shut the Navy down, fire every admiral, and start over.
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(1)Breaking Defense website, “Navy Plans To Cut Ships, But Fleet Plan Remains MIA ”, Paul McLeary, 28-May-2021,
Well, on the plus side, at least they're not buying more LCS's!!
ReplyDelete12 are still in various stages of construction though!.
DeleteIf they want to call the LCS a failure good but stop work on them now and scrap them on the slip ways rather than throwing good money after bad and finishing them first.
Agree here... Admitting a failure and cutting bait is long overdue. Honestly though, between the legal costs of cancelling contracts, and the damage it could do to the already weak shipbuilding industry, I can't imagine anyone standing up and actually proposing it. We've painted ourselved into a corner here...
DeleteBut replacing slated or newly begun LCS construction with FFGs is a thought. We'd probably have to throw out some subsidies/bailout to the LCS yards until the junk is scrapped, the ways are clear, and the new line can spin up, but with the govts massive giveaways lately, its a relative pittance. Trading.production of somthing flawed and worthless for somthing with SOME capability is probably worth the headache...
" damage it could do to the already weak shipbuilding industry,"
DeleteI'll offer you a bit different perspective on this. Neither Lockheed nor Austal had built a warship before and Austal had not built vessels in the US so they were not part of our shipbuilding industry. Their lack of experience was graphically demonstrated with very poor designs (to be fair, the Navy contributed much of the poor design ideas!). That said, it is a very debatable point that LM and Austal are actually an EFFECTIVE part of our shipbuilding industry. I would argue that they are not, not even a little bit. They've produced unmitigated disasters - arguably the worst class of ships since pre-WWII (again, not entirely their fault). Is this the type of industry that we want to prop up and hold on to?
I would say that this is a case of letting industrial Darwinism take its course and allowing LM and Austal shipbuilding to die a well deserved death.
"We'd probably have to throw out some subsidies/bailout to the LCS yards until the junk is scrapped, the ways are clear, and the new line can spin up,"
Really???? LM and Austal, the producers of the worst ship class in modern history, and you want to subsidize them and reward them with more work? That would be subsidizing and rewarding failure.
Now, if those yards want to drop back down to civilian work, on their own, and work/earn their way back to EFFECTIVE naval warship production then that's fine. They can do it without the US govt assistance. If they make it, fine. If they don't, it's probably just as well.
We have to stop rewarding failure. In various posts and comments, I've described much better ways to incentivize and support our shipbuilding industry.
This is reflective of our society where it doesn't matter how bad you are, you get a participation trophy, a subsidy, and a reward of more work. This has got to stop.
Looking just at Austal. They had already built patrol boats for Australia before coming here. The yard here had built the Hawaii Super Ferries and a smaller vessel before leaning into LCS and EPF. The Navy made the speed requirement and decided against the cathodic protection on the first LCS-2. The Navy decided on the berthing. The Navy decided on the mission module interfaces, sizes, and weights. On EPF, the Navy studied and decided against a straight up plug and play from one of the earlier Austal hulls (Or to have gone with Incat/Bollinger). The hull LCS-2 is based on is 16 years old now and spent 163 full days at sea in 2019 (pre-covid). If they are to be faulted for anything, I guess it would be for not telling the world's best and worst customer what they ought to actually request rather than take the requirements at face value.
DeleteMcDonnell Aircraft was a new aircraft manufacturer in WW2 and it's first fighter was a colossal failure and so was it's second but it's third was the F2H Banshee and it's eight was the F-4 Phantom II with the F3H Demon and F-101 Voodoo in-between.
DeleteAll companies have failures and then they make something fantastic.
Can Lockheed and Austal do this? I don't know but let both offer a design to the Navies request first (this does require the Navy to put out a decent request though)
"Looking just at Austal."
DeleteRegarding the Independence variant, from one of my posts on the subject about trial results:
LCS-2 Acceptance Trial Part One
Newfound Starred Deficiencies = 39
Uninspected Systems = 83
Incomplete Certifications = 12
Incomplete Compartments = 31%
And, here's a post giving an update on LCS-2 problems and it's based on DOT&E reports:
LCS-2 Update
The Navy certainly contributed to the LCS debacle but the shipbuilder failed almost across the board.
"Can Lockheed and Austal do this? I don't know but let both offer a design"
DeleteThis is exactly what the Navy's frigate competition did. Unfortunately, both designs were exceedingly sub-optimal from what we could gather. They were just slightly up-gunned versions of the LCS. In fact, Lockheed dropped out before the competition even ended. To be fair, the requirement that the entry had to be based on a pre-existing hull pretty well tied their hands (and limited the Navy's choices!).
The major premise of the LCS-2 update seems to be Sea Giraffe isn't good enough and Star-Safire EO/IR also sucks. This again is the Navy allowing the contractor to select COTS equipment and providing little in the way of specs. The survivability upgrade is swapping Safire out for Mk 20. Not sure what to do about Sea Giraffe. The Coast Guard is using it for OPC and the Navy for air traffic control on the CVNs.
Delete"This again is the Navy allowing the contractor to select COTS equipment and providing little in the way of specs."
DeleteOne can debate the merits and flaws of farming out the design to industry but, having chosen to do so, both LM and Austal made it abundantly clear that they were incapable of competently designing a ship, selecting the equipment, and constructing it. The Navy contributed to the fiasco but the bulk of the flaws originated from, and are the responsibility of, the builder.
When you provide little in the way of specs, you're depending on the builder to fill in all the details and, clearly, neither builder was capable of doing that in a competent manner. The builders took on the design, integration, and construction responsibility and failed miserably at it. Of course, this also raises the question, why did the Navy select two companies who had never built warships before and why did they think that would produce a good result? I've never built an automobile before and if you issue me a contract to build one the results are going to be, predictably, bad. Certain acts of insanity are quite predictable before they happen and asking two companies who had never built warships before to do so was an example of predictable failure.
Imagine how bad the losing bidders' designs were.
DeleteCherry picking problems a bit. Plenty of other navies think Sea Giraffe works. I think we would both like a no lives at play real world test sometime.
DeleteThe losing design was a smaller SES ship.
" Plenty of other navies think Sea Giraffe works."
DeleteWhich makes the builder's failure all the more damning!
"I'll offer you a bit different perspective on this. Neither Lockheed nor Austal..."
DeleteYou make an excellent point CNO!! I very much agree with you. Im certainly not a proponent of participation trophies and rewarding failure. But... (and admittedly my knowledge of particulars here is thin) the LCS failure seems to be a collaborative one. The Navy and their changing, watered down requirements were a major contributor, along with trying to build a ship without a CONOP, and mature tech. The powertrain failures can be traced to suppliers/subcontractors. The minimal manning and contracted maintenance nightmare is also somthing that cant be laid at the builders feet. So it seems to me that many of the poor aspects of this mess arent truly their cross to bear. If we could reduce it to simple numbers, what would be the builders percentage of the failure?? 10,20,50,80%??? And what is the threshold where we let them absorb the failure and let Darwinism take over?? Understand, im NOT really arguing your point, but just saying that it was a true team effort that produced the Little Crappy Ships, and that with such a small, endangered shipbuilding base, we need to make sweeping changes to "the team" to avoid a repeat fiasco. Those yards can be useful, but maybe as builders with less input on design(??)
Also, if they are allowed to die off, thats another precedent that would dissuade other companies from trying to become builders for the Navy. I think we need more budding yards and builders to not only widen the base but to increase competition in the industry...
"the LCS failure seems to be a collaborative one."
DeleteIn a sense and to a degree but only in a limited way. To fully grasp the ramifications of this issue you need to understand what the builder is supposed to do and what they're responsible for. This goes back to the Spruance class which, as far as I can tell, was the first ship class where the Navy threw the design out to industry and hoped for the best and, indeed, in that case it largely worked. The point is that when you (the Navy) abdicates its design responsibility, it is the builder that assumes that responsibility. If they don't want the responsibility then they need to withdraw from consideration.
So, having established that the detailed design is the builder's responsibility we must also understand what that means. It means that the build is responsible for the detailed design, selection of equipment (minus any specific govt mandated equipment), integration of equipment, and the actual construction. So, just because the Navy may have specified, say, a high speed that has no tactical or operational usefulness, it was the builder's responsibility to select engines, combining gears, lubricating systems, etc. that could achieve that high speed spec. This is where the builder's inexperience reared its head. They simply didn't know what equipment would work, how to integrate it, and how to design and build it so as to be easily operable and maintainable. This example repeats itself endlessly throughout the LCS design and build. Whether it's weight margins that were not achieved, stability margins that were not met, speed that was not achieved, range that was not achieved, gun vibrations, or any of hundreds of other failures, they were all the responsibility of the builder, not the Navy. There was nothing collaborative about it.
The Navy actually set very few specifications. They set some general performance objectives but it was the responsibility of the builder to make it happen or, in the extreme, to recognize that it was impossible and say so.
The Navy didn't help matters, by any means, but it was the builder that failed massively. The Navy's main failing was that, even if the LCS had been mechanically perfect, the LCS would have been deemed a failure from an operational usefulness perspective and that is not the builder's fault. That's purely on the Navy. As it turned out, the LCS failed both from the builder's side and the Navy's - a poor operational concept by the Navy was married to a poor ship construction design by the builder. Nothing good could have possibly come from that and it didn't!
The Navy's biggest failing, as I said, was selecting two builders who had never built a warship before. If you're going to allow industry to design the ship then you'd better be damn sure that the builder is competent and experienced. LM and Austal were neither of those and the result was predictable.
