The LCS production run is nearing an end and the ships have been in service for over a decade so let’s take a moment and see how the promise of the LCS has panned out.
|
LCS Attribute |
Result |
Comment |
|
Speed |
fail |
Arguably the number one design attribute of the LCS, the speed has been steadily reduced to a pedestrian 35-37 kts despite so much being sacrificed at the altar of speed. |
|
Module Swapping |
fail |
This was abandoned when stability and other issues were found to preclude rapid swapping. The LCS is now a single function, non-swappable vessel. |
|
Minimal Manning |
fail |
The original minimal core crew of around 40 has ballooned up to 50-60 and now two crews per ship put the total core crew at well over one hundred. Add in the module crew, helo detachment personnel, and shore maintenance crew and the manning figure is around 200+ per ship. |
|
Deployment |
fail |
The rotating crew concept was supposed to enable extended forward deployments but the reality is that very few deployments of any kind have occurred. Most LCS have remained pier side on a nearly permanent basis. |
|
Affordability |
fail |
The LCS was originally targeted at $200M each which then increased to $220M and then on up to $750M or so before steadying out around $500M-$600M without modules. |
|
Modules |
fail |
After nearly two decades of development, no LCS has yet deployed with an effective module of any type despite each module having been dumbed down to nearly ineffective levels. |
|
Numbers |
fail |
The initial plan called for 55 LCS. The number was steadily reduced and currently stands at 35 vessels built, under construction, or on order. The first four LCS have already been retired, leaving a current total of 31 and several of those have been designated non-deployable training vessels. |
The LCS is the very epitome of a failed program. Not a single promised capability has materialized and most capabilities have been significantly dumbed down. The original concept has been completely abandoned and the entire LCS fleet has been reorganized multiple times along with total revamping of the crew training program. Speed, range, and endurance have been downgraded. The modules, which are the main weapon of the LCS, have failed completely and have been continually revised downward. The ASW module was completely abandoned and re-conceptualized when the original concept was deemed a mistake. The ASM and MCM modules are struggling with performance and weight issues. The ASuW module has been hugely downgraded and has still not been fielded in any useful, combat-effective form. The Freedom class variant is plagued by a systematic propulsion design flaw severe enough to cause the Navy to halt ship deliveries. Most LCS that have put to sea have suffered major propulsion plant failures and many have suffered multiple failures. The first four LCS have already been retired. And the list goes on …
The promise of the LCS has utterly failed to materialize. This is the very definition of abject failure.
"After nearly two decades of development, no LCS has yet deployed with an effective module of any type despite each module having been dumbed down to nearly ineffective levels."
ReplyDeleteIt's a very tough competition, but this kind of failure will be very hard to beat.
US Army to USN:"hold my beer."
DeleteIn defense of LCS, its only been 10 years in service so you can't blame the design, production or lack of usefulness after all this time....oh wait, thats not a defense,its an indictment.
"this kind of failure will be very hard to beat."
DeleteThe first four LCS have been retired, never having carried a useful, functional module (the ship's main weapon). That's embarrassing and humiliating. I wonder how many more LCS will be retired without ever carrying a module?
"I wonder how many more LCS will be retired without ever carrying a module?"
DeleteHowever many we build.
LCS 1-4 are still in commission at this time, but you aren't wrong. They don't go anywhere. Crew is 70 and includes module team + 23 AV Det now. SO yes, 140 to man the ship + AV Det. When they look at the entire rest of the world the best equivalent at the time would have been Singapore's Formidable class. 92 crew including the AV Det for 1 H-70. And they have 1 main propulsion engine type to keep track of. Same basic engine as LCS-2 and EPF. I especially like this example since they would have been sharing the same pier space in Singapore. Do what the locals are doing! Looking now the extreme low manning end seems to be Sa'ar 6 at 70 w the H-60. This is a ship that need not go very far from home and also has uncomplicated propulsion.
ReplyDelete"And they have 1 main propulsion engine type to keep track of."
DeleteYou're referring to the Combined Diesel and Diesel (CODAD) propulsion which is similar to the LCS (combined turbine and diesel) in that it requires a combining gear assembly and clutches to mix the two engines. It is the combining gear that has given the LCS ships so much trouble. So, yes, they only have one engine type but they still have an unnecessarily complex combining gear, as opposed to simply using a single engine. I'd be curious as to what their operating experience has been.
