 |
| LX(R) / LPD-17 Flt II |
As
a reminder, the LSD-41 (Landing Ship, Dock) Whidbey Island class, built in the
1980’s, was designed specifically to transport and launch LCAC vessels and has
a capacity of four LCACs which is the most of any amphibious ship.(1) It can
also provide docking and repair services for LCACs and for conventional landing
craft.(1)
In
1987 the Navy began construction on LSD-49 Harpers Ferry class which reduced
LCAC capacity to two while increasing cargo capacity.(1)
Here’s
a few basic specifications for the LSD-41/49 class. (1) Note the LCAC capacities.
LSD-41/49
Specifications
|
||
LSD-41
|
LSD-49
|
|
Length,
ft
|
609
|
609
|
Beam,
ft
|
84
|
84
|
Displacement,
tons
|
16000
|
17000
|
LCAC
Capacity
|
4
|
2
|
 |
| LSD-41 Whidbey Island Class |
There
are several questionable aspects to the LPD-17 Flt II program that warrant a
bit of discussion.
Well Deck Size. The LX(R) is intended as the replacement for
the LSD-41/49 class. The problem is that
the LX(R) has a significantly smaller well deck than the LSD-41 class and can
only carry 2 LCACs. Here are the well deck dimensions for recent classes of
amphibious ships (see, “Wither The Well Deck”). Note
the generally decreasing well deck sizes.
Amphibious Ship Well Deck Size
|
|
Whidbey
Island LSD-41
|
440’ x 50’
|
Harpers
Ferry LSD-49
|
220’ x 50’
|
Tarawa LHA-1
|
268’ x 78’
|
Wasp
LHD-1
|
267’ x 50’
|
America
LHA-6
|
none
|
San
Antonio LPD-17
|
170’ x 50’
|
The decreased well deck and LCAC capacity represents a significant decrease in ship to shore amphibious capability which seems incongruent with the LSD/LPD’s main function of amphibious assault. One can’t help but wonder what the Navy sees as the main function of the new LPD-17 Flt II since it clearly isn’t amphibious assault.
Cost. Navy’s cost target for the LPD-17 Flt II is
$1.8B (FY2019$) for the lead vessel, LPD-30, and $1.5B (FY2019$) for the follow
on ships (2), however, LPD-31 is now estimated to cost a bit over $2.0B (5) so,
as always, the Navy’s cost estimates are significantly understated.
Huntington
Ingalls announced a sole-source $1.5B fixed price incentive contract for the
lead ship, LPD-30, in Mar 2019. As
usual, this is only a partial cost and does not include advanced procurement
funds already expended, Government Furnished Equipment, or post-delivery
construction which is an ever-increasing portion and is intended to get around
cost caps and make acquisitions seem cheaper than they are. The true cost is likely $2B+. Indeed, the Navy’s budget request documents
show a cost of $1.7B without GFE or post-construction costs. (4)
As
usual, the Navy is not pursuing responsible contracting practices and is doing
everything it can to obscure costs. From
the CRS report,
The Navy plans to
award sole-source contracts to Huntington Ingalls—the only shipbuilder of
Flight I ships—for Flight II construction. Further, the program did not request
a separate independent cost estimate for Flight II prior to awarding the LPD 30
detail design and construction contract. At the same time, the Navy identified
no plans to establish a cost baseline specific to Flight II. Without this
baseline, the Navy would report full LPD 17 program costs—rather than Flight II
specific costs—constraining visibility into Flight II. (4, p.14)
Design Basis. The Navy’s driving force for the ship design
was the cost target rather than functionality or combat effectiveness. As we have repeatedly stated, cost is a
secondary consideration for warship design and cannot be the primary design
factor. No good ship was ever designed
with cost as the primary design criteria.
From
1Q 2013 to 1Q 2014, the Navy claims to have conducted an Analysis of
Alternatives (AOA) with three alternatives considered:
- modified (reduced capability/reduced-cost) LPD-17
- brand new designs
- foreign design
Given
the Navy’s documented half-hearted or non-existent AOAs for other ships, one
can’t help but wonder about the rigor and validity of this AOA. The LCS, Ford, Zumwalt, Burke Flt III, and
new frigate never got rigorous AOAs.
They were either never performed or they were conducted for show with
the outcome having been pre-determined.
Indeed, the selection of the modified LPD-17 strongly suggests that this
was yet another example of a pre-determined AOA conducted purely for show.
Following
are LX(R) design features compared to the San Antonia Class (3):
- half the medical spaces
- smaller hangar for stowing two MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft
- no composite masts
- two main propulsion diesel engines instead of four
- two spots for Landing Craft Air Cushion hovercraft or one Landing Craft Utility boat
- reduced troop capacity from 800 to 500
- reduced vehicle storage space
- enhanced command and control facilities
Competition. According to the Congressional Research
Service, as recently as May 2017, the Navy had publicly stated that a
competition would be held between HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding of Pascagoula, MS,
the builder of LPD-17 Flight I ships, and General Dynamics’ National Steel and
Shipbuilding (GD/NASSCO) of San Diego, CA.
However, on April 6, 2018, the Navy announced that it would sole-source the
design and construction of LPD-30 to HII.
Again, this suggests that the previously announced ‘competition’ was for
show and that the builder had been pre-determined from the start.
CONOPS. One of the major justifications for the LX(R)
is the “requirement” to operate independently.
Of course, this is idiotic but that’s the Navy’s story and they’re
sticking to it. Under this concept, the
3-ship Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG/MEU) will routinely disaggregate and
operate as independent ships, widely separated geographically. This, the Navy/Marines claim, will increase
flexibility and responsiveness.
The
reality is that disaggregated ARGs have even less capability than the
mathematical 1/3 capability that splitting them up into three parts would
suggest. For example, the LPD, when
operating independently, carries less than a third of a MEU and almost none of
the aviation assets. Similarly, the
larger LHA-6 America class, when operating independently, cannot land heavy
equipment as they have no well deck.
The
Marines state that a MEU is the smallest full-function combat unit. Subsets of a MEU are, by the Marine’s own
definition, incapable of effective combat.
So, what does the Navy/Marines want to do? Why, split the MEU up and send the pieces off
to distant points where they cannot act as a complete unit nor support each
other! Stupid on a shingle!
Commandant’s
Vision. All of the preceding was background for the
real point of this post and that is to consider how the LPD-17 Flt II jibes
with the Marine Commandant’s recent statements and documents which call for a
movement away from the 38 amphibious ship and 2 MEB lift requirements.
It
is worth noting at the outset that the LPD-17 Flt II was conceived long before
the current Commandant took office.
Thus, it may be that the Flt II doesn’t fit his plans for the Corps, at
all !
Commandant
Berger has unilaterally and arbitrarily set the Corps on a radically different
path, assuming he follows through on his early statements. To be fair, there are, as yet, few details so
much is speculation, at this point. That
said, Berger has been pretty clear that the Marines will move towards small,
dispersed units using forward bases. The
question, then, becomes how does the Flt II fit into and support this concept,
if at all?
