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Monday, June 14, 2021

LCS - How Much Worse Can It Get?

I’ve stated before that the Navy has reached a point where even they quietly acknowledge that the LCS is a complete and total failure.  Consider the evidence: 

  • nothing but an occasional token deployment
  • attempting to early retire 6 ships
  • all but given up on module development and just going through the motions
  • abandoned module swapping
  • given up on minimal manning
  • acknowledged that the maintenance model of using civilian contractors is an abject failure

 

Now the latest in a string of panels, boards, task forces, reports, investigations, etc. has found more systemic defects.

 

The Navy has identified almost three dozen upgrades and fixes that are needed for the littoral combat ships to improve their reliability, and has selected a commander to oversee the ship’s improvement efforts. 

 

“We found…there were about 32 key reliability issues across both variants that were impacting our ability to get underway and meet those fleet commander requirements,” Vice Adm. Roy Kitchener, the commander of Naval Surface Forces, told reporters Monday. (1)

 

What were the problems?

 

The problems with the Freedom variant are with the combining gear, diesel generator rigid mounts, fuel lines, a water jet upgrade, and boat davit upgrades. The combining gear, which connects the ship’s two engines, had already been determined to be a class-wide defect following propulsion failures with multiple ships. (1)

 

The Independence-class needs water cylinder replacements, pressure switch replacements, diesel engine replacements, and water jackets on the diesel engines. (1)

 

Doesn’t this feel like we’re just beating a dead horse?  I mean, how many more ways do we need to describe what a complete and utter failure the LCS program is?  What’s the point? 

 

With that complete lack of interest in further beating the dead LCS horse, I would like to note what I feel is the most significant aspect of this latest LCS debacle and that is the title of the next guy who’s going to ‘fix’ the LCS:

 

The study’s data and conclusions guide efforts to improve the ships by Task Force LCS, led by Rear Adm. Robert Nowakowski, the deputy commander of both Navy Recruiting Command and Naval Education and Training Command Force Development. (1)

 

Deputy commander of Navy Recruiting Command and Naval Education and Training Command Force Development?????  Are you kidding me?  Was the commander of the Navy Footwear Recommendation Board too busy?  Were the Annapolis midshipmen all busy studying for finals?  This is who they had to get?  How much less importance and emphasis can you assign something? 

 

This tells me, unequivocally, that the Navy has given up on the LCS.  We’re going to see a constant stream of requests to Congress to retire the LCS ships, a few each year until the entire class slowly and quietly disappears.  Although they won’t quite say this publicly, the Navy would like nothing better than to have the LCS fleet fade into the sunset.

 


 

 

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(1)Defense One website, “Navy Finds 32 Problems with Littoral Combat Ships”, Caitlin Kenney, 8-Jun-2021,

https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/06/navy-finds-32-problems-littoral-combat-ships/174588/


47 comments:

  1. The main point here is that at a time the Navy claims that it has insufficient funding, it chooses to WASTE MORE MONEY on the LCS rather than just admitting their mistake and scrapping them. And they are telling this Rear Adm that his next promotion will depend on him maximizing the amount of money that he wastes (see JCS head Lloyd Austin about this standard).

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  2. SO WHY ARE 12 STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION! just cancel them already.


    35 total ships with 12 under construction and 6 already up for retirement.

    This is an abomination.

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    1. "SO WHY ARE 12 STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION!"

      Pork barrel politics. Factories producing components for these useless ships, provide jobs for constituents in influential congressmen and women's states. If only these factories could be retioled to produce components for ships that are actually useful... Sadly, too many leaders view such efforts as "too much trouble," as proven in the bout of laziness and penny-pinching that made the Boeing 737 MAX a deathtrap.

      "just cancel them already."

      The Navy seems reluctant do so, as that will be publicly admitting the LCS's very concept is downright moronic, and all the resources invested in those useless ships- money, time engineers and naval architects could've used to design more useful ships, engines and other components shipbuilders could've used to build more useful ships, berthing space in shipyards that could've been used to maintain useful ships we already have (instead of building these useless ships)- are wasted.

