The Des Moines class cruiser was designed during the peak of
WWII and incorporated all the lessons learned about naval combat to that
point. More importantly, it was designed
by people who were actually fighting a naval war as opposed to the people
designing ships today who have no first hand knowledge of combat and,
seemingly, no awareness of history or history’s lessons about warship design. The class can, in many ways, be considered
the ultimate development of the cruiser.
As such, it would behoove us to examine the design and see what
characteristics its designers focused on and why. Presumably, we should be valuing the same characteristics
in our designs today or, if not, we should have a very carefully thought out
rationale as to why not along with supporting evidence and data to demonstrate
why we believe that the lessons of actual naval combat no longer apply.
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| Des Moines Class Cruiser |
While the design work began around July 1943 with final
design characteristics approved in November 1943, the lead ship, Des Moines,
was laid down in May 1945 and commissioned in November 1948, too late for the
war.
As a brief summary, here are some specifications of the Des
Moines class.
Des Moines Class Specifications (1)
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Length (overall), ft
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716
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Displacement (full load), tons
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20,950
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Beam (waterline), ft
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76
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SHP, hp
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120,000
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Speed (trial), kts
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32.5
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Range @ 15 kts, nm
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10,500
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Main Battery
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9x 8”/55 (3x triple
mounts)
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Secondary Battery
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12x 5”/38 (6x dual
mounts)
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AA Battery
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24x 3”/50, 12x 20mm
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Fire Control
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2x Mk54 (8”), 4x Mk37
(5”), 4x Mk56
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Armor Belt, in
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6-4
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Bomb Deck, in
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1
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Armor Deck, in
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3.5
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Bulkheads, in
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5
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Barbettes, in
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6.3
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Main Mount Armor, in
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up to 8
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Conning Tower, in
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up to 6.5
|
Let’s take a brief look at the design characteristics that
are evident from the specifications.
Armor – With a 1”
bomb deck (intended to detonate armor piercing shells and high explosive bombs
before they reached the main armor deck), 3.5” armor deck, up to 6” main belt,
and heavily armored main gun mounts, the class was well equipped to stand and
fight and continue fighting while absorbing damage. We’ve completely forgotten just how well
armored ships used to be. Imagine a Des
Moines class cruiser going up against the 57-76 mm guns so prevalent in today’s
navies. The cruiser would be almost
invulnerable to gunfire. Even 5” gunfire
effects would be greatly mitigated. Of
course, anti-ship cruise missiles are a different story, to some degree, and no
one is suggesting an exact duplicate of WWII armoring schemes for modern ships
(see, “Conceptual Armor For Modern Ships”).
However, the lesson that armor mitigates damage and allows ships to stay
in the fight is a timeless reminder of the reality of combat and one that we
have forgotten, today. WWII warship
designers understood this even though we’ve forgotten the lesson, today.
Speed/Range –
Capable of 32+ knots and a range of 10,500 nm at 15 kts, the Des Moines was
heavily armored for her size and reminds us that we don’t have to sacrifice
speed or range to achieve armor.
Contrast this with the entirely unarmored LCS which is only capable of
around 37 knots (see, “LCS – Not All That Fast”) – hardly much more than the
Des Moines while being significantly lighter!
So many people have commented that armor means less speed and
range. They’re wrong and the Des Moines
specifications prove it conclusively!
Modern ship designers have completely forgotten how to achieve the
combination of speed, range, and armor that we routinely met in WWII ship designs.
Battery – The Des
Moines carried a heavy and numerous main and secondary battery. We’ve forgotten just how densely packed WWII
ships were with weapons. Weapon density
(redundancy) is what allows a ship to keep fighting even if one or more weapons
are disabled. It is also worth noting
the secondary battery which was numerous and powerful. Compare that to today’s ‘secondary’ batteries
– for those ships that even have one it generally consists of one or two 30 mm
guns or some such. This reminds us that
there is value in a powerful secondary battery in the event that the main
battery is disabled. It also provides an
alternative for situations in which firepower is still needed but the main
battery would be a vast overkill. The
failure to recognize the value of a powerful secondary battery, today, is yet
further proof that we no longer design WARships.
Fire Control
Redundancy – One can’t help but be struck by the number and types of fire
control systems in the Des Moines class.
In addition, and notably, the Des Moines had two separate main battery
plotting rooms which would provide invaluable redundancy in combat. Contrast that with today’s obsession with
consolidating every sensor into one system which, of course, creates a single
point of failure in combat. As battle
damage accumulates, the more fire control systems that are available, the
longer a ship can stay in the fight.