On
the one hand, the Flt II, with traditional well decks and LCACs may be
considered a relic of the old way thinking which involved massed combat power
and amphibious assaults and, thus, of little value in a small unit, dispersed,
forward based type of force structure.
On the other hand, a Flt II, being significantly smaller than the large
deck LHA/LHDs, might be quite useful in moving around and supporting small
units. Then again, the Flt II has very
limited aviation capability which is a cornerstone of the forward base concept
and the Marine’s recent push to become aviation-centric. As I noted, without details about Berger’s
plans, it is very difficult to pass judgment about the value of the Flt II in
the new Marine concept.
If
we take the Commandant at face value and assume that the Flt II is of limited
value, it calls into question the reason for the entire Flt II program. Should we immediately halt the program and
move in a different direction? Berger
has suggested that the Marines will look to smaller, cheaper, more numerous
vessels such as the JHSV or the Light Amphibious Warship (see, “Light Amphibious Warship Update”) for transport.
If that’s the case, we can build a lot of JHSVs for the cost of one Flt
II and we should halt the Flt II program immediately. At the very least, a pause in the LPD-17
program is warranted until the Commandant decides what ships he wants for his
Navy.
(1)Navy
website,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=1000&ct=4
(2)Congressional
Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II (LX[R]) Amphibious Ship Program:
Background and Issues for Congress”, R43543, Ronald O’Rourke, 3-Jul-2018,
https://www.defensedaily.com/wp-content/uploads/post_attachment/202101.pdf
(3)Wikipedia,
“LX(R)-Class Amphibious Warfare Ship”, retrieved 10-Oct-2019,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LX(R)-class_amphibious_warfare_ship
(4)Congressional
Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress”, 10-Oct-2019
(5)Congressional
Research Service, “Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress”, 22-Jul-2020
"Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG/MEU) will routinely disaggregate and operate as independent ships"
ReplyDeleteThis seems lunacy.
All together thay provided a balanced if small forward deployed force. That can used for lots of peace time and not peer war operations or tossing something on the ground quick in pre war run ups. That seems useful for a global power. In a pinch they can do stuff with some fighter support even if thay have to leave a CV umbrella. In places where the locals have small air forces, if any. It is worth recalling even a wealthy African country like SA only has 12/13 operational Gripens.
To break them up seems silly since each ship serves a slightly different role. What is going to screen them is each one going to get a new mini burke escort?
I concur if the USMC really is going to the tiny unit thing is needs a small stealthy cheap and disposable ship to do it with. Here I would agree a ship with low amenities because its only purpose first Second and last is a specific mission executed quickly presumably vs hostile reception well above the Taliban's pay grade.
Also the ideal is still silly. Has command (at the USMC) forgotten just how (not) well Japan did at Guadalcanal with a small light force that only received a string of small light reinforcements.
I wanted to note that I don't exactly know the plan of commander Berger and this is purely speculation on my part.
ReplyDeleteIn the Force Design Concept, Commander Berger stated "It would be illogical to continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. The adversary will quickly recognize that striking while concentrated (aboard ship) is the preferred option. We need to change this calculus with a new fleet design of smaller, more lethal, and more risk-worthy platforms." (1)
He certainly recognizes that the LPDs don't fit his vision of the Marines and in favor of cutting it. However, I think that he still allow these ships being built because he believed that there are simply no better replacements for it now and it's simply keeping legacy capabilities while waiting for the replacement. In fact, Lt. Gen. Eric Smith which is also one of the architects of the original Force Design stated: “We’re looking for ways to make ships more numerous, more autonomous, and more attritable,...There has to be a smarter way to do logistics and supply that we don’t need an [amphib] to do. We’re looking for alternate platforms to take the load off those ships.” (2)
My guess is that the commander are using these ships as sea FOBs where they are constantly moving to avoid detection around island bases as a logistics hub and supplies hub. There are two images that is painted in my head with this force structure. One is the commander are using the LPDs as forward deployed units to perform QRF, strike and evacuation missions. These units are supposedly very vulnerable but they are good baits for Chinese ships to chase after and inadvertently stumble upon our A2AD zone with these isolated bases. The other one is that he is putting the island bases in front and use the Surface Action Group to supply the island bases or a relocation hub and perform the essentially same tasks as island bases but mobile. His emphasis on the slowness and the multipurpose/expensive nature of the LPDs have led me to make those assumptions above with supporting evidence like the Navy is currently procuring both the Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD) and Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ship classes. And by scouting the RFPs from NAVSEA, the Marines/Navy has also put out a request for a "smaller than existing ships in the Combat Logistics Force, and will operate near contested environments, sustaining afloat (Surface Action Group) and ashore (Expeditionary Advanced Base) requirements." Do note that Smith did note that total replacement is probably unlikely and the most possible scenarios are to "partially replace, or bolster, large amphibious ships as the way Marines get to the fight."(2) This also partially explains how he envisioned using the F-35s, as a local defense air force as opposed to the other concepts proposed by the Navy and the Air Force.
Unfortunately this CONOPS is doomed at the start due to the inability to explain how they got to these islands in the first place under contested environment. Assuming that this somehow magically works, the Marines are basically the a barrier serving as a failsafe in the case of the Navy could not effectively contest China military forces.
(1)We Are The Mighty, "The new Marine Corps Commandant hates slow amphibious ships", 07/2019 https://www.wearethemighty.com/news/commandant-hates-slow-amphibious-ships?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1
(2)Breaking Defense, "Marines Kick Off A Year Of Wargames To Help Build New Force", 09/18/2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/09/marines-kick-off-a-year-of-wargames-to-help-build-new-force/
(3)Breaking Defense, "No Shipbuilding Plan, But Navy Works On New Ships To Counter China", 05/18/2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/no-shipbuilding-plan-but-navy-works-on-new-ships-to-counter-china/
"There has to be a smarter way to do logistics and supply that we don’t need an [amphib] to do."
DeleteLots of problems and challenges with this. In WWII, the smarter way to do logistics was with cheap commercial design cargo ships. If you go too small, you can't lift a useful amount of cargo. If you go too big, you can't risk the loss.
"constantly moving to avoid detection"
Does the idea of a small, slow, non-stealthy ship 'constantly moving' really seem like something that will avoid detection? I don't think so.
"they are good baits for Chinese ships to chase after"
The far more likely scenario is that anti-ship cruise missiles and aircraft will chase after these ships, not other Chinese ships. Being totally defenseless, our small, slow, non-stealthy ships will have very short lifespans in combat.
"inability to explain how they got to these islands in the first place under contested environment."
If you can't imagine how these ships would get the forces to the islands in the first place, I assume you're equally unable to see how resupply ships would get there undetected and un-sunk?
"Does the idea of a small, slow, non-stealthy ship 'constantly moving' really seem like something that will avoid detection? I don't think so." My assumption applies more towards to the second scenario of support and supply as i believed the ship will be operating under EM-CON and has fixed locations for these operations to happen (a designated port or a makeshift spot). I also based my guess on how land SAM systems move their radars and launchers to these fixed alternative locations. Now that I think about it, it's probably more vulnerable when it moved.
