We’ve previously noted that the Navy is a mostly defensive force. Now, we have to add the Marines to that assessment as they are transforming from a ground seizing force to a missile-based defense force.
For the sake of discussion, let’s pretend that the idiotic Marine concept of small, hidden, missile launching forces is completely valid, effective, and survivable. How does that concept impact an overall war? Well, let’s consider what influence a small missile launching unit can have in combat.
Being able to launch a handful of anti-ship missiles into an area of one or two hundred miles radius around the launch point prevents enemy ships from entering that area – again, we’ll assume that enemy Aegis-type ships would be deterred by a handful of missiles. That’s a denial capability which is, inherently, defensive. In the Chinese theatre, this translates to setting up a blockade of sorts – we’ll assume we’ll somehow get permission to set up such bases on the myriad islands that we have no ownership of, or basing rights to, – that, at its most effective, prevents the Chinese surface navy from exiting the first island chain. We’ll ignore the fact that for the foreseeable future, the Chinese have no interest in exiting the first island chain during a war.
Now, let’s consider the geography and distances. The distance from the first island chain islands to the Chinese mainland is 500-1000 miles depending on where you choose to measure. The shortest distances are from the Philippines and we can safely assume that the Chinese-leaning Philippines are not going to grant us basing rights in a war with China. We’ll be lucky if they don’t actively enter the war on the Chinese side! So, that leaves us with the longer distances, again, assuming we can get basing rights anywhere. That means that the bulk of the thousand mile deep South China Sea is unthreatened by the Marine’s one or two hundred mile missiles – we’ll ignore the targeting challenges involved in getting sensor platforms one to two hundred miles deep into the South China Sea and surviving long enough to find a target and transmit data.
The usual purpose of a war is to seize territory: either territory you want to take from someone else or territory you want to reclaim because it was taken from you. As they are constituted today and as they are envisioned in the moderately near future, how are the Navy and Marines set up to seize territory? The short, brutal answer is that they are not.
The Marines have flat out stated that they are out of the amphibious frontal assault business. Further, they have transformed themselves from a middle weight force with tanks and artillery to a very light infantry force with no tanks, not much artillery, no armored fighting vehicles, and few heavy weapons. They won’t be seizing anything.
In short, the Marines have very little to contribute to an offensive strategy.
The navy can’t, themselves, seize ground, of course. However, the traditional role of the Navy is to support ground forces that can seize territory. That role involves transporting soldiers and supplies, providing amphibious assault ships and ground support firepower, and conducting offensive strikes in support of an overall offensive, ground seizing strategy.
Unfortunately, the Navy has completely abandoned naval gun support firepower, has only an obsolete, non-survivable land attack cruise missile that is too expensive to use in general area bombardment, and has ships that are too expensive to risk in open battle. The Navy’s main weapon system is Aegis and that is a purely defensive system.
The Navy has only the big deck amphibious ships for transport and those are likely to be phased out in favor of the small Light Amphibious Warships (capacity 75 troops) that the Marine Commandant has demanded the Navy give him. Given the cost of building, manning, and maintaining large amphibious ships that the Marines don’t want, the Navy is likely to quickly begin retiring the large ships.
In short, the Navy has very little to contribute to an offensive strategy.
The Navy and Marines have ensured that the next offensive waged by this country will be a purely Army affair with no Marine contribution and, at best, some logistics contribution from the Navy.
Of course, if we toss in even a bit of realism (you noted all the assumptions we had to make in the preceding discussion in order to keep the conversation moving?), the Marines missile-shooting concept is dead on arrival and they won’t be able to contribute even a defensive effort.
Seize the high ground? Sorry, no ……..
The Navy can contribute offensively by sinking the PLAN, attacking land targets with cruise missiles and bombs, and providing fighter and ISR overwatch for other forces.
ReplyDeleteBTW, try out the Defense Futures Simulator to put together a 5 year military spending plan.
https://www.defensefutures.net/
"The Navy can contribute offensively"
DeleteOnly in a peripheral and limited way. Our ships are too expensive to risk in direct combat. Our missiles are too expensive to be used in the quantities that are needed. Our air wings are too small and too limited in capability to establish aerial dominance even if we wanted to risk the carriers. Our logistics capacity and sea transport is limited nearly to the point of non-existence. Our ability to clear mines in support of offensive operations is nearly non-existent. And so on.
In short, the Navy's ability to conduct - or even significantly contribute to - an offensive strategy is quite limited.
Don't forget SSNs.
DeleteI don't think our missiles are too expensive. We fired 50 at tents and caves in the desert without batting an eyelash.
"We fired 50 at tents and caves in the desert without batting an eyelash."
DeleteSure, when we use an average of around 50 per year, we can afford that. In a war, we'll need thousands per battle. We can't afford that especially when most will be destroyed by the defenses without accomplishing anything. We desperately need a basic (meaning, simple and affordable), stealthy, maneuverable, cruise missile that can be acquired and expended in large quantities.
The advantage missiles have in range, means they can potentially sink a gunboat can LONG before she can get close enough to retaliate, making the guns "dead weight"- the same reasons why aircraft carriers replaced battleships as capital ships in every navy that can afford them. Attempts to increase a gun's range to make it competitive with missiles, also increased the cost of the gun and its shells to be comparable to missiles, as the Zumwalt's Advanced Gun System demonstrated. It's sadly understandable why contemporary ships are fitted with VLS cells in place of large caliber guns.
ReplyDeleteAny ideas how to counter this so the Marines get the naval gunfire they claim they need?
I think that the Multipurpose ship is one of the big problems. Having DDs that are gun-centric, along with reviving the 8in gun could fix the gun support issue. Having different ships that are specialized (and are individually much simpler and cheaper) yet work together makes more sense. Separate ASW, AAW, and gun support completely...
Delete"making the guns "dead weight"
DeleteYou're making a false equivalency: that guns and missiles are meant for the same task … they're not! They have different uses and are NOT, therefore, competitive. There is not requirement to choose one over the other. Yes, there may be some overlap in tasks (land attack, for instance) but they are still intended for two different task sets. I'd enumerate the various tasks but I'm sure you know them. Thus, guns are far from 'dead weight'.
Trying to make guns have a missile's range betrays a lack of understanding of their separate task sets.
"Any ideas how to counter this so the Marines get the naval gunfire they claim they need?"
You 'counter' by clearly defining a Marine mission requirement. Unfortunately, the Marines have publicly stated that they are out of the assault business so there is no Marine requirement for naval gun support. That does NOT, however, mean that there is not task set for naval guns - there most certainly is.
Imho, we really need a navalized artillery rocket. Ideally there'd one that takes up a full vls cell with a range of just over 100 miles, and a smaller quad packed rocket with a 25-50 mile range or so.
DeleteBoth would have GPS/inertial guidance, backed up with basic wind/drift correction so it can be fired in a 'boresight' unguided mode if GPS is down.
The bigger rocket could have either a unitary warhead, or 5-10 large submunitions (still legal under the cluster bomb ban).
"we really need a navalized artillery rocket."
DeleteAre you talking about guided rockets which are expensive or unguided which are cheap? Unguided rockets can't be fired from a VLS. They have to be trained on a ballistic path.
A guided rocket with a range of 25-100 miles loses the distinction from a missile, for practical purposes.
What is the fascination with range? It's not just you, it's the entire military. We should be worrying about the enemy armored units that are right in front of us and about to roll over us. We seem to want to overlook the near fight and focus on the deep strike. Why?
@CNO: "Any ideas how to counter this so the Marines get the naval gunfire they claim they need?"
DeleteI will bite:
1) DOD should field a VLS version of its Long Range Precision Fires missiles and a TITAN plugin to its tactical data links.
2) The Navy needs to develop a gun that can fire current NATO standard 155mm artillery projectiles (the new NATO guns are much longer and have significantly more chamber volume for greater range.
3) The navy needs to implement the decades-old idea of putting a cluster munition warhead atop its Standard missile family (UXO compliant of course) along with appropriate guidance to enable it to kill high priority land targets. A PGM unitary warhead would also be useful.
4) The Navy needs to build a conventionally tipped short or intermediate range IRBM. Forget the current hysteria and food fight over hypersonic weapons, The decades old Pershing family of IRBMs hit at hypersonic velocities. This is a big deal because:
A 1,225 kg AP shell from one of New Jersey’s a 16”/50 guns strikes at ~514 m/s giving us roughly 161,820,050 joules of kinetic energy.
A 250 kg warhead atop a IRBM (MGM-31?) striking at mach 8 or ~2,744 m/s giving us roughly 941,192,000 joules of kinetic energy, which is a fantastic improvement over the 16” gun.
A 250 kg ceramic coated tungsten carbide 'rod' atop a Pershing II *might* burn through a mountainside.
GAB
"A 1,225 kg AP shell from one of New Jersey’s a 16”/50 guns strikes at ~514 m/s giving us roughly 161,820,050 joules of kinetic energy."
DeleteFor comparison purposes, 1 kg TNT = 4.184M J, thus the 16" shell kinetic energy is equivalent to 38.7 kg TNT (161,820,050 / 4,184,000 = 38.7).
Similarly, the IRBM case is 941,192,000 / 4,184,000 = 225 kg TNT. If the 250 kg warhead were TNT (I know it isn't but we'll assume so for wild discussion) then the total TNT energy equivalent of the missile would be 250 kg + 225 kg = 475 kg. So, the kinetic energy contribution is on par with the warhead contribution.
Assuming all the numbers are correct, those are not insignificant TNT equivalencies but neither are they vaporization category events as so many people assume. The IRBM case would crudely/roughly double the total energy release … with the following caveat.
