Distributed Lethality - the Navy fad that promises to revolutionize naval warfare and bring our enemies to their knees using just a handful of miscellaneous ships armed with a half dozen or so anti-ship missiles.
Okay, that was slightly unfair and somewhat overstated – though not by as much as you might think. Still, let’s be just a bit more accurate in describing distributed lethality (DL).
For starters, DL now sees threats as targets.
“We have to stop thinking of adversary
maritime forces as ‘threats’ and instead what they really are: ‘targets’ for
our increasingly lethal, distributed surface, amphibious, and submarine
forces,” Dr. William Bundy, director of the Gravely Group at the
Sure, the threat didn’t change but what was a serious threat yesterday is now just a target waiting to be destroyed. Wait a minute, you say, how did a serious threat suddenly become just a hapless target? Is simply changing the descriptor ‘threat’ to ‘target’ really all it took to defeat high end threats? Why didn’t we think of this before?
By the way, did you catch that bit about our “increasingly lethal … forces”? I’m not sure what navy Dr. Bundy is looking at but there’s nothing increasingly lethal about our forces. In fact, a pretty good case could be made for the exact opposite. The Navy is in the process of sidelining 6-11 Aegis cruisers, never to be returned to the fleet. How is that an increase in lethality? The LCS, sans any functional module, has replaced the entire 55 ship Perry frigate class. How is that an increase in lethality? Our carriers have dropped from 15 to the current 10. How is that an increase in lethality? Our air wings have shrunk from 80+ aircraft to around 60. How is that an increase in lethality? We’ve dropped to only 9 air wings. How is that an increase in lethality? We have removed Harpoon missiles from the Burkes. How is that an increase in lethality? We have a looming shortfall of submarines. How is that an increase in lethality? I can go on all day but you get the idea. Dr. Bundy is delusional or intentionally deceptive.
Setting aside the lethality issue, how is distributed lethality going to work?
“In broad terms,” Jeffrey Kline, chair of the Systems Engineering Analysis program at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), observed, “distributed lethality proposes creating small offensive adaptive force packages comprised of surface action groups with a variety of support elements that operate across a wide region and under an adversary’s anti-access sea denial umbrella. Its purpose is to confound adversary locating and targeting while introducing a threat to their sea control ambitions.” (1)
Really??! That’s amazing. Apparently, surface action groups (SAG) will freely roam through an enemy’s A2/AD zone, undetected, unassailable, or, if detected, will ‘confound’ the enemy’s targeting, thereby inducing total enemy paralysis of action, so we’re led to believe.
How, exactly, will the presence of a few to several SAGs “confound” the enemy’s detection and targeting? Is there some degree of confusion inherent in the mere presence of several additional ships in a region? Do additional ships somehow make detection more difficult? I don’t think so. If the enemy detects a SAG, they’ll simply attack it and, by definition, the SAG will be lightly armed and relatively defenseless so the attack will be more along the lines of a live fire exercise than a battle.
In WWII, both Allies and Axis powers managed to track and attack hundreds of ships without being confounded and yet, today, the mere presence of a few lightly armed SAGs will utterly confound the enemy. Absolutely incredible!
Doesn’t it seem far more realistic, historically supported, and logical that the enemy, upon detecting one of these lightly armed SAGs, will simply smile, offer thanks to our stupidity, and proceed to sink it and will do the same to each SAG, in turn, as each is detected?
The notion that relatively defenseless SAGs will freely roam an enemy’s A2/AD zone with impunity is nonsense yet typical of the increasingly delusional operational thinking that assumes the enemy will allow us to do whatever we wish, without opposition. Nowhere in any distributed lethality discussion does any proponent describe how these small SAGs will survive long enough to carry out their functions. Apparently, the enemy has almost no sensors and any they might have will be ‘confounded’ by more than one target.
