Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (1975-1977 and 2001-2006) single-handedly instituted the policy of transformationalism whereby he forced the military to attempt to skip ahead a generation of technology development and to reject any weapon programs, developments, or upgrades that he didn’t deem sufficiently transformational. This was, arguably, the beginning of the US shift from a focus on strategy to a focus on technology. In the event, history has passed its judgment and found transformationalism to be a failure – one whose reach has negatively impacted even weapon systems being brought on line today.
The purpose of this post is not to examine Rumsfeld or his failed philosophy but, instead, to examine the current Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, in light of the Rumsfeld experience. Huh? How are the two related? Let’s see.
Let’s start by examining a speech SecDef Esper gave on 16-Sep-2020 at the RAND corporation.(1)
What is Esper’s main focus? He states it, clearly, himself:
I made clear that my highest priority would be the irreversible implementation of the NDS [ed. National Defense Strategy].
This strategy tells us that to be successful, we must follow three lines of effort: first, enhance our lethality and readiness across the force; second, strengthen our alliances and build partnerships; and third, reform the department to align our highest -- our resources with our highest priorities. (1)
Okay, that’s pretty generic but not terribly objectionable. What are his somewhat more specific goals? Esper cites a few goals he refers to as ‘lines of effort’.
Our first line of effort aims to maintain our warfighting advantages and continue outpacing the competition when it comes to lethality and readiness. To modernize our capabilities, we have successfully secured funding for game-changing technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics, directed energy, and 5G networks. We have also made significant progress recapitalizing our strategic nuclear triad.
Our second line of effort builds on our relationships with other Nations, an asymmetric strategic advantage that no rivals can match.
Our third line of effort drives us to reform the department for greater performance and effectively manage our Fourth estate, which includes organizations such as the Defense Logistics Agency. (1)
Um … so … Esper believes we’ll be successful because of AI, networks, relationships, and the Fourth Estate (whatever he means by that since he lumps a non-media group in with it). Where was any mention of combat firepower?
Esper might be just a little overconfident. He says,
I want to make clear that China cannot match the United States when it comes to naval power. Even if we stopped building new ships, it would take the PRC years to close the gap when it comes to our capability on the high seas.
Ship numbers are important, but they don’t tell the whole story.
They do not address the types of ships and the capabilities of the vessels being counted; the skill of the crews that operate them; the prowess of the officers that lead them; or the ways in which we fight and sustain them…just to name a few. (1)
Given the demonstrated collisions, groundings, surrenders, etc. one has to realistically assess the ‘prowess of the officers’ and the ‘skill of the crews’ as being decidedly lacking. That being the case, it calls into question his assessment that ‘China cannot match the United States’ but let’s set that aside and move on.
What does Esper have to say about the Navy and its fleet structure?
That said, to compete in a 21st century high-end fight, we will need a future fleet that optimizes the following operational attributes: first, distributed lethality and awareness; second, survivability in a high intensity conflict; third, adaptability for a complex world; fourth, ability to project power, control the seas and demonstrate presence; and fifth, capability to deliver precision effects at very long ranges. (1)
Again, note that of his five operational attributes, none are directly related to firepower and only one or two are even indirectly related to firepower.
Now, the million dollar question and the heart of this post … how will Esper implement his vision?
This fleet will be made up of more and smaller surface combatants; optionally-manned, unmanned, and autonomous surface and subsurface vehicles; unmanned carrier-based aircraft of all types; a larger and more capable submarine force; and a modern strategic deterrent. (1)
We already knew this but there it is in plain English. He wants to convert the Navy from traditional firepower to small, weak, unmanned vessels and unmanned aircraft. He also mentions a larger submarine force, which is commendable, but I suspect he’s referring to the large displacement unmanned undersea vehicle (LDUUV), which the Navy has already begun the acquisition process for, rather than conventional submarines.
Taking all of the above statements from Esper, we see that he wants to move the Navy towards networks, AI, directed energy, hypersonics, unmanned ships and aircraft, and distributed operations. What’s utterly lacking is firepower!
This is what I want to consider, today. SecDef Esper is pushing the military and the Navy down a path of networks, unmanned, and data as a substitute for firepower. SecDef Rumsfeld pushed the military and the Navy down a path of technological leaps that were simply not reasonable or feasible. Do you get an eerie sense of similarity? Both ignore(d) routine firepower in an attempt to ‘leap ahead’ on the technology development curve to gain an illusory advantage. History has passed judgment on Rumsfeld and transformationalism. Are we seeing the same judgment in the process of being passed on Esper? A decade or so from now, will we look back and deem networks to be a failed effort and rue our lack of firepower due to the focus on data instead of explosives? Is Esper the next Rumsfeld? History will decide but it’s not looking good, at the moment.
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(1)US Department of Defense website, transcript of speech at RAND Corporation, 16-Sep-2020,
As the FT in one of the Navy adverts says, it's all about putting warheads on foreheads.
ReplyDeleteThat's one thing (of many) that I find so troubling about the Fords. Carriers don't put ordnance on target, their airplanes do. Carriers are just mobile airports. Enhancing their abilities to move or protect themselves may be worthwhile. But building them at a cost that could have funded a Nimitz plus 50 more airplanes does not seem to be a reasonable tradeoff. We are reducing air wings at least in some part because our carriers are gobbling up more money.
As far as all of the distributed networks, I wonder 1) how well does that stuff work in a contested jamming environment, and 2) what do we do if it doesn't?
You are not supposed to ask those questions.
DeleteCdr Chip. In the days of analogue (1970s) I designed Australia's most popular CB antenna for my cousin's boyfriend. I was a mad antenna designer.