Of course, the kinetic energy has to be converted to a useful form. The example of a bullet striking a piece of paper illustrates that kinetic energy alone does not produce an 'explosive' result or significant damage. The kinetic energy requires resistance in order to 'release' (convert) it's energy to a useful form (heat) that can do damage. For a weapon striking a soft target, (earth, thin skinned vehicles, buildings (depending on materials of construction), the kinetic energy 'release' (conversion) will be slow relative to the release in a chemical explosion and the resulting 'explosive' effects may (will?) be muted to a degree.
GAB, you have much more direct experience with explosives than I do so feel free to correct me if I'm wrong about this!
Gps and INS are both super cheap vs radars, infrared or laser guidance. The only thing cheaper is unguided gyroscopic or spin stabilized rockets. Even these can have basic avionics to ensure the otherwise blind missile stays on an easily predicted course.
DeleteI'd say unguided rockets can be fired from a VLS as long as you have a method to tip them over and point them in the desired direction after firing. With basic a ionics you can set the missile to go in a specified direction and distance before impact. This is ww2 Buzzbomb levels of technology.
The goal here is to keep costs as low as reasonably achievable while maintaining a decent modicum of accuracy. If GPS is jammed, the rockets should still be useful unguided, still cheap enough to use them as such.
As far as range goes: we need to be far enough away go be safe from most shore based weapons, but close enough to prosecute pop-up targets rapidly. My goal is to get in the near fight.
At over 1000 miles, you're shooting tomahawks at airfields and fixed radar sites. At 250-500 miles, youre launching aircraft sorties. At 5 inch gun range, you're within artillery and SPG range of shore. Even tanks may start shooting at you. I want to fill that gap by fielding an affordable, expendable weapon that can be launched from under fighter range yet beyond gun range.
The navy seems to think that ships within 100 miles of shore will be instantly annihilated in a hail of ASMs, I think the enemy will have an even harder time moving and coordinating missiles on land then they would by ship or aircraft. I also think ships can shoot and scoot as needed to avoid ambushes from hidden launchers and minimize threat exposure.
@CNO
DeleteYou are correct.
KE warheads are mostly appropriate for armored targets and concrete fortifications, or deeply buried structures. Pretty much everything else can be serviced by HE-Frag warheads, particularly cluster or cargo munitions.
The marginal effectiveness of large 'unitary' HE-fragmentation warheads diminishes quickly – explosive waves radiating into space disperse at an inverse cubic function. Unless you need a larger explosive to defeat a specific target (e.g. a building or log bunker), a number of smaller explosives tends to generate better fragmentation and blast effect over a larger area than an equal weight single large charge.
It is also worthwhile to consider the effect of fragmentation size and fusing options.
GAB
". . . has only an obsolete, non-survivable land attack cruise missile that is too expensive to use in general area bombardment, . . ."
ReplyDeleteCarrier aircraft is also an option for general area bombardment. That is assuming they can get to the target area.
Against an undefended target, yes. Against a peer defended target, no, for many reasons which have been listed in these pages.
DeleteRisking $70M Hornets to conduct blind area bombardment is the wrong side of the cost/risk/benefit equation. This is exactly why large caliber naval gun support used to exist. And, before you even think it, if we haven't got sufficient control of the skies to place ships within naval gun range of the target then we don't have sufficient control to risk bomb-laden aircraft in the area. At the first sign of enemy aircraft, the attacking strike aircraft would have to jettison their bombs to honor the A2A threat.
DeleteAnd, again, before you even think it, no, precision guided weapons can't be used for area bombardment. It's far too expensive. No competent peer enemy is going to provide any 'visible', detectable targets for precision weapons to be used against and those that might appear will be fleeting and will disappear as quickly as they appear.
Navy, at least US Navy is an offensive force. In two Gulf Wars, we saw not only cruise missiles launched, lots of carrier based aircrafts attacked. 6+ aircraft carriers joined the two Gulf Wars.
ReplyDeleteNavy guns, due to its limited range, can only be used on land attack only if US gains air superiority. Don't be fooled by the two Gulf Wars, fighting a regional power is totally different to fight another superpower. Take China as an example (let put emotion away but focus only on technologies), if US can gain air superiority, whether use naval guns is not important as there are many weapons can be used, for instance, helicopters from amphibious assault ships. Key problem is that is extremely unlikely to happen in the First Island Chain. Lots of land based missiles alone can push US fleet far away.
DF-21D and DF-26 are another problem as they can hit carriers far away. Last year, China did a demonstration to launch a DF-21D and DF-26 from two locations more than 1,000 miles apart but hit the same target ship in the South China Sea. Not long after that, defense secretary Esper told his Chinese counterpart that "rumors of US seeks a military incidence with China is not true".
Unlike US' west coasts where are deep waters, Chinese coasts have large area of continental shelves - shallow waters. Today, with sonobuoy, submarine's survivability in shallow water is very questionable, especially nuclear submarine (due to its IR signature). This means if US Navy wants to attack China's coast, it is close to mission impossible. No wonder, as we read from news, Pentagon's computer war games in past two years always ended up US lost in fight with China in Western pacific.
Let's focus on technology development than emotions of past honor, national pride, ...etc. China has grown up and has her own home grown technologies, even though US helped her before. What really matters is how we develop our own technologies.
" In two Gulf Wars"
DeleteThere's quite a difference between an utterly defenseless enemy and a peer. Also, a great deal has changed since then. Many weapons have become nearly obsolete with few or no replacements. Ship and aircraft classes have retired with no or poor replacements. Costs have skyrocketed making ships risk-averse. And so on.
"DF-21D and DF-26 are another problem as they can hit carriers far away"
No, they can't. No one has solved the long distance targeting problem.
You need to come up to speed on naval technology, history, and operations. This blog is a good resource but it is not the place for beginners. Your comments are, frankly, substandard. You may want to peruse some more basic naval sites.
Regarding last year's DF-21D and DF-26 test, Pentagon has confirmed:
Deletehttps://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/aug/26/china-test-fires-carrier-killer-missile-us-announc/
As I read, except early days of development, China was very reluctant to test them in open sea. Rather, they tested in deserts to simulate open sea. Of course, there are differences.
Key is to find and locate (include tracking) a moving target on open sea. People suspect it adopted a key technology started in Persian mid range missile. It is to "lift up" a missile to enable it to aim before final rush down. It increased Persian missile precision a lot.
I read Navy watches very closely on WZ-8, a very high speed high altitude spy drone which first displayed to general public in Oct. 2019. However, it looks like China doesn't use WZ-8 to provide target information but satellites. However, I don't know details.
I'm only going to say this one time. The missiles you're talking about have ranges in the thousands of miles. NO ONE HAS FIGURED OUT HOW TO PROVIDE TARGETING AT THAT RANGE. Add in the fact that any targeting asset would have to penetrate a carrier group's layered air and SAM protections and you have a nearly unsolvable problem.
DeleteIt doesn't matter what the range of the missile is if you can't provide targeting for it.
Anti-ship ballistic missiles are pure fantasy, at the moment.
That raises the question of just how far out can China target their antiship ballistic missiles today. If they can do 1,200 to 1,500 miles, they could hit a carrier group long before they get within range to launch their Tomahawks.
DeleteIt doesn't raise any question. They don't have the capability because they don't have the targeting capability any more than we do.
DeleteYou mean the Chinese don't have aircraft, ships, subs, or satellites that can locate our ships that close to their home waters? Really?
DeleteIn Missile Escort, you suggested that the Chinese had detected our cruise missiles "almost at their firing points" because "communications and centralized computer planning were nowhere near as secure as believed." If that were the case, what would stop the Chinese from firing a salvo of antiship ballistic missiles to saturate that area in the hope that some hit the carrier or her escorts. That certainly complicate things for the carrier group as they launch aircraft to escort the cruise missiles.
Don't be obtuse. Either contribute something meaningful or just don't comment.
DeleteObtuse? Hardly.
DeleteDo you really think China isn't doing their best to track our ships in the South China Seas and wherever they can. I'm sure they are working as hard tracking our ships are we are theirs. I seriously doubt China would invest in antiship ballistic missiles without the intent to use them. There is the issue of targeting, but being close to home, I don't see that as a problem. And, a carrier group of multiple carriers and 30-odd escorts would make a most tempting target.
I think there may be more value than you think in placing missile crews in the first island chain. Not only to block the Chinese from exiting the chain, but also to defend those islands (which belong to our allies, and in some cases -- the Ryukus, for example -- treaty allies) from a Chinese amphibious assault. Sort of an AA/AD system in reverse, for the Eastern end of the East CHina Sea. Now, I do agree that the platoon sized force with a handful of missiles seems inadequate for that, at least to me. And we certainly do need more survivable reconnaissance capabilities near those islands. Most of our reconnaissance assets (the P8, Triton, Global Hawk, U2, and Reaper) will not be survivable in those areas in a war. We do have the RQ 170 and RQ180, but there aren't very many of them and they need runways.
ReplyDelete"I think there may be more value than you think in placing missile crews in the first island chain."
DeleteYou say that but then you do on to identify some of the problems that make me believe that there's little value and even less viability in the concept.
You note, correctly, that a small unit with just a handful of missiles is of limited value.
You note, correctly, the lack of surveillance assets which means you can't target beyond the 12 mile horizon.
You also fail to note several problems:
The small platoon size units can't successfully defend themselves.
You skip over how we'll manage to place these units without them being detected and destroyed on the way in or once in place.
You ignore the logistics/resupply issue.