In June of 2015, the Navy established a Distributed Lethality Task Force (weren’t “task forces” originally actual ocean going fleets rather than study groups? But, I digress …) to “… operationalize the concept of a distributed, more lethal force, and … synchronize and lead a transformation across the surface community …” (2). As part of that effort, the Navy has conducted 10 wargames to try to understand the value of DL and VAdm. Tom Rowden, Commander of Surface Naval Forces, assures that DL “… works, it delivers value.”
I’m all in favor of wargames although given the Navy’s history of rigging games to produce a pre-determined outcome, the pronouncement of success has to be viewed with skepticism if not outright disbelief. It would go a long way towards strengthening the Navy’s claims if they made some of their game scenarios and results public.
The Navy is attempting to use the results of the DL wargaming to guide weapons procurement.
“We’ve done a lot of analysis and wargaming to see which weapons are probably going to be the most effective and where we should put the next dime that we have.” [RAdm. Peter Fanta, Director of Surface Warfare] (2)
Using wargame analysis to guide weapons procurement is excellent. That’s exactly what should be happening and I commend the Navy for doing this. Of course, the value of this is entirely dependent on the validity of the wargames. If the games are rigged, as Navy history suggests, then the value of the resulting weapons procurement analysis is invalid. As computer programmers have long known, ‘garbage in, garbage out’. Again, the Navy should release some of the wargame scenarios and results to strengthen their case.
Further, the Navy is trying to relearn how to command small surface groups.
“The Navy will also send out a three-destroyer Surface Action Group to re-learn how to command and control a group less complex than a carrier strike group but more complex than three independent deployers operating in the same vicinity.” (2)
The fact that the Navy has to relearn how to command small surface groups is a scathing indictment of Navy leadership. What have they been doing for the last several decades? We knew how to do this. Heck, we knew how to command vast fleets. Who let this fundamental capability lapse?
The referenced articles are a bit old, being from 2016. During the ensuing months, we’ve seen that the ballyhooed DL anti-ship missile competition has turned into a highly questionable, single-source procurement. I’ve seen no further significant DL reports or articles. Is DL just another Navy fad that is fading away or is it a serious, if stupid, idea that will become our operational and doctrinal foundation for naval combat in the future? We’ll have to wait and see.
______________________________
(1) USNI News
website, “Opinion: Gaming Distributed Lethality”, Scott C. Truver,
https://news.usni.org/2016/07/26/opinion-gaming-distributed-lethality
(2) USNI News website, “A Year Into Distributed Lethality, Navy Nears Fielding Improved Weapons, Deploying Surface Action Group”, Megan Eckstein,
This is utterly depressing. It makes me want to learn Chinese.
ReplyDeleteI thought the idea behind a task force was that you massed force to achieve an objective. You had CAP and AAW destroyers to protect you from air attack, you had guns (sort of) and SSMs (except we don't really) to protect you from surface attack, and you had ASW ships (except we don't have those either) to protect you from submarines. So you went and did your mission (whatever that was).
Now we're going to break that up and send one lonely DD off by itself to do what? And what to protect it from the bad guys? Stealth?
Face it, other than possibly sub-launched cruise missiles, we aren't going to be able to assert any force inside China's A2/AD umbrella. That means the China Sea belongs to China. We can live with that, but what we can't really live with is letting them take over the first island chain, and then the second, and expanding the reach of that umbrella. Outside of that, we are in an economic battle with them far more than a military one at this point.
Anybody who thinks distributed lethality can accomplish anything of value in that environment is simply nuts.
"Now we're going to break that up and send one lonely DD off by itself to do what? And what to protect it from the bad guys? Stealth?
DeleteFace it, other than possibly sub-launched cruise missiles, we aren't going to be able to assert any force inside China's A2/AD umbrella. That means the China Sea belongs to China. We can live with that, but what we can't really live with is letting them take over the first island chain, and then the second, and expanding the reach of that umbrella. Outside of that, we are in an economic battle with them far more than a military one at this point."
Oddly enough, there is actually a goal for DL, to contain or blockade Chinese naval forces. The Navy is envisioning this elaborate and complex net encompassing the first and second island chains with specifically placed ships that could fire missile through using the sensors in the net.