      Sadly, the admirals don't understand such reluctance to admit they made a mistake that's OBVIOUS to everyone in Congress, is just increasing the risk to the Navy's shipbuilding budget. What's the point of giving the Navy the money to build and maintain 350+ ships, if the service is going to waste it on more useless ships?

      Delete
  3. "Rear Adm. Robert Nowakowski, the deputy commander of both Navy Recruiting Command and Naval Education and Training Command Force Development."

    Why is the DEPUTY Commander of either command an admiral (appears to be a one-star/lower-half from his official photo)? I could see, maybe, how the Commander of either could be an admiral, but not the Deputy Commander. This is how the Navy creates slots for 284 admirals for 290 ships. Of course the Navy would probably point out how frugal they are being by having one person wear two--and now three--hats. Of course, he probably didn't have anything to do wearing the other two, so this at least gives him sort of a job.

    Looking at RADM Nowakowski's credentials, he has a BS in Biomedical Engineering from Northwestern (great school, but not entirely relevant), a Masters in Mechanical Engineering from San Diego State (more relevant degree, less renowned university), an MBA from Cal State San Marcos (less relevant degree from less renowned university), and a Technical Engineer Certification from Stanford (great university, but what does the certification entail?). He also attended the Air University at Maxwell, Joint Forces Staff College, and Navy Senior Leadership Seminar. Looks like he had one sea tour, auxiliaries/electrical officer, then first lieutenant, then assistant operations officer on an AEGIS cruiser, then went the reserve route since 2000. He has had a bunch of titles up through the ranks in the reserve community, none of which actually involved going to sea. You think I'm devoted to spreadsheet analysis, this guy has been doing nothing else. He has been away from sea duty for 20+ years. I hope he knows the right questions to ask.

    Not to pick on RADM Nowakowski, who may be a very good man and very deserving of his star and even highly qualified for this job, but there are too many people with too many stars, and at least on paper he seems a perfect example. And the further they get removed from actually going to sea on ships, the more inclined they are to come up with ship designs and strategic concepts that are worthless.

    And as an aside, why do we have this absurd one-star/two-star lower-half/upper-half stuff? What's wrong with just calling him a Commodore?

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    1. I did a little further digging on RADM Nowakowski. He has been a civilian with Qualcomm since 1998, and a reservist since 2000. I'm guessing he may have picked up at least some of the advance degrees and the certification online or by correspondence. I'm actually more impressed by his Qualcomm credentials than his Navy credentials.

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  4. "The study’s data and conclusions guide efforts to improve the ships by Task Force LCS"

    Wasn't a task force a battle group, once?

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    Replies
    1. Back when we had a sea-going, warfighting navy, yes.

      Delete
  5. Lockheed Martin is building 4 Multi-Mission Surface Combatants (MMSC) for Saudi Arabia and have they have pitched the design to Greece for their new frigate program. The Saudi MMSC design retains the 57mm gun and SeaRAM launcher but adds an 8-cell VLS for ESSM and 8 Harpoon II antiship missiles.

    Given how public the LCS problems have been, I wonder what LM has already changed, fixed, and improved in the Freedom variant to clinch a sale to the Saudis.

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    Replies
    1. Saudi arms purchases are mostly to create friendly congressmen and senators

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    2. See also: "speech fees".

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    3. @Fighting Irish. Not much to go by but I got the impression the propulsion part isn't different from regular US LCS, maybe Saudis will just stick to 30 knots and below to not tax too hard the propulsion system???

      https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/06/07/navy-targets-early-fy-2022-for-first--freedom-class-littoral-combat-ship-fix/

      Delete
    4. ""The Saudi MMSC design retains"

      Wiki and other sources report the Saudi version uses a Oto-Melara 76mm gun and 2x 8-cell VLS with a TRS-4D radar, among other modifications. Still other sources list a single 8-cell VLS and the 57 mm gun.