You ignore the fact that we don't own any of the islands in the first island chain so we have no basing or occupancy rights. Are we going to invade several other countries and violate their territory to establish these bases?
So, taking all that together, it's hardly surprising that I have a dim view of the concept!
What I meant was that I believe there is a case for missile units, for example in defending the Ryuku islands of Japan, but that I don't believe that platoon sized units are sufficient and that we really need bigger units. Note that we already have basing rights in Japan (several tens of thousands of troops in Okinawa, for example). We also have an alliance with Japan and are committed to defending them. While it's not a certainty, I think it's more likely that the Japanese would allow us to base forces on other islands than that the Philippines would, for example. Perhaps we could even pre-position troops or at least equipment on some of the other islands. Obviously (well, maybe not obviously) any pre-positioned troops would have to be dispersed, hidden, and perhaps hardened to protect them against a surprise attack.
DeleteI see this as completely different from my understanding of the Commandant's plan to have small units moving around in slow, non-stealthy ships during the war.
In addition, the Ryukus are mostly real islands, with many of the "hiding" advantages of the mainland, where you can fire and relocate on the same island. Plus mountains and forests, which allow more opportunities for hiding.
I mentioned the targeting problem to indicate that this is an area that we need to work on. Just like the Commandant's Light Amphibious Warships.
I'd also point out that most of the Ryukus are inhabited. Wouldn't we WANT to defend them against and amphibious (or airborne) assault?
DeleteRegarding logistics, consider a speculation. If China controls the East CHina Sea but we control the Ryuku islands plus the Pacific ocean to the east of them, and the logistics ships stuck to the Pacific side of the islands, would that make them more survivable? For example, the islands would block much radar coverage from the East China Sea.
DeleteFinally, regarding the Commandant's plan. A question. What types of islands is he proposing to use for this purpose? Are they actual islands, like the Ryukus of Japan or Palawan in the Philippines, or is he talking about atolls, which basically have no place to hide and are basically just ships that don't move?
Delete"for example in defending the Ryuku islands of Japan"
DeleteI'm not sure why the US would be defending Japanese islands when they're perfectly capable of doing so, themselves?
The Ryukus are northeast of Taiwan and would serve little purpose in a South China Sea fight which is where the focus of a war would likely be. Of course, if we wanted to retake Taiwan they would be useful.
I would also assume that the Chinese closely monitor the Ryukus and would be well aware of any military units/bases on them and that those units/bases would have a fairly short life expectancy at the outbreak of a war.
We need basing in and around the periphery of the South China Sea and, unfortunately, we completely lack such basing rights. This is the main problem (well, one of the several main problems!) with the small missile units concept that no one has yet explained how to deal with.
"I see this as completely different from my understanding of the Commandant's plan to have small units moving around in slow, non-stealthy ships during the war."
DeleteYou seem to be advocating much larger, fixed bases that we would not attempt to hide but would, instead, stand and fight/defend? Such bases would be useful (location issues aside) IF YOU CAN KEEP THEM OPERATIONAL while you fight to defend them. That was the problem with Guadancanal - we were able to defend it, barely, but couldn't keep it operational while doing so. It wasn't until the Japanese withdrew that the base really become operationally useful and at that point the operational usefulness moved on to other locations!
"regarding the Commandant's plan. A question. What types of islands is he proposing to use for this purpose?"
DeleteNo one knows and he hasn't said. We own no islands in the area and have no basing/use rights. This is a major flaw in the concept. I've recently seen a few professional journal articles pointing out this exact problem and no one from the Marines has yet explained how we'll acquire these magic bases. The entire concept is completely divorced from reality. In fact, reality denies that it ever even dated the concept, let alone got married and then divorced! Reality claims not to have even known the concept. Personally, I doubt that reality and the concept have been in the same room together. All right, I've tortured that metaphor enough!
"You seem to be advocating much larger, fixed bases that we would not attempt to hide but would, instead, stand and fight/defend?"
DeleteExactly. Although not big bases like Kadena or Guam, but smaller facilities (maybe a battalion?) capable of firing a meaningful number of missiles and defending itself against an airborne or amphibious raid. I'm thinking along the same lines as a number of writers in recent years, under names like "Archipelagic Defense".
For example, here:
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/03/03/how_to_deter_china_enter_archipelagic_defense__107682.html
or here:
https://www.spf.org/en/global-data/SPF_20170810_03.pdf
Regarding Guadalcanal, I understand your point although it's at least plausible that the situation might be different here. In Guadalcanal, our striking capability was concentrated in Henderson field, with aircraft clustered there, and of course a runway. This gave the Japanese an easy and concentrated target to attack. Plus, since it was an expeditionary thing, there was no capability to stockpile supplies and fuel, or build hardened shelters for aircraft. In these cases, since we (or our allies) control the territory before the war, we have time to build dispersed hardened shelters for equipment, ammunition, and fuel, and to stock up before the war. Plus, truck mounted anti-ship missiles are much easier to disperse and hide among terrain and vegetation than aircraft. Plus they don't require a runway.
"The Ryukus are northeast of Taiwan and would serve little purpose in a South China Sea fight which is where the focus of a war would likely be"
DeleteI understand that the focus of a war MIGHT be in the South China Sea, but I don't agree that an East China Sea fight is extremely unlikely. Which is more likely? I don't know. I'll defer to you on that. But consider that if Japan is involved, I think that the East China Sea is a fairly likely theater of war.
Why would Japan be involved? Well, several possibilities occur to me:
(1) If China attempts to take the Senkakus.
(2) If China attempts a massive ballistic missile barrage of our bases in Japan (of which there are many) to neuter our ability to interfere with their actions in the South China Sea. Note that these bases are on Japanese territory, so the Chinese missiles would be attacking Japanese territory. In addition, don't we actually share some of those facilities with the Japanese military? So such an attack would almost certainly kill many Japanese.
(3) We do have an alliance with Japan, so they MIGHT feel obligated.
(4) Consider the most likely flash point for a war, namely a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The loss of Taiwan would create serious strategic problems for Japan, independent of whatever obligation they may feel to support us because of the alliance. I read a few years ago (sorry, can't recall the reference) that Chinese military journals a number of years ago were bragging about how, once they conquered Taiwan, they would be able to base ships and aircraft there that would allow them to strangle Japan. So Japan might regard it as in their OWN interest (independent of their alliance with us) to help defend Taiwan.
Oh, one more point about the Ryukus. China is already starting to lay the ground work for claiming that the Ryukus (that is, the island chain including Okinawa) don't actually belong to Japan. While the Foreign Ministry hasn't yet made this claim, it has been made in some pretty official journals. If we (and the Japanese) continue to appease them, how much longer will it be before they act on this? Especially if they manage to chase us out of East Asia.
Delete"We need basing in and around the periphery of the South China Sea and, unfortunately, we completely lack such basing rights. "
DeleteI agree completely with this. And even if these countries were inclined to grant permission during a war, remember this is a situation where we want to make the existence of the base a secret. Are we really sure we want to depend on the country that owns the island not leaking the info to China?
One more thing on the South China Sea. I agree that none of these countries is going to allow us to base forces in their country in a pinch, unless of course that specific country is already under attack by China. This leads me to wonder why it makes sense to still have an alliance with the Philippines. They won't allow us to base forces or even equipment in their country, and we almost certainly can't defend them against China without such bases. So what's the point of an alliance?
DeleteA second thought. Suppose we just go to these countries and say, we get it that you don't want an alliance with us. And that's ok. But it does mean that you will be responsible for defending your own interests. However, we ARE prepared to give you weapons, equipment, spare parts, and ammunition, along with technical advice and training, to allow you to do that.
Would that work, relying on the individual countries, with equipment provided by us, to defend themselves against China?
"So Japan might regard it as in their OWN interest (independent of their alliance with us) to help defend Taiwan."
DeleteMy view of Japan is that they would be very likely to enter a war against China. The problem is that given their close proximity to China, they would be involved full time just trying to defend their bases and, like Guadalcanal, those bases would then be totally defensive, not offensive. Therefore, for us to count on using those bases to leisurely mount offensive operations is just wishful thinking.
Further, trying to get resupplies from the US to embattled Japanese bases would be problematic, at best. I suspect that whatever forces and supplies we have in place at Japanese bases at the start of a war would be all that were going to be there for some time. So, after an initial, small offensive strike or two, those forces would become totally defensive and offensively useless.
Of course, simply tying up Chinese forces attacking Japanese bases potentially helps offensive operations elsewhere so it's not a wasted effort by any means but to believe that we'll be able to conduct offensive ops is not realistic. All of Japan will become a giant Guadalcanal, focused on surviving rather than offense.
"Would that work, relying on the individual countries, with equipment provided by us, to defend themselves against China?"
DeleteThere is no South China Sea country that can successfully defend itself against China even with unlimited equipment from the US.
Far more importantly, most of those countries have no great quarrel with China and recognize that the reality is that they are far more closely aligned with China in terms of trade, economies, and geopolitics than with the US. Pragmatism ensures that those countries will either side with China in a war or, at best, attempt to remain neutral (while likely supplying China with covert intel on US actions).
We should, right now, be conducting an economic war with China and part of that should be a massive political and economic effort to develop support among those countries to, at least, ensure their neutrality, if not support. Unfortunately, we seem to be making no great effort to do so.
Through neglect, we allowed Philippines to slip away and now China is working on annexing the country or converting it to a vassal state. There is still time to prevent this but, again, we seem to be making no great effort.
"they would be involved full time just trying to defend their bases and, like Guadalcanal, those bases would then be totally defensive, not offensive."