Essentially, they are taking the defensive side in a war with China. I am not sure if the Navy gave up on the SCS but they do not discuss how you can maintain this concept in an attack. Like how does a single lonely ship would survive in an enemy controlled area? Does these sensors must move beyond allied zone and venture in enemy controlled area to provide the same see-all and know-all vision in the defensive concept? If we have used up most of our forces to maintain the encirclement, what forces are left to deploy? What and how do we decide to attack then? Or The Navy is envisioning another No man's land in the SCS?
I have many reservations about the defense aspect of the concept but I could never wrap about the offensive part of the equation. Guess we will have to wait and see.
It is actually 100% possible for a couple destroyers to "operate across a wide region and under an adversary’s anti-access sea denial umbrella".
ReplyDeleteIt used to be called "begging to get sunk", or "distributed lethality" in modern parlance.
Here is what I see as a combat formation.
ReplyDelete1) A central force consisting of 2 CVBGs (each 1 CVN and 1 CV, so 4 carriers total) and a SAG/HUK group (1 BB 1980s battlecarrier and 1 ASW helo carrier), with or without an ARG, depending on mission.
2) A screening force of 30 ships:
- 3 cruisers in the inner ring (for sector command, AAW, possible NGFS, and base for launching/recovering a large number of small UAVs, USVs, and UUVs),
- 6 AAW destroyers in the second ring (could be Burkes),
- 9 GP escorts in the third ring (could be FREMMs configured primarily for anti-surface and secondarily for AAW and ASW), and
- 12 ASW frigates in the outer ring (ComNavOps's ASW escort works for this).
Cruisers and AAW destroyers would have AEGIS/AMDR, GP frigates would have EMPAR/SMART-L, carriers/battleships/frigates would have TRS-3D/4D. Frigates would have full suite of sonar, GP escorts would have bow sonar and towed array or VDS, Burkes would have current configuration, cruisers and battleships would have hull mounted just to know what's out there, but not primarily ASW ships. Battleships would have 16" guns, cruisers 8", Burkes 5", GP escorts 5" or 3", and frigates 3". All would have VLS cells, with loads varying based on mission.
Distributed lethality would come in the form of small, relatively expendable drones launched primarily from the cruisers, but could be some from any ship. They would be used primarily for ISRT (intel/surveillance/recon/targeting) and would be expendable, but also could have some missile-firing drones.
Keep two of these in WestPac, one in the Mideast, one in the Med, and one in the North Sea/GIUK gap, and you'd have a pretty potent force.
Actually probably 4 - 2 in WestPac, 1 in Mideast, and 1 in Europe split between Med and North Sea/GIUK gap.
DeleteIn other news, at least someone actually proposes something that would increase lethality. If ever adopted. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/january/hail-hydra-return-sea-launched-missile
ReplyDeleteThis is in the running for the dumbest idea I've ever read about! The fundamental, conceptual problems with this are too numerous to even be worth discussing.
DeleteWas there some aspect of this that you found appealing and, if so, why?
“the future fleet has to include a mix of unmanned,” because “we can’t continue to wrap $2 billion ships around 96 missile tubes in the numbers we need to fight in a distributed way, against a potential adversary that is producing capability and platforms at a very high rate of speed.”
DeleteWell, he got the problem right... and the solution wrong.
50/50?
Roll the missile into the water like a mine or gently lower it with a crane. Not for in your face shooting, but to get missiles distributed and in theater. I'll still take those 40 laid up platform supply vessels in Gulfport. Steel is cheap and air is free. Water is also free and cheaper than more steel or God forbid, aluminum.
Delete"Steel is cheap and air is free."
DeleteNo. See, Steel is Cheap and Air is Free.
I've repeatedly demonstrated that this is not true with examples. For example, see, Burke Class Cost Breakdown
"This is in the running for the dumbest idea I've ever read about!"