Keep in mind, they selected from only 3 that competed and the third was pushing an SES. OPC had 8 bidders. I still half feel like the Navy is missing the boat by not just grabbing the OPC or one of the other proposals and just adding their gear to it. Similar to the Lightweight Fighter Program. Like it like the F-18 actually was, not like how the Navy used that as a concept to build both LCS.
Delete"Keep in mind, they selected from only 3 that competed"
DeleteIt doesn't matter if only one company submitted a bid. The onus is on the Navy to ONLY select a company if that company is competent to build a warship. Clearly, neither LM nor GD/Austal was and that's not hindsight. It was obvious then that companies that had never built warships would not produce a good product on their first foray into warship construction. The Navy should have declined to award a contract. Alternatively, they could have opted to award a single prototype to one company to allow that company to gain experience and then re-evaluate after operating the prototype. Instead, in a stroke of insanity, the Navy committed to 55 ships by a company(s) with no warship construction experience. That's insanity by anyone's definition.
Thanks... I didnt realize how many of the choices were actually up to the builder. I know we're far removed from the days of the Navy creating designs, buy didnt realize it was THAT far...!!!
DeleteOf course the only problem with shutting down the Navy and starting over is that, by the time we can rebuild, we'll all be needing to learn Chinese. Sigh ....
ReplyDeleteAmazon would get the New Model Navy contract, they'd run the whole thing. Build it Korea, man it in the Philippines, RN officers, like a cruise line with missiles.
DeleteCNO think your fleet numbers for operational ships might be painting an optimistic picture, why saying that is as you quote ship life of 35 years, Bryan Clark of the Hudson Institute noted that the Navy warships in their last decade of operation, support costs rise by 30%, they will be spending more time tied to the pierside and unavailable for operations eg the USS Vella Gulf (CG-72) after deploying earlier this year had to return to port due to fuel tank leaks and then again with casualty to the lube oil system of the MRG, two months late Vella Gulf deployed, now that might be due to age or not, but think indicative, need access to the detailed numbers by age and class of ships in maintenance.
ReplyDeleteAnother pointer commercial merchant fleet ships scrapped at average age of approx <25 years, there are exceptions for many reasons, but think best if you want your fleet operationally available to deploy realistic ship life should be max of 25 years, may be with 21st century design tech ships you could closely monitor wear and tech to forecast life, not that was needed with the LCS class, they were so bad from inception that an Admiral should have been shot as Admiral Byng "To encourage the others"
If my understanding is correct that might be one of the drivers behind the Navy planning to scrap/retire "15 ships including 7 cruisers, 4 LCS, and various logistics vessels" as the operations and maintenance budget is ballooning out of control to keep them in service.
That as you point out is resulting in a very small fleet, not helping is the May Navy budget showing the single Burke costing $2.4 billion, as discussed on your blog several times need drastic change in design philosophy to bring cost of ships back under control, think zero chance of the current Admirals having a change of mindset so fire them all and start over:)
"quote ship life of 35 years"
DeleteThat's the most common (and 'average') design ship life used by the Navy. Gotta use some number and that's as good as any.
Some ships go longer (carriers and amphibs), some look to right around 35 (Burkes and some amphibs), and some are shorter (subs and LCS). 35 seems a decent number for this kind of discussion.
If the USS Vella Gulf (CG-72) is really in that bad of a condition and it's the second youngest of the Tico's how bad are the older ones?
DeleteTo much deferred maintenance far to often.
"ship life should be max of 25 years"
DeleteI've suggested a 20 year ship life!
Does it really matter how long you design for if you don't do the needed maintenance?
DeleteKey problem is cost too high. Even with budget increase in past 4 years, Navy procured less and less weapons. This year, basically, budget is flat.
ReplyDeleteChina spends ~1/3 to build an equivalent high tech ship. Soon, we will find this figure reach ~1/4 ... There is no hidden cost otherwise you would sea Chinese economy burdened down like Soviet Union. I posted a picture before of current under construction Chinese 003 aircraft carrier and pointed out real amazing thing is a huge container ship was under construction next to it. That container ship is even longer than the carrier.
Where are money been spent? there are way too many people in the food chain.
"China spends ~1/3 to build an equivalent high tech ship."
DeleteThat's not even remotely true. As I've pointed out, China has massive subsidies for military construction including both direct subsidies and indirect such as state owned companies. Do your homework on this.
"amazing thing is a huge container ship was under construction next to it."
DeleteWhat does that demonstrate? The US NASSCO shipbuilder routinely builds giant tankers and cargo ships and that doesn't demonstrate anything other than they can build them.
"As I've pointed out, China has massive subsidies for military construction including both direct subsidies and indirect such as state owned companies."
DeleteAnd why isn't the US government subsidizing its own military industries, instead of allowing them to go bankrupt and close down?
The politicians' priorities are all messed up, the generals and admirals are abetting such delusions instead of correcting them. And as I repeatedly stated, none of them are preparing for war- proposing necessary but politically unpopular measures like conscription, rationing, media censorship- yet they keep demanding "something be done" about Syria, Iran, Russia, China...
I would argue that the US is subsidizing the defense industry by paying them for non-working systems like LCS, Zumwalt, Ford and KC-46, and systems that drag on and on like F-35.
DeletePlease don't start on conscription. The US has no way to utilize 17 million people in military service at one time nor the ability to intake and train 2 million men every year. Unless you are creating a very large ground force, you don't need a massive number of bodies.
Plus, if the current primary constraint on US military policy is financial, why would you want to spend all of the money required to feed, house and equip that many troops?
I will strongly agree that the US political leadership has been a major problem, especially vis-à-vis China. Plus US leaders don't like to be told that certain aspects of our strategy (like defending Taiwan) are simply never going to work, or are bad ideas (like expanding NATO up to the Russian border), especially when doing so would cost them votes or campaign contributions. However, this does not stop them from demanding that "something must be done" as you correctly state.
I would finally argue that the US political and military leadership has spent the last 40+ years convincing the American public that they don't need to make sacrifices like rationing or conscription in order for the US to exercise it's military power.
None of this absolves US military leadership from repeatedly making the same bad decisions and wasting the resources they are given the by civilian leadership.
"Please don't start on conscription. The US has no way to utilize 17 million people in military service at one time nor the ability to intake and train 2 million men every year. Unless you are creating a very large ground force, you don't need a massive number of bodies."
DeleteThreatening to enact conscription, will be like threatening to use nuclear weapons: An obvious message things are SERIOUS. Such a message will force the political activists screaming, "Something must be done!" to consider what human and material resources are necessary to get things done. Otherwise, these activists may get the US prematurely involved in a war- one we will LOSE if we fight without the necessary resources.
"Plus, if the current primary constraint on US military policy is financial, why would you want to spend all of the money required to feed, house and equip that many troops?"
The problem is not financial, but intellectual, i.e., seeing threats everywhere, and demanding, "Something must be done!" without gathering information and performing analysis to determine whether or not the threat actually exists, to say nothing of what threat it poses, and what CAN be done.
"I will strongly agree that the US political leadership has been a major problem, especially vis-à-vis China."
It's entirely emotional, without any thought put into it. Is China an existential threat to the US? Then why aren't we doing everything we can to meet this threat, e.g., implementing conscription, rationing, etc.? Is China NOT an existential threat? Then why are we provoking it and FORCING THEM into the role of a threat, to justify a trade war that may lead to an actual war?
Viewing other nations with the notion "If you're not with us, then you're against us," is dangerously restrictive. It got Russia and Germany to start a war they couldn't win (World War I), and if we're not careful, it'll make the US end up like those empires.
Practically, US has lost commercial building industry.
Deletehttps://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2019/06/05/philly-shipyards-struggle-signals-jones-act-isnt-enough-to-secure-u-s-sealift/?sh=768328b24b30
Angry talk may sound "patriotic" but not help. If China really spent far more on military than their announced budgets, then, her economy would have been dragged down as Soviet Union.
A sound civilian ship building industry allows ship builders to implement cost saving learned from commercial side in military. Now, among allies, only S. Korea and Japan still have sound commercial ship building industry. You can see that they build a military ship much faster than US. Their weakness is that they have to buy expense combat systems and weapons from US.
Unless government can solve the cost issue, there is no way that Navy can acquire more large ships. Worse still, many use Pentagon as ATM, some obvious and some under table. Politicians tend to force defense contractors to bring jobs to their district. This results in one job been done by several in different states. My experiences on multiple sites working on the same task (commercial side) is a nightmare as each site wanted to demonstrate its importance and wanted to dominate.
"If China really spent far more on military than their announced budgets, then, her economy would have been dragged down as Soviet Union."
DeleteThat's ridiculous. The US spends far more than China claims to and our economy isn't collapsing and neither would China's.
The US certainly does have a shipbuilding problem which is exacerbated by a woefully mismanaged naval construction program.
@anonymous: Firstly, how many decades did the Soviet Union spend such a large proportion of its budget on its military before the collapse? Secondly, how many times more wealth does modern China have than the Soviet Union ever have at its disposal?
DeleteShutting the Navy down is a bit hyperbolic, but I'm onboard with firing the Navy's Admirals whose leadership over the past two decades has led us into this disaster.
ReplyDeleteEffective writing sometimes requires a degree of hyperbole to hammer home a point! Intelligent readers recognize it for what it is, as you did.