DeleteI'm not sure defensive is a big problem. I see the primary goal as defending the first island chain, at least early in the war. I would NOT try to do offensive operations to achieve sea control in the East or South China Sea. I would be satisfied with denying sea control to China, which I believe is a simpler problem. Perhaps primarily with submarines.
Sea control is not an end in itself. It is an enabler that provides the ability to trade, and to move our own stuff around in preparation for amphibious attacks. We can reroute our trade around the outside of the two China Seas (to the east of the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Ryukus. It would be inconvenient, cost more, and take longer, but it would be an inconvenience, not an existential problem. And I can't think of any conditions under which we would launch an amphibious invasion of China, so we have no need to maneuver amphibious vessels in those seas during a war. So why not just stick to sea denial in those waters?
Obviously, we may want to do some strikes on the Chinese mainland, to knock out sensors that threaten our ships, but maybe we should just stick to standoff weapons for that.
Delete"So why not just stick to sea denial in those waters?"
DeleteBecause that does nothing but assure that we'll have to fight the same again. If we go to war, we need to end it in such a way as to assure that we'll never have to fight China again. I've posted on the strategy for such a war, see, "China War" and "True Victory"
The US Army in the Pacific is a joke. Armored "heavy" brigades provide the US Army's real combat power. There is one brigade assigned to help defend South Korea. How many other heavy brigades are in the Pacific? None! The closest is in Colorado! It would take a month to move it to its embarkation port of Oakland and another month to embark with 30 days of supplies. These 5000 soldiers would hardly be noticed by the massive Chinese army.
ReplyDelete"The US Army in the Pacific is a joke."
DeleteWhy? As best I can tell, there is no land mass that is likely to be a battle area that can support an armored division.
The Marine baby missile units do seem silly, given current system. If we are ever able to get a hypersonic glide body past the procurement process (maybe by bribing the companies who are not given the contract to allow it to be made this decade, and bribing the federal judges to allow production), then maybe.
ReplyDeleteBut why do we need two armies? Reequip the Marines as colonial police and let them take charge of beating the locals into submission with then current policies from DC, and leading sepoy forces, and let the army be an army.
"The Marine baby missile units do seem silly, given current system. If we are ever able to get a hypersonic glide body ... then maybe."
DeleteWhy would hypersonic missiles make the concept any better. The same problems of targeting, logistics, lack of basing rights, survivability, etc. still exist regardless of the type of missile.
A possible option for Navy land bombardment, an affordable rocket manufactured in large numbers, the Army GMLRS, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, 50,000 del'd to March 2021, variants with ranges from 20 to 43 miles and now testing ER at 80 miles, 200 lb HE and cluster munition warheads. Guidance INS/GPS, would think at shorter distance in a GPS denied environment the INS accurate enough, fired from a M16 launchers :)
ReplyDeleteNot saying in the class of a 8" M71 for a destroyer due to weapon deck space limitations but for a dedicated rocket variant Light Amphibious Warships maybe a possible. The limitation being survival against determined counter attack from land and air. attack.
"Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System"
DeleteEveryone is focused on 'guided' and 'precision'. Why? Why GUIDED MLRS? Do you think the enemy is going to obligingly provide targets out in the open, waiting to be destroyed? Assuming China knows enough to hide or camouflage themselves, what will these exquisitely precise, guided munitions be target at?
I would remind you of our middle east and Kosovo experience where we ran out of identifiable targets in a matter of days despite the enemy remaining widespread and abundant!
There are of course also UNguided MLRS rockets, which use spinning for stabilization in flight. I guess the problem with those is that a moving ship pitching and rolling on the ocean is much different from a land-based launcher in a fixed position. We certainly have techniques that adjust for this for naval guns, but I think we'd need to think about whether those techniques will be adequate for rockets, which take longer to launch than gun rounds do. One advantage of the guided rockets is that this becomes less of a problem.
DeleteThe unguided rockets are probably good enough for area attacks, although we DO need to be sure they are accurate enough to not land on our own troops!
Expect any unguided rockets at 20 miles would be blown substantially off course in any wind, as are shells with substantially less size than a rocket and less effected by the wind. Army artillery battalions have their own mini weather stations to monitor atmospheric conditions to assist in targeting their shell barrage on target.
Delete"There are of course also UNguided MLRS rockets,"
DeleteWe used unguided, 5" rockets quite effectively in WWII amphibious assaults BUT ONLY AS AREA SUPPRESSION weapons.
@CNO
DeleteThere are also weapons (or accessories) that fall in between the guided and unguided category: course correcting fuzes, or CCFs
CCFs dramatically reduce cumulative errors in trajectory and give 'unguided' munitions very small CEPs.
CCFs are relatively cheap and can be used to confuse counter-battery radars by altering ballistic flight paths of shells and rockets.
GAB
Either US or China has abandoned armor division, no more concentrate large number of tanks together in fighting. Rather, both emphasize ground force in many smaller units with different weapons - mix of tanks and wheeled armor vehicles in a battalion.
ReplyDeleteToday, advanced nation has a slogan - find and destroy. Once you are detected and precisely located, basically, you are in great danger. Therefore, concentrate tanks together is not only easy to be detected but also hard to survive.
For marine, large scale amphitheater landing in a confined area brings death. It is not WWII any more. Just use outdated old style mines in water can slow down marine a lot and end up in a slaughter.
As people say - generals usually fight last war. Forget previous glories and prepare for next with hope never happen.
To be fair, terrain dictates the feasibility of large armor formations. Much of Asia is unsuitable for large Blitzkreig-style maneuvers. But that doesn't mean that they're obsolete everywhere, and combined arms warfare, where armor works in conjunction with air and other ground forces is still quite viable. So while you wouldnt see the Marines using huge massed armor formations in the Pacific, eliminating their armor, and the capabilities it brings, is foolish...
DeleteI'm reminded of the Malaysian campaign and the fall of Singapore. The British, didn't bring anti tank weapons nor armor, due to the belief the terrain wasn't suitable for it. The Japanese, did not share that belief.
Delete"US or China has abandoned armor division, no more concentrate large number of tanks together"
DeleteYou seem not to understand what an armored division is. In WWII, for example, the 1st Armored Division in 1943 consisted of the following units:
-Headquarters Company
-Combat Command A
-Combat Command B
-Reserve Command
-1st Tank Battalion
-4th Tank Battalion
-13th Tank Battalion
-6th Armored Infantry Battalion
-11th Armored Infantry Battalion
-14th Armored Infantry Battalion
-81st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized)
-16th Armored Engineer Battalion
-141st Armored Signal Company
-1st Armored Division Artillery
-27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
-68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
-1st Armored Field Artillery Battalion
-1st Armored Division Trains
-123rd Armored Ordnance Maintenance Battalion
-47th Armored Medical Battalion
-Military Police Platoon
-Band
As you can see, an armored division is NOT just a massive collection of tanks. It consists of infantry, tanks, artillery, engineers, logistics, etc.
Of course, previous armor divisions have different unit. At that, different functions were integrated at division level. An armor division has several tank battalions. Tank battalions frequently move together. Today, brigades have replaced division (less persons) as unit of land battle. Even in a brigade, less and less owns tank battalions. Rather, tank companies were put under a battalion with multiple function groups used to be integrated in division level. Rather than nations don't have advanced weaponries like N. Korea, you don't see large number of tanks moving together. US Army has even been debating whether tanks still have a role in modern day land battle. This led to very slow upgrade on M1 tanks, much slower than some other nations.
DeleteKey is Army has learned in a modern war with competent counterparts, because of proliferation of missiles, Army can no longer concentrate large number of troops (also weapons) in a small area.
As technology advance, navies of superpowers face the issue. Concentrate large number of large ships only invite saturate missile attacks. We know that all missile defense systems today are not 100%, especially face saturated attack which was initiated by Soviet Union.
@Anonymous: “Either US or China has abandoned armor…”
DeleteSomeone forgot to tell the Chinese!
Tony Cordesman at CSIS reported in 2017 that the Chinese have some 6,540 tanks of which 2,990 are modern MBTs. The PRC also have 3,950 IFVs. The PLANMC is well equipped with MBTs and amphibious IFVs and SPGs.
Russia, also an Asian power, has 2,700 tanks, of which 800 are modern MBTs. The Russians also have 5,400 IFVs.
Our potential advisories have better doctrine, more flexible organizations (brigades!), have vastly superior firepower (armor and artillery), and are fully proficient in the employment of their forces.
The USMC fantasy that “infantry is the solution” and marines will never have to fight modern tanks is patently absurd.
GAB
US also has lots of tanks.
DeleteWe don't talk about number but how they are used.
During WWII, German started concentrating tanks together while France distributed them in small groups. German's way worked beautifully. At that time, there were not many good anti-tank weapons. Concentrate tanks together gave good coverage of subsequent troops.
Today, if you dispatch 500 tanks in a confined area to lead a charge, you simply commit suicide as there are many upon many excellent anti tank weapons. Furthermore, most important, large number of tanks cannot be hidden.
@Anonymous
DeleteYou are talking in circles...
From personal experience, you can't see a tank in thick vegetation except at close ranges, ranges that are often within the minimal arming distances of most US anti-tank weapon systems.
ReplyDeleteI doubt we will see massed tank formations in the Pacific. I suspect we will see single or a few tanks detached to support infantry units, as the US did in Vietnam.
I do believe theres footage of the 11th Cavalry regiment operating in such a manner on youtube. Using M113s and M551s to bulldoze paths thru the jungle to assualt enemy positions and create a path for the infantry thru the foliage.