      The LM website lists the same CODAG propulsion system as the LCS but gives the speed as only 30 kt. I had once read that the waterjets would be dropped in favor of conventional props. I don't know if that happened or not.

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    5. Makes one wonder why USN can't just drop the speed requirement, get rid of the waterjets and stick to below 30 knots?!?

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  6. Remember that LCS has met it's primary mission. It funneled, and continues to funnel, large amounts of money to the Gulf Coast and Great Lakes Congressional Members districts.

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  7. If there is such a thing as ROI for Navy ships, I bet LCS has to have the worst ever costs to days deployed ratio!!!

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    Replies
    1. We might want to look at T-EPF also in that case

      Delete
  8. The Navy classified the first four ships as prototypes due to past incompetency in design/build even thou only the first two were funded from the R&D budget, tried to retire all four of them in FY2021 but Congress only allowed LCS 1 & 2 to be retired, Navy trying again in FY2022 with LCS 3 & 4 plus addition of two Freedom class ships, USS Detroit (LCS-7), commissioned in 2016; and USS Little Rock (LCS-9) commissioned in Dec 2017, understand USS Milwaukee (LCS-5) only exempted from the axe as trials ship for the Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) - Hellfire.

    My interpretation of Navy current thinking is the Freedom class not worth the pain and cost of keeping them operational whereas they can make limited use of the Independence class. The one big disadvantage of the Freedom class besides the combining gear tech problems is the limited range due the semi-planning hull giving then the drag co-efficient of a brick above 10-12 knots until they fire up their massive GTs. All Independence class deployed to the Pacific and Freedom to Atlantic thou don't think Freedom will be operationally viable even in the Atlantic due its such short range.

    GAO recently reported Navy estimated it would cost them $61 billion to operate and maintain the Littoral Combat Ship fleet of 35 ships, presume the driver for cutting the numbers asap especially the more expensive to operate Freedom class.

    If the Navy was consistent in making operational availability/ cost of operation and maintenance a major metric in choice of ships they would move from CVNs to conventional carriers :) - Modly " In the 1980s, the carrier strike group cost about 14 percent of the total Navy operating cost, today it’s 31 percent"

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    1. "Navy estimated it would cost them $61 billion to operate and maintain the Littoral Combat Ship"

      Take any operating cost figures with a massive grain of salt. Operating costs are whatever the person calculating them wants them to be. For example, a shore warehouse/magazine facility that stores aircraft munitions for carriers - is that an aircraft carrier operating cost? If you want to produce a high operating cost, you include it. If you want to produce a low operating cost, you exclude it. And so on with a thousand other cost factors.

      The Navy wants to justify getting rid of the LCS so they'll calculate an operating cost as high as possible.

      You can make the operating cost whatever you want it to be by including or excluding factors.

      Delete
  9. Anyway, those ships look pretty good for a large-scale SINKEX.

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  10. Who has lost his/her job or rank over this unmitigated disaster? As far as I know, nobody. Unless and until there are adverse consequences, stuff like this will continue to happen.

    What about the Fords?
    What about the Zumwalts?
    What about the fact that you can't get tanks and artillery ashore from LJAs/LHDs 25-50 miles out?
    What about virtually no ASW or MCM or NGFS capability?

    We ought to have more heads rolling around than a bowling alley.

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    Replies
    1. I bet more people have been promoted than demoted! Makes you wonder, what the heck you have to do to lose your job or rank?!??

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    2. Amd previously I thought being a weatherman was the only place you could be wrong 75% of the time and still keep your job...

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    3. "Makes you wonder, what the heck you have to do to lose your job or rank?!??"

      Make Politically Inappropriate Jokes and they'll come for you and your kids.
      Large-scale idiocy and malfeasance are fine, though,

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    4. Nico: "what the heck you have to do to lose your job or rank?!??"