DeleteI read that article and perused through the linked reports. In general, I agree that putting fields of missiles in the open ocean as proposed is ridiculous. But, launching a missile after dropping it into the water is not that all far-fetched. The Russian's RPK-7 Veter (SS-N-16) anti-submarine missile can be fired from a surface ship's torpedo tube and has a range of 100 km. If anything, its an option to launch a large missile that wouldn't otherwise fit in an VLS cell.
"If anything, its an option to launch a large missile that wouldn't otherwise fit in an VLS cell."
DeleteCome on, now, think this through. What's the point of launching a missile? Whether land or ship attack, the idea is to put an overwhelming volley of missiles as nearly simultaneously on target as possible. For a land target, we've seen the US use 70+ missiles for fairly small, undefended targets. A naval task force target defended by Aegis-like systems would, presumably, require many dozens or hundreds of missiles to have a chance.
Does dropping, by whatever means, an odd missile or two into the water sound like a viable method of attack?
There's a lot of competition for dumbest idea ever but I'm going to go ahead and give the award to this idea.
"Does dropping, by whatever means, an odd missile or two into the water sound like a viable method of attack?"
DeleteNot against a land target. But, you would fire "an odd missile or two" against a submarine, or a merchant ship, or a small combatant. And, you would be able to do so without a VLS. You might be able to mount a couple on something as small as the Mk 6 Patrol Boat.
"But, you would fire "an odd missile or two" against a submarine, or a merchant ship, or a small combatant. "
DeleteDo you recognize what kind of ridiculous, one-in-a-million scenario you're creating to justify this idea? You'd have to have just the right target type (essentially, an undefended target so that just one or two missiles would suffice), encountering a ship/boat that, apparently doesn't have its own missiles but somehow has the means to carry a containerized missile and somehow drop it in the water. Where/how/when would such a scenario realistically occur?
What kind of ship/boat would not have room for its own missiles but have room to carry a containerized missile and some kind of handling mechanism to lift and drop a missile overboard?
And, how would this ship/boat that's too small to carry its own missiles be able to have the sensors to spot a surfaced submarine, merchant, or small combatant?
Just out of curiosity, what would the enemy small combatant be doing while our ship/boat was busy trying to drop a missile in the water? Waiting patiently to be sunk? This is the kind of thinking that afflicts our military! An enemy combatant is going to obligingly cruise back and forth waiting for us to get a missile craned over the side and into the water?????
This is laughable piled on crazy piled on absurd!
"Do you recognize what kind of ridiculous, one-in-a-million scenario you're creating to justify this idea?"
DeleteWill the next war consist solely of massive exchanges of missiles? No. As in WW2, there will be many small-scale engagements involving just a few ships.
As for the launching mechanism, a small ship could simply drop one in the water, much like a burial at sea, at a low speed to allow the ship to travel a safe distance. A larger ship could fire such a missile using existing equipment.
As for targeting, the same problem applies, you can't hit what you can't see. But, how often does a Burke see its target when it fires a Tomahawk? Or, a Super Hornet when it launches a Harpoon missile?
"As in WW2, there will be many small-scale engagements involving just a few ships."
DeleteActually … no. I'm trying to think of an example of a naval engagement involving 'just a few ships' and I can't come up with one off the top of my head. I'm sure some happened but they were the rare exception. Naval forces, by intent, massed to provide defense and offense.
Again, think this through. A small boat would only be able to carry one, maybe two, such missiles. What can one or two missiles accomplish against an enemy warship? Nothing, unless the enemy was a small patrol boat. Above patrol boat size, ships will have AAW defenses and one or two attacking missiles will be useless. Again, you would have to concoct a one-in-a-million scenario for this concept to work.
"how often does a Burke see its target when it fires a Tomahawk?"
Always! It 'sees' its target by reading the coordinates off a map because all Tomahawk missiles are land attack against known, fixed targets. Similarly, an aircraft always sees its target in one form or another. No one blind-fires multi-million dollar missiles.
This is just a purely absurd concept. Best just to drop it and move on!
Dear ComNavOps
ReplyDeleteI understand your frustration and share most of it. However I think that you let it get out of control. What about getting over it and discuss the real issues about distributed lethality ?