I would remind all that tanks and other armored vehicles were used extensively in the WWII Pacific island campaign.
DeleteI would agree that massed armor formations will be much rarer in the future, however armor has an even greater advantage over infantry today than even a generation ago.
DeleteTanks now have a huge potential in sensors (thermal, LIDAR, RADAR, SONAR, acoustic, etc.) making it very difficult for infantry to hide from the superior firepower of tanks. There is little to nothing infantry can due to stop an armored formation; effective infantry anti-armor weapons are not really man-portable (the ancient TOW missile is ~60lbs) and the advent of active armor makes those weapons less viable.
'The Pacific' region of the world features tremendously varied terrain and climate to include deserts, jungles, forests, mountains, and of course significant urban areas.
GAB
Tank has a problem - strong IR signature while move, heat from engine.
DeleteDuring WWII, there was no IR homing missiles. Today, lots of anti tank missiles have IR homing. Some even take an IR image first thus follow the shape while ignore flare shot from tanks.
Javelin and China's HJ-12 can even attack top of a tank where armor is not as thick as front.
@Anonymous
DeleteCurrent active armor systems, particularly APS, have pretty much put paid to infantry ATGMs, including top attack weapons.
Russian Arena-E Active Protection System
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xjdAHnfkHL4
Israeli Rafael Trophy APS:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6aA9HsmLHBQ
German Rheinmetall APS
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKeuVHKc92U
GAB
@Anonymous
DeleteHere is the best explanation of APS from Janes:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XxmkrSy8B3o
GAB
To piggy back off you GAB, smoke canisters and jamming also capable of disrupting laser and IR type missiles.
DeleteThose are one of the reasons the BGM71 (TOW) missile is still service, as are similar wire guided missiles in other countries.
Even in a tanks worst environment, such as urban combat, recent combat in Syria has shown, even against modern anti tank weapons, even dated designs with reactive armor are capable of shrugging off missiles with regularity.
@GAB, do you mind sharing the information that APS could defeat top-attack munitions? My understanding is that it's currently infeasible making Javelins, HJ-12 and Israel Spike 3 highly sought after by many countries. Most tests I saw make it seems like top-attack munition is extremely difficult to defeat, often failing to do so in acceptable timeline and distance.
DeleteAdding to the information above, APS is still in its infancy and it already takes 3-4 coordinated projectiles from the same side to even be overwhelmed. Although there could exist a similar fragmentation issue similar to the Navy's missile shoot-shoot-look scheme, it is projected to be able to defeat 6-7 projectiles simultaneously (and even low-velocity KE round) which is vastly more than any infantry squad's ability bring to the table currently.
@Ipman9114
DeleteMore updated ERA schemes include top armor protection and newer tanks, such as the T14 have crewless turrets and increased armor thickness. The Javes, and similar weapons, are still susceptible to jamming and smoke, if said systems are installed and used.
Sidenote; The newer TOWs, I think the BGM71A2, has the ability switch between horizontal and top down in a similar way to the Javelin. I believe that version is available to export and is compatible with most digital launcher systems.
@lpnam9114 "... do you mind sharing the information that APS could defeat top-attack munitions?"
Delete“Arena is intended to protect tanks from antitank grenades and ATGMs and top attack munitions, including ATGMs launched from aerial platforms.” ‘Active Protective Systems: Impregnable Armor or Simply Enhanced Survivability?’ By Captain Tom Meyer, page 9, ARMOR magazine May-June 1998. https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/3aps98.pdf
APS and other active systems are seriously complex – and classified. I thought the analyst in the Janes video I linked above did an excellent job explaining the concepts - did you look at that video? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XxmkrSy8B3o
If you watched the video, what are your specific questions?
The Arena, Raphael, and Rheinmetall APS videos showed ‘some’ of the capabilities of those systems – they work. Keep in mind that the Russians have Field several APS systems starting in the late 1970s (Drozd, Shtora, Arena, Afghanit, etc.).
Anecdotal evidence is that the Ukrainian ground forces were unable to damage a single Russian T-90 MBT due to its APS and Russian EW. The Ukrainians reportedly claimed that the 2S1 Gvozdika SPH in a direct fire mode was their most reliable anti-tank system.
GAB
@GAB, I'm having a hard time trying to understand the extent of their proven capabilities as manufacturer's claim often overestimated by a large margin.
DeleteFor now, here's what I could compile on the general state of APS.
+ Proven: Short-range AT system (Israel and Ukraine) and flat-trajectory ATGM (Israel and successful intercepts by Ukrainian APS), Mortars.
+ Unproven: High Velocity KE (Arena is rumored to achieve this), low-velocity KE (Rheinmetall has published research regarding the abillity to do this but no videos have surfaced yet), Top-attack ATGMs are talked about and demonstrated through some examples in possible ways to defeat it but none reflect actual top-attack munitions. They are more representative of mortars or artillery rounds and rockets.
I'm not saying I doubt the actual effectiveness of APS but information is scare and far-between. Some claimed they are the next big thing and others believe they are just a marginal change from the already proven use of ERA or armor.
If you have any articles go in depth in APS, I would be glad to read more about it!
@lpnam9114" I'm having a hard time trying to understand the extent of their proven capabilities as manufacturer's claim often overestimated by a large margin."
Delete++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Your question is like asking for performance details on the Type 93 torpedo in 1940, but worse because you are asking about *Russian secrets*… Not to be flip, but Russians are (were?) so paranoid that they intentionally push the wrong button in the elevator of their apartment building to conceal the floor they live on from strangers.
The usual sources to watch are articles/reports from FAS, Defense Science Journal, RAND, CSIS, Armor Magazine, Potomac Institute, etc. – the battle analysis of conflicts is telling.
Janes is probably the best open-source asset, but you are going to have to pay, or visit the library to borrow specific articles or texts. Noted experts Richard M. Ogorkiewicz and Rolf Hilmes (writes in primarily in German and he has video presentations, also in German) are excellent sources - I cannot recall anything by Ogorkiewicz since 2012.
Suspicion is warranted, but the Russians have multiple generations of APS (Hard and Soft-kill), and everyone else has, or is buying in.
APS is not a panacea; the hard-kill munitions are certainly limited and the components are subject to damage. All that said, even a 30% effectiveness rate could be a major game changer. ANd a lot fewer 'top attack' ATGMs are going to get fired than we think. I think RAND played with APS in a model of armored combat.
GAB
Heres an video released by the US army during Vietnam.
ReplyDeletehttps://youtu.be/_sOEkhvntOk
Great video!
DeleteMy only thought to this whole Marines fiasco is where the Navy's involvement in this?
ReplyDeleteThis whole small units missile wielding concept seems perfectly suited for the Navy's Special Warfare unit. If it had any chance at working, I would think a specifically trained unit with clandestine entry method has the best chance at it. I wonder why they haven't talked much about the Marines choices or at least see through the requirements require to support MULTIPLE Marines insertion.
The problem with clandestine insertions, in this mission case, is that the 'weapon' is a very large, unwieldy missile PLUS TRANSPORT TRUCK of some sort. It is very difficult to clandestinely insert trucks into an enemy's territory! It's also very difficult to transport trucks inside submarines (a common clandestine delivery method) or clandestinely transport them aboard cargo ships.
DeleteLet's play devil's advocate for a bit here.
DeleteWhat if we could bring in missiles using a repurposed oiler and cargo ships? Of course, this means that the re-supply would have to take between weeks to arrive (as to not raise suspicion)and the NSW unit would have to make do with what they have inside the island. The more problematic issue would be that at best we could get a dozen missile and at worst, the effort will be thrashed and our unit will be destroyed before it get a chance at operating.
This does represent a distinct possibility of carrying out the Marine's concept. One could accept this risk if it presented a high enough reward to justify the operation. A dozen AShm or Land-attack missiles isn't enough to penetrate/damage anything.
"Let's play devil's advocate for a bit here."
DeleteOkay, but you didn't really advocate anything! As you say,
"A dozen AShm or Land-attack missiles isn't enough to penetrate/damage anything."
A handful of missiles, even if you could work out all the other problems, can't accomplish much. We've talked about needing hundreds of missiles to overwhelm a Chinese surface group. A handful of missiles won't do anything.
If that's the best 'advocating' we can do then the concept really is bad - devilishly bad!
"In short, the Navy has very little to contribute to an offensive strategy."
ReplyDeleteThe Navy needs 1) offensive weapons, 2) offensive platforms, and 3) an offensive mindset. I've discussed my ideas for all three of these at length and won't repeat here.
"In short, the Marines have very little to contribute to an offensive strategy."
The Marines need to go back and focus on their heritage. When the Royal Marines were faced with budgetary extinction in the 1950s/60s/70s, they reinvented themselves as amphibious and commando specialists. I think that's what the Marines need to do. Quit being "baby Army" with a "baby Air Force" and start being Marines again. That would be a smaller Corps, with obvious budgetary implications, but that would be a truly elite and focused organization.
As far as the amphibious mission, I don't foresee an opposed assault against mainland China or Russia, but that doesn't mean no opportunities, even in a peer war. I could see places for amphibious ops around the first island chain, or in the eastern Med, or in the Baltic, or in the Persian/Arabian Gulf against a rogue state. And there could be a number of port seizure operations against the Chinese "string of pearls" in south Asia and Africa.
Over at WarOnTheRocks, several posters have suggested merging the Marines and SOCOM. That's basically what the Royal Marines did, and again what they did could be a roadmap.