DeleteFor EMF there is a rule of physics to keep in mind. The strength of the signal in inversely proportional to the distance squared. So the difference between a signal at 1 km to 2 km is that it is ¼ of the strength at 2 km, 1/16 at 4 Km.
In analogue days antennas would be directional, use spread spectrum, burst mode, and frequency hopping.
Digital radios/radars and phased arrays do all of the above but can also disguise their emissions.
So in short you can only jam something where you know it is. The effect will be a range reduction. How much depends on how close the jammer is. Implying it is close enough to be attacked by medium range weapons.
In short contested EMF is a problem that must be addressed not a show stopper.
There is far more to the signals issue than just the ability of an antenna to broadcast. Fidelity of signal is one issue, certainly. Just as broadcast systems have benefited from digital enhancements so, too, have disruption systems. Jamming can now be applied broad spectrum and/or with it's own frequency detection/hopping, thereby limiting broadcasts to very short periods before having to move. This is problematic for the high bandwidth applications that the military has become so fond of.
DeleteOther problems include simple detection. Even if the broadcast system is unhindered, if it can be detected and localized, it can be kinetically destroyed. Our comm systems are not as secure as we believe them to be. The Ukrainians found that out the hard way and we have had difficulties in Syria.
Our comm systems, including phased arrays, are susceptible to cyber attacks. If an array can broadcast or receive, then it can receive 'hacking' attacks (virus).
And so on.
Until we test our systems against the full weight of attacking EW/cyber we won't know what works and what doesn't. For reasons I don't understand, we seem not to want to find out what are systems are capable of - or not capable of (and maybe that's why we don't want to know).
1/ On the first day of the war the Russians sent a code to the Russian supplied Ukrainian radios. They all stopped working. All the Russian ESM was against CB radios and mobile phones. It took the Russians 3 days or so to set up an ambush. Then locate mobiles, send a UAV to confirm, then they all fire on a preprogrammed plan with just the impact point to be adjusted by the UAV.
DeleteRussians have very different artillery fire tables to western armies. They seek to destroy EVERYTHING in a particular area. They fire a very large number of shells and rockets.
2/ The second point is that war time waveforms are closely guarded and never used anywhere where they may be recorded by any potential enemy.
3/ GPS is 37,000 km away and are limited in power. Anything flying at 10,000 m can jam GPS on the ground using normally ineffective barrage jamming.
My pigeons have a Missile Approach Warning System (they see UV), they use terrain matching (like Tomahawk), infrasound, the Sun as a compass, and magnetic lines of force (which are fixed in place by geography eg mountains) to navigate. The US is just starting to explore magnetic lines of force as a way of navigating without GPS.
DeleteQuoting Esper, "Ship numbers are important, but they don’t tell the whole story.
ReplyDeleteThey do not address the types of ships and the capabilities of the vessels being counted; the skill of the crews that operate them; the prowess of the officers that lead them; or the ways in which we fight and sustain them…just to name a few."
Types of ships and their capabilities?
We have spent the last decade or so building Fords, LCSs, and Zumwalts. Which of those bring the capabilities of which he speaks?
Skill of the crews and prowess of officers?
We've had two collisions, a grounding (in full view of Honolulu airport), and a surrender to a lesser force of a third world country. What skill and prowess. We seem to ave lost professionalism in our run to embrace Kumbaya.
At the risk of sounding too much like an Anglophile, I go back to where the RN was when I did combined ops with them. We had better equipment, but they were more professional. I'm not sure where they are today, so perhaps some of our Brit commentators can opine. But I see no reason why we couldn't get to where they were back then. I don't think we have anything like FOST or Springtrain or Perisher for submarine COs (and I'm not sure they have them any more, at least not with the same rigor). But those all seem reasonable models for things we should be doing.
I also like their idea of separating engineering and weapons/deck officer career paths. The engineers run the ship and the deck/weapons officers fight the ship. They develop specialists rather than generalists. Their engineers who make a career of it are trained and educated extensively and are truly experts. Their deck/weapons officers receive far more training in tactics and strategy, as well as things like Rules of the Road (would probably have helped Fitzgerald and McCain).
Ways in which we fight and sustain them?
When is the last time we trained like we will have to fight? When is the last time we even steamed with 20 or more ships in formation for an extended period? When is the last time we had an all-out exercise with "enemy" forces that were free to engage as they chose rather than following a script? How often do we turn of SATNAV and all those other things that we are unlikely to have in a peer war, and get by on seamanship? If we don't train like we fight, how do we know how we fight?
Esper seems to be talking to Admiral B.S. Potemkin way too much. Wouldn't be nice if Sec. Esper stop talking in powerpoint cliches, next person saying "game-changer" will spend a few months cleaning the loo in Ft. Greely.
ReplyDeleteAre there any examples in history of a dominant Great Power throwing away it's advantages through deliberate and sustained policy misadventure?
ReplyDeleteOne could argue the German's wasted resources on a surface fleet instead of submarines in both WWI and WWII. The French mistakenly bet everything on the Maginot Line... But that's all I can think of. There must be some historical analogies to help bring folks to their senses. I get that invading Russia has always been a strategic mistake, but this is not one bad decision. It is a decades long choice to invest untold wealth in policies doomed to fail.
Interesting question.
DeleteOne could make a case for pre-WWII Japan having made a decade or more of flawed policy decisions although that's more of a geopolitical rather than purely military realm.
A better case is Britain who made an endless series of flawed decisions that led to losing their global power and fielding a shrunken military a fraction of its previous size. In fact, the poor decisions continue to this day.