The Israeli Sa'ar 6 has the same CODAD propulsion system as the Formidable, as far as I know.
"LCS 1-4 are still in commission at this time"
DeleteYes, lawyer Andy, you're correct that they have about six more weeks until the official retirement date of 31-Mar-2021. The retirement was announced last Jun and the vessels have been idled and abandoned, as far as I know. I 'rounded' the statement off. Sue me!
Formidable has 4 20V 8000s and they don't cross connect like Freedoms do. Formidable has 2 20V 8000s per shaft, no funny stuff. Plenty of ships use that gearing format. Sa'ar 6 has only 1 20V 1163 per shaft whiich as eaasy as it gets. They don't even have an electric motor so far as I know. Pictures of Formidble arrangement are in here https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/SNAME/c94aa3c4-ac81-452f-83a9-e8fdbd2e7837/UploadedFiles/ModernNaval%20Solutions_2final.Ohmayer.Nov%202012c.pdf
DeleteYeah, the Formidable engines do cross connect since it's not a one engine to one shaft arrangement. It's two engines to one shaft which is cross connecting and means they need a combining gear of some sort to manage whether they're running on one engine or two per shaft. Whether it's any simpler than the LCS gear, I have no idea.
DeleteAnd yet they're still building... Seems as though the Navy should get some Johnny Cochran-level lawyers and get out of all the contracts asap. Theres no reason to keep building/buying ships that will never have ANY reasonable level of usefulness. The CNO stated LCS was one of his top priorities, but thats a fools errand. Rather then fight a covering action, admit the failure and cut bait. Its long overdue....!!!
ReplyDeleteI disagree with any attempt to call the LCS program a failure. I suspect each hull has created at least 8 exceptional paying jobs for retired O6-O9s. Possibly as many as 12.
ReplyDelete100% success. Perhaps 150%.
Most amazing thing is that despite Pentagon realized its failure, it cannot stop building more. This is NOT Navy only problem. Air Force wants to retire ALL A-10 but no success. $ of military industry complex and politicians keep outdated and even failed weapons in operation. A-10 were very good in old war but not today's as they are vulnerable to Stinger like missiles.
ReplyDeleteTrump has conned or coarsen Saudi to buy LCS but not dare cancel US Navy's orders.
LCS' self defense capacity is not ordinarily low but ultra low thus I doubt they can even be used to attack nations like Iran.
Was it last year? or 2019?, USN was talking about using LCS and Zumwalts to create some sort of research/test squadron, haven't heard much since....my guess, after some studies they realized it would cost a fortune to transform these ships into anything useful as OPFOR OR more likely, it was just another smokescreen from USN. I fully expect both LCS and Zumwalts to quietly go away in the night.
ReplyDeleteThey are useless, we should stop trying to figure out ways to make them something they're aren't, they will never be warships, never...just put them out of their misery.
Sea Hunter, Overlord/Ghost Fleet, and Zumwalts.
DeleteYes, the Navy has an experimental group of ships examining unmanned uses. Zumwalt is part of that, at least from time to time. I've not heard of any LCS being assigned to it.
DeleteWho were the officers making these decisions? Who were the program managers? While one would hope that negligence or incompetence of this magnitude would induce congressional proceedings, I fear that those responsible felt no repercussions and may have even benefited from this procurement disaster.
ReplyDeleteI remember a post on the Ford class program officer that ComNavOps did a while back. Does anyone have direct knowledge of where the progenitors of the LCS actually ended up?
The fact that almost nobody can answer that question without lots of digging up is proof that the LCS accomplished his intended goal, although not the stated ones.
DeleteDecision laundering as its finest.