DeleteMy biggest complaint is the budget release was buried on a Friday afternoon before a holiday intentionally and with little honest explanation. Therefore, concluding the worst is the prudent decision. In reading it, what I see is a massive Covid impact. Why buy more of things already delayed due to production and supply chain issues. Especially if you foresee a change in direction for FY23 which will be the first budget with the new administration's team fully in place. There is clearly a massive inflationary pressure that forces reduced quantity and that in turn spikes cost further. I would have liked to see the out years in the budget per the norm. I understand why they would leave it off given the obvious impact Covid delay and inflation might yet impact those numbers. They seem to focus on maintenance and readiness. Tough to go wrong with that. Plenty of time to vote out their power of the purse next year if they botch the next one. One huge issue is this 1 ship per type, per yard, per year. It reduces shipbuilding to just a massive jobs program.
ReplyDeleteI think you're giving too much leeway to the effect of COVID. The Navy has been floundering for a few years now and it has nothing to do with a virus. For example, the Navy has had multiple fleet study plans cancelled and delayed and has failed to deliver to Congress their shipbuilding plan, AS REQUIRED BY LAW, two years (3?) running. That alone, that willful ignoring of the law, should get the CNO court martialed and fired.
DeleteThe aimless foundering spans both the current and previous administrations so it's not just a case of a new administration falling behind. The Navy has been drifting for years/decades, as I've exhaustively documented in this blog.
How does this compare with known Chinese shipbuilding plans? Could that be a post all on it's own?
ReplyDelete"Navy has announced they’re retiring all 12 of the new Mk VI riverine patrol boats."
ReplyDeleteWhy? Are they that bad?
The US navy doesn't use them as they were something an Admiral wanted without a mission in mind.
DeleteToo small and not sexy enough.
DeleteWhile US gives more details in defense budgets, China only gives an overall budget numbers (personal, weapon procurement, etc.) than details to what would be procured.
DeleteWhat about transferring the Mk-VIs to the Marines as a basis for developing a riverine capability?
DeleteHave the Marines shown any interest in a riverine capability?
DeleteHow about the Rio Grande?
DeleteLutefisk
"Have the Marines shown any interest in a riverine capability?"
DeleteI'm not aware that they've shown much interest in anything useful.
It still seems to me that the Navy (and all branches) should be asking the following questions, in order:
ReplyDelete1) What threats do we face, prioritized in order of both likelihood and severity?
2) What are our strategies for dealing with each of these threats?
3) What missions do we need to perform successfully to execute those strategies?
4) What do we need to fulfill those missions?
I see no evidence of any of those questions being asked in a realistic way. What I see is a process being driven by congressional budget votes, which in turn drives an acquisition strategy that rewards districts of key congress persons.
Because our military is both uninterested in, and incapable of, producing a viable military strategy, we've substituted technology for strategy. We now believe that technology IS a strategy. Nothing could be further from the truth.
DeleteBecause our professional warriors cannot elucidate a coherent strategy to Congress, the acquisition process devolves into the system you then describe.
My point is that we must not allow ourselves to believe the reverse - that Congress is wrecking the process despite the best efforts of our military. It's exactly the other way around. Our military is making a mockery of the strategically driven acquisition process and Congress, lacking any useful input from our professional warriors, is flailing and failing. Let's be crystal clear … the responsibility starts and ends with our so-called professional warriors. Yes, it would be nice if Congress would step in and take over but if they do that then one has to ask why we have professional warriors? No one expects Congress to be professional warriors so it's difficult to fault them too much when they fail at it. We do, however, expect our professional warriors to be experts and they demonstrate every day that they are incompetent beyond belief.
It appears that Naval officers of high rank are evaluated & promoted based on how much money they can squeeze out of Congress. Actual warfighting ability is probably a hinderance.
Delete"Is China an existential threat to the US? Then why aren't we doing everything we can to meet this threat, e.g., implementing conscription, rationing, etc.?"
ReplyDeleteThe conflict with China is fundamentally an economic problem at this point, not a military one.
Eisenhower, a military man, understood in the 1950's that the path to winning the cold war was through prioritizing economic strength. All military strength stems from economic strength.
We would be best served by getting our economic house in order and stop enriching the CCP.
Implementing conscription or rationing, or even considering it, is the height of folly.
Lutefisk
"The conflict with China is fundamentally an economic problem at this point, not a military one."
DeleteAgree totally. And we need to start contesting it as such.
I would say that 1) we need to make sure we build and retain the military capability to defeat China (and Russia) soundly, while 2) we get our economic house in order to overcome China economically. We are currently not addressing either.
Can the ships being retired early be sold? With the proceeds applied to overdue naval maintenance or even returned to the Treasury.
ReplyDeleteNah, most of them are too old and need to be refurbished, if USN can't afford it....plus, I bet USN wouldn't approve the sale anyways, would hate for some other country to prove them wrong!
DeleteOnce upon a time, UK proudly required her navy be more than 2nd and 3rd largest navies combined. Eventually, it could not maintain this. After US forced it to relax its FOREX control on the Sterling Block right after WWII, UK knew this mean to give up her printing press but as it was broke and badly needed US loans, in 1948, it threw towel. We then heard a wave of UK colony went independent. UK simply had no means (financially then militarily) to stop that wave.
ReplyDeleteTime fast forward, now, US is more and more difficult to maintain her hegemony. Weapons are expensive, outrageously expensive. China and other rich nations are tired of accepting greenback printed by Fed. With nuke on-hand, China doesn't worry US gone last resort.
It is time for the nation to reform. Unless Americans can re-establish the nation's manufacturing base, collapse is only when. UK served as an example.
The UK example is what I am deathly afraid of for our country.
DeleteHowever, I don't think it is too late for us to change course.
Lutefisk
There was a group of congressmen and women that were calling for a 10-25% (??) cut in defense spending. While i dont see it happening (yet), with current trends and mentalities, an 8 carrier force is entirely possible. Ill try and skirt politics here, but Id certainly love to have a crystal ball and see what the force structure plans and budget are in 3.5 years... Bets anyone??
DeleteAll empires established by human fall. Hope is that US hegemony can last long. Apparently, US hegemony won't last longer than UK's. UK was the first known global empire and US second. Roman only dominated in some part of the world and it was never able to conquer Perish despite ~800 years wars (continued to E. Roman Empire after W. Roman overthrown).
DeleteTo have a strong navy, you need to have a strong industry base which must be supported by a strong economy.
If you check in past two decades, almost NONE of major weapon development program ended in fully success. Less and less bright college graduates choose STEM but want to be lawyers, medical doctors (practice to make $, not researchers), bankers, ...
Think about WWII, despite starting with far less aircraft carriers than Japan, soon, one month a carrier was built. A peak, US produced ~150,000 aircrafts a year! Today, real horrify thing of China is her industry base.
CNO... Other than the obvious deficit in VLS cells, isnt the FLTIII Burke a suitable replacement for the Ticos?? To me it seems as if the Burkes have the same (or even upgraded) capabilities, just with shallower magazines. Im not behind Tico retirement at all, and would like to see a proper AAW cruiser to replace them. But except for the smaller weapons load and room for an AAW commander, is there anything that makes a Burke inferior to a Tico??
ReplyDelete"Other than the obvious deficit in VLS cells, isnt the FLTIII Burke a suitable replacement for the Ticos?? "
DeleteNot even a little!
"is there anything that makes a Burke inferior to a Tico??"
That's the totally wrong question!!!!!!!!!!! The real question is, is there anything that makes a Burke suitable for future combat? We don't want to produce a ship that matches a decades old design (even if we could). We want a ship that can fight and win on the future naval battlefield. This is analogous to the F-35 which was designed to match the F-16 in maneuverability. Why would we want to match a decades old aircraft performance instead of designing to meet the future aerial combat requirements?????? That was insane.
The same thinking applies, here. We can't keep building a ship from the 1970's and 1980's. Combat requirements have changed drastically. We need new designs.
The Burke, whether it's Flt III or Flt XXVI or whatever, has reached the end of its evolutionary life. The question is what are the characteristics of a future naval combatant and can/does a Burke Flt III have those characteristics. So, with that in mind, here's a partial list of future combat characteristics:
-extreme stealth
-much greater power generation
-extensive small UAV capability for organic passive surveillance
-large caliber naval guns or some other form of affordable area bombardment
-extensive close/medium range missile defense
-extensive and high powered EW/ECM
-armor
The Burkes have none of those characteristics and most cannot be retrofitted into the design. The Burkes have reached the end of the line.
The Burke design was finalized in 1985. That's 36 years ago. Imagine if we had been building ships in WWII whose designs were finalized 36 years earlier in 1905 and just had some modern equipment added on? We would not have won the war in the Pacific!
That makes sense, and what you lay out is all very valid for a new design LSC, which is very overdue. But more of what I was asking is that, looking at the potential of the Navy getting its way and starting to retire the Ticos en masse soon, cant the Burkes basically perform the same mission? I certainly want to see a proper modern Tico replacement built, (by that I mean one ship, not the 'family of' nonsense) but thats still a long ways away, if it ever even happens. Aside from the previously mentioned shallower magazines and lack of space for an AAW commander group, are there any other systems or capabilities a Burke lacks vs the Ticos?? Or put another way, if a Burke had 120+ VLS and extra space to host an AAW group, would we care abouy the Ticos retirements??
DeleteThe reason im asking is because for the foreseeable future, the Burkes are what are going to be sliding down the ways, regardless of their age, dated design, and lack of growth potential.
Delete"-extreme stealth
Delete-much greater power generation
-extensive small UAV capability for organic passive surveillance
-large caliber naval guns or some other form of affordable area bombardment
-extensive close/medium range missile defense
-extensive and high powered EW/ECM
-armor"
Agree totally need new 21st century design DDG though I'm puzzled as to why you would want more power generation, the Burke has adequate propulsion power, what would be a big advance was longer range for operating in the Pacific without need of oilers or carriers to refuel. Burke ~4,800 nm max range which in actuality nearer ~3,000 nm when operating to minimal fuel reserves, its GTs are gas guzzlers unless operating 90% plus rpm.