All of the above characteristics are noteworthy, without a
doubt, however, they don’t add up to a truly special warship. So, is there something else that makes the
Des Moines class special? There is! It’s the rapid fire 8” guns.
8”/55 RF Mk16 – This
gun represented a major step forward with the capability to achieve firing
rates three times faster than previous guns!
As reported by Navweaps website, the 8”/55 routinely demonstrated
sustained firing rates of 10 rds/min thanks to automated shell handling and
loading. As Navweaps states,
…
a fire rate three times greater than that of previous 8"
(20.3 cm) guns and coupled
together with the use of "super-heavy" AP projectiles, these weapons
made the Des Moines (CA-134) class the most powerful heavy cruisers ever built.
(2)
The guns were able to be loaded at any angle – again, a
major benefit – and were able to achieve firing ranges of 30,000 yds (17
miles). Interestingly, the guns used two
radars on each turret for rangefinding instead of optical rangefinders.(2)
 |
| 8"/55 Gun Turret Drawing |
 |
| 8"/55 Gun |
We see, then, that the key to the Des Moines class was the
very heavy weapons fit and the ability to fire those weapons three times faster
than any previous 8” gun! Combine this
with a heavy armor fit and the Des Moines was a powerful, effective warship,
for sure. It is little wonder, then,
that the Des Moines keeps cropping up in discussions about modern cruisers and
why modern ships compare so poorly to the WWII class.
The lessons of the Des Moines and the characteristics that
were valued by WWII warship designers were speed, range, firepower, redundancy,
armor, and rate of fire – all of which, except perhaps speed, have been abandoned
by today’s ship designers. What makes us
think that those characteristics of a good warship design no longer apply to
naval combat? What evidence do we have
that those characteristics no longer confer any benefit in naval combat? The answer is … nothing. Only our own stupidity, ignorance, and
arrogance are telling us to abandon the hard learned lessons of actual
combat. We’re substituting our
ignorance-based thinking for combat-reality and the folly of that will quickly
become apparent in the next naval battle.
Indeed, the folly has already become apparent with examples
such as the Norwegian frigate that sank from a simple, limited collision, the
gentle grounding of the Port Royal that mission killed the ship’s VLS and
Aegis, the exterior bomb blast that almost sank the Cole, the two Burke
collisions that almost sank those ships, the French ship that was unable to
launch its cruise missiles, the LCS that cannot repair even the simplest damage
at sea, and so on. Today’s examples are
telling us, loudly and clearly, that our ship designs are garbage and unsuited
for combat. We need to return to the Des
Moines, conceptually, if not literally.
Imagine a Des Moines class cruiser with VLS and some modern
sensors added. It would instantly be the
most powerful surface ship in the world.
(1)“U.S. Cruisers, An Illustrated Design History”, Norman
Friedman, Naval Institute Press, 1984, ISBN 0-87021-718-6, p.481
(2)Navweaps website, retrieved 17-Jun-2020,
http://navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_8-55_mk16.php
FYI there have been a few speculations/information about the French ship that didn't fire its cruise missiles :
ReplyDelete- Some said it was buzzed by Russian SU24 and the CO didn't want to have an accident (i.e. a cruise missile hitting an aircraft).
- The CEMM (French CNO) has said that his sailors are not getting enough training in terms of firing live missiles and guns and he wants to be able to purchase more rounds so that they can get proper practice without endangering stock levels, which are apparently ectremely low (that's another interesting subject I think ....)
So it seems to be either a question of training or one of diplomacy, not shipbuilding.
You're assuming that one of the two explanations you offered is true. I make no such assumption without supporting evidence. It is equally likely that the ship simply suffered a failure and was unable to launch - which is what most of the reports claimed.
DeleteFrom Task & Purpose website,
"The three naval cruise missiles fired from the French frigate Languedoc were initially intended to come from a different French frigate whose first salvo simply “did not fire,” French Joint Chief of Staff spokesman Col. Patrick Steiger told Defense News."
There's no mention of Russian interference and the acknowledgement seems to be one of simple system failure.
Regarding training and live fire exercises, every CNO wants more training!
So, the problem seems to be neither diplomacy nor training but, rather, simply system failure on the part of a never before used system. Hardly surprising that a system that has never been used would fail in its first actual use. The real failure is French command for failing to rigorously test the system. The US also fails to rigorously test its systems and we should have learned a lesson from this incident but we did not.