One could make a case that Germany, despite having the wealth to build a potent military has made decades or poor decisions resulting in a substantially hollow force today.
If I thought about it, I'm sure there's many more examples. Your point about using history to learn lessons about military mismanagement is quite apt.
"One could make a case that Germany, despite having the wealth to build a potent military has made decades or poor decisions resulting in a substantially hollow force today."
DeleteThat's entirely by design, I think.
On the other hand, the way Britain managed to win the war and lose her empire has been astonishing.
The German surface fleet was only a waste in hindsight and even then the amount of resources needed (a capital ship or two with every Arctic convoy) just in case Tirpitz launched where resources not being used in the Med or the Pacific.
DeleteROME!
ReplyDeleteThey started to rely on mercenary in the end. Letting the Germanic tribes guarding the northern border. Those troops did not but up a good defense and this helped the fall on faster. They also debased the currency by adding lower grade metal into the coins resulting in rapid inflation. Degrading the empire and the possibility to sustain the required army. Then The Praetorian Guard also helped to kill off Rome.
And we're hiring more and more contractors to perform maintenance, operate complex equipment, provide cyber security, perform logistic support, etc. ---- Wise use of personnel or scary parallel to Rome? What do you think?
DeleteScary parallel, could say terrifying!
DeleteImperial overstretch is a word that could be used.
Almost 20 years of fighting that did not give any benefits to the US.
If the army engineers/navy equivalent could rebuild Germany/japan after WW2 they could do all the rebuilding and constructions required anywhere. There is never a good reason to use contractors. However to start en economy local companies could be employed by the engineers to do work. Same for building bases, it is lower cost, better control and the risk of getting companies like Blackwater is gone. Also the risk of getting bills that are inflated is reduced. Kickbacks and retirement for higher officers are also reduced since no companies are involved.
If my comment is too political I'm sorry.
"If my comment is too political I'm sorry."
DeleteIt's directly related to naval matters so it's fine.
"If my comment is too political I'm sorry."
If you're talking about strictly bulk construction, that may be true. What about more complex tasks like maintaining the LCS while it conducts a deployment to Singapore? Dozens (a hundred or more?) of contractors were hired and flown to Singapore to provide technical and logistical support. In the same vein, the Navy hires contractors to maintain its Aegis systems which are beyond the capability of normal tech-sailors.
Do you see a legitimate need for contractor technical support or should the Navy provide their own technical support? Is it even possible to use sailors to perform technical support for very complex computers, radars, and the like? Have we gotten too complex to be maintainable without contractors?
For advanced equipment, OEM support would be prudent fine, but not during deployment. The ship should be designed to be maintained by the crew and the maintenance cycle give in the contract when building the ship. Then the navy should go and hire Engineers (with degrees) to help maintain high-tech equipment. Call them Technical officers if it helps with the focus to maintain the equipment and help write the specifications for new equipment. Also more LRU should be used. Just swap out broken units, install new and send the broken to second line support facilities.
DeleteWhat would happen in a peer to peer war if you are dependent upon contractors and no one want to contract because it is dangerous, payment would need to go through the roof?
"What would happen in a peer to peer war if you are dependent upon contractors and no one want to contract because it is dangerous, payment would need to go through the roof?"
DeleteQuite right. There is also a law against placing civilians in war zones which would legally rule out contractor 'ride alongs' on ships.
Do the navy have Technical Officers?
DeleteI was thinking those would have there own progress, Technical-lieutenant, Technical-commander and so on. There focus would be to keep the advanced equipment working, and probably allot of the supply chain. Writing the specifications for new technology and so on. That way the "normal" officers could focus on the combat and leadership.
The captain of the ship would then not need to know everything about all technical details of the ship and could focus on winning the fight.
No, there is not a formal engineering/command split as some navies have done.
DeleteWho would then have the knowlage and insight to write specifications, evaluate offers, perform PDR/CDR. Have the navy left all of this to the industry?
Delete"No, there is not a formal engineering/command split as some navies have done."
DeleteI have posted several times recommending that we adopt the engineering and deck/warfare split that I understand the Royal Navy uses. Engineers run the ship, and deck/warfare officers fight the ship.
"Who would then have the knowlage and insight to write specifications, evaluate offers, perform PDR/CDR. Have the navy left all of this to the industry?"
And this is one of several reasons why I have recommended doing that.
" Have the navy left all of this to the industry?"
DeleteLargely, yes. And that's the heart of the problem. When the Navy abolished their BuShips, which designed ships, they gave up almost all of their in-house expertise and now depend on industry to supply the expertise. Unfortunately, industry's goals don't always mesh with good warship design.
Have no idea how things are today, but I know ET "A" school was a top notch school that taught troubleshooting and repair to component level. With the mass use of surface mount components, and the difficulty in repair, that might be somewhat moot, but still the ability was taught. Still should be. Whether replacement boards or cards are kept in inventory is unknown, but even Aegis should be able to be maintained by sailors...
DeleteBtw...I was referencing the late 80s/early 90s.... Plenty of time for things to have gone very wrong since then...
Delete"even Aegis should be able to be maintained by sailors..."
DeleteThe difficulty and challenge is not in making sure that the system has power and the display appears, it's in understanding the intimate and interrelated aspects of all the factors.
Several years ago, a CO wrote a short piece in Proceedings that described how he believed he had the finest Aegis/radar system and people in the fleet until he was invited to have the manufacturer's reps do an assessment of the system for him. Thinking it would prove how good his people and system were, he agreed. What they reported was that the system was so out of spec that it was almost useless. The problem was that the system was so complex that his people couldn't even tell that the system was bad. Unfortunately, the Aegis manufacturer's reps have now all gone back to their companies and the Navy is largely on its own.