Burkes three GT generators produce ~12MW, more than adequate for its new SPY-6V1 radar and the new $73 million SEWIPV7 with its powerful jammers, if more electric power required perhaps another generator, diesels powered not the gas guzzling GTs.
Wondering what the additional power required for, talk of lasers but they don't work in adverse atmospheric conditions which common at sea level and secondly have seen no breakthrough on cooling, a big 1MW laser at max 40% efficiency means 600 kW waste heat needs to be 'lost' otherwise it burn out very quickly, high powered microwaves maybe?
The list of possible future power requirements includes lasers, rail guns, high powered ECM, larger radars, pod propulsion, UAV catapult launchers, more powerful sonars, active electrically manipulated coatings, etc.
DeleteThe Burke's radar, for example, is only a fraction of what the Navy deemed necessary. A future ship needs the full radar and will need additional power and utilities.
ECM is the single, proven effective anti-missile defense, as demonstrated by the data in Hughes book, and I envision much larger ECM suites that use very powerful active emitters - far beyond anything we have now. I've even suggested dedicated EW/ECM ships to act as surface group escorts.
And so on.
Power is one of those things that always turns out to be in short supply over the life of a ship.
As mentioned think longer range just as high priority, Navy asked for 7,000 nm for the FFG(X) settled for the 6,000 nm of the parent Fincantieri design.
DeleteDon't think 16MW with four DG's would be a problem to design in for new DDG so power to spare if some of the future possibilities you mention come to fruition, the rail gun from the Navy FY2022 budget appear to have gone the way of the dodo, as said personally very dubious high power lasers are feasible and Navy has expressed its satisfaction with performance of the new SPY-6. If the Navy design/spec DDG(X) allows space for upgrade with larger more powerful DG's it should be no problem if in future more power required.
One of the drawbacks of the Burkes is so much kit crammed in its a dense ship making maintenance difficult and costly.
I think the flight III was designed with a 7.5% power margin before SEWIP Blk III. I do wonder about a ship with the LHD/LHA plant and 4 of the 4 MW diesel gensets. Plus turning the electric motors into gensets when running the gas turbines is getting easier.
DeleteWould it be better to ask China to build them?
ReplyDeleteYou can build 24 ships for the same amount of money and build them faster?
The goal of 355 warships can be achieved very quickly.
Well, just kidding, I just think the US does not have the low cost and high construction speed of China.
The Chinese arent building comparable ships for a significantly lower price. CNO has explained that due to subsidies among other things, Chinese cost figures cant be directly compared to US numbers, its apples n oranges...
DeleteIf I throw an apple or an orange, you won't want to be hit by either.
DeleteChina's ship construction cost figures are pure fantasy, as I've explained. However, what is not fantasy is that they're producing ships at a prodigious rate compared to us and that IS a direct and applicable comparison. They're putting us to shame with their speed of construction and generation of new ship designs (though most are simply copies of what we have). Of course, we have no idea of the level of quality of their construction but, neither do we have any reason to believe it's substandard. So, I give the Chinese full marks and credit for their construction achievements.
DeleteYou may look recent Chinese naval ship exports to find out. Thailand, Pakistan, Malaysia, ... have purchased some.
DeleteChinese ship building and weapon costs are much lower than US.
"Chinese ship building and weapon costs are much lower than US."
DeleteNo. They're subsidized.
I would not subsidize American shipyards.
DeleteI would charge high docking/offloading fees for any ship that was not built in an American shipyard.
I would also charge high docking/offloading fees for any ship that is not American flagged.
If companies try and get around these fees by offloading in Canadian or Mexican ports, then the fees are applied when they cross the border.
This should incent shipping companies to buy American built ships and flagged as American.
Lutefisk
If you think our shipyards aren't subsidized you are living a fantasy. Their labor is cheaper. In some cases their yards are newer and have efficiencies in lay out. Their ships cost less. Anything they reverse engineer is cheaper. Everything they license build is cheaper. We need to spend wisely on capabilities we can have and deny to them.
Delete"If you think our shipyards aren't subsidized you are living a fantasy."
DeleteAs a general statement, US shipyards are not particularly heavily subsidized and that is one of the major reasons why US shipbuilding has had difficulty competing with foreign shipbuilders.
Here's a nice article from back in the '90s. I'm not aware that anything substantial has changed but I don't follow commercial shipbuilding all that closely.
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/03/business/on-second-thought-us-decides-shipyard-subsidies-aren-t-so-bad.html
Here's some relevant quotes from the article:
"With no agreement in force, European nations have decided to continue subsidizing their industry, to the tune of more than $1 billion annually, 20 times what the United States spends guaranteeing loans for the sale of American ships."
"But with European governments paying upward of 9 percent of the cost of building every ship, American shipbuilders had no chance of becoming competitive."
"The biggest Federal subsidies to American shipbuilders ended a decade ago, though the Transportation Department still offers 25-year loan guarantees for the purchase of American-made vessels. That program would be scaled back, but not wiped out."
It appears that US shipbuilding enjoys few subsidies and what there are appear not to directly impact costs but are focused instead on loan guarantees - if that program is even still operative.
In contrast, here's a 2018 article about Chinese shipbuilding subsidies:
https://microeconomicinsights.org/chinas-hidden-shipbuilding-subsidies-impact-industrial-dominance/
And quotes:
"... government subsidies decreased the cost of production in Chinese shipyards by 13-20% …"
And those are only direct subsidies and do not include factors like govt subsidies and ownership of supply companies and the govt sponsored R&D (intellectual property theft and actual R&D) that supports naval shipbuilding.
So, if you believe that US shipyards benefit from substantial subsidies, please provide some documentation. My awareness on the issue is dated and could use some updating. I look forward to your explanations.
I suspect, but cannot prove, that a significant factor in the fall of US shipbuilding (fall as in "the fall of Rome") is crippling regulation on the part of government, from labor to environment to taxes. It's not my major focus of interest, but when one sees such total devastation of an industry (I seem to recall that the US share of global shipbuilding is now ~1/3 of 1%), it's government at the root.
DeleteIn the last few years, the US Navy has been procuring between 1 and 2 Arleigh Burke destroyers per year on average.
DeleteAccording to the Chinese Wikipedia, the Chinese PLAN is going to commission 13 major surface combatants this year (9 Type 052d, 4 Type 055).
If the trends of the last few years continue, then by 2030 both Navies will have some 80 modern major surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers) in service.
Empires do not fail because their military costs are too high. They fail because they have forgotten how to create an economy with a thriving, prosperous people to pay for it all.
ReplyDeleteWe're straying off topic. Let's stick to naval matters.
DeleteNavy has established the Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG(X)) program office -PMS 460. This means now Navy is serious about DDG(X).
ReplyDeleteWhat do you all expect? Another cost over run long delay outdated upon final deployment? Or, this time is different. DDG(X) will be the best next generation cruiser.
Have you had a chance looking at the recent Battle Damage Assessment? It paints a pretty bleak picture (even more than we predicted) with deficiencies in almost all areas. The more worrying thing seems like their inability to update damage training model that predicts battle damage and how to repair it.
ReplyDeleteHere is the link to the GAO report: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-246?utm_campaign=usgao_email&utm_content=topic_natldefense&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery
G2mil took heat for this article about the railgun fraud and hyper-velocity round BS.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.g2mil.com/rail_gun_fraud.htm
These wild accusations proved true.
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/06/04/it-may-be-end-of-line-navys-hypervelocity-projectile.html
I've done a few posts on rail guns and HVP. You might be interested in this one: "HVP Speed Lie"
DeleteThe total request list to decommission starting in 2022 is like 37 ships across FYDP, including a number of Flt I Burkes. Plus, I keep hearing around work that there is an NDAA section on the books from over a decade ago that any new cruisers must be nuclear powers - hence no work done on replacing Tico.
ReplyDeleteNot so bad, Navy has set next generation destroyer program. Construction plans for FY2028.
ReplyDeletehttps://news.usni.org/2021/06/04/navy-stands-up-next-generation-destroyer-program-office-construction-start-planned-for-fy-28
The Navy has stood up the program office PMS 460 for the DDG(X) which will incorporate PMS 320 Electric Ships Office. It already appears a fait accompli to be planning a more advanced version of the Zumwalts all electric power Integrated Power System, IPS.
DeleteI'm sure it will be a very sophisticated system and also very expensive if based on Zumwalt IPS, to me a classic case of "the best the enemy of the good" as no way can the additional cost be justified over standard less expensive separate propulsion system and generators, if as claimed now in times of limited funding for surface combatants, the overriding priority should be to design the new destroyer for the least cost to meet its CONOPS.
Electrical propulsion is inherently less efficient than mechanical propulsion as by converting mechanical power to electrical and then back to mechanical you take a hit of 8% or so in power/fuel consumption and equivalent reduction in range and max speed, can be more than justified for ASW frigates that use HED a limited IPS for its ability to reduce self generated noise, but that's not the priority mission for a destroyer, that's for the frigates and SSN's.
The big unknown is what the Navy DDG(X) CONOPS will be, if as expected a Burke type multi-function destroyer which may be $2.5 to $3+ billion per ship? and if so expect funding might be limited to a procurement rate of one ship per year if cost at the higher end. (Zumwalts procurement cost $14 billion, $4.7 billion per ship), so another probability exists that costs will rise and Congress then kills the DDG(X) and keeps funding more Burkes :(
Hopefully, this time they can deliver. For past two decades, we rarely see a weapon development completed in full success, either ended in failure and cancellation or entered services with heaps of problems.