Delete"The far more likely scenario is that anti-ship cruise missiles and aircraft will chase after these ships, not other Chinese ships. Being totally defenseless, our small, slow, non-stealthy ships will have very short lifespans in combat."
My impression is Commander Berger willing accept the losses and advocate for the ability to absorb losses. The design of the ships are focused purely on the cost perspective (his paranoia in terms of budget lost) with secondary objectives as speed, stealth qualities. This also applies to his supply ships which is "too small, you can't lift a useful amount of cargo.". Would you say the cost incentives offset the fact they are probably gonna be targeted by vastly more expensive weapon systems? I think that Berger believe it's possible if they could keep their promise of a procurement cost under $100 million(1)(The price of a YJ-18 is probably around $4 missile or less and you probably need the maximum of 2 to take a down a LAW), this is purely speculation from his decisions.
(1)USNI News, Report to Congress on Navy Light Amphibious Warship, 06/12/2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/05/29/report-to-congress-on-navy-light-amphibious-warship
"Would you say the cost incentives offset the fact they are probably gonna be targeted by vastly more expensive weapon systems?"
DeleteThat's not quite the right way to look at it. The real comparison is the cost of the enemy missile(s) to deny the entire 'missile marine' forward units. If China can sink the majority (or all !) of the small, slow, non-stealthy resupply vessels then the tiny, dispersed Marine units will wither on the vine and 'die' (become combat ineffective) for lack of supplies.
So, it's not an issue of the cost of the enemy missile versus the cost of the resupply ship but, rather the cost of the enemy missile versus the loss of the entire Marine capability.
Also, China comes out way ahead when the cost of a missile is $1M-$4M versus a (optimistically) $100M ship!
Have a look at ships, only those with transponders are shown, clustered in one potential operational area - https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/centerx:124.6/centery:28.6/zoom:6. The Chinese problem is identifying US Marine targets while USAF Bombers and USN CSGs also are probing.
DeleteThey are acting as maritime light cavalry. Which at it's heart is reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance.
"The Chinese problem is identifying US Marine targets"
DeleteYou understand, I hope, that the vast majority (nearly all) of those ships would not be there during a war? No commercial ship is going to sail through a war zone. There won't be ANY US commercial ships sailing near China and the only Chinese commercial ships will be tucked up against the Chinese mainland for protection. ANY target China sees, they'll assume to be enemy (US) which makes their targeting a very simple operation: see it, destroy it.
So many people seem to assume that peacetime activities will continue during a major war but I know you're not one of those people!
"They are acting as maritime light cavalry. Which at it's heart is reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance."
No, they're not. Recon attempts to stay undetected. The Marine missile units will be the opposite with slow, non-stealthy delivery and resupply ships sailing through enemy waters, pinpointing their location, launching UAVs (presumably), launching missiles, operating radars (presumably), building fairly sizable bases/camps, operating radios, etc. They'll be spotted almost instantly - the exact opposite of recon.
Now, if the Marines were talking about clandestinely inserting small 'coastwatcher' teams, that would be another story but that's not even remotely what they're talking about.
Technically reconnaissance is fighting to acquire/deny information. Scouting is sneaking about. And in the US Army scouts also do counter scouting.
DeleteAt CIMSEC they have a article with a successful and an unsuccessful vignette of the Marines. See http://cimsec.org/winning-the-spectrum-securing-command-and-control-for-marine-stand-in-forces/45122
I think this concept only has utility in the first island chain. If China is outside there then they'll have bases and the answer then is bases bigger than theirs to blockade their bases.
They can operate independently only while against backward nations with outdated weapons. Nations with land based mobile anti-ship missiles can cause serious troubles to them. They don't even have Sea Ram or CIWS to defend themselves from missile attacks.
ReplyDeleteNot even sure they can operate near Third World nations, don't forget that Iran supplied ASMs to Yemen and they took a couple of shots at all kinds of ships passing by, even supposedly at a Burke! I think US DoD needs to get away from the mindset of a permissive environment because the bad guys are supposedly poor and primitive, just about everybody can get their hands on SAMs, SCUDS and ASMs if you have some cash and connections.....
DeleteI will comment further later, but my bottom line is that we have totally lost the bubble as far as amphibious ships are concerned, and that is destroying the Marine Corps.
ReplyDeleteI was in Gator Navy when the LHAs/LHDs started coming in. Our reaction to them at the time was that was too many eggs in one basket. One unlucky rocket or torpedo, and your whole amphibious assault was toast. Because of that risk, doctrine requires that they stand 25-50 miles offshore. From that distance we have no adequate ship-to-shore connectors to get tanks, artillery, and AAVs ashore—boats are too slow, helos/V-22s can’t lift the weight, and LCACs are too unreliable—so all we can land is basically light infantry.
ReplyDeleteSo we need
1) a massive breakthrough in ship-to-shore connector technology, or
2) a redesign of the amphibious force, or
3) the Marines to become exclusively a light infantry force.
Number 1) would be great if we could do it, but that seems too great a technological leap at this point. I don’t know how it could be doable, given size limitations. I personally would opt for 2), with a concerted effort to improve 1) at the same time, but that doesn’t seem to be the way the Navy is going. So the Marines are basically down to figuring out missions that can be accomplished by Boy Scouts with BB guns, or facing extinction. I have too much respect for the Corps to want to see the latter happen.
There is a proposal in a post over at War On The Rocks for the Marines to merge with Special Operations Forces. When Royal Marines were faced with extinction in the 1970s, they went the special operations/commando route. I don’t think the Navy would want to give up SEALs, or the Army to give up Green Berets, or the Air Force to give up their spec ops forces. But I think you could come up with some way for Marines to take over SOFCOM and provide the bulk of spec ops forces, and have the other services attach personnel as needed. That’s kind of what happened in UK, navy kept SBS and army kept SAS. Maybe somewhere around 50,000 Marines as cadre, and supplement with SEALs, Green Berets, and AF spec ops.
For another 90,000 Marines, I think there is still a role for an amphibious force that is mobile and can bring a huge amount of firepower to bear on an objective. Airborne is mobile, but the heavy firepower can be a problem until they can secure an airport. I would give Marines primary responsibility for objectives within 50-100 miles of the shore, and give Airborne primary responsibility for objectives further inland.
A combined arms Marine Corps, which could land infantry, tanks, artillery, and amphibious armor, and support it with tactical air, either from carriers or from bases ashore once they landed, would be a potent force. I can see a need around the first island chain in a peer war with China, or in the Med or Baltic in a peer war with Russia, in addition to rogue nations. Obviously that force cannot be landed off an LHA/LHD, or even the San Antonios or the LX(R)’s. So I would favor
1) creating a Marine expeditionary task unit that includes an infantry battalion, a tank company, an artillery battery, an amphibious armor company, a tactical/CAS air wing focused on support of the landing force, and a special forces detachment;
2) restructuring our amphibious force to provide squadrons that can haul that force (about 3200 personnel, plus equipment), and
3) developing improved ship-to-shore connectors, including an amphibious tank like the Chinese have developed.
