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Tuesday, March 23, 2021

LCS Bridge Wings

We’ve talked about the demise of the Navy’s in-house ship design expertise (General Board and BuShips) and the subsequent farming out of the design responsibility to industry and the negative consequences that engenders.  Here’s one small example of that phenomenon.  The Independence LCS variant was designed without bridge wings.  Bridge wings, as you know, are a fairly standard feature that allows the ship to be safely maneuvered in tight quarters such as when docking.

 

The lack of a bridge wing for the LCS was quickly found to be a problem and bridge wings were eventually incorporated into production beginning with USS Kansas City (LCS-22) and retrofitted to those ships lacking them.

 

In the photo below, you can see the LCS without bridge wings.

 



 

In the next photo, bridge wings have been added.


 




As best I can tell, the omission of bridge wings was a cost savings measure which, as it turned out, wound up costing more money after retrofitting, than it saved!  This also illustrates ComNavOps’ recurring theme about not designing WARships to a business case.  This business case design wound up costing more money, in the end, and produced a less efficient ship. 

 

Interestingly, the Swedish Visby corvette is a notable example of a ship without bridge wings – likely due to its extreme emphasis on stealth – but it compensates with an extensive camera system.

 

The Zumwalt class was also built without bridge wings and will likely never be retrofitted as the ships have been relegated to experimental use, for the time being.  I don’t know the rationale for omitting bridge wings on the Zumwalt – perhaps a stealth measure?  I also don’t know if Zumwalt has a compensating camera system.


35 comments:

  1. LCS isn't really a stealth ship, but I'm gonna go ahead and say the designers scrapped the bridge wings because they didn't "look stealthy" - the #1 design requirement for both classes. Bridge wings are just bolted-on bits of metal with no real plumbing or wiring, they're a really cheap and conventionally essential line item on the shipbuilding budget.

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    1. I strongly suspect cost was the issue. Recall that the original cost goal was $200M and it quickly became apparent to the Navy that the goal was not realistic so they went on a cost cutting spree. They eliminated structural elements, weakened the flight deck supports, eliminated galvanic corrosion protection, eliminated bridge wings, etc. They knew what they were doing was wrong but they did it anyway in pursuit of the cost goal over combat effectiveness. This is why you don't design combat assets to a business case.

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    2. There is no ship is 100% stealthy (radar cannot detect) but how small its reflection on a radar. Therefore, make surface area as small as possible and shape diffract radar wave to shorten enemy's radar detection range provide advantages to LCS's original strategic goals.

      LCS are designed to fight against less powerful nations. They don't have good radars nor strong navy to petrol far from their coasts. Problem is that US cannot no longer find any this kind of nation worthy of invasion.

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  2. Look at the budget, they all have camera systems. Does it put the cameras in the right places? No idea.

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  3. Even a good camera system doesn't have the capability of the human body to rapidly look in a dozen different direction from a bridge wing. If you have seen an image of the LCS bridge they are festooned with cameras. But as anyone who has done security work can tell you cameras are not a replacement for foot patrols and a sailor on bridge wing will always see more. Commercial ships all have cameras and also have bridge wings.

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    1. I would assume cameras would just as vulnerable as the nifty set the BMW I own. Is all cool on nice clear day. But add rain and mud and dirt roads and the 360 surround view and warning blips well suffers degradation I would hate to lack my rear view mirror.

      Also note of course the nifty navigation system is prone in the rural west to miss your destination by a bit or more... So yes I think I would vote to have people on the bridge wings adding redundancy. Unless as noted like the Visby you are clearly going all in on stealth. Although I think they would have been better off with more AIP subs really.

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  4. Good call on the LCS. However, the Visby class, unlike the LCS, has windows all around the bridge and there is a small deck behind the bridge to post lookouts. Plus, lookouts could be posted on the flight deck.

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    1. Bridge wings are not for lookouts, at least not as the primary function. They're used for maneuvering in tight spaces where a view up and down the length of the ship is required - like docking. Smaller vessels actually have duplicate helm and throttle controls on each wing.

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    2. One advantage of bridge wings over cameras is two-way communication. With a camera, you can see what's going on. From a bridge wing you can also see what's going on, but you can yell down and give hand sign instructions, which can communicate instructions a lot faster than indirect methods.

      Bridge wings are also useful for conning when alongside for underway replenishment (UNREP) or RAS for our Brit friends. I am not sure how a camera can give you the perspective you need for that. You need the perspective of the whole length of both your ship and the other ship.

      From using backup cameras in cars, I know that you can't always get the full picture from a camera.

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    3. "Smaller vessels actually have duplicate helm and throttle controls on each wing."