The Navy needs to give the Marines a bit of help on the amphib side. The LHAs/LHDs and San Antonio LPDs are too expensive to be risked close enough to shore to mount an effective assault, and the LAW is too small, too slow, and not stealthy enough to be useful. Something in between the two is needed.
"they reinvented themselves as amphibious and commando specialists."
DeleteKeep firmly in mind that what they did was NOT because they believed that was the best mission for them but because that was the ONLY mission that allowed them to survive from a budget perspective. In other words, what they did may well have been the lesser of evils rather than the best possible option. The proof is that if they believed it was the best possible option they would have done it BEFORE being threatened with budgetary extinction. Never confuse the least BAD option with a good option.
"a smaller Corps, ... but that would be a truly elite and focused organization."
Why would a Corps with a focus on women, gender equity, multi-gender identifications, pregnancy accommodations, diversity, lowered physical fitness requirements, gender-normed training, climate concerns, and, now, extremist witch hunts ever constitute an 'elite and focused organization'? They would just be a mundane, screwed up organization with a different mission to screw up.
"what the Royal Marines did, and again what they did could be a roadmap."
What the RM did was a path of failure. Is that really the roadmap you want to follow? They may not have had any choice but we still do.
So what is your idea of a good option?
Delete"So what is your idea of a good option?"
DeleteI've pretty well laid it out in previous posts and comments. I see the core mission as port (?and airport? don't know since it duplicates an Army mission) seizure which would allow large scale follow on forces to enter and resupply.
Just as a point of contemplation, what if a Marine port seizure force had existed at the time of the Normandy assault? How would D-Day have differed and would it have turned out better in terms of objectives accomplished versus casualties incurred? It certainly would have been a much smaller scale operation, at least initially although the follow on forces to deal with the expected German reinforcements would have still had some major battles to fight but, at least, we would have had a major port to work with right from the start. Remember, quickly restoring functionality is a part of the port seizure mission! Something to think about.
This non-expert has a couple questions about the port seizure idea. I've read your previous post on it, but these still bother me.
Delete(1) If the marines focus on port seizure, won't that allow the enemy to concentrate their defense forces on the small number of ports instead of a much larger number of beaches?
Which of course would mean that the marines would be assaulting concentrated defenses. Presumably including anti-air defenses which would probably be lethal to the aircraft (or helicopters) carrying airborne troops.
(2) It seems like any area bombardment in support of the landing would likely destroy much of the port infrastructure that we need. I understand that you propose to repair it, but just saying.
(3) Ports are almost always in urban areas, and urban warfare is among the most difficult warfare for modern Western armies, and significantly reduces our technological advantages.
Given this, it seems to me that such an assault would be "fraught", with high risks and limited probability of success, at least against a capable and determined defense force.
What am I missing?
Regarding the port seizure mission, is it feasible to rapidly built a make-shift port near or equal to an organic port?
DeleteMy view is that port is a flat piece of ground that have cranes and fuel pipelines (which we will have to bring our own anyway). Could we capture an open piece of land and use a large enough amount of pontoon with makeshift warehouse to sustain a follow up force? Maybe at least before or in conjunction with the primary effort of capturing the real port?
"Regarding the port seizure mission, is it feasible to rapidly built a make-shift port near or equal to an organic port?"
DeleteWell, it's not trivial, but has been done. Remember, ports are typically in harbors, which provide protection from weather. And they also provide deep water close to shore since Cargo ships, unlike landing craft, require it. So an artificial port needs breakwaters (for the weather protection) plus piers (probably long ones since they have to go out all the way to deep water).
Two artificial harbors and ports were built for the D-Day invasion in World War II. They were called "Mulberry". All that heavy stuff (the breakwaters and piers and whatnot) had to be towed across the English Channel to be put in position.
Note that the towing distance across the English Channel was only a few tens of miles. Not sure of the implications of trying to do a Mulberry in the Western Pacific.
"Regarding the port seizure mission, is it feasible to rapidly built a make-shift port near or equal to an organic port?"
DeleteThe US Navy actually does have a limited capability similar to what you probably had in mind (temporary causeway out to deep water to unload vehicles and cargo, and large pipes and hoses for fuel). It's called "Logistics Over The Shore" (or JLOTS -- the "J", of course, is for "Joint"). But it's more limited than a real port. And I suspect it doesn't work in bad weather as well as a real port.
"Keep firmly in mind that what they did was NOT because they believed that was the best mission for them but because that was the ONLY mission that allowed them to survive from a budget perspective."
DeleteThe USMC may be closer to that position than you seem to want to acknowledge. It would probably be political suicide to end the Corps, but the more they try to play "bsby Army" and "baby Air Force," the more they expose themselves to attacks that they are redundant. They need a unique mission to ensure survival, and they used to have one. That mission still exists, and going back to it seems to make sense to me.
"Why would a Corps with a focus on women, gender equity, multi-gender identifications, pregnancy accommodations, diversity, lowered physical fitness requirements, gender-normed training, climate concerns, and, now, extremist witch hunts ever constitute an 'elite and focused organization'?"
Where did I indicate that I would favor a Corps focused on, "women, gender equity, multi-gender identifications, pregnancy accommodations, diversity, lowered physical fitness requirements, gender-normed training, climate concerns, and, now, extremist witch hunts"? I want a Corps, like all branches, focused on mission. Women and gender equity are here to stay as concerns, and along with that pregnancy accommodations are inevitable, but things like multi-gender identifications, lowered physical fitness requirements, gender-normed training, climate concerns, and extremist witch hunts need to disappear. If you are a woman who can compete with the guys, you go girl. If you are a guy who can't, sucks to be you.
"What the RM did was a path of failure. Is that really the roadmap you want to follow?"
They seem to have implemented it pretty successfully. They remain an elite, focused organization. They were pretty successful in the Falklands, admittedly not against a peer opponent, but given the constraints under which they operated, that was by no means a walkover.
"1) If the marines focus on port seizure, won't that allow the enemy to concentrate their defense forces on the small number of ports instead of a much larger number of beaches? Which of course would mean that the marines would be assaulting concentrated defenses. Presumably including anti-air defenses which would probably be lethal to the aircraft (or helicopters) carrying airborne troops."
DeleteNormandy may actually be viewed as a port seizure operation. We wanted Cherbourg and Le Havre, but going directly into either would have been the kind of suicide mission you describe. So we picked a spot in between that was less heavily defended, established a beachhead, did the Mulberry thing to get a limited amount of stuff over, and then proceeded to take Cherbourg and Le Havre. Cherbourg was out on a peninsula, so we cut off the base, and it fell within a month. It took another month to repair what the Germans had destroyed, but from the time we got it back up and running until the end of the war, Cherbourg was the busiest port in the world. Le Havre fell in September, and after that we had two ports through which to offload logistics to support the push into Europe.
"(2) It seems like any area bombardment in support of the landing would likely destroy much of the port infrastructure that we need. I understand that you propose to repair it, but just saying."
Some obvious targets for the port seizure mission would be the Chinese "string of pearls" ports around the Indian Ocean. The objective would be not so much to use them ourselves but to prevent China from using them. We would obviously have to restore them ASAP.
"(3) Ports are almost always in urban areas, and urban warfare is among the most difficult warfare for modern Western armies, and significantly reduces our technological advantages."
Urban warfare would be one area where Marine commandos would receive intensive training, and would work to develop new and better tactics and techniques.
"If the marines focus on port seizure, won't that allow the enemy to concentrate their defense forces on the small number of ports instead of a much larger number of beaches?"
DeleteYes, the enemy would have an idea of possible targets. Germany had correctly narrowed the list of possible D-Day targets down to just a couple and hugely beefed up the defenses. Opposed assaults will be costly. That's the reality of war. It's the job of the attacking force to come up with tactics, forces, and firepower that can overcome the defenses. Again, that's what war is.
"Ports are almost always in urban areas, and urban warfare is among the most difficult warfare"
This is a partial misconception. Ports are NOT in urban areas, they're on the EDGE of urban areas, by definition, since they border the water. That means that the port, itself, is not really part of the adjoining urban area and, in any case, there is no need to go out and subdue/seize/occupy the entire adjoining city. While securing transport routes out of the port might involve a degree of urban combat, the fear of large scale urban combat is not real or required.
"Given this, it seems to me that such an assault would be "fraught", with high risks and limited probability of success, at least against a capable and determined defense force."
Have you read about Eisenhower's fears about the failure of the Normandy landings? Have you read about almost any major combat operation and the fears of the commanders? By definition, a major operation such as a port seizure will be 'fraught' with risks. THAT'S WHAT WAR IS.
"What am I missing?"
You're missing the reality of war and seem to think, as we've become conditioned to believe by decades of low level conflicts, that war can be waged without risks, death, and destruction on a massive scale.
"Some obvious targets for the port seizure mission would be the Chinese "string of pearls" ports around the Indian Ocean."
DeleteWhy would we want to take those ports? My understanding of the port seizure idea is that the port would be needed to support a major invasion force. But these are third party countries. Why invade them? If we want to block the Chinese from using those ports, why not just mine them or attack them with missiles or whatever and destroy them?
"Regarding the port seizure mission, is it feasible to rapidly built a make-shift port near or equal to an organic port?"
DeleteThe short answer is no. To build such facilities you'd wind up building an actual port and, by definition, it wouldn't be in a desirable location. This is exactly what we did at Normandy while we were waiting for the ports to be captured and repaired. We moved a lot of cargo across the beach but it came nowhere near meeting the requirements to sustain he armies. We had to have actual ports.