Sure those guys in the Pentagon are talking BS, but that is part of their job description (let's be clear I hate that as well and spend a lot of time going against it in my job) but you won't stop them, it's almost a prerequisite to get to their level of responsability :-)
On the other hand the concept may have some value that is worth discussing, the weakest point IMO lies in the way you make the distributed platforms talk to each other so that they can coordinate. The idea that the airwaves will stay free of interference and that Link16 or Link22 will operate in a peer level war as it does during exercises is fantasy BUT if no communication at all was possible then submarine based deterrence can be thrown away right now.
I am not asking every distributed element to carry a E6 type VLF radio but maybe something can be imagined, for example laser communications going via satellite between aircraft that won't work below the clouds but it has been done.
So my point is : I'd like to hear ideas about how to achieve some form of robust communication between platforms that are not within sight of each other in a peer warfare environment.
D614-D623
"So my point is : I'd like to hear ideas about how to achieve some form of robust communication between platforms that are not within sight of each other in a peer warfare environment."
DeleteI think ComNavOps's position is that no can do, particularly in a contested peer warfare environment.
I think the Navy's (unstated) position is that they don't think they can recruit and retain enough sailors to crew the number of ships they need, so their plan is just to distribute lethality to a bunch of drones and hope that it works. I think small, relatively expendable drones can handle ISRG (intel/surveillance/recon/targeting) and some missile-carrying drones may also be useful, but at the end of the day the usefulness of any "distributed" technique is going to be limited, particularly in a combat environment.
"What about getting over it and discuss the real issues about distributed lethality ?"
DeleteFeel free! I'd like nothing more than for someone to lay out a viable plan for distributed lethality operations.
I've thoroughly examined the concept and there is nothing about it that makes sense - not the concept, not the equipment, not the ships, not communications … nothing. However, if you think there are aspects that I'm missing, I encourage you to describe them.
If you're asking me, personally, to come up with ways to make the concept work, there aren't any. It would be like asking me to come up with ways to cross a busy highway, blindfolded. I can't. It's just a stupid idea.
If you have some ideas, please share them. I'd love to get some viable alternatives on the table.
The key to distributed lethality (well, one of the keys) is vast, regional, real time sensor networks and communications which, as you note, are not possible in a peer combat scenario. If you're asking me to invent some kind of regional, secure, impregnable, reliable network … I can't. I'm not a communications expert and, from what I do know, it's simply not possible.
So, with all that said, I truly encourage you to offer ideas, if you have any.
My approach:
Delete1) Build cheaper, but robust, ships with maximum firepower and armor and redundancy and survivability and stealth. Build a mix of Nimitzes and conventional carriers instead of Fords, build ASW frigates instead of LCSs, build capable GP escorts instead of Zumwalts, and so forth. ComNavOps has a proposed fleet architecture on this site, I've posted a similar one, either one is a better way to go.
2) Expand your numbers and distribution by augmenting them with small expendable unmanned systems for ISRT (intel/surveillance/recon/targeting) and missile drones.
3) Put more firepower on our ships, particularly anti-ship and anti-surface, to match what others are doing
4) Do everything we possibly can to research and develop more secure and stable networking systems, but
5) Count on them not working in combat and train both to utilize them efficiently and to operate effectively without them
I was asking for your advice, I admit that I have no more ideas than you.
DeleteOne thing (for CDR Chip) : I do object to asking for stealth AND armor, for me if you have both and then you get hit, your stealth disappears PDQ and you have spent a fortune for stealth and lost is as soon as you get a small non lethal hit. Otherwise why would coatings be so important ?
D614-D623
" I do object to asking for stealth AND armor"
DeleteYou may be misunderstanding the role and value of both. Ship stealth is largely a matter of shaping. Coatings are not a major factor as they have been with aircraft.
Stealth, for ships, allows them to evade detection longer than otherwise and avoid missile locks or render them susceptible to decoys and countermeasures. A hit on a ship will likely increase the ship's radar signature but it does not instantly wipe away the entire 'stealth' aspect. See, Stealth.