To partially answer my own question, three admirals list the LCS prominently on their navy.mil bio pages:
DeleteRear Adm. John Neagley served as lead requirements officer for LCS in 2003.
https://www.navy.mil/Leadership/Biographies/BioDisplay/Article/2236161/rear-admiral-john-neagley/no/
Rear Adm Thomas Anderson served as Littoral Combat Ship Shipbuilding program manager (PMS 501).
https://www.navy.mil/Leadership/Biographies/BioDisplay/Article/2236423/rear-admiral-thomas-j-anderson/
Rear Adm Casey Moton led the SUPSHIP Detachment, Marinette, Wisconsin, as Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program manager’s representative.
https://www.navy.mil/Leadership/Biographies/BioDisplay/Article/2236471/rear-admiral-casey-moton/
I have no direct knowledge of their involvement beyond these biographies nor do I know whether the failure of LCS was due to or in spite of their efforts. But I firmly feel that unnecessary brief rotations of officers through these positions as well as distributed responsibilities amongst civilian staff and contractors lengthens overall program timelines and reduces culpability and pride in the product. In contrast, designating a chief designer (program manager seems much less removed), that single person carries the weight of delivering a quality product. Also, if your job was to see a design to completion, then it would also be in your interest to expedite the timeline as big as possible. Whereas if you know you will be rotated to a new project in a couple of years and the current project is already underway with no sign of completion, then you have no incentive to finish it. Ship design efforts can last 5-10 years, then construction which can take another similar amount (granted with some overlap even with minimal concurrency). A project founded on someone else's idea, will be completed by someone else in the future, therefore there is no urgency in effort or responsibility for failure.
There was an article in USNI Proceedings a few months back that proposed making two of the Zumwalts flagships for the 6th and 7th fleets and sending the third to a research/test squadron in San Diego. That makes more sense than anything else I've heard. Maybe one of each class of LCS to that research/test squadron, too, and get rid of the rest.
ReplyDeleteAs for the Ford program officer, CAPT Talbot Manvel, here is a video of his presentation at Annapolis on the Ford design effort:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=kIjvNCFXCjs
You can draw your own conclusions. What I find interesting is that there was apparently no consideration given to the opportunity cost imposed by the Ford, or to the idea that you could buy one Nimitz and one smaller conventional carrier for roughly the same cost as a Ford.
FWIW the Senate Committee on Armed Services - June 2020 recommendations for the FY2021 NDAA, have not seen the actuals in the Dec 2020 FY2021 NDAA.
ReplyDeleteMCN module procurement funding reduced to $95 million from Navy request of $219 million, as the buried mine hunting module and remote mine hunting module would occur prior to operational testing, which is planned to be completed in FY2022.
ASW reduced to $5 million, from Navy request of $62 million due to deficiencies with the new Raytheon VDS AN/SQS-62, hope sorted before installed on the FFG-62.
To be noted that both modules to be funded from Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) not from the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) budget as would be standard practise in Navy new ship build.
This is a plain as day "better is the enemy of good enough" scenario. CAPTAS 4 should be deployed on those hulls before now. The rest of this is pure catering to their Raytheon customer instead of their other customer, the rest of the American people.
Delete"their other customer, the rest of the American people."
DeleteWell said!
"CAPTAS 4 should be deployed on those hulls before now."
The only thing I can think of is that perhaps the weight was too great. The LCS are severely weight constrained and the modules are undergoing severe 'diets'. Just speculation on my part about the VDS. I have no definitive information.
Thales developed the CAPTAS 4 Compact in 2016 in response to the Navy competition for a low weight LCS VDS due its to limited weapons payload capacity. The Compact reduced the volume from 84 m2 to 45 m2 and weight from 34t to 25t for the independent variant and 20t for the dependant tow version.
DeleteNavy picked the all new Raytheon digital VDS
PS In original LCS ASW trials Navy fitted CAPTAS 4, DOT&E reported with some success.
From what I have seen the Captas-4 Compact fits the footprint originally envisioned for the package but not the weight. To get the weight they'd be looking at a Captas-1. Absolute unreality was the basis of their module weights across the board. 7000 KG max for a 20' container? Its 2200kg empty, normal max gross 30,000kg.
DeleteFrom memory LCS max weapons module payload limit is 105t, if so don't think weight is the problem unless other issues, Navy trialled the original heavier CAPTAS 4 on a LCS. Have not seen any mention of the Raytheon VDS weight so whether lighter or heavier unknown, what we do know from the Senate is that AN/SQS-62 has deficiencies that showed up in trials.