Think about all that's required to make a port. Aside from the docks (dredging the ocean???), you need giant cranes to unload cargo, giant storage lots for vehicles and cargo sorting, an extensive road system to transport the cargo from the port area to the front lines, and the ability to handle many ships simultaneously. There's a reason why ports are immense! Trying to do that on an ad hoc basis across a beach is just not feasible.
"You're missing the reality of war and seem to think, as we've become conditioned to believe by decades of low level conflicts, that war can be waged without risks,"
DeleteNo. Now that's just insulting. Of course I know there will be risks. But we need to take calculated risks. I just don't think it's fair to send our marines on what we have every reason to believe is a suicide mission.
You've said that we should do airborne insertion to initially take the port and transit corridors. But the transport aircraft and helicopters used for this type of activity are EXTREMELY vulnerable to ground fire, which will be copious since the bad guys will know we're coming. Can this type of attack actually succeed?
"They seem to have implemented it pretty successfully."
DeleteThey're a very low end, very light infantry that would have nothing to contribute to a major war. That's where you want the Marines to go?
"Some obvious targets for the port seizure mission would be the Chinese "string of pearls" ports around the Indian Ocean."
DeleteThere would be no need to seize those ports as they would not be needed to support our operations. Simply denying their use to the Chinese would suffice.
"Can this type of attack actually succeed?"
DeleteOf course it can. It all depends on applying the requisite resources and preparation. The Germans knew pretty accurately where and when the D-Day assault would come and yet we succeeded. The US knew almost exactly when Pearl Harbor would happen and yet it succeeded. History is replete with examples of the defenders knowing where/when they would be attacked and yet still losing. Why would port seizure be any different?
What we need to do is exercise this kind of operation rigorously and continuously to develop the tactics and resources required to accomplish it.
You also seem to think that there would be one and only one port for the enemy to defend. That would be extremely unlikely. There would almost always be multiple choices though not many. Even splitting the defender's forces among just two locations cuts the defender's resources in half and splits their attention. The Germans faced this at Normandy where they had narrowed the invasion locations to just a couple but had to disperse their forces to defend both/all.
We've forgotten what real war is and what the risks and costs are for a major war operation. We've come to believe that war is a squad of guys on patrol with access to air support and everyone goes back to barracks at the end of the day for a shower, pizza, and video games.
You also seem to think I'm suggesting that a port can be seized with a couple of aircraft and a platoon of Marines. The reality is that it will require massive amounts of naval fire suppression (which we haven't got), aircraft for SEAD, divisions worth of infantry, tanks (which the Marines have eliminated), artillery (which the Marines have greatly reduced), transports (which we won't risk and are unsuited), C-RAM (which we haven't got), and so on. It will require massive Air Force support to establish local air supremacy and interdict enemy reinforcements. And so on. And that's just for the initial seizure portion of the operation. Then we have to hold, secure, and repair!
One of the beneficial aspects of assaulting a port is that the defenses are self-limited by the port and surrounding urban area, itself! You can't stack the area with fortifications, for example, because there's nowhere to put them. You can't line up tank battalions because there's nowhere to put them that wouldn't present them as a massed target. You can't establish extensive SAM and AAW sites because there's nowhere to put them and the surrounding buildings would obscure/interfere with their radar and launch paths. Infantry fire sight lines are extremely limited due to buildings so the only effective defenders have to be right on the edge of the water which makes them easier targets. In short, when you start to think about it, it's a lot harder to defend a port than it is to defend an open beach.
"No. Now that's just insulting."
DeleteNo, it's a wake up nudge to get you to think on a truly war scale. It's a reality that we've all become conditioned to think that the limited casualty, limited scope operations of the past decades are what war really is and that's so far from reality that real war will utterly shock us. We, here and now, need to begin thinking in real war terms. The risk of, say, a port seizure mission is just part of war. That doesn't mean we casually accept it. Quite the opposite. We need to study the mission, exercise it, develop tactics and resources and treat it as the meat grinder mission that it will be but, in the end, we need to recognize that it is achievable and necessary and will come at a great cost. We need to begin to mentally prepare to pay the cost and not shy away from the risk just because there's risk.
Insulting? No. Eye opening? Yes.
"The US Navy actually does have a limited capability similar to what you probably had in mind (temporary causeway out to deep water to unload vehicles and cargo, and large pipes and hoses for fuel). It's called "Logistics Over The Shore" (or JLOTS -- the "J", of course, is for "Joint"). But it's more limited than a real port. And I suspect it doesn't work in bad weather as well as a real port."
DeleteI looked it up and I found out this very interesting discussion on the possibilities of ship to shore logistics: https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/05/ship-to-shore-logistics/
They talked about several different concepts of transportable port but the most interesting one is FlexiPort. Form the writer's research, he believes that one could use FlexiPort which supports ship unloading and the Lightweight Modular Causeway System that allows for heavy equipment (tanks) to be easily transported together for a rapid makeshift port.
He also note that this concept isn't new and have been used repeatedly after the Falklands conflict for North Sea oil rigs. In fact, one of the added benefits is how easily could you expand FlexiPort (as they are essentially mooring custom designed and built pontoons in sufficient depth of water to enable ships to lie alongside.).
My only worries is the weather as you mentioned but we just had to wait and see to really judge for ourselves. And who knows, there have been decades of development since then, maybe we have solved if we try it now.
"Think about all that's required to make a port. Aside from the docks (dredging the ocean???), you need giant cranes to unload cargo, giant storage lots for vehicles and cargo sorting, an extensive road system to transport the cargo from the port area to the front lines, and the ability to handle many ships simultaneously. There's a reason why ports are immense! Trying to do that on an ad hoc basis across a beach is just not feasible."
Ironically, the more you expand on it, I see it being potentially feasible. Now make no mistakes, I'm not an expert on the issue but I see several ways you can approach that.
+ Dredging operation: contrary to normal civilian operations, I could see the Navy applying massive amount of explosive to rapidly expand the depth of water without any regards to biological life.
+ Giant Crane: I have seen several examples of an offshore barge that can be be rapidly brought into use that have its own crane. If we really think about attempting this, I would say developing a dedicated crane ship is not out of the question.
+ Giant storage lots for vehicles and cargo sorting: From the FlexiPort (or the Mulberry barges) example above, I believe it's feasible to bring a large enough amount to sustain the initial divisions and then we rapidly built up that capability in the following days. If not, we restrict ourselves to areas with heavily forested areas. Using napalm, we then could clean massive amount of land for these facilities.
+ an extensive road system to transport the cargo from the port area to the front lines: This here is something I agree couldn't be rapidly done with any current capability. However, I am reminded that many highways/freeways are usually designed along coast. One could argue that one could aim for that and then build roads leading up to these roads for linking up. We may need additional invest and research on armored Road Roller, basically anything to create roads as fast as possible.
+ the ability to handle many ships simultaneously: This is of course an area of concern but I wonder if we could identify a large enough coast that many ports could be built so to alleivate the problem. If not, the FlexiPort concept seems to provide a possible solution.
That's just my initial thoughts. I will probably look into more ways to handle many ships simultaneously.
The concepts you're looking at are for small quantities relative to the logistics requirements of armies in the field. If all you need to support is a brigade, you might be able to do it. Armies consume unimaginable quantities of everything. Look at the throughput of Cherbourg and Le Havre, among others, during WWII. It's almost inconceivable! Again, we've completely forgotten what it takes to sustain an army in the field.
Delete". . . but the more they try to play (sic) "bsby Army" and "baby Air Force," the more they expose themselves to attacks . . ."
DeleteExcept, by federal law, the Marine Corps shall consist of three divisions and three airwings.
"Just as a point of contemplation, what if a Marine port seizure force had existed at the time of the Normandy assault? . . . It certainly would have been a much smaller scale operation, at least initially . . ."
DeleteI thought the Dieppe raid (Operation Jubilee) proved that you either go big on an amphibious assault or you don't go at all.
And, even if you attacked the port, a well defended area, you would still need to land troops by air or by sea to the surrounding areas to block reinforcements from entering the port. As it was, it took the Allies about 12 days to seize Cherbourg.
"I thought the Dieppe raid (Operation Jubilee) proved …"
DeleteDieppe proved that if you have no idea how to conduct an operation you'll probably fail. Dieppe was a live fire training exercise whose objective was to learn how to conduct an amphibious assault. In that, it succeeded brilliantly as the lessons learned led to the success of Normandy and all the Pacific island assaults.
"you either go big on an amphibious assault or you don't go at all."
You go as big as you need to and with the resources you need. Seizing the single port of Cherbourg would have been a smaller operation if for no other reason than there wouldn't have been room to cram unlimited troops and ships in the harbor area.
Inserting interdiction forces would, of course, be part of the operation. Where and how many would be required is unknown but, again, interdicting at a specific point is a smaller operation than interdicting across a broad front, as was done. The land (meaning road) approaches to Cherbourg would have severely limited the German reinforcement options and simplified the Allied interdiction effort. The Germans would, in essence, have been 'funneled' into kill zones by the existing road system, assuming the Allies could have successfully established a sufficient blocking force.
Interestingly, serious consideration was given to attacking and seizing Cherbourg directly.
"Interestingly, serious consideration was given to attacking and seizing Cherbourg directly."
DeleteAny idea why the Allies abandoned attacking Cherbourg and landed at Normandy instead?
I was afraid you were going to ask that. I'm sorry, I don't know the reasoning.
Deletelpnam: "I would say developing a dedicated crane ship is not out of the question."
DeleteActually, we already have a couple of crane ships in the ready reserve fleet. No idea what condition they're in -- they're probably pretty old by now.