Armor comes into play once the ship has been detected and attacked. Armor mitigates the damage to the ship. See, Armor.
Both armor and stealth play a vital role and are necessary, in appropriate levels, on every ship.
With regards to asking for stealth AND armor.
DeleteThose tank grognards have been talking about their sloped armor for years. It's about time us navy buffs get a turn. Sloped armor both reducing radar return and increasing effective armor thickness at the point of penetration.
Of course, warships have much more internal volume requirements, and all those sensors and exhausts to mount, so can't slope their armor much.
However, I found the tank analogy interesting with regards the trade-off between armor thickness vs internal space. Tanks don't mount an accommodation cabin on the back. They would have no effective armor if they did. To have a chance in the battle zone the crew boards the tank, drives into the combat zone, suffers some discomfort and eventually gets out and sleeps somewhere other than inside the tank. However, in return they have not only sloped armor, but nice thick armor to protect their relatively tiny crew space.
However, the navy seems to have gone with the opposite position, of having large internal spaces and not having any armor. The army would never get away with no armor because their vehicles have actually been shot at on a regular basis over the years. I suspect if the navy had actually been shot at occasionally they would have moved towards more armored protection, as wartime designs always seem to do.
I acknowledge that the sea is very different to the land, and warships do need significant crew spaces, but I feel that the basic principle applies.
If armored protection means the Navy needs to move away from lengthy peacetime deployments to out-and-back wartime-type deployments due to having smaller WW2-style crew spaces, then that would seem a necessary trade-off.
Navy doesn't have unlimited resources to build its wish list, not even desired list for national security. It is a fact that Navy spends ~ 3 times of money to build a similar ship of China. Too many people are in the food chain. For some, it is returns of their political investments while others, your wastes are their well paid jobs. As US has lots civilian ship building industry, there is no domestic standard to benchmark the food chain.
ReplyDeleteWith limited resources and ever growing high tech Chinese navy, Navy needs to be creative. They cannot shake the food chain and top generals expect to join the food chain after retirement.
"Distributed Lethality" itself per se has no problem as long as Navy can effectively execute them than wishful thinking. If you put a large fleet together, for a high navy, they would live this as they can sink the fleet in one go than needs to strike many targets far apart.
I don't lament retirement of old cruises as they can no longer confront many high tech weapons. Question is where are their replacements.
Lots of huge ships with 16 inch guns are history. Even in WWII, Japan's Yamento with 18.2 inch guns ended up with the same fate as UK's pride - Prince of Walse, sunken by aircrafts.
Today's navy battles between high tech ones are mostly beyond visual range thus capabilities of electronic warfare, network, and missiles are real keys. Of course, for submarines, good torpedo also work (but never can have same range as missiles due to water resistance).
"The referenced articles are a bit old, being from 2016. During the ensuing months, we’ve seen that the ballyhooed DL anti-ship missile competition has turned into a highly questionable, single-source procurement. I’ve seen no further significant DL reports or articles. Is DL just another Navy fad that is fading away or is it a serious, if stupid, idea that will become our operational and doctrinal foundation for naval combat in the future? We’ll have to wait and see."
ReplyDeleteSince you have expressed doubts that the Navy still believes in the concept, have you seen any proposals that the Navy is seemingly working towards to?
On the other hand, assuming that we follow through with the proposed procurement plans, what can be done with such a heavily unmanned fleet? We certainly could not keep it in the original task. But could we use it as external argumentation for our fleet? I mean quite literally towing it and attach a CIWS to increase the number of guns. Could they be used as scouts or decoys? Other than that, I am drawing blanks here.
I think the major problem of the concept is the communication aspect that is unlikely to be true in combat. This makes it has very little room when each of your units must communicate for it to just be functional. If they had excluded this from the original concept, we would have more breathing room. That said I am still undecided on the UAV. We will wait and see about that.
Distributed lethality still crops up regularly from Navy spokesmen but there seems to have been some diminishment of focus in favor of increased emphasis on unmanned vessels. As I said, we'll have to wait and see how it plays out.