      Not being woke enough seems to do it. I believe a ship captain was recently relieved because he made some sort of symbolic prize for his crew out of an AK47.

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    5. CDR Chip, I don't disagree with you, but for accuracy wrt LCS, PM was fired back in Jan 2007 for cost growth. PEO was fired at that time as well, but for another reason; LCS cost growth became the "pile-on" charge for that removal. Other than that, no adverse consequences since. Being a PM of any shipbuilding program is hard, but when the degree of difficulty is stacked on, e.g. 1000 and CVN, success is almost impossible, and anyone who says that is committing career suicide. Requirements generators who want it all, and senior Operational and Acquisition leadership should be held accountable but rarely are - in any service. By the time things come to light, they have moved on and some other poor sap is trying to make a go of what they have been handed. Nico is correct, more promoted than fired, but in their defense, there is no incentive to anyone taking over a flawed program to pull the E-stop. They put their nose to the grindstone and attempt to make it work, because that is what is expected. In my memory, the PM removal I cited was the only head I can recall that has ever "rolled".

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  11. "...and water jackets on the diesel engines. (1)"

    As a diesel tech for 20 yrs, this is scary. Did a vendor provide diesel engines without proper cooling provisions?? That quote suggests that they're air-cooled...!!! Id certainly hope not considering that they're installed in ships with an unlimited supply of cooling water!!!


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  12. I heard a rumor that they were pulling the VDS from the ASW module due to ongoing issues.

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    1. It would explain why they aren't buying more. I'd love more info there. It mine boggling they would go for the awkward thing they got over a CAPTAS-4 Compact.

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    2. I don't know what you heard but the ASW module has had long-standing weight issues which caused the Navy to eliminate the original VDS and opt for a newly developed Raytheon lightweight VDS with, supposedly, better performance. The new VDS, called Dual-mode Array Transmitter (DART), is being tested. Of course, the odds that a brand new system will perform as advertised are just about zero.

      You may recall that the Navy issued contracts to three companies to perform weight reduction studies for the LCS ASW module. I've yet to hear any results from that although, likely, this DART is part of the fallout from those studies.

      The weight issues arose from the original, very limited module weight margins and the Navy's decision to completely abandon the original ASW concept and module and replace it with a more traditional - and heavier - ASW fit. In essence, the Navy painted themselves into a corner and then shot themselves in the foot to ensure that they couldn't get out of the corner.

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    3. I think it was on this podcast.

      https://defaeroreport.com/2021/06/10/defense-aerospace-daily-podcast-nov-18-2020-cavas-on-navy-lcs-review-mq-25-first-leaked-secnav-memo/

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  13. LCS has almost become a 4 letter word among military fans. Let’s check the reality:

    The good – despite some technical problems and failure on weapon developments, they can fairly perform tasks designed for – fighting nations or irregular forces without strong naval force. “Littoral” doesn’t mean US coasts but other nations’.

    The bad – technical problems mainly on its powering system and some weapon development failure

    The ugly – strategic blunder! Today, there is no such enemy but cannot fight another competent naval.

    The strategic blunder came from 190-91 Gulf War and Soviet Union collapse in 91. Navy thought their main mission was to support land invasions on nations with weak naval forces. These nations, at beast, have some small boats, conventional powered submarines, capability to launch conventional mines. This was how Navy thought on modules - mine sweep, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and dispatch special forces on land.

    Speed and mobility are top achievements of LCS designs. For an Independence Class LCS, it has 4 LM2500 gas turbines. It is like put a cruiser’s power on a small frigate. Furthermore, it uses water ejection to propel. While it turns, it doesn’t reply on ladder but water ejection. With its speed and mobility, most then anti-ship missiles (such as Harpoon) may not be able to hit a fast moving LCS. Problem is that despite this great design, its power system has abnormally high failure rate. This is the major technical problem of LCS.