(continued)
(continued)
ReplyDeleteMy proposed amphibious squadron (PhibRon) could lift that Marine task unit: small LHA/LHD like Spanish Juan Carlos, LPH like French Mistral, LPD/LSD like British Albion, LST with a real LST bow so it can beach, combination LPA/LKA, and NGFS/land attack frigate. Ten PhibRons would lift 32,000, basically meeting the USMC’s 1991 requirement to lift 2.5 MEB, and exceed the 2006 requirement of 2 MEB. Based on the Marines’ 3-phase rotation policy, about 96,000 would be required to maintain 32,000 in deployed/deployable units. In current dollars, to build one PhibRon would probably cost around $5 billion, or 10 PhibRons for $50 billion, versus about $85 billion for the Navy’s 38-ship amphibious force. Headcount and operating costs should be comparable. And this PhibRon can actually do landings. A big help in getting cheaper is living with an 18 knot SOA instead of the 20+ that the Navy currently requires. I agree with ComNavOps that cost should not be your primary consideration, but $35 billion worth of opportunity cost buys you 2 Fords, or better, a Nimitz, a Kitty Hawk, and about 20 escort ships.
That leads to the question of what to do with the LHAs/LHDs and San Antonios. One other major criticism I have is that if we keep building Fords, we will run out of money before we have a dominant carrier force. My idea is to have carrier battle groups (CVBGs) consisting of a CVN and a smaller conventional carrier. This could be either a CV like a modernized Kitty Hawk, or a CVL like the one proposed by CSBA. I would propose 12 CVBGs each with one CVN, 6 with Kitty Hawk CVs and 6 with CVLs. LHAs/LHDs are about the same size as the FR Charles de Gaulle, or the British 1950s/60s Ark Royal. If we added sponsons, and angled deck, and cats and traps, we could end up with something with about 40 aircraft. If CVNs held 80, and CVs held 60 (and both groups operated with larger air wings before) then putting 2 CVBGs together to form a CTF would allow 260 (80+80+60+40) aircraft, which should be a very potent force.
As for the San Antonios, HII has proposal to put an ABM/BMD ship on the San Antonio hull. So convert them to meet that need.
Setting aside my overall disagreement, you're somewhat glossing over the most important factor even within your own conceptual construct and that is distance from shore. You acknowledge that we have no connector that can operate effectively from 25-50 miles off but then you proceed to propose an entire amphibious force without addressing how you would overcome that limitation. The only means you propose that can land heavy equipment is an LST and, to be consistent, if you didn't like the concentration of risk in the LHAs, you can't like the concentration of risk in an LST: 20-40 tanks and hundreds of troops gone in an instant if an LST gets hit. LSTs are very large, very slow, totally non-stealthy - in other words, perfect targets! You'll note that we almost never used LSTs in the initial waves of seriously opposed assaults in WWII. LSTs were used for follow on sustainment AFTER THE ASSAULT SITE WAS SECURED. Using LSTs in the initial landing against anti-ship missiles, modern artillery, attack helos, mines, ballistic missiles, and whatever else China has would be suicide. An 18 kt SOA beginning from 25 miles would expose the ships to enemy fire for well over an hour and from 50 miles it would be exposed for nearly 3 hours. You're looking at huge attrition (70%-100% ?) in an opposed assault.
DeleteSo, how do you propose to get troops and heavy equipment ashore in the initial assault from 25-50 miles? Or, do you propose moving in to 3-5 miles?
LSTs were actually the first wave at Inchon. That's an exception rather than the rule, but it's still the case.
DeleteIn my day the LSTs came into the line of departure (LOD) and offloaded the LVTs, just spit them out the stern ramp as we sailed down the LOD. LSTs were used for that purpose because they were shallower draft and thus could operate in closer. Then the LSTs would withdraw back further in the AOA and come back when the beach was secured to offload anything else they had.
I don't propose doing anything from 25-50 miles, except maybe air ops off the Juan Carlos LHA/LHD. With 5-6 ships, the risk is much less concentrated in one hull. I would bring the rest of the phib force in to 3-5 miles.
Remember, I'm going to have tactical air plus a battleship with 16-inch guns, and a cruiser with 8-inch guns and the NGFS frigate that is an integral part of the PhibRon to do suppression fire, and I'm going to have some sort of MCM capability to reduce the mine threat to what is considered an acceptable risk level. I'm going to have them armed to the teeth with SeaRAM/Phalanx/Goalkeeper. Past that, we probably will take some fire and may lose a ship. But if we do proper compartmentation and damage control, gone in an instant is not going to be the result of a single hit, unless that hit is nuclear, and then all bets are off.
Will we have to take some risks to do an amphibious assault? Absolutely. You take risks in wars. But if the objective justifies the risks, then you do it. It's not like there are no risks if you go in Airborne.
Umm … You still didn't answer the question. So, are you going to have LSTs be your initial landing craft for heavy equipment or are you going to wait for the site to be secured which means no heavy equipment/armor in the initial assault?
DeleteGone in an instant doesn't have to mean vaporization. Any hit that prevents the LST from discharging its load is 'gone in an instant'. A hit to the bow, for example, that disables the bow doors, the ramp, or prevents access to the bow eliminates the LST. Any hit that alters the draft by much prevents unloading. Any hit that induces a list may prevent landing and unloading. Any hit that disables the engine prevents landing and unloading. Any hit that results in debris or damaged vehicles blocking access to the bow would prevent unloading. And so on.
"I would bring the rest of the phib force in to 3-5 miles"
I agree completely, however, the problem of how to get armor and heavy equipment ashore in the initial landing still remains. The only technologically viable solution, at the moment, is amphibious light tanks (an LVT(A)-4, essentially). However, that still leaves us without Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEV), self-propelled artillery, self-propelled anti-air vehicles, etc.
Well, if you're just going to worry about everything that could go wrong, just surrender and get it over with.
DeleteYes, there are some risks to amphib ships. Proper intel, proper air cover, proper suppression fire, and mine countermeasures can reduce those risks substantially.
How to get the armor and heavy equipment ashore is to let the LST's drop the AAV's off at the LOD to be the first wave. Second and third waves can include some tanks, CEVs, artillery, and anti-air vehichles along with infantry in landing craft. You don't have all the tanks on the LST.
One option with the T is that if you take a hit, just go ahead and ground it out. Yes it will be a target then, but that will divert fire from the landing craft. And if you can get far enough to get a dry ramp, then you just offload. That's one reason why the conventional LST bow works better than the Newport ramp. As far as disabling the bow doors, yes that would be a problem. But the T's I have in mind also had a stern gate and a RO-RO tank deck, so you could still offload over the stern to LCUs.
One of the things that you really need to do for amphib ops is be flexible. That's one thing I like about a 5-6 ship PhibRon with each ship being different. If one thing doesn't work, something else will. Another thing I like is that if you do lose a ship, you haven't lost the whole operation.
"Well, if you're just going to worry about everything that could go wrong, just surrender and get it over with."