      In lieu of bridge wings, I was thinking the deck behind the bridge would serve a similar purpose when maneuvering in tight quarters.

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    4. "I was thinking the deck behind the bridge would serve a similar purpose when maneuvering in tight quarters."

      No, the purpose of a bridge wing is to extend a platform as far out to the sides as possible to provide a view up and down the length of the ship. It is the extended side placement that is necessary.

      On the Visby, the deck behind the bridge not only doesn't have the extended side but it also obscures the forward view.

      Examine photos of any ship with bridge wings and you'll quickly understand the purpose and placement.

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  5. The LCS and the Zumwalt class are textbook examples of the USN being "penny wise, pound foolish." The USN sees Chinese Navy ships' quality and quantity advance to match its own, and what does it do? Try to "Skip a generation," and "Do more with less!" instead of investing the necessary resources (time, money, training, technology, INFRASTRUCTURE) to maintain what it already has, to say nothing of improving those ships.

    The rush to add as much "future technology" as possible to its ships and then build as many of those ships as possible, BEFORE conducting the necessary tests to see if the technology will function in service environments, was beyond foolish. To use the Zumwalt class as an example, the USN should've considered whether the AGS would actually be useful (spoiler: it would be of limited use for supporting an amphibious assault, as its range was shorter than truck-mounted antiship missiles commonly used for shore defense, meaning Chinese defenders could potentially mission kill the Zumwalt before the ship was close enough to suppress their defenses); fitted the Zumwalt's AGS to a ship (maybe one of the Spruance class ships that were prematurely retired to free funding for the LCS) for testing; and if it worked, then consider mounting it on new build Arleigh Burke class ships, BEFORE bankrupting itself developing a new class around an unproven weapon.

    Worse, the USN stopped ordering replacement parts necessary to keep ships currently in service, to pay for future ships' development and construction; this made businesses responsible for manufacturing those parts, to shutdown production lines, let go of trained and experienced workers; which further increased the costs of maintaining ships already in service. Are you deluded enough to burn down your own house, under the certainty you can then use the insurance payout to buy a bigger, better house? As USN procurement plans demonstrated, many officers and officials ARE.

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    1. Zumwalt is not even penny wise but a very very expensive failure. Not only a strategic blunder but also a technical failure. Many boasted before failed to materialize after spent tons of money:

      Dual band AESA --- no, failed

      Railgun -- no, failed

      155mm gun with long range projectile --- projectile ended up similar price as Tomhawk but carries far less payload and has far less range. Only 150 ordered thus make the 3 Zumwalt class' 2 (each) 155 mm gun a decoration.

      Strange, no idea -- why Army likes to use even number - 105mm(4") and 155mm(6") but Navy likes to use odd number -- 3" and 5". Navy only puts 155mm gun on Zumwalt but not compatible with Army's thus cannot even use Army's ammunition.

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    2. The USN should've started with designing and then working out the kinks in the electric drive the Zumwalt was poineering. The Arleigh Burke has reached the limit of its ability to accommodate new technology, particularly its ability to generate electricity for more powerful radars for defense against stealth aircraft and ballistic missiles (and the railguns you mentioned, if and when we can get them to work). The USN could've and should've designed a hull around the electric drive, and then drops the Arleigh Burke's existing top deck (radars, bridge and crew compartments, weapons, hangar and aviation facilities, etc.) atop this. Test the hell out of this "Super Arleigh Burke" to make sure the electric drive works- the Navy would've been certain everything else worked, as they were all proven- and once the electric drive is proven, add the AGS and/or new VLS in the next ship in class, the composite bridge module with its dual-band radar in the one after that... A series of baby steps towards the next generation.

      Hell, the Chinese Navy did just this in the 1990s and 2000s, building Type 051 and 052 destroyers two at a time, each two incorporating new technology, until they had Arleigh Burke analogues in the Type 052C and 052D.

      But no, the USN wanted to skip a generation. It went "all in" on future technology, BEFORE properly testing it to make sure the technology worked. The result: Three white elephants that cannot be used in combat- not even as sacrificial targets to protect more useful ships, as the Zumwalt still requires HUNDREDS of seamen to operate it, and those seamen are NOT expendable.

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    3. Zumwalt is really a victim of the Gulf War and the belief the Battleships were still relevant and that stealth was the be all end all of the future. We do have a viable electric propulsion and high power, zonal electrical system. Its still stealthy, has great aviation and boat launch. VLS with room to grow. The VLS magazine isn't a giant target and adds protection rather than lessens. Weight for a real radar if they chose to go that direction. Less draft. The potential is there for a future flight. The navy needs a design office to produce vetted designs. Then leadership gives it a thumbs up or down. If up, hand a detailed draft to the yards to bid on for detailed design and build.