Require expending expensive ammo now does it? Worse across the fleet. Better to have showy well scripted RIMPAC event and call it all good and save money for you know the X sized fleet building whatever ships you can get Congress to build as long as they are not mine sweepers..
Delete"So, the problem seems to be neither diplomacy nor training but, rather, simply system failure on the part of a never before used system. Hardly surprising that a system that has never been used would fail in its first actual use."
DeleteYou're being a little to harsh here as the backup ship, Languedoc, was able to fire its three missiles, apparently, without a problem.
Why the backup was able to fire its missiles and not the primary ship is an unknown. It could have been a last-minute computer problem or something related to the launch equipment or the missiles themselves. The MdCNs are relativley new to the French Navy, so there might be some teething issues as well.
"You're being a little to harsh here"
DeleteFirst, I was simply stating that a failure of a new, never used system is hardly surprising. That's just simple reality that has nothing to do with being harsh.
Second, a 50% failure rate most certainly warrants a degree of harshness!
Well the only consolation I can come up with is more or less everyone else seems enamored with the current consensus in how navy ships should be build with all the same flaws.
ReplyDeleteBut given how fantastically big the US defense budget it would seem we could afford to build a few outside the box ships - and not always just bleeding edge tech ones. I would not even complain about the Zumwalt if It had been halted at one when it became clear it was a failed design with a failed gun sytem so had no point[to paraphrase Oscar Wilde "to build one bad ship is misfortune to build three is carelessness"] .
"a few outside the box ships - and not always just bleeding edge tech ones."
DeleteAbsolutely outstanding suggestion! Any thoughts about what kind of one-off ships you might want to try?
They built only 3 and never refitted them with missiles. You can buy these, but then not much else. Going back to your earlier article you would want 2 of these with each carrier. The reality is you got 20 ships the size of the Baltimore and 40 the size of the Clevelands during and after the war. I'm all for more weapons and redundancy, but numbers are very relevant to the U.S. Let the Russians build a hand full of monsters we can easily keep tabs on. As for armor, I really think we need to dig a bit more on Zumwalt as I think it is sporting some. One more reason not to tear it up to slam in more VLS.
ReplyDelete"Zumwalt as I think it is sporting some."
DeleteIf you can find some information on this, let me know!
"numbers are very relevant to the U.S."
DeleteNo. Combat effectiveness is what's relevant. If numbers are the only relevant factor then we can just build 10,000 combat canoes and we'll have the greatest navy the world has ever seen. Of course, that's absurd. It's combat effectiveness, AS A FLEET, that's important. That dictates a mix of powerful units and less powerful ones. You build as many powerful units as you need to meet your operational requirements.
We've discussed many times that our acquisition system is badly broken. We can easily afford a basic, powerful, state of the art (but not one item beyond state of the art) ship if we follow the guidelines I've laid out in past posts.
Any hesitation we have is just justifying our current malpractice acquisition standards.
Several are out there on the armor around the PVLS. The one that specifically mentions 4 inches is here. https://navylive.dodlive.mil/2014/04/17/uss-zumwalt-building-the-future/
DeleteYeah, I've seen that. It specifically mentions that the purpose is to contain hotter burning exhaust from missile launches so it appears not to be armor in the usual sense but just a stronger, thicker exhaust channel. How much, if at all, that would contribute to the overall protection of the ship is unknown.
DeleteI swaer I read a while back that the Mk 57 VLS provided some battle damage protection by having the "inner" walls thicker than the outer walls, so that the explosive force would exit through the weaker wall- ie- outwards. But I can't find where I might have read it.
DeleteIn any case, the Zumwalt does provide a little out of the box thinking- peripheral VLS means the weapons are being spread out for redundancy. Remember the German frigate which had an explosion in it's VLS battery and the whole battery became inoperative 1-2 years ago?
The helicopter flight deck is very, very long on the Zumwalt. There is ample space for more weapons.
And I've always wondered- what is the space of a 145-170m long warship used for? 30% seems to go to the helicopter hanger and flight deck. Weapons 5 inch gun and VLS seem to only be about 20-25% the length of the ship. Are sensors, the computing room, living quarters really so important that they gobble up weapon's space?
Andrew
"peripheral VLS means the weapons are being spread out for redundancy."
DeleteIt does spread out the weapons. Of course, the flip side is that a hit almost anywhere will take out some of the VLS.
I do remember hearing that the hull of the zumwalt had around 6 or so inches of armor. However it may be just around the gun systems.
DeleteTo meet the Navy survivability standards for the FFG(X) Fincantieri added 300 tons of steel to the FREMM.