DeleteThis is exactly what I imagine our generals and admirals saying during their wargames as they hand wave away problems!
The opposite approach is to worry about nothing and assume everything will go right. That's the approach our current military leadership uses! You still didn't answer how you'll get armor and heavy equipment ashore. That's not worrying about small details - that's a pretty major item! Here's what you said,
"Second and third waves can include some tanks, CEVs, artillery, and anti-air vehichles along with infantry in landing craft."
Are you imagining some kind of individual tank landing craft? We have nothing of the kind, today, anywhere in the world, as far as I know, so it's kind of glossing over a pretty important point! I'm not trying to beat the horse, here, I'm trying to understand how you'll get your heavy equipment ashore?
If you're going to use LSTs before the site is secure, you're going to suffer frightful losses. It's one thing to accept some risk and another to knowingly accept frightful losses.
So, satisfy my curiosity - how and when are you going to put heavy equipment and armor ashore?
“So, satisfy my curiosity - how and when are you going to put heavy equipment and armor ashore?”
ReplyDeleteLet’s look at the capacities and connectors of the ships that I am sending into the AOA (not including the Juan Carlos which will remain offshore to have room to launch and recover aircraft, and will have 913 troops (1200 short term) to land by helo and has 4 LCM).
LPH Mistral – 450 troops (900 short term), 13 tanks, 57 other vehicles, 2 LCAC or EDA-R
LPD/LSD Albion – 405 troops (710 short term), 67 vehicles, 4 LCVP, 4 LCU Mk-10
LST – 431 troops, 17 AAV/LVT, in the Australian Kanimbla version 2 LCM, and since these are not the primary helo ships, I would give up hangar space for 1 helicopter to keep the 4 LCVP from the Newports
LPA/LKA – 900 troops, 8 LCM, 12 LCVP
NGFS Frigate – 100 special forces, these would be inserted ahead of the main force, by RHIB and/or helo.
That gives me 17 AAV/LVT, 2 LCAC or EDA-R, 4 LCU, 10 LCM, 20 LCVP
Okay, so here’s one way to do it
First AAVs dropped off by the LST at the LOD. I have said that I would get something like the Chinese amphibious tanks, and so maybe 6 amphib tanks, 11 LVTs. 17 vehicles.
Second wave, 2 LCAC or EDA-R and 2 LCU (4 tanks), 5 LCM (artillery and other heavy vehicles), 10 LCVP (350 infantry). 19 boats.
Third wave, 2 LCU (2 tanks), 5 LCM (artillery and other heavy vehicles) , 10 LCVP (350 infantry). 17 boats.
So I get 6 tanks ashore in waves 2 and 3, plus the 6 amphibious tanks in wave 1. And I have 10 LCMs in the two waves to transport various vehicles.
Then recycle the LCAD/EDA-R, LCU, LCM, and LCVP to form additional waves. Put LCAC or EDA-R in second wave, because they can probably recycle faster and to form additional waves.
Plus another 700 infantry landed by helo.
I don’t see what’s so difficult there. Yes, there will be some attrition. We will count on intel, suppression NGFS, air support, mine countermeasures, and ships’ own CIWS—SeaRAM, Phalanx. Goalkeeper—to minimize those losses.
I guess my question to you is, given the composition of the amphibious force in your proposed fleet--9 LHA/LHD, 6 LPA, and 8 NGFS frigates—would be, “So, satisfy my curiosity - how and when are you going to put heavy equipment and armor ashore?”
You're violating a lot of doctrine! LCACs are doctrinally relegated to follow on sustainment ONLY AFTER THE SITE IS SECURE. Helos are considered non-survivable in an opposed assault. LCU/LCM are not survivable in a modern opposed assault though their smaller size might warrant risking if enough suppressive fire could be provided.
DeleteHistorically, amphibious tanks (Shermans) had a poor success rate even getting ashore. LVT(A)s had a better success rate, though not great. Since we have no modern amphibious tank, we have no idea what the landing success rate might be but it's unlikely to be 100%, either due to enemy fire or swamping/bogging down.
You've got the beginnings of a viable assault procedure but you need to rethink the LCAC and helo roles. Since you're imagining all kinds of new platforms, you might imagine a single tank landing craft (Higgins boat for a single tank).
One of the major problems that modern assault proponents haven't faced up to yet is the huge improvement in guided weapons over WWII. Large, slow targets like AAVs, LCU, LCM, LCAC, etc. are going to be decimated by Hellfire-like weapons, area cluster munitions (MLRS type), RPGs (won't sink large craft but will decimate their cargo/troops), etc. The only counter to this is huge suppressive fire of which we have zero. I know you've postulated some firepower (good!) but nowhere near WWII levels which is what's needed.
“You're violating a lot of doctrine!”
DeleteMaybe a lot of doctrine needs violating—or changing.
“LCACs are doctrinally relegated to follow on sustainment ONLY AFTER THE SITE IS SECURE. Helos are considered non-survivable in an opposed assault. LCU/LCM are not survivable in a modern opposed assault though their smaller size might warrant risking if enough suppressive fire could be provided.”
What you’re saying right now is that we have this $3.5 billion dollar LHA, and the only ways it has to get troops and equipment ashore are helos (V-22 is a glorified helo) and LCACs, and neither one of them can be used. No wonder the Marines are coming up with idiotic mission ideas. It’s all they can do. Whether intentionally or negligently, the Navy is basically destroying the Marine mission.
I can see places where amphibious and coastal/littoral operations would be very useful—along the first island chain versus China, in the eastern Med or Baltic versus Russia, and lots of places versus a rogue state or terror group. It’s a capability we need, but we are treating it only marginally better than we treat mine warfare.
As I understand it, there are three categories of amphibious assault. Doing this from memory, but I think the terminology is:
- Unopposed – basically an administrative landing with no enemy contesting – this is the kind of landing that we might do to bolster a friendly nation
- Opposed – the bad guys don’t want us to land, but can’t or don’t really put up strong opposition; Brits landing at San Carlos would be an example
- Contested – the bad guys shoot everything they have at us to prevent our landing.
I don’t think there’s any problem doing the first. The third is pretty much Nelson’s, “A ship is a fool to fight a fort.” But the middle category is possible if you have good enough intel and deception, and enough suppressive NGFS, and air control and good CAS.
Normandy was basically a port seizure operation—Cherbourg and Le Havre. But to go directly into either one of those would have been hotly contested and a huge blood bath. Thanks to intel and deception, we found a spot halfway between where there was opposition, but not enough to prevent a successful landing. Cherbourg was on a peninsula, and once we solidified the beachhead it was fairly easy to cut them off by land, and they weren’t getting anything by sea down the Channel, so they fell fairly quickly. Le Havre took a bit longer.
Inchon was way behind the Nork lines, and they never expected us to strike there. Those are two examples of how to succeed.
“Since we have no modern amphibious tank, we have no idea what the landing success rate might be but it's unlikely to be 100%, either due to enemy fire or swamping/bogging down.”