It appears we have ten T-ACS crane ships. They were built mostly in the early to mid 1960's as various types of ships and then later converted to crane ships. They've been in the ready reserve since the mid-1980's. Yes, they're old!
Delete"Insulting? No. Eye opening? Yes."
DeleteOK CNO, I don't think we actually disagree much. Perhaps on emphasis.
Let's pretend for the moment that I'm SecNav, the civilian non-military-specialist who has to decide whether to invest in this capability, or to approve a particular operation. I have three concerns:
(1) Risk. I'm not crazy enough to believe that we can do this for free, and I'm not going to reject it because people will be killed. Heck, even in Desert Storm we expected a lot more casualties than we got, and we certainly can't assume that the Russians or Chinese will be as incompetent as the Iraqi army was. So yeah, of course a lot of people will be killed.
(2) Benefit - should be much larger than the risk. In this case I suspect that it is.
(3) Is it achievable? Obviously we can't be 100% certain that it's achievable because everything goes wrong in war, but neither should it be a coin flip or, worse, a desperate Hail Mary move. I don't want to sacrifice the lives of perhaps thousands or more Marines if there's a high likelihood of failure. You mentioned that Eisenhower worried about the possibility of failure at Normandy. Of course he did. He was a thoughtful guy who didn't want to waste the lives of thousands of soldiers. But I'm also pretty sure that he was fairly confident that the odds were in his favor. Otherwise he wouldn't have launched the operation.
A specific concern I have is whether it's actually possible to insert enough forces in the initial assault to overcome what will be very intense resistance. You mentioned air insertion. Consider though. A port, while it's much larger than my backyard, is still quite small compared to, say, all the beaches of Normandy, or an airfield. And it's not a wide open space. There are warehouses, stacked cargo containers, giant cranes, trucks, and other obstructions. How many helicopters could we actually bring in simultaneously? And, given that some will be shot down due to intense ground fire, note that succeeding waves can bring in even fewer troops than the first. Will it be enough? I don't know. A similar argument might apply for parachute insertion. There's a limited number of places for paratroops to land because of all the obstructions, and only a limited number of transports can be overhead that limited area at a time, or else they will get in each other's way. Plus they also have to be careful about running into the paratroopers from the preceding plane!
Similarly, for the amphibious reinforcement (which would bring all the heavy equipment), there's a limit to how many landing craft can simultaneously land on the limited frontage of the port. It would be almost like trying to run the whole Normandy invasion though ONE of the beaches. Can the rate of landing be large enough to overcome the resistance?
So, if I'm SecNav and you bring me this plan, I'm going to say "Hmmm ... sounds interesting, but I'm not sure it's achievable. So go do some detailed planning and war gaming (hopefully realistic war gaming) and come back and show me how to do it successfully."
I don't blame you for not having done this yet. Obviously it takes a whole staff and you don't have that. But I would want to see some of it before actually committing big bucks to investing in the capability.
"I was afraid you were going to ask that. I'm sorry, I don't know the reasoning."
DeleteI'm not playing "Gotcha" here, but I think I found out why.
From Wiki, "The Germans had so thoroughly wrecked and mined the port of Cherbourg that Hitler awarded the Knight's Cross to Rear Admiral Walter Hennecke the day after he surrendered for "a feat unprecedented in the annals of coastal defense."[1] The port was not brought into limited use until the middle of August; although the first ships were able to use the harbor in late July. Nevertheless, the Germans had suffered a major defeat as a result of a rapid Allied build up on their western flank and Hitler's rigid orders. General Friedrich Dollmann, commanding the German Seventh Army, died on 28 June, having just been informed of a court martial pending as a result of the capture of Cherbourg, reportedly from a heart attack but possibly by suicide by poisoning."
I'm guessing the Allies figured if they attacked Cherbourg directly the Germans would make Cherbourg unusable for the Allies or the port would be damaged as a result of the attack itself. I'm sure the British made similar plans fearing a possible German invasion early in the war.
"Why would we want to take those ports? My understanding of the port seizure idea is that the port would be needed to support a major invasion force. But these are third party countries. Why invade them? If we want to block the Chinese from using those ports, why not just mine them or attack them with missiles or whatever and destroy them?"
DeleteThose might be alternatives. Whichever is best would probably vary by port, although our offensive mining capability is fairly small at this point.
"although our offensive mining capability is fairly small at this point."
DeleteMay be true. Although QuickStrike mines, at least, are just Air Force 500 pound, 1000 pound or 2000 pound bombs with different fusing. So I imagine we ought to be able to make more fairly quickly.
"I don't blame you for not having done this yet. Obviously it takes a whole staff and you don't have that. But I would want to see some of it before actually committing big bucks to investing in the capability."
DeleteWell, of course!!!! Obviously we need to exercise and train for the mission. We may conclude that it's impossible … we won't because nothing is impossible, it's just a matter of the necessary resources and that's what extensive gaming, exercising, and training will tell us: what resources we need.
I'll offer this analogy: we have Army and Air Force units dedicated to airport/airbase seizure so we obviously believe that's possible and it has many of the same challenges and, in terms of defenses, even more challenges because it's a more open, spread out area.
I assume you read my comment about the challenges and limitations that the defenders would face which self-limits their defense capability? All the same challenges you mention for the attacker apply to the defender, as well.
I'm not remotely pretending that this is an easy operation that a couple of squads can handle before lunch. This would be a very significant undertaking. However, I see no reason why it would be impossible.
The reality is that if you're going to conduct foreign ground operations then you need a port(s) somewhere to support it. We were fortunate in Desert Storm that we had friendly port(s) to use. That won't always be the case and then it's mandatory to seize a port. The mission capability really isn't optional. It's just a question of whether we want to have a trained force for the mission or have to WWII-wing it and learn on the fly how to do it.
So, by all means be skeptical but recognize that it's not really optional. Ask yourself, if you don't want the Marines to be capable of this, how are you going to secure a port when you need one?
"The Germans had so thoroughly wrecked and mined the port of Cherbourg"
DeleteThe Normandy operation used 250+ minesweepers so mine removal would have been no more of a concern than for Normandy and the limited area of the harbor would have actually meant FEWER mines to remove.
The Cherbourg port facilities were supposed to have been destroyed by the Germans but in actuality were only partially destroyed for reasons unknown (probably the general confusion of war). The degree of destruction was large BECAUSE THE PORT WAS NOT SEIZED INITIALLY AND QUICKLY. One would hope that a direct attack on the port would have lessened the degree of destruction but that is by no means certain. Whether a direct seizure or eventual, indirect seizure the Allies would have had to plan on rebuilding much of the port facilities so that consideration was likely a wash either way.
In the event, the Allies were able to restore the port to function within a matter of months which, in the scale of a multi-year war is remarkably fast.
So, there were challenges with either a direct port assault or the indirect Normandy assault. The port facilities would have been largely destroyed and required rebuilding either way. Thus, I'm not seeing any strong rationale one way or the other for either direct or indirect assault. I know the Allies debated the issue at length which tells me that they believed either option could work. In the end, I'm left not knowing the Allied rationale for choosing the indirect option.
The Germans couldn't have known that the Allies opted not to assault Cherbourg directly so I wonder what types of defenses they had in place at the port? I've never read anything about that.
@lpnam9114 "I looked it up and I found out this very interesting discussion on the possibilities of ship to shore logistics: https://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/05/ship-to-shore-logistics/"
DeleteThat series of articles from TD is great.
GAB
@Fighting Irish: "Any idea why the Allies abandoned attacking Cherbourg and landed at Normandy instead?”
DeleteConsider the enemy disposition: Overlord was about bridges first (24 hours) and ports second. https://i.pinimg.com/originals/ec/5b/7d/ec5b7dd2ce469df37e2f144231fb05e5.jpg
The port was worthless without the bridges and rail lines need to move supplies from the port. There were two German Army groups that controlled the key bridges and rail lines around Caen and also threatened the flank of any Allied landing near Cherbourg. The last thing any Allied ground commander wanted to do was to get bottled up on the Carentan peninsula by trying to land directly in swampy Cherbourg, lose any opportunity for maneuver, and let the Germans destroy the bridges and rail lines required for future operations.
The objective of Overlord was not simply to land on continental Europe and declare victory, or to seize the port of Cherbourg, although that was a key task: the mission was to land two Army Groups and conduct combat operations leading to the defeat of Nazi Germany.
The plan was to seize key bridges at Caen (Caen and Orne river bridges) behind the invasion beaches, land the initial forces, move inland and turn the flank of two Germans army groups, which would cut-off Cherbourg from the Germans. Reducing the Carentan peninsula and seizing the port were second steps. Eisenhower was prepared to lose 80% of his Airborne forces (three divisions: British 6th, USA 82nd and 101st), if required to seize the Orne river bridges, canal crossings and causeway exits, which tells you what Allied commanders prioritized.
GAB
"The degree of destruction was large BECAUSE THE PORT WAS NOT SEIZED INITIALLY AND QUICKLY."
DeleteI guess it comes down to what the Germans could have done to damage the port during the time they were under attack. As it is, it took the Allies 11 days to secure Cherbourg.
Could the Allies have taken Cherbourg sooner in a direct attack? Maybe. But, even if they took Cherbourg in 4 or 5 days, that's plenty of time to do some damage. And, if the Germans had done some preparations beforehand, They could have achieved more.
"I guess it comes down to what the Germans could have done to damage the port during the time they were under attack."
DeleteBarring a total surprise attack and instantaneous seizure of the port, some degree of destruction of the port facilities was always going to be a given. The longer the Germans held the port, the more extensive the damage they could have wrought.