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    4. "Hell, the Chinese Navy did just this in the 1990s and 2000s, building Type 051 and 052 destroyers two at a time, each two incorporating new technology, until they had Arleigh Burke analogues in the Type 052C and 052D."

      I can agree somewhat to this statement. It's the right move to invest in incremental developmental ship classes but you have to understand the nature of experimenting.

      The Type 052 (and the 051, to an extent) is a bet to catch up to the US shipbuilding industry as quickly as possible. And for that matter, a lot of technologies do fail all the time. The problem with this is the technology they have been testing may just only works in basic (perhaps scripted) environment, making the ship class unusable and unsurvivable in combat. As you know, war conditions require more than just working but hard reliable technology that can be abused over and over again.

      What the Navy needs is returning to the roots, to rely on certainty rather than a possibility. The Navy used to have one-offs ship for testing purposes in the 60s and 70s. We did it unintentionally with the Zummwalts and we can certainly do it again. But we need to stop treating our main surface force as an experiment. The ships for testing and for actual combat needs to be separated.

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    5. "The problem with this is the technology they have been testing may just only works in basic (perhaps scripted) environment, making the ship class unusable and unsurvivable in combat. As you know, war conditions require more than just working but hard reliable technology that can be abused over and over again."

      It's dangerous to assume one's opponents are guaranteed to be incompetent, as you seem to be doing. Remember where that got us in the first year of WWII? Where it got Japan as the war raged past the six months in which Yamamoto Isoroku was able to "run wild"?

      "But we need to stop treating our main surface force as an experiment. The ships for testing and for actual combat needs to be separated."

      True.

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    6. Each Zumwalt costs 4.24 billion to construct without amortizing R&D cost. If R&D is included in the three, each costs 7.5 billion, price of a USS Ford.

      It is an expensive failure.

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    7. The 2020 GAO annual report lists the Zumwalt procurement cost as $4.7B each or $8.7B with R&D. Note that those costs do not include the on-going final construction and software development costs which are funded via other mechanisms.

      The Ford total cost is well on the plus side of $14B and continues to mount as the weapon elevators, EMALS, AAG, DBR, and other costs continue to increase. Again, the Navy is burying those costs in other accounts.

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    8. "Each Zumwalt costs 4.24 billion to construct without amortizing R&D cost. If R&D is included in the three, each costs 7.5 billion, price of a USS Ford."

      I wish a Ford were only $7.5B. Closer to twice that.

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    9. " VLS with room to grow."

      I'm unaware of any VLS growth potential unless you're referring to removing the existing AGS and installing VLS in its place. The cost to do this would be staggering and I don't think there's any chance of it happening.

      "The VLS magazine isn't a giant target and adds protection rather than lessens."

      This is an unproven claim and misleading. The peripheral VLS claims to lessen the impact of a missile strike by directing the resulting explosion(s) outward thanks to a thicker interior bulkhead. It does not provide actual protection though this may fall into a semantics debate. It is also not at all clear that the thicker interior bulkhead is sufficient to actually redirect a missile hit explosion and a possible resulting sympathetic VLS missile explosion. As far as I know, this has not been tested in any way. It is also not clear that the fore and aft separation between adjacent peripheral VLS cells offers any protection from a chain reaction potentially extending the length of the ship's VLS installation. If you have any actual information or test data on this, I'd love to see it!

      "The navy needs a design office to produce vetted designs. Then leadership gives it a thumbs up or down. If up, hand a detailed draft to the yards to bid on for detailed design and build."

      This is the General Board and BuShips issue that we've posted on. One can make a pretty solid argument that the demise of both led directly to the current state of the Navy. Re-establishment of both would be a major improvement.

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    10. "It's dangerous to assume one's opponents are guaranteed to be incompetent, as you seem to be doing."

      I'm not exactly sure what you mean. I was just stating the concept of technological demonstrator which is precisely the nature of the 052 and the 051 variants (par the 052D). This fact is not only recognized by China's military inner circle and naval observers but also the Chinese goverment. China knows that they are extremely vulnerable (military-wise) from the 80s-2000s but they were willing to take the risks.

      I'm also not suggesting the Chinese are incompetent. My comment was made in response to the previous comment which points out recent US shipbuilding failures. If anything, I am just providing a different perspective to interpret China's path to success in shipbuilding. The distinction I wanted to make is that China was fully aware of their shortcomings and treat their vessel for its intended purpose, a demonstrator. From the mistakes and the problems with the preceding ship classes, they managed to create the 052D and 055 which are arguably world-class indigenous design.