You'll recall a few years ago that the Navy determined that Aegis was so degraded fleet-wide that they formed one of their infamous Admiral-chaired groups to study the problem and remedy it. I've heard nothing since which suggests to me that the problems continue.
This is why I constantly suggest that we dial back our technology a bit. I'd rather have an old, mechanical, rotating radar that works perfectly and can be operated and maintained by sailors than an Aegis system that is constantly degraded and we don't even know it and that can't be effectively operated or maintained by sailors.
Remember the recent supposed anti-ship attacks against the Burke off Yemen? I did a post on that. They had the most advanced radar system in the world and couldn't even tell if they really were attacked or not and then couldn't tell if their defensive missiles hit anything. I attribute that to the degraded Aegis.
"This is why I constantly suggest that we dial back our technology a bit. I'd rather have an old, mechanical, rotating radar that works perfectly and can be operated and maintained by sailors than an Aegis system that is constantly degraded and we don't even know it and that can't be effectively operated or maintained by sailors."
DeleteI think we need to have some variety and redundancy. I have proposed carriers, battleships, cruisers, AAW destroyers, GP escorts, and ASW frigates. What I'd propose for air search would be:
24 Carriers and 8 Battleships - TRS-3D/4D
20 Cruisers and 40 AAW Destroyers - AEGIS/AMDR
60 GP frigates - Combination of APAR or EMPAR or SAMPSON with SMART-L or S-1850
80 ASW frigates - Maybe TRS-3D/4D
I thank that would give us redundancy in having several different systems to fall back on, plus would complicate the bad guys' jamming and ECM problems. I'm not super familiar with the European systems. What little I know about SAMPSON/S-1850 suggests that it is the most robust combination, but that the RN as had some maintenance/reliability issues. I don't know how the Horizon classes are doing with their EMPAR/SMART-L combination, or how the Dutch and Germans are doing with APAR/SMART-L.
AEGIS clearly appears to be as system that has some marvelous capabilities, but if it can't be maintained by sailors, then it's next to worthless. How are the Japanese, Koreans, and Spaniards doing with theirs?
"When the Navy abolished their BuShips, which designed ships, they gave up almost all of their in-house expertise and now depend on industry to supply the expertise. Unfortunately, industry's goals don't always mesh with good warship design."
My idea is that if we did the RN engineer and deck/warfare split, the senior billets on the engineering side would go to command of shore repair, maintenance (and possibly construction) facilities and to something like a modern day BuShips that would be responsible for ship design.
Quick correction. The Horizons are EMPAR/S-1850 per Wikipedia.
Delete"engineering side would go to command of shore repair, maintenance (and possibly construction) facilities and to something like a modern day BuShips that would be responsible for ship design."
DeleteI completely agree with an engineering-command split, however, that would not lead to ship design. In the days of BuShips, ship design was mainly a mechanical engineering exercise. Today, it's not only mechanical but also computer, electronics, stealth, etc. It would not be possible to acquire sufficient knowledge just from following an engineering path. There would have to be some kind of specialized path for ship design, independent of engineering aboard ships. The ship design path would have to involve, basically, sending engineers to school for advanced design studies. That's doable but would require almost another split: command-engineering-design.
"redundancy"
Delete"plus would complicate the bad guys' jamming and ECM problems."
As you know, I'm all for redundancy but it needs to occur on a single ship, not just across the fleet - and I think that's what you're saying.
Redundancy aboard ship should include not just a second piece of whatever but, when possible, that the second piece be of a different technology and be completely isolated and self-sustaining from the primary. For example, it does no good to have a hundred radars (to make a ridiculous example) if they're all tied into the same power system so that a single power casualty renders them all inoperative (like our four EMALS cats that are all rendered inoperative when any one is damaged and must be repaired).
Also, the variety in radars that you suggest should apply within single ships to the degree possible (which ties into redundancy being technologically different). If a given radar is on more than one ship type, that complicates an enemy's identification efforts. The ubiquitous SP-48/49 of old was an example of a radar that appeared on many ship types and made it difficult for an enemy to ID the ship type.
This isn't my clearest comment. I hope you understand the point, anyway!
"Today, it's not only mechanical but also computer, electronics, stealth, etc. It would not be possible to acquire sufficient knowledge just from following an engineering path."
DeleteMy thought is that post-graduate schools could fit into a career path such that by the time an engineering officer made captain, he/she would old a PhD in some engineering discipline. I agree that designing today's ships would require a lot more than pencil and paper Mech.E. skills. But I do think that someone with the technical and academic credentials, who had also been in the shipboard operational environment, would have some feel for, "No, that would never work," and would therefore do a better job.
My idea would be a career path that looked something like (using merchant technology, which IIRC the RN also follows to some extent) do a tour as 3rd engineer, then go ashore and get some additional formal education, then back to sea as 2nd engineer, then more formal education, then back to sea as 1st engineer/ChEng, then to shore establishment at a repair/maintenance/construction facility or design bureau.
One reason I like the APAR/EMPAR/SAMPSON combination with SMART-L/S-1850 is that you have some degree of redundancy onboard ship. If one goes down, you still have the other. As I understand it, SMART-L/S-1850 has greater range and APAR/EMPAR/SAMPSON is more precise, so they aren't perfect substitutes. I don't know how good a fire control solution you can get from the SMART-L/S-1850. But at least if you lose one, you aren't totally in the dark.
Delete
Delete"This isn't my clearest comment. I hope you understand the point, anyway!"