DeleteOne thing I would note, if distributed lethality does not completely come to fruition, one has to wonder what role the LCS will have in the Navy since that seemed to be the only semi-defined role there was.
"one has to wonder what role the LCS will have in the Navy"
DeleteThe role of the LSC will be to make all other Navy ships super cool by comparison, I'd say.
They've been pretty good for giving our tugs practice towing them home.
DeleteGranted the USMC's anti ship plans and their desire for an unarmed slow LCM seem poorly planned...
ReplyDeleteThe fact that both the army and the marines independently concluded the United States Navy is no longer able to pose a threat to PLAN ships should be a real concern.
Like a wholesale clean out of all flag officer and SES ranks level concern, and cancelation of all build contracts for ships and missiles.
"concluded the United States Navy is no longer able to pose a threat to PLAN ships "
DeleteI don't think anyone has concluded that in any realistic assessment. The US submarine fleet, alone, constitutes a very serious threat to the Chinese navy. Add in the threat from air launched LRASM and ship launched NSM, LRASM, and anti-ship Tomahawk, if they ever come, and you have additional serious threats. On top of that, air support from Guam and, possibly, Japan if they enter the war, can constitute yet another threat, if somewhat sporadic.
The Navy has serious gaps in its warfighting equipment and concepts but to conclude that it poses no threat is ridiculous.
"Like a wholesale clean out of all flag officer and SES ranks level concern, and cancelation of all build contracts for ships and missiles."
I have no problem with that but you need to have a replacement option. What would you suggest as the replacement?
"I have no problem with that but you need to have a replacement option. What would you suggest as the replacement?"
DeleteI'd get rid of half of them and eliminate their billets. We have 280-odd admirals for 290-odd ships. At least half of them MUST be superfluous.
What distributed lethality says to me is that we are going to put a bunch of platforms out there that can't defend themselves, some of them unmanned, and the concept is going to work because somehow in a maximum jamming environment they are all going to have perfect communication and exchange of data. Help me please, I have a problem. I'm trying to figure out what phrase out of that is the most nonsensical.
The Distributed Lethality idea is patently ridiculous.
DeleteIt's as if the US Navy prior to WW2 decided to build 2000 PT boats to fight the war.
Hey, each PT boat had four (4) FOUR! ship-killing torpedoes and 20mm and 40mm cannon to protect themselves from enemy aircraft attacks.
Equip them all with radios so they can coordinate their attacks....heck, I'd almost have felt bad for the poor Imperial Japanese Navy that would have had to face that DL onslaught!
Lutefisk
"PT boats"
DeleteSee, PT Boat
And here I thought I was being originally flippant.
DeleteThat PT Boat posting was a good read, I think you described it pretty well.
The most disappointing thing is that actual naval officers have made the connection between DL and PT Boats....and they are still OK with it.
Lutefisk
Delete"See, PT Boat"
The operative sentence in that post is, "Again, the boats were very heavily armed for their size." I don't see anything that the USN is considering that could be described objectively as heavily armed for its size.
You also make the points that sensors matter, size matters, support matters, and numbers matter. All of those seem lost on today's ship planners.
As CAPT Wayne Hughes might say, "Detect first, shoot first, win." We need ways to detect the bad guys before they detect us, and to put warheads on foreheads when we do. I don't see how DL does that. Without lethality, it's hard to distribute lethality.
"As CAPT Wayne Hughes might say, "Detect first, shoot first, win."
DeleteNo, that's not actually correct. I don't have it in front of me but I believe the actual quote is "attack EFFECTIVELY first". This may seem a subtle difference but it is supremely important. Merely attacking first with a single distributed ship will produce no positive effect and will just reveal one's presence. The key is to be the first to attack EFFECTIVELY (I would phrase it DECISIVELY). This, alone, eliminates distributed lethality from consideration because, by definition, scattered ships cannot attack effectively/decisively unless one believes in the fantasy of perfect, secure, 100% reliable, real time sensor and data networking and, even then, unless there are enough ships in range to mass a decisive attack, it will still fail.