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    11. "It's dangerous to assume one's opponents are guaranteed to be incompetent, as you seem to be doing."

      I think you may have misinterpreted the comment. The author was not, at all, implying that. In fact, just the opposite.

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    12. Seems there is at least 1 proven example of the disadvantage to keeping all the VLS cells in one place now. https://www.janes.com/defence-news/german-frigate-returns-to-sea/

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  6. Perhaps, not just cost saving, also increase stealthy (reduce radar reflection).

    One way to walk around with bridge wings is to add multiple cameras.

    Today, most cars have rear view camera. Some have multiple thus you don't need to turn your neck but watch cameras only.

    Of course, military is slow to adopt this than commercial side.

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    1. Because cameras can and will fail, like any other product of technology- especially if someone is shooting at it. The military needs backups in case the technological devices fail.

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  7. Who cares if our ships (and airplanes) don't work? As long as we all know how to sing Kumbaya, we will be okay.

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    1. It's frustrating government leaders are so inconsistent on the use of force. Cut the defense budget so they can fund welfare and other social services? Then the government leaders should know that places limits on what the military can do, and refrain from participating in UN peacekeeping operations, avoid using inflammatory language that can escalate tensions with other nations, and not waste money ordering cruise missile attacks on those nations! Refuse to "look weak" in front of other nations, and insist on enforcing a "rules-based international order"? Then the government leaders should know that requires a strong military, and cut social services to fund it! Try to simultaneously fund a strong military AND abundant social services? That just starves both of vital resources, preventing anyone and everyone from getting what they need to get the job done!

      War is NOT something we can afford to get into half-assed. If the people aren't ready to accept a draft, imposition of rationing, increased taxes, the sacrifice of social services and luxuries to pay for military needs- to say nothing of loss of life, permanent and crippling injuries, and personal tragedies- then they shouldn't talk nonsense about how "something should be done"!

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  8. I really wonder if anyone who had actually conned a ship had input into these designs.

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    1. In the sense that you're likely thinking … no. The Navy has farmed out the design process to industry. The Navy only provides minimal 'design objectives' for industry to work from - nothing detailed.

      For the LCS, the mistake of farming out the design process was compounded by selecting two companies WHO HAD NEVER DESIGNED OR BUILT A WARSHIP BEFORE! That was stupid compounded by stupid. Did anyone really believe a good result would come of that process?

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    2. Sadly, I dont see this problem getting better anytime soon. I know quite a few jet engine engineers and designers that aren't even in their 60s yet and they are being "retired" already, only imagine it's the same in other areas of defense, you need to make the quarter, that means replace experienced people with a bunch of kids fresh out of university....and thats when these companies still want to be in the defense business period.

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    3. The only solution that I can see is that we have to grow our own. We need a return of something like BuShips and/or the General Board. ComNavOps and I have both advocated this, but we have differed on how to staff it.

      For unrelated reasons, I have supported following the Royal Navy model and splitting line officers into Deck/Warfare and Engineering (further divided into propulsion, weapons, and air), where Engineering runs the ship and Deck/Warfare navigate and fight the ship. Each group can be much better trained in its specialty. For example, Deck/Warfare officers basically become qualified merchant masters (which helps them avoid running into other ships) and Engineering officers receive advanced education in engineering fields. Only Deck/Weapons are eligible for command at sea, which presents a career drawback for Engineering types. I would propose that their advanced career positions would include command of shore repair/maintenance/construction facilities and positions at the BuShips/General Board entity(ies). ComNavOps does not agree with the latter, and we have tangled about it before. But I'm not proposing that BuShips (call it) would consist entirely of such, or even mostly of such. BuShips used to have about 1250 people, and having 100 or so with fleet experience (albeit not in command but at least they've been at sea) plus advanced degrees in the engineering and/or naval architecture fields would seem to me to bring a highly useful perspective. I think they'd know why we need bridge wings. I think propulsion engineers would recognize why FN Jones couldn't maintain the complex LCS engine rooms, and I think the weapons engineers would understand why it makes no sense to arm the Zumwalts with a gun that can shoot only bullets that either don't exist or cost more than missiles, or air engineers would take one look at the EMALS system and conclude that PO3 Smith couldn't maintain it. And I think we need those perspectives, among others, in the design process.

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    4. Retaining internal knowledge is a big problem, not just for defense. Not sure that anybody has a good idea how to maintain it, how many young engineers are getting real world experience on complex systems? Apart from approving rapid prototyping and other similar programs where young talent can get experience, not sure what else to do...a new kind of BuShip could help some.

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    5. "approving rapid prototyping"

      I think you hit on a key there. We don't do prototyping. And we don't do rapid anything. And time costs money.

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