Absolutely. My only reason for spreading them among different ships is the cost and space required on any one ship. I do note that in your proposed fleet, you appear to equip the AEGIS/AMDR ships also with TRS-3D/4D as backup. If that works with space, weight, and cost parameters, then so be it.
Throwing a bunch of different radars in the mix with similar capabilities doesn't really make sense. We have the AMDR family of S-band radars. So no need for the S-band SAMPSON. We have TRS-3D/4D and Sea Giraffe C-band radars, so no need for EMPAR. APAR is a bit different, as it's an AESA X-band. We do actually have a need for one of those, which was supposed to be filled by the very expensive SPY-3. However it doesn't make sense to use APAR, since we have a ton of different US-built x-band AESA radars on aircraft, ground, ships and fixed installations. It makes more sense to use one of those technology bases.
DeleteSMART-L/S-1850 might be an interesting option. We don't have a large, powerful L-band radar anymore with the pending retirement of SPS-49. L-band has some ability to defeat fighter-sized stealth shaping.
However, a more interesting option might be to consider a sea-based UHF AESA radar, perhaps based on the E-2D APY-9. UHF has an even better chance of defeating fighter-sized stealth shaping.
"Throwing a bunch of different radars in the mix with similar capabilities doesn't really make sense."
DeleteAnon2, you are far more into the technical side than I am, so I accept your comments. My thoughts were twofold--1) select from stuff already in use, rather than give the Navy a shot to turn a mouse into an elephant in its adaptation process (not that it wouldn't do that with SMART-L or S-1850 or APAR or EMPAR of SAMPSON, just would have a harder time destroying an existing system), and 2) try to find something more reliable rather than the "great when it's well, but usually sick" AEGIS.
I confess that I don't know the reliability record of any of the European systems, and can't seem to find much online. Do you have any data on that?
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to compare that kind of data with anything we have, due to differences in funding, maintenance, spares and failure tracking practices between nations.
DeleteAnd AEGIS is more than just a radar, it's an entire combat system. It makes more sense to compare it to the full PAAMS suite.
And many of our sailors will die.
ReplyDeleteFor old generation, they equate firing power to more weapons which fire (ships, tanks,... etc.). Technology advancement has changed this picture. Today, precision weapons mean a few can achieve what many battle ships could do decades ago.
ReplyDeleteNot just precision, firing speed has also increased. For instance, modern destroyer only install one gun because it could fire at high speed.
Pentagon does keep US firing power at high level, for instance, insist to have 4,000 cruise missile stock.
Reconnaissance becomes top priority in modern wars between superpowers. There are many precision weapons ready to strike once people find WHERE to strike.
Key problem for US today is industry capability lagging behind China. In US, civilian ship building is dead thus ship building equivalent to navy ship building which makes cost to construct a ship ultra high. Back to 2016, two of world's top 3 missile factories were in China. Today, the situation is only worse.
Rate of fire?
DeleteWW2 Fletcher 5 5inch guns each with ROF of 15-22 rounds per minute.
Burke 1 5inch gun with ROF of 16-20 rounds per minute.
If the Burke loses a gun from combat damage it no longer has a gun a Fletcher has 4 left.
Today, between superpowers, missiles are main weapons for naval battle.
DeleteNevertheless, navy gun technology has also leaped ahead. Advanced guns are guided by radar then human eyes.
Take example of China's H/PJ-38 130mm (Soviet Union standard, slightly larger than 5 inch), it fires ~40 rounds/minute with water cooling. Range is ~30km without using projectile. While use projectile (missiles fired from artillery), range reaches 120km with precision guidance. I don't have data of their latest H/PJ-45A 130mm naval gun.
If you Google webs, you can find currently Chinese naval guns all from reverse engineering and then improvements of Soviet Union systems thus use 76mm, 100mm (stopped for new one), 130mm. Their speed of improvement far exceed Russia.
"Key problem for US today is industry capability lagging behind China. In US, civilian ship building is dead thus ship building equivalent to navy ship building which makes cost to construct a ship ultra high. Back to 2016, two of world's top 3 missile factories were in China. Today, the situation is only worse."
ReplyDeleteBut China believes that losing a war is worse than allowing some defense contractor to make a profit.
Let me be clear, I'm not defending the exorbitant profits that some defense contractors make. I'm just saying that if we want to continue to have a viable military, we have to put some incentives in place for the private sector to support it. And keeping more defense contractors alive means competition which is what's missing now, and why costs are so far out of line. When you have one shipyard that can build a nuclear carrier, how much does a nuclear carrier cost? Whatever that shipyard wants it to cost. Maybe initially you have to find some yard that can build a conventional carrier, and set up the competition as nuclear versus conventional. That's one reason why I am a proponent of bringing back a modernized Kitty Hawk. But we need to be building enough ships to keep enough shipyards in business to maintain some level of competition.
And the Navy needs to be specifying what it wants and needs (as do other services), not letting contractors dictate. If that requires recreating BuShips or something similar (and I think it probably does) then do it. The question I have right now is who would populate BuShips. That's one reason why I have supported the engineering vs. deck/warfare split in the line community. Build up a reservoir of professional engineers with both advanced academic qualifications and considerable at sea experience.
@CDR. I think we all agree here, maybe even a few idiots in DC would agree that USA needs to get to a bigger (diverse) and healthier defense industry BUT the problem is how do we get there? It probably starts to veer too much into politics but realistically, how do we get there from where we are today?
Delete"how do we get there from where we are today?"