DeleteTake an example, XM-501 missile was Navy version of NLOS-LS developed for LCS. It was planned to be LCS' major offensive missiles for both land and sea attacks. This system use network to locate targets. After its failure, LCS had no attacking missiles for a long time. Finally, Hellfire was put on some as a reluctant stop gap ones with less firepower and shorter range. Army version was also ended in failure.
Worse, China was successful and push them for export. First showed in their export oriented Zhuhai Air Show then several others, include this year's IDEX in Abu Dhabi. Their CM-501 CM-502 family have missiles larger than XM-501 but they use name - CM501, do they want to mock US' XM-501 failure?
They need to grow the FFG and make a lot of them. Whatever is larger will be in cruiser number and more a cruiser role no matter what they call it to get it built. I'm seeing the new ship in a qty like 12-40.
Delete"They need to grow the FFG"
Delete????? We already have upsized Constellations. They're called Burkes. I suspect I'm missing your point. Try again?
I'd split the role between the FFGs and Burke replacements. FFGs are good to put most anything on aside from our top end capabilities. Those top end capabilities are going to cost more and likely take more space and weight. Go big knowing you aren't going to have Burke numbers. Fill in with FFG.
DeleteI have looked at a 4-tier high/low arrangement:
Delete- 20 Cruisers, on a Des Moines hull, with upgraded capability over the Ticos, including 8" guns and some larger VLS cells for long-range supersonic anti-ship/surface missiles
- 40 AAW Destroyers, which could be Burkes, or go with something on a Tico hull that gives you a bit more room to add capability (maybe additional power for future weapons) and reconfigure to make the superstructure more stealthy
- 60 GP escorts, which could be FFG(X)s, but with more of a FREMM GP weapons/sensor load--particularly ASuW and some ASW--than the current FFG(X) which is basically a small AAW AEGIS platform (I still think the Navy is going to hold the Burke numbers basically constant and that the numeric replacement for the Ticos will be even less capable FFG(X)s).
- 80 ASW frigates, basically ComNavOps's ASW escort.
That would give 20 escort squadrons (CortRons) or escort task elements, each with 1 cruiser, 2 AAW destroyers, 3 GP escorts, and 4 ASW frigates. If we control costs properly, we should be able to build the cruiser for $3.4B, the 2 AAW destroyers for $1.8B each, the 3 GP escorts for $1B each, and the 4 ASW frigates for $500MM each, in 2021 dollars. So we are looking at around $12B for a CortRon, or $240B for the lot. Per CBO's analysis of the Navy's 2020 shipbuilding plan (1), the Navy is looking to build 131 surface combatants, apparently Burkes or smaller, for cost that CBO estimates at $225B. For roughly the cost savings of building a 2 Nimitzes ($18B) and 2 Kitty Hawks ($12B) instead of three Fords ($45B), we can have one more carrier and 69 more surface ships, including some units with more capability and some single-purpose units with less. I know which one of those navies I would rather go to war with.
I am a big believer in the Zumwalt high/low mix approach. I know ComNavOps and others have stated that my high-end ships are cramming too much in, and that is the Navy's problem. But the big difference between my approach and the Navy's is that the Navy is proposing to build nothing but high-end ships, while I would add length to the fleet with a lot of cheaper single-purpose ships, like the ASW frigates (which fill a gaping hole in the current fleet design).
(1) https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-04/57091-Shipbuilding.pdf, p. 22.
"That would give 20 escort squadrons"
DeleteSetting aside any thoughts I might have on numbers or types of ships, you have a decided peacetime mentality operating. In war, the Navy doesn't operate in neat little escort packets. It operates by operations. An operation is planned (a strike or assault or whatever), the required numbers and types of ships are assembled, the mission is executed, and the ships disband awaiting the next operation.
What this means is that you need to be thinking in terms of operations, not units. What kinds of operations are likely and what types/numbers of ships will be needed to execute those operations.
I understand that most of the time we're in a state of peace but even there the strict delineation of groups is counterproductive. We should be training as we'll fight which is not in neat, small units. We should be assembling large fleets and training regardless of where those individual ships may have come from.
Finally, we don't want to get so caught up in producing nice, neat, uniform, repetitive groups that we lose focus on operational requirements.
Something to think about.
"Setting aside any thoughts I might have on numbers or types of ships, you have a decided peacetime mentality operating. In war, the Navy doesn't operate in neat little escort packets. It operates by operations. An operation is planned (a strike or assault or whatever), the required numbers and types of ships are assembled, the mission is executed, and the ships disband awaiting the next operation.
DeleteWhat this means is that you need to be thinking in terms of operations, not units. What kinds of operations are likely and what types/numbers of ships will be needed to execute those operations."
Of course, but my thinking is that at least starting with units that have the capability to execute some defined operations puts you ahead of the game for whatever need comes up.
If you have a balanced force, then you can add or subtract to tailor it for specific needs.
If you have 10 escorts for a 2-carrier CVBG, and 10 escorts for a battleship-led surface action group, then putting 2 CVBGs together to form a carrier task force, and adding a battleship-led surface group, forms a pretty strong battle force, which with just the notional units would have 30 escorts.
"Finally, we don't want to get so caught up in producing nice, neat, uniform, repetitive groups that we lose focus on operational requirements."
The whole concept is based on operational requirements. I don't see much operational thinking in the current Navy approach that we'll just build so many of these and so many of those and then we will somehow put together the force we need for an operation.
As far as your thoughts about numbers or types of ships, at least what you have published is not at great variance with mine. 27 carriers versus 24. 6 battleships and ASW carriers versus 8. 208 cruisers/destroyers/frigates versus 200. 12 SSBN versus 12. 70 SSGN/SSN versus 80. 40 corvettes versus 30. Our numbers are close enough that you could start out building one of our forces, and end up building the other with relatively little change.
As far as the peacetime delineation of groups, if we are going to fight in task units, we should probably train as those task units to the maximum extent possible.
"If you have a balanced force, then you can add or subtract to tailor it for specific needs."
DeleteYou just did it again! Why do you want a balanced force? I suspect that's the accountant in you. You want nice, neat, balanced, uniform groups. The reality is that you should be looking at actual operations and designing a force to execute those. If, for example, that requires all carriers then that's what you build. If it requires all corvettes then that's what you build. Those are ridiculous extremes but you get the idea.
Don't build neat, balanced, peacetime groups - build war operation forces. Balance has nothing to do with it.
For example, if you think we'll need to execute lots of amphibious assaults then build a force that can transport, support, execute, and protect amphibious assaults. If you think we'll stand a thousand miles off and implement a blockade then build a force to do that. And so on.
Twenty escort squadrons may look good and tidy on a spreadsheet but it's unlikely to be the best force structure for whatever war you envision.
When the shooting war with China comes, what operations will you execute and what forces will you need? Make your forces fit the war rather than trying to make the war fit your forces.
“The reality is that you should be looking at actual operations and designing a force to execute those.”
DeleteBut that’s what I am doing, and this is the force that comes out of that process. 12 CVBGs that combine to form 6 4-carrier CTFs—2 for China, 1 for the Indian Ocean, 2 for Europe, and 2 CVBGs on each coast for reserve/surge. 8 SAG/HUK units to ensure sea control in the open oceans—2 Atlantic, 2 Pacific, 2 Indian, 1 on each coast for reserve/surge. 10 ARG/MEUs—3 for Pacific, 3 for Europe, 2 for Indian Ocean, 1 on each coast for reserve/surge. 20 escort squadrons, one for each CVBG and SAG/HUK. Maybe I’m light on what we will need somewhere, and maybe heavy somewhere else. With a balanced force we can move around to compensate.
“Don't build neat, balanced, peacetime groups - build war operation forces. Balance has nothing to do with it.”
But if you start with some balance, then it is easier to shift as needed. If you don’t build any ASW units, and then face a submarine threat, you have a problem. If you build a balanced force that can handle AAW, ASuW, and ASW, then whichever one you get, you can shift that way. Right now, the Navy can’t really handle 2 of those 3.
“Twenty escort squadrons may look good and tidy on a spreadsheet but it's unlikely to be the best force structure for whatever war you envision.”
But it is equally unlikely to be as ill-prepared as overemphasizing one area and guessing wrong. In one of my COIN schools way back in the day we were asked, what is the next war going to be? The answer correct given was, the one we don’t prepare for. That still influences a lot of my thinking.
And it’s a lot more than a tidy spreadsheet (and less, too, the spreadsheet gets pretty untidy at times). It’s designed specifically to address shortfalls in the existing and Navy proposed fleets—ASW, NGFS, MCM, ABM/BMD, and frankly, amphib ops.
“When the shooting war with China comes, what operations will you execute and what forces will you need? Make your forces fit the war rather than trying to make the war fit your forces.”
First, I don’t think that a shooting war with China is the only possibility that we need to prepare for. We have an economic war going on with China and we need to figure out how to win there before worrying about a shooting war. And that is one reason why I think cost is important.