This doesn't even consider the problems with sensing and targeting. That's a separate aspect that is also on the fantasy level.
"attack EFFECTIVELY first"
DeleteWe saw this play out with PT boats. They were often able to attack first but rarely effectively and, thus, they failed.
We also saw this in the naval battles of Guadalcanal. The Allies were sometimes able to attack first but often not effectively and wound up losing battles until they got the hang of it. In contrast, the Japanese, especially employing massed torpedo attacks, were often able to attack effectively first.
Effective attacks REQUIRE massing of weapons on targets. This is most easily done by physical grouping of ships in one location thereby easing targeting, communications, timing, and coordination. Distributed attacks can mass weapons on target but the difficulties in targeting, communications, timing, and coordination almost, by definition, preclude success barring fantasy level sensing and comm networks.
"And here I thought I was being originally flippant."
DeleteThe archives are a treasure trove of information and I trust you're availing yourself of the opportunity to come up to speed!
"The most disappointing thing is that actual naval officers have made the connection between DL and PT Boats....and they are still OK with it."
DeleteI know our naval officers are required to read about naval history but, clearly, simply reading doesn't mean that the reader will draw any (or even better, the correct) lessons. That requires thinking about the historical events and, clearly, our officers are not doing that. Oh well, that's why I provide this blog so that they can read about the lessons they should have, but failed, to grasp.
". I don't have it in front of me but I believe the actual quote is "attack EFFECTIVELY first". "
DeleteOK, I oversimplified a bit. Sorry to be too pithy. I don't think we disagree.
I have no doubt you understand the concept. The problem is that Navy leadership seems not to. They have pretty much explicitly stated that the LCS is the modern PT boat and that the key is to hide and get the first shot in which is the opposite of Hughes' statement and wisdom. The Navy sees individual LCSes lurking around and attacking targets as they wander by which, given that they'll only have 4-8 missiles, is unwise in the extreme. Arming amphibs and logistic ships is even dumber and yet that's what the Navy appears to want to do and they're being pushed by the Marine Commandant to do so.
DeleteMy clarification of your statement is for the benefit of all readers and Navy leadership readers, especially, because it is a vitally important point to grasp.
Side note - I don't think the statement is original thinking by Hughes. It's common sense that goes back to the dawn of fighting. Nathan Bedford Forrest, for example, offered essentially the same thought with his "firstest with the mostest" line (at least, it's attributed to him in that form).
"The archives are a treasure trove of information and I trust you're availing yourself of the opportunity to come up to speed!"
DeleteWhenever I can...there is so much to read, but it is enlightening.
Lutefisk
"How is that an increase in lethality?........ "
ReplyDeleteThat paragraph is probably the most disturbing, saddening, and true thing Ive read in a while. The Navy is absolutely foundering. Flailing about, grasping at straws, desperately trying to find some kind of overall CONOP, for its existing self, as well as new construction, AND still diving deep into future/unmanned tech hoping for another "offset" that isnt there!!!
Distributed Lethality is really a reversal of the concepts that served us so well in the past. Overwhelming, focused firepower, while not exactly an American invention, has been a SOP for decades. If individual units werent exactly overehelming or superior, we brought a dozen to make up for it. We always understood the balance between quality and quantity. Now we have neither, and are trying to reinvent everything so that on paper, we have superior. Its like scripted wargames with an intended result. Thats not how it works. Although Im hoping for heads to come out of the proverbial dark place, I fear its fantasy. Until there is some serious purging of buzzword bingo non-warfighters in the Admiralty, the decline will continue, and its probably already too late. The -20s will see nothing improve, and the 30s... Flip a coin, but dont bet the farm.....
It is not WWII anymore, concentrate fire power in a large fleet gives competent enemies chances to destroy them in one go.
ReplyDeleteNot just Navy, even Army no longer dispatch large number of tanks together. Advanced nations have abolished divisions in favor of brigades.
You completely misunderstand multiple concepts, here. I can't even begin to help you.
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