DeleteToo many people give up at this point and just say it can't be done but that's not true. The 'how' is actually fairly simple: build many more ships! I'm not talking about building many more gazillion dollar ships because that's what we're doing now and we can't afford them. I'm talking about building simple, single function ships, as I've posted about for years. If we build simpler, single function ships, they'll cost less and we can build more of them. If we build more ships then we need more suppliers, more designers, more shipyards, and more of everything that is required to design and build a ship. As an added bonus, more of everything drives the price of everything down. More ships also means more maintenance which requires more drydocks and shipyards. See where this is going? It almost becomes a self-sustaining cycle of growing the defense industries and it all starts by making the simple, basic, conscious decision not to build do-everything, win-the-war-singlehanded ships that the Navy does now.
Sure, there's a whole lot of detail that has to go into the overall effort, the core solution is actually quite simple.
NICO, after getting out of the Navy I worked in the offshore oil and gas industry for a while, and saw some of the same issues. Getting an offshore drilling rig built in the US is a bit of a problem, too.
DeleteOne thought I've had (and although we disagree on details I think ComNavOps has similar thoughts) is to build more smaller and cheaper ships rather than a few super-expensive ships, so the load can be passed around to more yards.
One reason I favor building some conventional carriers is that we have only one yard that can currently build nuke carriers. We can't have competition for nuke carriers, but if we have somebody else building conventional, we can at least have competition for carriers. And as ComNavOps has noted, the differences between the two are small enough that you can be ambivalent about which you prefer. The Forrestals were built 2 by Newport News and 2 by Brooklyn Navy Yard. The Kitty Hawks were built 2 by Newport News, 1 by Brooklyn Navy Yard, and 1 by New York Shipbuilding, Camden, NJ. Of those, only Newport News is still in existence building navy ships.
Or look at the end (fortunately) of the LCS production run. Marinette is going to be building the FFG(X) FREMM variants. We need some purpose-built ASW frigates and some coastal corvettes and missile patrol boats. Maybe let Austal build them to keep their production lines open.
And we aren't building much of anything on the west coast. There aren't a lot of yards left there, but let's give them some work to keep them going.
Those are some thoughts. I don't have any silver bullets. But I do think making conscious efforts to spread the workload around would help, and I think going with more and smaller and cheaper ships would be one way to do it.
"Maybe let Austal build them to keep their production lines open."
DeleteThe thought is a good one but Austal did a very poor job on the LCS - aided and abetted by the Navy, of course. Austal had never built a warship and it showed in their design, engineering, and execution. Instead of Austal, I'd look at other firms such as Bollinger who built the Cyclones or VT Halter Marine who built the MkIII Ambassador class for Egypt. They already have warship design and construction experience. There's also SAFE Boats Int. who built the MkVI patrol boats and Textron Marine who's building the new LCACs. There's probably a few others if I think about it a bit more.
The point is there are several warship builders who could be nutured and grown into larger frigate/destroyer size builds with a little effort. Austal is included in that group but is my least favorite of the batch since they're not really warship builders and are not really a dedicated warship building company but just a cobbled together conglomerate for the specific purpose of the LCS.
I was actually under the impression that Marinette did a worse job with its LCS group than Austal did with theirs.
DeleteWe have a number of yards that can build smaller ships. And you and I agree that the Navy needs to build a bunch of smaller and cheaper ships--ASW frigates, coastal corvettes, and I would add a missile patrol boat and a couple of types of mine countermeasures ships. So let's get Bollinger, Halter, SAFE and Textron Marine to build some of these smaller ships, and build them up.
If all we build are Fords and LHAs/LHDs and Burkes and Columbias and Virginias, we are going to run out of money before we get enough ships to do the jobs that need doing. We need some numbers, and smaller and cheaper is the way to get numbers. But not numbers like LCSs or drones that have no combat utility. We need ships that can fight, and can defend themselves.
The fact that the world's most powerful Navy doesn't have shipbuilding capability will never not be stupid and criminal.
ReplyDeletePer Wikipedia, here is a list of USA shipyards. I’m not certain which are still open, and what are the capabilities of those that are. But it would seem that the Navy has a lot of options for spreading shipbuilding around. Go for a larger number of smaller ships (ASW frigates, coastal corvettes, missile patrol boats, mine countermeasures ships) and spread them around to keep yards in business.