The solution there is obvious—get a modern amphibious tank and train with it—like China does. I don’t think anybody expects 100% success. But if we can get enough through, then good enough is good enough.
“You've got the beginnings of a viable assault procedure but you need to rethink the LCAC and helo roles. Since you're imagining all kinds of new platforms, you might imagine a single tank landing craft (Higgins boat for a single tank).”
Actually, because of reliability issues, I would tend to use EDA-Rs rather than LCACs. The only ship in the AOA that might carry LCACs is the Mistral, and it’s a French design as is the EDA-R, so they are probably more compatible anyway. You’ve got some of the same issues with any connector you use, but you’re going to have to take them on to do a landing. The Higgins boat for a tank is pretty much what the EDA-R is, although it can do 20 knots.
“The only counter to this is huge suppressive fire of which we have zero. I know you've postulated some firepower (good!) but nowhere near WWII levels which is what's needed.”
Again, the solution is simple. Get firepower.
I still want you to explain how you would do an amphibious assault with your proposed fleet. Or maybe you just rule them out altogether.
I actually like your idea of a one-tank Higgins boat.
DeleteI know we have discussed before about the firepower issues and we have concluded with bringing back Battleships and cluster bombs munitions and the like. We also know that until units can get into shore, they could not put down effective fire suppression. But is there a middle ground between the two?
DeleteCould we deploy a heavily armored ship that operate about 5-10 miles from the shore with the sole purpose of proving more direct fire support? I imagine they are about the size of our current LCAC and look something like the Zubr (but they are not hovercraft and do nto carry troops) and in the front, they are equipped with Abrams turret (to provide effective tank countermeasures and bunker destruction, the Abrams also have sensor to detect if lazer is painted on them and presumably provide a way to target antitank missile) and 2 CIWS turrets in the middle to provide close in defense support.
In the back, they are either equipped with unguided rocket launchers (Ogon missile launchers come to mind) or they are equipped with a counter artillery radar and use mortars or 150mm to suppress or neutralize the artillery batteries.
I also propose that an Anti Air version could be easily made by replacing the artillery component with Stingers or a system like ADATS.
The last thing that I could see happen is a electronic warfare module (as it is much closer in the battlefield, it is much less expensive and also much more powerful for the local area)
I believed that these versions could also defend the initial objectives from counter attack (nearby ports, beachhead and coast towns).
"I still want you to explain how you would do an amphibious assault with your proposed fleet."
DeleteAs I've stated and as you noted, I see no strategic requirement for amphibious assaults. My small core amphibious ships exists to maintain a core of institutional knowledge in the unlikely event that the need arises. The core would also be tasked with tactics development and equipment development/evaluation. They would also be available for the occasional administrative unloading.
"heavily armored ship that operate about 5-10 miles from the shore with the sole purpose of proving more direct fire support?"
DeleteThose existed and are called monitors. You can read about them in Wiki and various Internet sites.
"equipped with Abrams turret"
This would be nearly useless in an assault support role. A tank gun simply does not have the firepower necessary for the job. While there is a role for 5" naval guns, the bulk of fire support is provided by 8"-16" guns. Naval 5" guns were used for point support of exposed targets of which there are relatively few since a wise enemy tries not to expose themselves.
Rocket launchers can be useful for suppressive fire in high enough volume but are useless as destructive fire. You might want to read, LSM(R) which discusses fire support vessels.
"As I've stated and as you noted, I see no strategic requirement for amphibious assaults. My small core amphibious ships exists to maintain a core of institutional knowledge in the unlikely event that the need arises. The core would also be tasked with tactics development and equipment development/evaluation. They would also be available for the occasional administrative unloading."
DeleteWell, the "unlikely event that the need arises" had better be nonexistent, because if the need ever does arise, we are not going to be able to meet it with that approach. You're relying on LPAs for the heavy component of your assault, so you're looking to load artillery onto assault boats by winching it over the side. Having "institutional knowledge" of how to operate a winch doesn't mean that the particular winch operator trying to put that particular howitzer into that particular LCM alongside knows what he is doing, or has ever done it before. And if he doesn't or hasn’t, he's very likely to sink the LCM or put a hole in the side of the LPA.
That's almost exactly how the Navy killed mine warfare after Korea, "Oh, we'll keep a few around just to maintain a core of institutional knowledge." Then Nixon mined Haiphong and End Sweep showed how lacking we were, but nobody really paid attention. So today we are pretty much destroying what little MIW/MCM capability we have left. The LCS as an MCM platform has to be one of the dumbest ideas ever. The only thing it can do is go fast, and a minefield is the last place in the world that you want to go fast.
After re-reading the LSM(R) post, I think something like that is definitely what is needed. Your assault support ship and Wayne Hughes’s NNFM gunfire support ship or my NGFS frigate and corvette could all incorporate some LSM(R) capabilities. But it also provokes a question. Is your opposition to amphibious forces more because you truly believe that phib ops will never be needed, or because you think we are so poorly prepared that we would have little hope of completing one successfully? Right now, I think it's very much the latter of those two, and my response is to fix the problem rather than abandon the mission. Same for mine warfare.
I see very highly possible needs for amphib and littoral ops in the first island chain against China or in the eastern Med or Baltic against Russia. And every one of them could include a significant MIW/MCM component. If China invades Luzon with 100,000 troops, then putting 3,000 Marines ashore to oppose them accomplishes next to nothing. But China can't invade Luzon with 100,000 troops. They can't get them there. Maybe they can get 100,000 or more to Taiwan, and that's the tough one to figure out the correct response. But I'm more into stopping wars than winning them. And if we've got a CVBG and an ARG in the China Sea on a continuous basis, then China has to ask itself very seriously whether it wants to up the ante. They aren't building PLAN, or their entire military, to take us on. They're building it to intimidate their neighbors. To me, it’s like the guy who used to bully you on the way to school and steal your lunch money, until one day your big brother showed up and beat the crap out of him, and he never bullied you any more. If we let China know—and let Taiwan and Philippines and Indonesia and Malaysia and Vietnam know—that we are there and ready to play big brother if necessary, the bullying stops. They’re all about saving face, and they’re not going to pick any fights that they can’t win.
"institutional knowledge"
DeleteCome on … You know what institutional knowledge is. It's the ability to set up relevant training programs. Institutional knowledge doesn't mean one guy in the fleet knows something and he's keeping it a secret. I know you know this.
"That's almost exactly how the Navy killed mine warfare after Korea, "Oh, we'll keep a few around just to maintain a core of institutional knowledge."
Oh come on, now. You can't seriously believe that. We can kill any capability, whether we maintain institutional knowledge or full fledged knowledge if we totally neglect it. Institutional knowledge REQUIRES that it be diligently practiced against future need. We maintained total amphibious assault capability with a fleet of 30+ big deck amphibs and yet we allowed our capability to vanish. We maintained a large frigate fleet and then allowed it to vanish. Institutional knowledge core capabilities are not why we lose capabilities. We lose them, whether institutional or not, when we neglect them. Again, I know you know this.