Second, I think the force I have outlined would be pretty well prepared for such a war. Any strike against mainland China would initially have to come from missiles launched from SSGNs—and I have proposed more of them—20, plus 30 VPMs—than anybody else I’ve seen. And with better missiles than Tomahawks. I would see the possibility of littoral and amphib ops around the first island chain, either to reinforce existing defenses or to take back an island that might have fallen. I see a significant need and opportunity for port seizure operations around China’s “String of Pearls” ports. I would see carriers staying out of all but the furthest reaches of China’s A2/AD umbrella and providing air cover for surface and amphibious units operating closer in—a big reason why we need carrier-based aircraft with longer legs. As we degrade the Chinese A2/AD, I would move units closer in to follow up. I would see the carrier task forces and the SAG/HUK groups basically shutting down and strangling China’s export and oil import trade, bringing their economy to a standstill and causing massive civil disturbance.
Third, I would ask you the same question. What kind of shooting war would you foresee with China, and how does your force structure respond to that?
I’ve seen your proposed fleet, and in fact have gotten many of my ideas from it, thank you, but what I haven’t seen is a link between that fleet and what you see as the combat requirements. You’ve made comments to the effect that it’s obvious, or should be. Maybe I’m just a dumb old country boy from Texas, but it’s not obvious to me.
Well … I tried. To be fair, you're putting more thought into this than most people so, kudos for that. I can't quite nudge you into thinking operationally (for example, distributing groups equally around the various regions of the world is not wartime operational thinking, it's an accounting type of equal distribution) but that's okay.
Delete"First, I don’t think that a shooting war with China is the only possibility that we need to prepare for. We have an economic war going on "
DeleteThe only thing preventing a shooting war with China is:
1. They don't yet believe they have a decisive military advantage. The moment they do, they'll start shooting.
2. They believe they're winning the non-kinetic war so there's no need for shooting … AND THEY'RE RIGHT!
"Well … I tried. To be fair, you're putting more thought into this than most people so, kudos for that."
DeleteThanks, I suppose.
"I can't quite nudge you into thinking operationally (for example, distributing groups equally around the various regions of the world is not wartime operational thinking, it's an accounting type of equal distribution) but that's okay."
But that's kind of my point. You're not going to keep those units in those positions always, that's just a worst-case scenario that you could handle. To the extent that you don't need assets in Europe, for example, that's more that you could send to Asia.
"The only thing preventing a shooting war with China is:
Delete1. They don't yet believe they have a decisive military advantage. The moment they do, they'll start shooting.
2. They believe they're winning the non-kinetic war so there's no need for shooting … AND THEY'RE RIGHT!"
Re: 1, our job is to keep them from ever getting that advantage. They may someday have an advantage inside the SCS, but they are a long, long way from having the advantage at or beyond the first island chain, and I believe this force could keep them away from that.
Re: 2, I agree. We need to step up our efforts to win the non-kinetic war. I have ideas for that, but they obviously cross over into politics and as such are beyond what I understand to be your intent on this board. I will say that as nearly as I can tell, neither major party has the right idea there, although one of them as a much more harmful agenda than the other. I do think that winning the non-kinetic war requires bringing manufacturing back to the USA, and that requires fiscal discipline that neither party seems to have, and that in turn is one reason why I pay attention to cost in my thinking.
"I can't quite nudge you into thinking operationally (for example, distributing groups equally around the various regions of the world is not wartime operational thinking, it's an accounting type of equal distribution) but that's okay."
DeleteI'm not really distributing them equally or evenly for operations. I'm trying to estimate a maximum need, and then find ways to get them built. They would be distributed operationally where they were needed. The fact that I put 2 CTFs (4 CVBGs) in Europe for planning purposes does not mean that for a fight with China we wouldn’t move at least 1 CTF (2 CVBGs) and other units to the Pacific.
I admit that one real problem for now would be shipyards, but if we could promise them long enough construction runs to rebuild a 600-ship Navy, I think the market would find a way to meet that need. To the extent that we would look at foreign designs, we might be able to persuade those foreign shipyards to open US yards, the way Naval Group is doing in Brazil.
Crewing would then become a problem, but I've had a couple of thoughts (beyond simply stepped-up recruiting) to address that. One, looking at existing headcount, cutting admin/overhead staffing in half, and distributing the personnel 1/3 to combat, 1/6 to combat support, and 1/2 to reserves (with an additional bump of like amount to reserves) would free up about 30,000 sailors, while cutting overall personnel costs. Two, since I have proposed a bunch more carriers, we need more airplanes and pilots. One thought is to focus Marine air on getting Marines ashore and providing CAS, with Navy taking over air superiority. I know about Guadalcanal and all that, but that would free up Marine F/A-18s and pilots to join Navy carrier air wings to alleviate at least some of the problem.
I do have a couple of questions about how you would employ your proposed fleet operationally. You describe three main operational groups—carrier, battleship, and cruiser. Your carrier group includes 3 CVNs and 1 CV. Given your plan for 15 CVNs and 12 CVs, that gives you 5 carrier groups, with 7 CVs left over, unless you went with a 2:2 composition for at least some groups. Five carrier groups would also use 50 of your AAW escorts, 50 destroyers, and 60 ASW escorts. Based on your 6 battleships and 2-4 per battleship group, you would presumably have 2 battleship groups. Two battleship groups would also require 8 AAW escorts, 14 ASW escorts, and 3 UAV carriers. Based on your 8 cruisers and 2-4 per cruiser group, you would have either 2 (4:4) or 3 (3:3:2) cruiser groups. Three cruiser groups would also require 12 AAW escorts, 21 ASW escorts, and 3 UAV carriers.
So you would be looking at potential demand for 70 AAW escorts, 50 destroyers, and 95 ASW escorts. That’s 10 more AAW escorts and 35 more ASW escorts than you are proposing to build. You would have 30 extra destroyers that could take over some of those duties, but I’m just wondering how you see the numbers all fitting together. I guess my questions to you would be
1) How would you address those potential shortfalls?
2) What would you do with the extra 7 CVs?
3) What would you do with the extra 30 destroyers?
I tried to tie it all together starting with operations. I have twelve 2-carrier (1 CVN, 1 CV) CVBGs that combine to for six 4-carrier CTFs to maintain air superiority, and 8 SAG/HUK groups to provide sea control. Those 12 CVBGs plus 8 SAG/HUKs require 20 escort squadrons, each including 1 cruiser, 2 AAW destroyers, 3 GP escorts, and 4 ASW frigates. So I end up with 20 cruisers, 40 AAW destroyers, 60 GP frigates, and 80 ASW frigates.
Obviously, should the balloon go up we would start taking casualties, and those nice, neat numbers wouldn’t last very long. But I still think that starting with a balanced fleet gives us a better chance to respond to whatever casualties we take.
" if we could promise them long enough construction runs to rebuild a 600-ship Navy"
DeleteThis is certainly unrealistic in the current climate and may well be unnecessary. Recall that we started WWII with around 280 ships (off the top of my head so I might be slightly off on that but not by much). HOWEVER, what we also started with was an extensive shipbuilding industry. So, with that lesson and the reality of our current situation firmly in mind, a much better approach might be to pass on a 400-600 ship navy (which we can't support in the current climate) and, instead, focus our spending and resources on rebuilding our shipbuilding industry by subsidizing, encouraging and building larger numbers of smaller, focused ships, as I've described. We also need to focus on DESIGINING SIMPLER SHIPS so that when war with China comes we'll be ready to build hundreds of new ships in a short time. The key is to have simpler ship designs ready to go.
"Crewing"
Manning is not an issue. We both clearly see how to free up all the manpower we need.
"I'm not really distributing them equally or evenly for operations."
I'm now going to prove you're wrong and that your entire philosophy IS ACTUALLY EVEN, ACCOUNTING-LIKE DISTRIBUTION RATHER THAN OPERATION NEEDS USING YOUR OWN STATEMENTS!!! Watch and see/learn and be amazed at your own subconscious non-operational paradigm. Here's your own statement:
"Given your plan for 15 CVNs and 12 CVs, that gives you 5 carrier groups, with 7 CVs left over, unless you went with a 2:2 composition for at least some groups. Five carrier groups would also use 50 of your AAW escorts, 50 destroyers, and 60 ASW escorts. Based on your 6 battleships and 2-4 per battleship group, you would presumably have 2 battleship groups. Two battleship groups would also require 8 AAW escorts, 14 ASW escorts, and 3 UAV carriers. Based on your 8 cruisers and 2-4 per cruiser group, you would have either 2 (4:4) or 3 (3:3:2) cruiser groups. Three cruiser groups would also require 12 AAW escorts, 21 ASW escorts, and 3 UAV carriers."
THAT IS THE EPITOME OF EVEN DISTRIBUTION AND AN ACCOUNTING-LIKE APPROACH. In contrast, I don't even think for a split second about such distributions. I view the ENTIRE fleet as a pool of resources to mix and match as the operation being planned and executed requires. THERE ARE NO STANDING GROUPS!!!!!!
Yes, I describe notional group structures but just as examples of how forces might operate. THEY ARE NOT RIGID GROUPS. Thus, I have no shortage of escorts in my force structure because there is no required equal distribution of assets.
One thing you massively forget is that after the first battle (and likely before!) the fleet will degenerate into a hodgepodge of ships with some sunk, some in repair, some leaving the theater, some entering the theater, some assembling for the next operation, some executing an operation, and so on. THERE WON'T BE ANY STANDING, ORGANIZED GROUPS. The commanders will pull whatever ships they need from those that are available with no regard for any pre-war, pre-conceived group organizations. Read the history of US naval operations in WWII and this leaps off the pages. Every operation was an ad hoc assembly of ships right up until the end of the war.
Your question about my force structure reveals exactly your mental approach and your focus on neat, equal, even distributions of ships. You simply can't fathom a non-organized collection of ships. Your subconscious can't help but organize everything in a spreadsheet-like manner! There's pluses and minuses to that. For example, you would not be a good fleet commander because you lack the mental flexibility that's required but you'd be a very good program manager exactly because of your organized approach.