ReplyDelete• Alabama Drydock & Shipbuilding, Mobile, AL
• Atlantic Basin Iron Works, Brooklyn, NY
• Austal USA, Mobile, AL
• Avondale Shipyard, Westwego, LA
• BAE Systems Ship Repair, Norfolk, VA
• Bath Iron Works, Bath, ME
• Bay Shipbuilding Company, Sturgeon Bay, WI
• Boston Navy Yard, Charlestown, MA
• Bollinger Shipyards, Lockport, LA
• Brooklyn Navy Yard, Brooklyn, NY
• Burger Boat Company, Manitowoc, WI
• California Shipbuilding Corporation, Los Angeles, CA
• Charleston Naval Shipyard (Detyen’s), Charleston, SC
• Chesapeake Shipbuilding, Salisbury, MD
• Chester Shipbuilding, Chester, PA
• Commercial Iron Works, Portland, OR
• Consolidated Steel Orange Shipyard, Orange, TX
• Delaware River Iron Ship Building and Engine Works, Chester, PA
• Dravo Corporation, Pittsburgh, PA
• Electric Boat Corporation, Groton, CT, Quonset Point, RI
• Gas Engine & Power Company & Charles L. Seabury Company, Morris Heights, Bronx, NY
• General Dynamics, Quincy, MA
• General Engineering & Dry Dock Company, Alameda, CA
• George Lawley & Sons, Neponset, MA
• Gladding-Hearn Shipbuilding, Somerset, MA
• Gulf Shipbuilding, Chickasaw, AL
• George Steers and Co, Greenpoint, Brooklyn, NY
• Hans Ditlev Bendixsen, Fairhaven, CA
• Henry B. Nevins, Incorporated, City Island, NY
• Higgins, New Orleans, LA
• Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, MI
• Isaac C. Smith, Hoboken, NJ
• Jakobson Shipyard, Oyster Bay, Long Island, NY
• James O. Curtis, Medford, MA
• Jeffersonville Boat & Machine, Jeffersonville, IN
• John H. Mathis & Company, Camden, NJ
• John Roach & Sons, Chester, PA and New York City
• John Trumpy & Sons, Annapolis, MD
• Kaiser Shipyards, CA and OR
• Lake Washington Shipyard, Houghton, WA
• Lawrence & Foulks, NY
• Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Company, Seattle, WA
• Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA
• Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Drydock, Los Angeles, CA
• Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA
• Marinette Marine, Marinette, WI
• Marinship – Bechtel, Sausalito, CA
• MD Drydock, Baltimore, MD
• Merchant Shipbuilding Corporation, Chester, PA
• Moore Dry Dock Company, Oakland, CA
• Morse Dry Dock & Repair Company, Brooklyn, NY
• National Steel and Shipbuilding Company, San Diego, CA
• Neafie & Levy, Philadelphia, PA
• New England Shipbuilding Corporation, South Portland, ME
• Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock, Newport News, VA
• Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, VA
• North Florida Shipyards, Inc., Jacksonville, FL
• Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, Portland, OR, part of the Kaiser Shipyards
• Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor, HI
• Pennellville Historic District, ME
• Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA
• Philly Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA
• Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, ME
• Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, WA
• Pusey and Jones, Wilmington, DE
• Reaney, Son & Archbold, Chester, PA
• Richmond Shipyards, Richmond, CA, part of the Kaiser Shipyards
• SAFE Boats International LLC, Bremerton, WA
• Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding, Seattle, WA
• Skinner & Eddy Corporation, Seattle, WA
• Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Chester, PA
• Tampa Shipbuilding, Tampa, FL
• T. J. Southard, Richmond, ME
• United States Coast Guard Yard, Curtis Bay, Baltimore, MD
• Vigor Industrial, WA, OR, and AK
• VT Halter Marine, Pascagoula, MI
• Western Pipe & Steel, San Francisco, CA
• William Cramp & Sons Shipbuilding Company, Philadelphia, PA
• William H. Webb shipyard, New York City
• Westervelt & Co. shipyard, New York City
• Winslow Marine Railway & Shipbuilding, Winslow, WA, Seattle, WA
• Zidell Marine – Portland, OR
If you click on the links in the Wiki list, a LOT of those are out of business. Many were wooden sailing vessel yards. The list seems more historical than recent.
DeleteI did a little vetting and removed some. Most seem to be active but smaller yards. Of the four you listed earlier, Bollinger can build ships up to 22,000 tons and Halter up to 50,000 tons, per their websites, while the other two are primarily boat builders. I was actually surprised to find that so many were still active. I did not realize that Detyen's had taken over CNSYD.
DeleteUS has long lost civilian ship building industry to insignificant level. Today, world's top civilian ship builders are: China, followed by S. Korea, then Japan.
DeleteThere is no wonder why China can build navy ships at high speed with less cost. US shipyards are stuffed with union workers, you know productivity.
Just look a recent satellite photo from media on China's 3rd aircraft carrier under construction, the most significant thing to me is --- next to it, is a 400 meter long cargo ship under construction.
This seems to be as good a place to post this as any.
ReplyDeleteAircraft carriers are airports. They don't do anything combat-wise. The combatants are the aircraft. Seems to me that one major problem (of many) with the Fords is that we are spending way too much on airports instead of building the aircraft we need.
In that context, the F-35 may be viewed as a (failed) attempt to cut aircraft cost by making one airplane do the work of three. As I see it the Navy needs 1) a fighter/interceptor with long-range sensors and missiles and good visibility and maneuverability in case it gets caught in a dogfight, 2) an attack aircraft with stealth, long legs, and a heavy bomb load, and 3) a "Marine A-10" for the USMC that is rugged and reliable, has a big cannon, can carry a big bomb load, can operate off a carrier and ideally would be able to operate of short and unprepared strips so it could go ashore with the Marines and be stationed close to the front to pop up as needed. The F-35 is none of the three.
I think I would 1) rely on the F/A-18 for the fighter/interceptor for now, 2) stop the F-35C and spend the money on developing the attack aircraft and getting it to the fleet, and 3) developing the "Marine A-10." And go back to Nimitzes for future carriers, using the savings for more aircraft or more surface ships.
Agree... The F-35 is a poor choice jack of all trades. The multi-purpose idea bites us again...
DeleteThe Marine A-10 is what shoulda been a focus eons ago instead if F-35. I have a lot less issue with a "Warthog carrier" than the wasteful "Lightning carrier"... Sure itd have to become a CATOBAR platform, but if we're determined to have LH platforms be aviation-centric, it should be for CAS... and A10 vs F35 in that role has a clear choice to me!!
DeleteF35 = TFX, same mistake, different decade.
DeleteNavy planes can be good AF planes,
it doesn't seem to work in the other direction.
I'd go the other way. The F-35 is a much better fighter and bomber than the SH. It may not be the end all be all long range interceptor, but that'll take years to develop.
DeletePush for sidekick to up the internal missile count to 6, the engine growth options for improved thrust and/or fuel burn, and continue to push availability upwards.
No fan of the F-35 but its available in near term with future cost of F-35C~ $109 million per a/c, will depend if they can bring ODIN on line to replace ALIS which has been a disaster to bring maintenance costs down to make F-35 into an affordable system. Understand Block 4 a/c upgrades include capability to fit six AIM-120 (and the follow-on longer range AIM-260 in full development) internally in weapons bay.