    While its 5mm gun is actually quite good on fighting small missile boats, its missile system XM-501 NLOS development ended in failure. Hellfire was brought in as a stop gap. NSM was also introduced as another "fix". On its weapons, because huge power system occupies big part of lower hull plus reserve rooms for modules and , all weapons have to be installed above deck. Forget install VLS. Independence's large fly deck and two helicopters are bright spots.
    --------------------------------------------------------------

    More on the failure of XM-501 NLOS-LS. Both Navy and Army were interested to develop a network based missile combat system. The idea is that information collected from different nodes (people, tank, drone, ship, ...) are integrated in a network. Missiles are guided by the network (like a mini cloud). Even if a node is destroyed by enemy, no effect on guiding missiles.

    An example - a band of Navy Seal lands in enemy' shore. Each one has his own GPS and laser distance detector. Once they find a tank, they can send location information of the tank, take its IR image and send to the network. A missile can then be fired from LCS toward that tank. If necessary, a Seal can even project laser onto that tank to help XM-501 homing. If permitted by commander, a front line Seal himself can pull the trigger to fight a missile from a LCS. Similarly, a small boat not found by a LCS but by other means (drone, etc.) can be attacked.

    Good idea but the development failed, largely due to immaturity of wireless network. The project was cancelled in 2011.

    Worse, a few years later, China has started promoting their network based system in trade shows for export. Missiles of the wireless network named CM-501XX (several different missiles). The concept is quite close to the failed XM-501 NLOS-LS. I don't know if China has sold any. Giving China showed several times at IDEX, it seems aim on rich Middle East nations fighting irregular forces.

    This kind of system depends strongly on wireless network thus no wonder, US is very uneasy on Huawei, etc.

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    1. "they can fairly perform tasks designed for"

      No. They were designed for three tasks: ASW, ASuW, and MCM. They can perform none of them. The ASuW is the closest to performing once the Hellfire is installed but even that is just a stripped down shell of what was spec'ed.

      "problems mainly on its powering system"

      Again, no. The problem list is vast and serious. Read the DOT&E reports. Absolutely nothing worked as intended.

      "Speed and mobility are top achievements of LCS designs."

      Once again, no. The original speed requirement of 40+ knots has been dumbed down to around 35 kts and the range spec has been significantly reduced, as well. Steering issues and stability have negatively impacted maneuverability.

      " most then anti-ship missiles (such as Harpoon) may not be able to hit a fast moving LCS."

      This is absurd. A missile moving at high subsonic speed is not affected by a ship moving at a comparative crawl.

      "This is the major technical problem of LCS."

      No. Propulsion is one of many problems. Larger problems are the inability to swap modules which rendered the entire LCS concept invalid, the total failure of the minimal manning which rendered the entire cost basis of the LCS invalid, the complete collapse of the off-board maintenance model and data transmission which rendered the entire support concept invalid, and the complete failure of all three modules which rendered the LCS incapable of combat.

      You need to come up to speed on the entire LCS program before you comment again. In addition to Wikipedia, the blog archives offer a good, if disjointed, history of the LCS. Please take advantage of the archives.

      "Forget install VLS"

      Yet again, no. The Saudi versions of the Freedom class will have one or two (reports vary) 8-cell VLS installed. VLS could have been installed but the Navy simply opted not to.

      "More on the failure of XM-501 NLOS-LS"

      In the future, please don't merely list common, basic information that is readily available on the Internet and other sources. I'm looking for comments that contribute something new to the discussion.

      Delete
    2. "It is not LCS faster than missile, it is its mobility (while power system functions). Its water jetting propelling can make sudden huge turn. This makes missiles like Harpoon keeps over correct its fly path."

      The Tomahawk, which has a speed of 550mph, probably won't miss a target doing 40-50 mph the size of the LCS, particularly the indepence class, which is as wide as the USS Alabama battleship.

      Delete
    3. Missiles aren't something you're going to evade at 20, 40 or even 80 knots, that's silly.
      Now, against torpedoes the extra speed can help a lot, but is it worth the price?