Delete" don't think weight is the problem"
DeleteYes, weight is the problem and it dates back at least to 2015, if not earlier. See, for example, (LCS ASW Weight from USNI News website)
Remember that the ASW module includes not just the VDS but other items. From the Navy website comes this list of ASW equipment:
ASW Escort Module
• Variable depth sonar (VDS)
• Multi-function towed array (MFTA) acoustic receiver
• Launch, handling and recovery equipment
• Signal processing and systems control
• Support containers
Torpedo Defense Module
• Detection/Alert: MFTA with Acoustic Intercept (ACI)
• Countermeasures: Light Weight Tow (LWT)
Aviation Module
• MH-60R Helicopter
Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS)
Sonobuoys (Active/Passive)
APS153 Periscope Detection radar
MK46/50/54 Torpedo
• One MQ-8B Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (1)
• Support containers
ASW Mission Management / Command and Control (C2) Center
• Mission Package Application Software (MPAS)
• Mission Package Computing Environment (MPCE)
There's also the helo torpedoes, fuel, sonobuoys, stores, etc. but I think those have a separate weight allowance.
They never requested one single pay load in the mission bay to exceed 10250kg. That would basically be the limit of the tow mechanism.
DeleteCNO thx for detailed list of the ASW module kit and pressure that puts on low weight so as able to meet the LCS very limited max payload weight capacity.
DeleteAs understand Navy let three competitive contracts late 2014 / early 2015 for the LCS VDS with Advanced Acoustic Concepts (a joint DRS/Thales company) L3 and Raytheon.
AAC said the VDS (CAPTAS-4) for the LCS ASW mission package was lighter than requirement set by the Navy. Raytheon subcontracted the VDS winch to Curtiss-Wright.
Navy awarded VDS contract to Raytheon May 2017, Raytheon saying low weight, not specified, all digital, transmit any waveform, single tow system - source and receiver on same cable, del'd Nov 2018, tested at AUTEC range in Bahamas, fitted to LCS Fort Worth for testing summer 2020.
Question why did the Navy pick the unproven Raytheon in preference to proven technology of the long range Thales low frequency CAPTAS-4 and with its successful track record. Raytheon sonar appears to be an all new sonar and TRL 3 or 4?, classic case of concurrency tho doubt it has any operational significance as LCS ships are in effect non-operational. If the Raytheon VDS overcomes its deficiencies and lives up to its hype may be an effective VDS by 2026 for the FFG-62:)
"Question why did the Navy pick the unproven Raytheon"
Delete"If the Raytheon VDS overcomes its deficiencies and lives up to its hype may be an effective VDS by 2026 for the FFG-62"
You may have answered your own question! I don't think the Navy sees the LCS as being a viable combat/ASW asset but they may be using the LCS funding to develop the FFG capabilities. Just speculation.
"Question why did the Navy pick the unproven Raytheon"
DeleteAnother possible explanation has to do with data rights. In recent years, intellectual and data rights have become an increasingly important factor in equipment selection. Without detailed design schematics and data rights, it is impossible to model system performance. Why is this important? Because, increasingly, the Navy is loathe to spend money on actual testing and is trying to do more and more 'testing' using digital models. Without the extensive data rights, digital modeling is not possible. This has stymied several Navy efforts and DOT&E annual reports have documented this. So, it may be that Raytheon offered a better data rights transfer than, say, Thales even though the product was inferior at the time of contract award.
Again, just speculation.
Would have assumed when the Navy issued the RFP for competitive bids for the VDS they would have specified the IPR conditions they required as they have the buying power, why Thales (France) took a 50% share of the DRS company Advanced Acoustic Concepts to manufacture in US.
DeleteCongress with Buy American Act insisting 100% US build of all FFG-62 systems even if they aren't the best, Rick Hunt President of FMM said contesting with Navy to use limited foreign kit as was better/quieter, also looking at the four 3MW DGs for FFG-62, assuming only one monopoly US supplier Fairbanks-Morse, guessing also in effect its a screwdriver plant for MAN diesels, might be wrong. China goes further and insist on 100% build of MTU diesels in country, used in their ships and subs.