“So, with that lesson and the reality of our current situation firmly in mind …”
DeleteI will try to respond to your points in order:
SHIPBUILDING/SHIPYARDS
Designing simpler ships is exactly what the high/low approach does. I’ve proposed a large number of smaller, simpler ships--ASW frigates, GP escorts, small SSNs, and littoral ships (corvettes, patrol boats, MCM ships, and SSKs)--that we could pump out pretty quickly. Yes, I’ve proposed some high-end ships, and you have focused pretty much only on those, but I think some are necessary (CVNs, SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, battleships, cruisers) and those numbers are small. The difference between my approach and the Navy’s approach (which you seem to equate) is that the Navy seems determined to build ONLY high-end ships (other than useless things like the LCSs and LAWs). Building a bunch of simpler and smaller but still useful ships brings a lot more shipyards into the picture as potential vendors.
“EVEN, ACCOUNTING-LIKE DISTRIBUTION RATHER THAN OPERATION NEEDS”
I thought we were discussing procurement, not writing OPLANS. You seem to think that I am imposing numbers through some accounting spreadsheet analysis, and then driving strategy and CONOPS from there. I’m actually doing just the opposite, estimating operational needs and then structuring a force to meet them. How about this discussion focus more on my operational ideas and how they would play, rather than projecting an approach that is not mine?
“In contrast, I don't even think for a split second about such distributions.”
Your approach strikes me as more, “War is an ad hoc event, so we will just build whatever and cobble together what we need when the time comes.” I’m trying a more intentional approach, to anticipate and estimate needs, and then derive ship types and numbers from there. That doesn’t mean that we would fight exactly that way (war is very much an ad hoc event), but it does mean that my ship types and counts come from some concept of wartime operational needs. The numbers flow back and forth from ship types and counts to operational employment and vice versa, because I am intentionally trying to design a force to 1) meet wartime operational needs, and 2) remain flexible as needs change.
STANDING GROUPS
My groups are strictly notional and ships could and would obviously be moved around as combat needs dictate. I would expect them to train in groups, because there are considerable lessons to be learned from group training, but to operate on an ad hoc, as needed basis. I am just trying to provide a pool that is sufficiently balanced to be able to respond to whatever need arises.
ATTRITION AFTER FIRST BATTLE
No I don’t forget. In fact, I agree completely with the premise, and also that unanticipated needs will arise. My balanced force approach is based on the idea that balance will enable us to respond better to such situations. I also think that while we need to prepare for a peer war with China, there are a whole bunch of other possible requirements, and we need some balance in order to be able to respond to all of them.
“You simply can't fathom a non-organized collection of ships. … For example, you would not be a good fleet commander because you lack the mental flexibility that's required but you'd be a very good program manager exactly because of your organized approach.”
I think that’s kind of an unwarranted low blow. I don’t think you understand what I am trying to do, so you are projecting an approach that is not mine.
I don’t see much point to continuing this thread, but I’m sure the subject will come up again. When it does, please discuss it from the operational side. Are 12 2-carrier CVBGs (6 4-carrier CTFs), 8 SAG/HUK groups, 10 ARGs/MEUs, and CAPT Wayne Hughes’s littoral force what we really need? Is my proposed composition of those groups reasonable? Let’s discuss those questions first, and then move to actual ship types and numbers. At least I can go back and forth from one to the other.
"I thought we were discussing procurement, not writing OPLANS."
DeleteThe two are one and the same! This is what you don't realize. Op plans determine procurement. They're one and the same! You claim to be building according to op needs but then turn around and build to nice, neat, even, spreadsheet needs with exactly equal groups.
“War is an ad hoc event, so we will just build whatever and cobble together what we need when the time comes.”
Now you know that's not true. This entire blog I've laid out both how operations will be conducted and WHAT operations ought to be conducted as well as the higher level geopolitical and military strategies. I've done everything but write a book on the subject and, in the aggregate, I've even done that!
"I am just trying to provide a pool that is sufficiently balanced to be able to respond to whatever need arises. "
No, you're not and your previous comment to me that my 'groups' didn't have sufficient numbers of escorts to exactly equal each other proves it. You're clearly focused on even distributions even if you don't recognize that tendency in yourself.
"I think that’s kind of an unwarranted low blow."
Not in the least! It's a recognition that we all have strengths and weaknesses and your innate tendency towards organization makes you strong in some tasks and weak in others. I haven't got a musical impulse in my body. That would make me a terrible choice to conduct an orchestra. It's not a criticism of me, it's just a recognition and acknowledgement of one of my limitations.
"Is my proposed composition of those groups reasonable?"
No, it's not, because those groups serve no purpose in peacetime and will not operate as such in war! Their formation/existence is divorced from wartime operational needs.
Take war with China, for example. In the near to moderate future, a war with China will NOT be fought in open ocean. Therefore, there will be little need for open ocean ASW, HUK, 'sea control' groups, etc. so why construct them? They don't meet anticipated operational needs. Similarly, we're not going conduct any amphibious assaults (I've clearly demonstrated this) so ARG/MEUs are a waste of resources. I know you have some nebulous vision of assaulting something, somewhere but that's just 'what if' thinking not operational planning. And so on.
If you're comfortable with your ideas, that's fine. You're certainly not going to change my mind so my suggestion is to simply stop bringing it up. You describe your 'fleet' frequently and in great detail and then get frustrated when I critique/comment. Just stop bringing it up so often and I'll have nothing to comment on and you'll likely be a lot happier! But, that's up to you. If you comment then accept the possibility of replies from me or anyone.
"Op plans determine procurement. They're one and the same! You claim to be building according to op needs but then turn around and build to nice, neat, even, spreadsheet needs with exactly equal groups.”
DeleteBut you are projecting that come up with exactly equal groups and then try to force them onto operations. I don’t. I expect some will need more, some less, and some may not be available. But all those things considered, starting out with some baseline that can be adjusted up or down depending on needs seems the best way to make sure we have enough numbers and flexibility.
“This entire blog I've laid out both how operations will be conducted and WHAT operations ought to be conducted as well as the higher level geopolitical and military strategies.”
You have, and your ideas have affected my thinking. But you don’t link your operating concepts to ship numbers and types. All I’m trying to do is link them. Operating needs drive ship numbers in my approach, not the other way around. If we have different operating concepts, we will end up with different ship types and numbers.
"You're clearly focused on even distributions even if you don't recognize that tendency in yourself.”
I am well aware that distributions will not be equal in war, and if it’s a shooting war they won’t stay equal for very long. My groups are intended as averages, with the expectation that units will be moved around and numbers will go up and down as needed. My estimates are just a way to try to ensure having enough of each type. I would have them train in notional units, just because group training develops skills that cannot be built through individual ops. But wartime operations will be mix and match ad hoc. I just want to have enough pieces.
"your innate tendency towards organization makes you strong in some tasks and weak in others.”
Sorry, but I don’t see how a tendency toward organization is detrimental to performing operations.
“In the near to moderate future, a war with China will NOT be fought in open ocean. Therefore, there will be little need for open ocean ASW, HUK, 'sea control' groups, etc. so why construct them?”
If we can cut off China’s seaborne exports and imports (particularly oil), we can collapse their economy in relatively short order. And if we can pose a viable threat to do so, we have huge leverage in any peacetime diplomatic scenario.
“I know you have some nebulous vision of assaulting something, somewhere but that's just 'what if' thinking not operational planning.”
No, I have very specific targets for assaults. Your port seizure mission would be very useful against the “string of pearls” ports that China needs to protect its oil supply line. I also see amphibious landings to reinforce or retake islands in the first island chain or the eastern Med or the Baltic or even the Persian/Arabian Gulf. Sorry, in the Med I can’t say whether it would be Santorini or Rhodes or Lesbos or Crete, but I’m pretty sure there are a number of realistic scenarios.
“If you're comfortable with your ideas, that's fine. You're certainly not going to change my mind so my suggestion is to simply stop bringing it up.’
I would just appreciate it if you recognize that I’m working from an operations requirement perspective and not imposing some accounting spreadsheet approach that you suggest. Our differences lie in defining operational needs, and the best way to meet them. I do think either one of us comes far closer to defining an operationally useful fleet, and a more affordable one, than the US Navy does, and we would probably both do well to acknowledge our points of agreement and leave it at that.
I just have an idea: could a comparison be drawn between the Yamato Class Battleship and the Ford Class Aircraft Carrier? Both were hugely expensive and fitted with the best equipment at the time. Both also embodied the way of fighting the last war amd a symbol of military prowess for the respective nations. There's probably some more that I couldn't think of but I trust some of you have better ideas!
ReplyDeleteLike the idea,Ipnam. Would be fun and depressing to think of biggest flops in the past to today flops!
DeleteI see the symbolism, but at least the Yamatos actually worked.
Delete"could a comparison be drawn between the Yamato Class Battleship and the Ford Class Aircraft Carrier?"
DeleteYou may be confusing capability with execution. The Yamato was a supremely capable vessel and when conceived in the mid-1930's and laid down in 1937, there was no reason to believe it wouldn't be a highly effective combat ship. As it happened, the carrier became the naval force in the Pacific and the Yamato was never utilized in such a way as to take advantage of its strengths. The Battle of Midway is an example of the failure to utilize the battleship effectively. Had the Japanese been able to engineer a battleship vs carrier engagement, things would not have gone well for the US. Similarly, the Guadalcanal campaign offered the opportunity to utilize the Yamato to devastating effect but the Japanese never did so.