      Delete
  14. Also compare the LCS with PLAN's Type 056 corvette.

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  15. Figuring out the issues, and the fixes, will aid the PLAN when they make their version successfully. With some sunburns grafted on in place of the bay.

    Protecting their illegal fishing fleet and sinking Burkes

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  16. The "final solution" to the LCS saga -- let's just CHANGE THE NAME TO SOMETHING ELSE and call it a success: https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/06/14/drop-littoral-combat-americas-17-independence-class-ships-are-surveillance-frigates/?sh=262b8bd01649

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  17. Let's also add a lot of topside weight its not designed for to the tune of another 45 million per hull (FY21 numbers). Then I assume another 45 million to upgrade the combat system, per hull. That article should say sponsored by Raytheon.

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  18. The Independence class has a huge mission bay with enough height to accommodate SH-60s. If we would enlarge the elevator to handle them, it could handle 6 to 8 helicopters. This would make it a usefull ASW platform or for AuSW.

    With LCS-4 scheduled for retirement, we should test it out on it. If I am wrong, you have not lost much.

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    1. What is the height of the mission bay?
      Where would the helo fuel be stored?
      Where would the helo munitions be stored?
      Where would the helo maintenance facilities, repair shops, and spare parts storage be located?
      Where would the dozens of extra helo crew and maintainers be berthed?
      Where would the expanded galley space and food/water storage for the extra crew come from?
      Where would the additional laundry, head, etc. requirements for the extra crew come from?
      How would helo movements in the mission bay be accomplished?
      Would there be enough space for helo movements in the bay with 6-8 helos?
      The Independence class suffers from excess weight. Can it handle 6-8 17,000 lb helos?

      Delete
  19. Bit late to the show been traveling. Seeing as the USN is killing all its Patrol boats and still building the LCS that seems to always have new issues and cannot do anything. Why not just kill it altogether. Give all that budget slice to the USCG and let it build the Patrol Frigate 4921(*) type HI proposed a while back. Add in an up armed Sentinel class boat (to something like the load a Cyclone has now after loosing the rescue bits). The Navy can wash its hands of jobs it hates. And the USCG if going to be asked play show the flag games - in the Taiwan strait or Black sea or confront China over allies fishing rights in the Pacific or play tag with with Iran in the Persian Gulf and can not have that be maybe committing suicide. Thus getting the navy more out of that job so thay could like practice navigation. Also its not like China or Russia have the same policy of not adding weapons to their Coast guard vessels at the naval grade.

    *
    https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2014/april/its-time-sea-control-frigate

    Note obviously one would imagine an NSM not a Harpoon now. And also maybe if the power is available more automated gun stations to replace the manual .50 cal guns

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  20. How much damage, politically, budgetary, or operationally, did the LCS program do the Navy? With all these additional costs and problems, would it have made more sense to upgrade the newer FFG-7 hulls as either a bridge to the FFG-62 class or as a supplement? Could an LCS take a hit from an Exocet and still float as in the case with the USS Stark, all those years ago?

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    1. "Could an LCS take a hit from an Exocet and still float as in the case with the USS Stark, all those years ago?"

      No, if for no other reason than the LCS is DESIGNED to be abandoned after a single, significant hit. It was not designed to withstand battle damage or even attempt it. In large measure, this was due to the decision to minimally man the ship. You can't conduct damage control without LOTS of bodies. Read the book, "Missile Inbound", which is the story of the attack on the Stark and the struggle to keep her afloat. It's written by the Captain and he makes quite clear that the ONLY thing that kept the ship afloat was a large crew to conduct the damage control.

      Delete
  21. I think the old PT Boats would have been a better investment. With that, how much thought went into the FFG(X), now the FFG-62 class? I remember damage control, I still have my DC book from the USS America(CV-66). My list of gripes is lengthy (to include the MK110-57MM..WTF is that all about?)

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