ReplyDeleteThe following missiles specifically designed/sized to fit in weapons bay maximising a/c stealth.
1. Raytheon is pushing the Norwegian Kongsberg Joint Strike Missile (JSM), ASCM, subsonic, passive sensor - IR and RF, thou with its IN/GPS guidance, GPS unlikely to be an operational system as will either jammed, spoofed or satellites taken out. Targeting of ASCM will depend on another Block 4 possible upgrade, Navy requesting the capability of the F-35 radar wide area search so as to target and launch long range ASCM etc eg JSM, by adding wide-area high-resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode to the NG APG-81 radar, a F-35 category 1 deficiency that dates back to 2012. Block 4 upgrade TR3 will give 25x the computing power which should make wide area SAR possible as no physical change required to radar, needs the software and computing power.
2.The Navy new NG AARGM-ER supersonic missile used to destroy enemy air defenses radars, as well as non-radar, time-sensitive strike targets.
3.The Air Force follow-on variant of AARGM-ER the Stand-In Attack Weapon, SiAW, designed to pursue targets that move quickly, including theater ballistic missile launchers, land attack and anti-ship cruise missile launchers, GPS jammers, anti-satellite systems, and integrated air defense systems per AF budget documents.
Others
F-35 can also fit eight of the new Small Diameter Bomb II in its weapons bay, 208 lbs / 105 lbs explosive, claimed range of 40 + miles but as unpowered range will drop drastically at lower launch height and or speed, uses GPS guidance plus tri-seeker head, as said big question over GPS, if so require SAR from a/c for guidance that puts a/c in sight line of AA ground radar.
Mention of secret joint Air Force Navy ASCM hypersonic missile, whether fit F-35 weapons bay unknown, think remember named Sea Dragon?
From my prospective, there is currently a strange confusion caused by rapid technological advance. Should we jump in and invest in what is currently the highest tech available for production? Should we keep and even expand what is currently fielded in order to buy time and invest into what will be available in five years?
ReplyDeleteGoing by what I have seen by advances made by such programs as DeepCoder and hardware including Neuromorphic Computing, we are nearing the AI Singularity. This is not to suggest that a computer will be tying it's own shoes anytime soon but, I think, it will be the case that machines will begin to take over combat very soon.
I have no reason to believe that the machines will no longer require such strengths as firepower and armor, since that is what humans need. Thus, knowing what worked for us in the past will help to prepare for the future.
So, people like me look to such sources as Navy Matters to get some sort of clarity.
"Should we jump in and invest in what is currently the highest tech available for production?"
DeleteOne of the problems that the US military has is its near-obsessive desire to produce very long-lasting war assets. For example, the Navy tries to build ships that will last for fifty years. While this is commendable on the surface, it actually leads to several, nearly intractable problems. If one wishes to build long lasting assets then one has to try to future-proof them by building in capabilities and capacities for future developments. This leads to excess cost and size. That might even be acceptable except that, inevitably, we guess wrong about what the future developments will be and we rarely (never?) actually upgrade the ships with whatever the future developments turn out to be. Instead, we early retire the ships and tell Congress we had to do it because the ships are 'obsolete', despite having been build with excess future-proof costs.
A better approach is to build ships with 10-20 year life and then build new ones. That way, you can always be building ships with the latest and greatest technology, you don't have to waste money up front in an always-failed attempt to future proof them, you won't be early retiring them, you can skimp on the maintenance which the Navy skimps on anyway, and the builds can be simpler and more focused thereby reducing costs. There is no need to try to guess which technology to invest in because you just use the latest EXISTING technology and in 10-20 years you'll know which technology has matured and you'll pick that for the next ship. I've posted on short ship life spans. See, "Ship Service Life Reductions"
"A better approach is to build ships with 10-20 year life and then build new ones."
DeleteCounterpoint is that if you build for shorter life spans, then you have to build more ships to get the same sized fleet. To have a 400 ship fleet for the next 40 years, with a 40 year life span you have to build 400 ships. To do it with a 20 year life span, you have to build 800, 400 for the first 20 years and then 400 replacements. If you could cut the cost in half, then maybe you could make the dollars work. But two hulls and two propulsion systems make that unlikely.
I still like shooting for a 40-year life and planning a two-year midlife overhaul and upgrade. And even within a class, you can upgrade systems as new technology presents itself.
Until you can explain how we managed to build and fully crew a 600 ship fleet in the 1980's but can't seem to even conceive of it today, this argument holds no water.
DeleteFurther, we managed to build a 6000 ship fleet in a span of 4-5 years in WWII.
We can certainly do it. We've just forgotten how.
"If you could cut the cost in half, then maybe you could make the dollars work. But two hulls and two propulsion systems make that unlikely."
DeleteI've already demonstrated how to do this. Ever so briefly, instead of building a Burke, we build an AAW ship half the size and cost of a Burke plus an ASW ship half the size and cost of a Burke.
You can reason it out for yourself. Take a Burke and remove EVERYTHING that isn't AAW and see what you have left. Right off the bat, you subtract around 140 ft of length for the flight deck and hangar. Then subtract towed arrays, helo machine shops, helo munitions magazines, helo fuel storage, helo det berthing, 5" gun, 5" gun magazine, more berthing for the reduced crew size, reduced water and food storage, and on and on. You wind up with an optimized AAW platform that's half the size and cost. Then wait 20 years and build another one with all the improvements that have occurred in the interim. This really isn't that complicated unless we want it to be.