BreakingDefense-Buy America Doesn’t Work; We Need Allies: Rep. Thornberry By REP. MAC THORNBERRY December 16, 2020
ComNavOps, among your list of failures you forgot the biggest one - the Navy brass is CONTINUING TO SPEND LOTS OF MONEY trying to not have to admit that the project is a failure !! SPENDING MORE MONEY on failed Blue/Gold and minimal manning models - really? SPENDING MORE MONEY on determining how to group LCSs with other failed ship types to support Berger's worthless LAW concept - really? SPENDING MORE MONEY to see if there is some incredibly cheap, light weapon to park on the LCS's deck so you can say it can now defend itself or has "any" offensive capability - really? As soon as the Surface Navy brass made statements like this earlier, you know that this is the time to FIRE THEM ALL as well as the people that selected them.
ReplyDelete"you forgot the biggest one"
DeleteWell, to be fair, the post compares the program's initial promises/claims to actual achievement. That said, you're correct that the subsequent mistake of continuing to pour money down the LCS hole is unforgivable and dwarfs the programmatic mistakes. Had the Navy, early on, recognized the failures and halted the program, I'd be much more forgiving. Instead, at every key point in the program they doubled down on the failure. Why? I have no idea.
I agree that CNO is being unduly harsh here.
DeleteHow can he grade all those failures when he didn't even give the admirals an opportunity to move the goalposts?
Sheesh, how can he expect them to get passing grades under those circumstances?
Lutefisk
I suspect that this is where Congress enters the picture. The leaders from relevant congressional districts probably offered to fund the unproven ships so long as both variants were chosen & the Navy agreed. Maybe this was like a gift horse.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, congress aren't experts in weapon or military procurement, design, purpose, or function.
ReplyDeleteThey rely on the "experts" to tell them what needs funded.
I don't think its that relevant, but probably not unrelated. Raytheon also had the contract to provide the hull sonar for Sea Hunter. Notice how any discussion of using that sonar has also vanished.
ReplyDeleteI haven't found any definitive description of the Sea Hunter sonar beyond 'high frequency sonar'. Do you have anything more definitive?
DeleteThe entire concept of the Sea Hunter has always struck me as extreme wishful thinking. The notion that an unmanned vessel with a single, low power, small (relative to, say, a Burke's SQS-53C) sonar can successfully find and continuously track SSKs has always struck me as absurd. If our largest, most powerful ship sonars, towed arrays, helos/P-8, sonobuoys, and highly trained operators can't find subs, how can this tiny sonar do it? Logic says it can't.
Agreed. But again, it's DARPA. They are learning. The Navy trying to make it operational is where the silly really starts. Hoping we see a lot more oomph if they make ASW for MUSV.
Deleteforgot the link https://raytheon.mediaroom.com/2015-11-18-Raytheon-delivers-sonar-for-DARPAs-unmanned-anti-submarine-warfare-vehicle-program
DeleteVery, very sad, but good analysis!
ReplyDeleteGAB
Related. Via the war zone:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/39240/the-navy-wants-to-get-rid-of-its-nearly-brand-new-patrol-boats
So the navy wants to ditch the almost new Mk VI patrol boats. And of course plans to shorty retire the Cyclones with no replacement. Oh wait it does have one (a plan) per the story...
"with a combination of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and U.S. Coast Guard patrol boats. There is no plan to buy additional ships of any kind to directly replace the Cyclones"
So this means the USCG is going to get a pass through budget slice from the USN? Err no I thought not.
So is there some rule in the navy now that if its not an over priced techno wonder or does not involve reducing crew size it cannot be built?
How could any organization blow so much money on something so completely useless? Then again, considering the Ford aircraft carriers, maybe it is not surprising at all.
ReplyDeleteThere is stiill a fair possibility imo the Ford Class could wind as much of a disaster as the LCS. The hull flexing at sea affecting tolerances of the weapons elevators and the EMALs system functioning could still prove to be an impassable obstacle, at least for the USS Ford and JFK. Perhaps they can/have learn(ed) enough from them to through enough extra and thicker steel into the New Enterprise and Dorie Miller, but ships have to and will flex some at sea. No idea if the weapon elevators simply have too tight a tolerance to ever allow for it. We will see if they turn out to be a $50billion boondoggle rather than just a $25-30 billion dollar boongoogle as the LCS has become.(rough guesses), I welcome more accurate figs , about the $ expense of both programs. But there is alot more expense than just money with these 2(3) ship classes
Delete