So, the ship was quite capable but the execution was lacking.
CNO
DeleteOne of your most popular posts was if the Japanese could have invaded Hawaii in 1941. That was possible if they directed all naval power to Hawaii, but were mostly concerned with securing natural resources in Southeast Asia. However, what if they sent a few battleships to the entrance of Pearl Harbor after the air strikes to blast away? And why didn't they? This might be an interesting post.
Imagine what those two Yamato class battleships would look like today, bristling with CIWS and VLS cells to complement those 18 inch guns?
DeleteLutefisk
"the ship was quite capable but the execution was lacking."
DeleteThat's exactly what I was looking for. We already believe that the Ford is lacking in capabilities, could a smart execution save it from being relegated to the sides? The Navy envisions the next war to be as distributed as possible. If so, how does that bode for the carrier? Could there be a case for a smaller but more rapidly deploy-able force?
That got me thinking: Were there any past examples of a poor conceptual weapon technology that finds a new life in a different execution than it was originally envisioned to do? It might be interesting because the current obsession over technologies was partly justified as being "widely adaptable". Is there any truth to such belief?
" Ford is lacking in capabilities, could a smart execution save it from being relegated to the sides?"
DeleteWell, the main problem with Ford is not any of the technologies but, rather, the cost. Even if everything works perfectly, we gain no actual combat improvement and we've doubled the cost of a Nimitz. Would any sane commander risk a $15B carrier in combat? If not, the ship is useless.
It's simply too expensive to risk in combat!
"what if they sent a few battleships to the entrance of Pearl Harbor after the air strikes to blast away? And why didn't they? This might be an interesting post."
DeleteThis might be an excellent speculative post for a guest author … just saying! Let me know if you're interested.
I would assume the Japanese were concerned that their strikes didn't eliminate the Pearl Harbor air forces and that battleships would be subject to continuous aerial attack. They would also, possibly, be subject to land artillery attack - I don't know the Army artillery dispositions at the time of the attack. And, finally, there would be a threat from whatever ships and subs survived the initial strikes.
One of the Japanese traits throughout the war was a tendency towards exaggerated caution. We saw it in constant hesitation by individual pilots to engage our aircraft. We saw it multiple times during the Guadalcanal naval battles when the Japanese had defeated our forces and the way lay open to crippling strikes on our shipping and land forces and yet the Japanese consistently turned back. We saw it at Leyte when the Japanese had fought through and were in position to continue on to the defenseless transports and yet turned back. And many more examples. This tendency to caution would likely have precluded any thought of sending battleships to finish the job at Pearl Harbor.
That said, a bold move such as that could have greatly magnified the devastation at Pearl Harbor.
That may be a bit too extreme speculation given various realities but the one failure that really puzzles me, and ties in with the previous note about a tendency to caution, is the Japanese failure to launch a third attack wave against Pearl Harbor. A third wave could have finished the targets that left, many of them far more important than the targets that were hit. Destruction of the fuel storage facilities, for example, would have crippled air and naval operations for many months. And so on. The failure to follow through with the third wave, which was tentatively planned, is a major mystery of the war.
At the tactical and, to an extent, operational levels the Japanese fought a very cautious, tentative war.
"Well, the main problem with Ford is not any of the technologies but, rather, the cost. Even if everything works perfectly, we gain no actual combat improvement and we've doubled the cost of a Nimitz. Would any sane commander risk a $15B carrier in combat? If not, the ship is useless."
DeleteI would argue that we may well have diminished capacity because of reliability issues with major components. If those get resolved someday (still not a given), the "too expensive to risk" issue will remain, and is correctly cited. The "too expensive to risk" issue also imposes substantial opportunity costs. For the $5-6B differential between the cost of a Nimitz and the cost of a Ford, how many escort ships, or aircraft, or missiles, or even bullets, could be have bought? Even if some operating cost savings are realized with the Fords (and that is speculative) how long is the payback period?
The whole Ford situation is absolutely mind-boggling. And committing to build a class before the kinks are worked out with the first one is even more mind-boggling.
What a pity!
ReplyDeleteDefense spending has increased from 704 billion (FY20) to 715 billion. While Army budget is down 1.5 billion, Air Force up 8.8 billion, Navy budget goes up 4.6 billion! More money, less weapons purchased. There are way too many on the food chain.
Unless the high cost problem is addressed, Navy will become smaller and smaller.
Navy Finds 32 Problems with Littoral Combat Ships -
ReplyDeletehttps://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/06/navy-finds-32-problems-littoral-combat-ships/174588/
Yeah, I saw that and debated whether to comment on it but, at some point, we're just beating a dead horse with the LCS. I mean, how many more ways can we list the LCS as a failure?
DeleteThe more significant aspect of the article was not the list of defects but the title of the guy in charge of this new effort:
"The study’s data and conclusions guide efforts to improve the ships by Task Force LCS, led by Rear Adm. Robert Nowakowski, the deputy commander of both Navy Recruiting Command and Naval Education and Training Command Force Development."
Deputy commander of both Navy Recruiting Command and Naval Education and Training Command Force Development. There's a low level, useless assignment. That tells me the Navy isn't really serious about the LCS any more and has tacitly given up on the program and is just going through the motions. Combine that with the Navy's attempt to early retire 6 LCS and you can see the Navy just wishes the LCS would go away.
"Deputy commander of both Navy Recruiting Command and Naval Education and Training Command Force Development."
DeleteWhy do we need a RADM to be DEOUTY to either of those positions? I can maybe see putting one RADM in charge of both, but having a RADM as deputy suggests somebody more senior as commander. That is how we get pay grade creep.
Not wanting to start or continue an argument, and not really looking for a response, but rereading back through your points, I think the big difference in our thinking is how we view the conflict with China. I think you are contemplating a shooting war in and/or around the SCS, as described in several of your posts, including the very good “Missile Escort” fiction piece back in April. I actually tried taking that and writing my own fiction piece about how I saw that situation paying out, but realized that I had such a different concept in mind that it really wouldn’t work. I think a shooting war inside the SCS is basically a suicide mission for us.
ReplyDeleteI do have an approach to strike missions, against China or anywhere else, should that become necessary. It is based on SSGNs (and a lot more of them than the Navy is currently proposing) as the primary strike platform in any conventional conflict, with a lot better missies than Tomahawks. I see the Navy’s failure to develop missiles equal to or better than those currently available to China and Russia as a major failing, which we need to address.
I see Cold War II with China as more economic and diplomatic than military. China is a long, long way from posing an existential threat to the USA, except maybe nuclear, and we would hope that all sides realize that is a suicide path. My approach is a containment strategy, focused on stopping China at the first island chain, much as Truman stopped Soviet European expansion at the Iron Curtain, and shifting gears to compete much more effectively on the economic side, until we can put enough pressure on their economy to collapse it from inside, the way Reagan ultimately did to the Soviet Union. I would expect some proxy wars to crop up here and there along the way, just as they did in Cold War I.
I think that difference in concept goes a lot further to explain any differences in our fleet designs than any “spreadsheet accounting” ideas on my end. Given the difference in our concept versus China, it is probably fairly amazing that our two fleet structures are as close to each other as they are, and as far away from anything the Navy is actually contemplating. I think that is more a testament to the stupidity of current Navy (and Marine) thinking than to anything else.
Whichever one of us turns out to be right, I hope it all turns out for the best. For what it’s worth, I’d much rather we were going with your ideas than the Navy’s (and Marine Corps’s).
" I think you are contemplating a shooting war in and/or around the SCS"
DeleteTo be clear, I see no ships inside the first island chain, at least not until defenses have been extensively rolled back. Carrier and surface groups would operate OUTSIDE the first island chain - hence, the importance of better, longer range missiles and longer range aircraft.
Same here if it gets to that point. And same points with regard to missiles and aircraft.
DeleteThe difference is you envision a 'holding' war to maintain the status quo whereas I envision a war with a goal of near-total victory of academic and industrial destruction, as I've described in older posts. Again, this requires different force compositions and levels. Actually, your force is overbuilt for your strategic objective of status quo. In fact, for the near to moderate future, China has no objectives outside the first island chain and thus there would be no need for your military at all as China would self-contain inside the first island chain, contenting themselves with seizing Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam and the like - none of which would take China outside the first island chain so … self-contained. Of course, a containment strategy GURAANTEES that a repeat war will be fought when China finally gets around to seizing objectives that are outside the first island chain. This guaranteed repeat war is the major flaw with a containment strategy.
Delete"Same here"
DeleteYou keep wanting to equate our forces despite the fact that there is no more than a superficial similarity. We have two radically different strategies, implementations, and operations in addition to at least one notable difference which is the amphibious assets.
Our visions have little to nothing in common.
"Actually, your force is overbuilt for your strategic objective of status quo."
DeleteI think you misunderstand my idea of containment, and the "overbuilt" part of my proposal is that it would be built for more than your idea of containment, but it's not worth arguing about.
"Our visions have little to nothing in common."
Again, I think you are trying to make a distinction without a difference. I think that's reflected in the numbers and types of ships we propose.
We end up with very comparable levels of carriers, large surface combatants, small surface combatants, and submarines, and neither of us is in love with drones except small ones as ISRT (intel/surveil/recon/targeting) assets. I do propose more amphibious and littoral ships, but those are cheap.
I think we can agree on two things:
1) Your idea or mine would be better than what the Navy has in mind; and
2) Unfortunately, the Navy isn't going to do what you or I have in mind.
I'm happy leaving it at that.
'Shut Down the Navy'
ReplyDeleteFixed it for ya....
Lots of love
The Royal Navy