"Is your opposition to amphibious forces more because you truly believe that phib ops will never be needed, or because you think we are so poorly prepared that we would have little hope of completing one successfully? "
I've said it many times but I guess I'll say it again. I've looked at the strategic requirements for war with China, Russia, Iran, and NK and concluded that there is no reasonable strategic need for amphibious assaults. The fact that we can't actually do it just makes it that much easier to greatly reduce the assets devoted to the mission.
"I see very highly possible needs for amphib"
DeleteYou've stated this repeatedly and I've offered a counter. While you're welcome to continue repeating it, I've made my position clear so there's no need to repeat myself in the future. So, while you're welcome to repeat it, there's no need as I won't offer any additional argument unless something new changes the equation.
"Oh come on, now. You can't seriously believe that. We can kill any capability, whether we maintain institutional knowledge or full fledged knowledge if we totally neglect it."
DeleteAnd that's the problem. If you reduce it to a small cadre to retain institutional knowledge, then it gets neglected. That's what happened in the mine warfare force, and is still happening today.
"I've looked at the strategic requirements for war with China, Russia, Iran, and NK and concluded that there is no reasonable strategic need for amphibious assaults. The fact that we can't actually do it just makes it that much easier to greatly reduce the assets devoted to the mission."
Do I think there will ever be a need--or even a want--to do an opposed amphibious landing in Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran? No. And I've said that before.
But does that mean there won't be a need to do an amphibious assault somewhere in the first island chain versus China, or somewhere in the eastern Med or Baltic versus Russia, or somewhere versus Iran or a rogue element? No.
You've got your belief on this and I have mine. I think that we both agree than an LHA/LHD-centric amphibious force is in reality no amphibious force, because we don't have the connectors to do a combined arms landing off an LHA/LHD, even with the addition of an LPD and LX(R). And that is driving the Marines to loony ideas like putting basically a bunch of Boy Scouts with BB guns ashore to conduct whatever operations they are supposed to do.
What kind of war will be the next one? The one we don't prepare for.
Who are we expecting that we might have to fight in a peer war?
DeleteRussia or (more likely) China.
What are they doing with their amphibious forces?
Expanding them, particularly China, but Russia is getting into the game, too.
What are we doing with our amphibious forces?
Destroying them, by adopting strategic and tactical concepts that make no sense.
What's wrong with that picture?
"You've stated this repeatedly and I've offered a counter. While you're welcome to continue repeating it, I've made my position clear so there's no need to repeat myself in the future. So, while you're welcome to repeat it, there's no need as I won't offer any additional argument unless something new changes the equation"
DeleteI don't think anything is going to change either of our minds. I do think we can agree that spending the kind of money the Navy is spending to build the kind of amphibious "force" that it is building is absurd. And in so doing, they are destroying the mission of the Marine Corps as an amphibious assault force. We disagree about what should be done about it, but I don't think either one of us would argue that what they're doing now makes sense.
Why focus on a MEU-sized assault? Any opposed assault would be MEB or MEF sized. MEUs just aren't big enough to really accomplish anything short of raids and presence.
DeleteAlso, why not just land the entire GCE via AAV/LVT/ACV? Landing a mere 17 amtracs seems pretty paltry. Should be in the hundreds.
"Why focus on a MEU-sized assault? Any opposed assault would be MEB or MEF sized. MEUs just aren't big enough to really accomplish anything short of raids and presence."
DeleteBuilding blocks. We need to learn how to do and MEU before we can master an MEB/MEF. MEB would be about 14,000 Marines, IIRC. That would be 4 proposed PhibRons (with short term loading of up to 4200/PhibRon). With 10 PhibRons, in a two-front war, you could have one MEB for each front.
"Also, why not just land the entire GCE via AAV/LVT/ACV? Landing a mere 17 amtracs seems pretty paltry. Should be in the hundreds."
Amtracs can't carry tanks or artillery. If you include an amphibious tank (like China) in your amtracs, then you would have those guns. But you'd probably still want to land some tanks and howitzers.
I really think the MEU/MAGTF structure isn't right for opposed assaults. It's fine for presence missions where its "Swiss Army Knife" design with a little bit of everything makes sense. 4,200+ per PhibRon is larger than entire Army brigades.
DeleteFor 14,000 Marines, your first wave will amount to only around a battalion equivalent ashore (11x3 infantry carriers and 6x3 assault guns). The rest have to fly in or be carried by landing craft.
Instead, how about give amtracs to all of them. Design the PhibRon to carry an entire brigade with several hundred of them, all landing in the initial wave. Then not only can they all land at the same time in a cohesive formation, they can also move off the beach under armor and on to objectives. They aren't just foot mobile light infantry when they come ashore, waiting for unarmored trucks to land to move them.
I suggest the book "To Foreign Shores" by Loreli Naval Institute Press. Covers US amphib OPs in WWII. You'd be suprised by the capabilities of the older LVT's. They had them traveling 50+ miles at sea during some of Macarthur's Island hopping Campaign along with support vessels and other amphibs . Adm Barbey of the VII Amphib Force was a military genius.
Delete"I suggest the book "To Foreign Shores"
DeleteI'll look into that one. Thanks!
The number of LCAC's, LCVP, or whatever is now irrelevant under the new Commandant. The 26 LCAC's will be fine for putting a bunch of missile batteries on an island with almost no ground troops or armor protecting them. This is the Missile Marines now. They do the Navy's job for them.
DeleteGranted, if the Navy was actually doing theirs he would have 0 justification for this foolish doctrine.
If the Old Breed is dead and gone the size of what you land is irrelevant. In fact the amphib fleet is irrelevant except for the shipyards needing contracts for amphibious fleet.
IF the Marines themselves are not interested in amphibious landings anymore perhaps the best use of this class is using the base hull for a new cruiser/arsenal ship or turning them over to MSC for supplying the missile marines and LCS ports but at half the cost of a Naval ship.
Aside from these FSPs (Fire Support Platform), I also imagine of a ship version of EFV that are designed to beach itself and have relatively thick armor in the front and really thin armor in the side and top ((kinda like a tank). It is designed to go futher than other landing craft because the units are supposed to exit from the back/ maybe the side as well.
ReplyDeleteI would think that supplies version perform similar to this, but they are probably a little bigger as they are designed to carry single tanks/amoured vehicles and they are also similarly designed to exit from the back (I assumed these units are trained with an AI capable of traveling in a straight line maybe a bit more to maneuver around the mines on the way to target so that we don't need any kinds of command systems that control these units)
"so that we don't need any kinds of command systems that control these units"
DeleteControl is ALWAYS needed in such a situation. NOTHING goes according to plan in an assault. There will always be unexpected obstacles, sunken, damaged, or beached landing craft to work around, redirection due to confused landing directions, changes due to enemy fire, etc. The history of amphibious landings is a history of confusion and chaos!
"The history of amphibious landings is a history of confusion and chaos!"
DeleteAnd that's exactly why I think your "core of institutional knowledge" approach would fail.
"And that's exactly why I think your "core of institutional knowledge" approach would fail."
DeleteOh good grief! The whole idea of institutional knowledge is that you 'remember' the problems AND SOLUTIONS for a particular capability and you train for them. You train for chaos and confusion. You train for bad weather. You train for unexpected obstacles. You train for …
You just do it with a small cadre rather than a 30+ ship fleet and 180,000 Marines. I know you know this.
"You just do it with a small cadre rather than a 30+ ship fleet and 180,000 Marines. I know you know this."
DeleteWhat I know is that the idea of preserving institutional knowledge of mine warfare by retaining a "small cadre" resulted in almost total neglect of the mine force and loss of the capability.
You seem fine with the loss of amphibious capability. If that's the case, why waste money and headcount on pretending?
Only a lucky anti-tank missile hit will disable an LCU. They are somewhat armored (bullet proof) while an anti-tank missile burns a small hole to kill those inside tanks or APCs. When they hit an LCU they will make a tiny hole and kill or injure anyone just on the other side, but the boat will be unharmed and continue onward with any armored vehicle aboard safe.
Delete"Only a lucky anti-tank missile hit will disable an LCU."
DeleteOr an artillery shell or a Hellfire-type missile or a 5" rocket or a mortar shell or an anti-ship missile.
Also, recall that an LCU is completely open and is packed with troops or vehicles. Any hit by any weapon is going to cause carnage.
"You just do it with a small cadre rather than a 30+ ship fleet and 180,000 Marines. I know you know this."
ReplyDeleteAs I said, that's how the Navy destroyed the Mine Warfare Force. Keep a small cadre. Only problem is, when you need to do something big like mining the North Vietnamese ports, or End Sweep, that small cadre isn't big enough to do it. To get the mining done, we used a device that had never been used, because we didn't have the ability to build that many Mk52 mines. Then we had to do an exercise to figure out how to sweep it (there's a great story there, but I don't know if it has been declassified). To get End Sweep done, we basically sent the Atlantic Fleet mine force TAD to the Pacific.
I agree that what we are doing makes no sense. But that doesn't tell me to stop doing it altogether.
Let's examine this a little bit more clearly, you said that's how the Navy destroyed the Mine Warfare Force by reducing the size and set them aside for their ability to atrophied through time. And you are correct on that but how about Marines capabilities? We invested entirely in a separate forces from the Navy, freeing them so much to just do one thing and they still failed! I assume CNO wanted to made the point that if we have already lost focus, we might as well reduce the forces and reuse that money for other important increase like ASW ships and less expensive carriers and the like. With no real operational needs (in his CONOPS), I believe that we can reduce them into a Design/Test force to basically rethink the entire concept that they have been doing before! The Navy mistakenly believe that unmmaned mine clearing ships or multimission ships is the future so they have been investing in that. The thing is that since they are (originally) small, they do not have a real impact on the Navy in the beginning. I am aware that they invested in a hugely expensive MCM module for the LCS and early retire the Avengers class but this is because they scale them up too quick to even think through the concept. Except for us, this is an ability we need to ramp up intensively compared to the amphibious assault needs.
DeleteI trace the demise of the Marines to two things:
Delete1) The LHAs/LHDs put too many amphibious eggs in one basket. One lucky (or unlucky, depending on your point of view) missile or torpedo could wipe out your whole amphibious assault. When the Navy figured this out, they adopted as doctrine that these would operate 25-50 miles offshore. From there it is impossible to launch a proper amphibious assault because there are no ship-to-shore connectors that can get tanks and heavy artillery to the beach from there--boats and AAVs are way to slow, helos and V-22s can't lift the weight, and LCACs are too unreliable.
2) In Afghanistan and Iraq, Marines have settled into occupation and peace-keeping roles. They've become basically adjuncts to the Army. I guess they took this just to get some piece of the action--anything--but this is pretty much antithetical to the historic Marine mission.
The Marines are supposed to be a mobile force that can get in, bring a huge amount of firepower to bear on an objective in a sort time, accomplish their mission, and get out. That's not what the LHA/LHD allows them to be, and that's not what they have been in the Mideast.
Suppose you're the Commandant, you are trying to save the Corps, but you can't do your traditional missions with the tools you are being given. What do you do?
His hands are tied on getting back to amphibious assault unless the Navy changes its force structure. I think that's why the Marines are making noises about input into ship design. But he is also getting rid of tanks and artillery, and so he is self-destructing the historic mission at the same time. And he is proposing "missions" that simply don't make sense.
I keep hoping there is some big, smart dude in charge, and this is all part of plan that will make sense at some point. But I just don't see it.
Between the 8 Whidbey Island-class ships and 4 Harpers Ferry-class ships, they could carry 40 LCACs. Replacing them with 13 ships that can carry a total of 26 LCACs is sheer folly. In other words, the Navy is paying billions to reduce our ship-to-shore capability by one-third.
ReplyDeleteThe Navy dropped two LX(R)s from its future plans a year ago, and I assumed the program was dead. The Commandant's small amphib concept that require no connectors would replace this. Details: http://www.g2mil.com/Devo-Amphibs.htm
ReplyDeleteAlso, LCACs are idiotic. They have no weaponry, aren't bullet proof, and a single anti-tank missile can destroy one as they ride very high off the surface. They burn lots of fuel, cost lots to maintain, and carry one-third that of an old LCU.
ReplyDelete"It is worth noting at the outset that the LPD-17 Flt II was conceived long before the current Commandant took office. Thus, it may be that the Flt II doesn’t fit his plans for the Corps, at all !"
ReplyDeleteHere's one thing (of many) that I don't understand about the Commandant's "plans." The kinds of small amphibs that he seems to be envisioning appear to be too small. Something of the size that is being discussed is not seaworthy enough to make the voyage from, say, Guam or even Okinawa, to any sort of engagement zone with China--at least not without having a load of very seasick Marines--too seasick to accomplish anything in combat. At the same time, they seem too big to carry in the well deck of any larger ship. So how do we use them? Where do they start from?
Hypothetical--Say we have a bunch of Marines in Okinawa that we want to put ashore on an island in the Philippines. How do we do it with the Commandant's proposed boats?
In line with your point, one of the things I've noticed over the last several years from military leadership is that all their plans START with the end result already in place. Whether it's hidden F-35 bases, small unit missile-marines, distributed lethality LCSes, or whatever, the discussions all begin with the assets already in place. No discussion of how they got there through some pretty enormous obstacles.
DeleteThis is more of the same. A small, slow, barely sea-worthy transport boat/ship that deposits a few marines on an enemy island with, as you note, no discussion of how they got there, where they came from, the challenges of the voyage, how they'll remain undetected, etc.
This is hand-waving away problems on a huge scale. We are literally witnessing the birth of disaster.
I think the question of how the Marines got there is easier to answer than the question of how a militarily useful "payload" such as a Patriot/NSM got there. There's plenty of small craft/helos that can walk Marine detachments up the Ryukus/SCS island chains. How do you get a JLTV sized missile launcher there is a whole separate story. Any FARP idea starts and ends with how do you move and store 16,000 pounds of Aviation fuel per sortie. Again, IMHO, the people move easily, the stuff doesn't.
Delete