ReplyDeleteHow that compares to Des Moines in percentage terms don't know, expect low, but token move in right direction, expect response to collisions of Fitzgerald and McCain.
"To meet the Navy survivability standards for the FFG(X) Fincantieri added 300 tons of steel to the FREMM."
DeleteWhat was added was NOT armor. It was additional compartmentalization which, of course, required more 'walls' to create the compartments. That was the bulk of the added weight. I believe some bulkheads may have been thickened but I'm not sure about that.
To the best of my understanding, the frigate will have no armor beyond some Kevlar-type anti-shrapnel protection for a few key spaces.
Why did naval designers turn away from armor? I've never seen a definitve history of it. Was it the prevelance of airstrikes in sinking even heavy surface combatants in WW2 that suggested to designers that it was a marginal issue in protecting ships? Was it the promise of precision munitions delivered by jets that made them think that ship damage would be critical and that the best bet was to stop the aircraft getting through in the first place?
ReplyDeleteThe short answer is stupidity. Once the designers who actually 'lived' through combat retired, the new designers apparently thought they knew better and had better ideas.
Delete"a marginal issue in protecting ships?"
You need to read up on what it took to sink a WWII warship. It was an immense effort, generally. You might want to read 'Neptune's Inferno' about the Guadalcanal naval battles. The amount of damage those ships absorbed and managed to keep fighting was beyond belief and it was all due to armor. A typical ship in a Guadalcanal battle would absorb 30-70 shell hits and possibly some torpedoes. Contrast that to today's thin-skinned ships that will be one-hit kills. We're building multi-billion dollar ships that will be killed with one hit. That's insane.
Hmmm, the (unarmored) destroyers and cruisers we procured in the 50s and 60s were undoubtedly designed by the generation that saw action in ww2, and the were overseen by legendary combat heroes like CNO Arleigh Burke himself, so it can't simply be an issue of 'inexperienced designers and leadership that haven't seen action'
DeleteI posit that it was a (well founded for the time) assumption that ww3 would inevitably go nuclear, that Ivan would use nuclear torpedoes, AShMs, and bombs on surface units, and no amount of armor could stop a multi-kiloton warhead.
Today, while the threat of nuclear antiship ordnance has receded, we're still building very lightly armored ships because of sheer force of inertia instead of reevaluating how much armor is necessary to stand against conventional ChiCom antiship ordnance.
One very important development that you're forgetting is that the General Board, which was responsible for the conceptual designs of WWII ships, was disbanded in 1951 so those ships of the 50s and 60s were NOT designed by the same WWII combat experienced group. Honestly, I don't know who designed the ships of the 50s and 60s.
DeleteThe details of design seem to have been conducted by the actual shipbuilders like Bath iron works, but the requirement in terms of sensors, armament, and protection came from the Navy leadership, which was definitely still comprised of ww2 combat vets well into the 60s, although many were aviators rather than surface warfare officers. Regardless of who designed the ship, those combat vets clearly didn't ask for thick armor belts, or that would have been added.
Delete"those combat vets clearly didn't ask for thick armor belts, or that would have been added."
DeleteThat is not at all evident to me. Once the General Board was disbanded, I don't know who took over the conceptual design process. It may not have been combat vets. It may have been young, rising accountants or business men.
It is also not clear to me who made the final decisions on what to include or not. Perhaps combat vets requested armor and were turned down?
As I said, if you can find any actual evidence of the post-war design process, I'd love to see it.
There is a very good reason for the reduction of Armor and the focus on active defense. Just look at Operation Crossroads. Heavy armor did not stop the "crew" from all dying of radiation. While several of the ships survived the explosion relatively intact the radiation results were shocking. The expectation that future fights would be with Nukes and you can see why the shift from armor to active defense. Lessons from the Falklands showed the value of armor and thus you have the ABs get the first "armoring" post WWII designs. Nukes are a threat but most of the weapons a ship will face are Exocet type missiles. A decent amount would increase the missile size and complexity thus reducing the numbers and available launch platforms. The larger the size of missile the greater the possibility of detection and ability to counter target and shoot down.
Delete"you can see why the shift from armor to active defense."
DeletePeople keep saying this but despite diligent searches of historical records, I can find no evidence that this line of reasoning occurred. I strongly suspect that this is after the fact rationalizing.
Do you have any evidence that this line of thought actually occurred?
You are absolutely correct. A bunch of attack planes carrying bombs and torpedoes was able to sink the Yamato and Musashi, the most heavily armoured ships in the world. The aircraft carried 10001b armour piercing bombs . A modern 2000 lb bomb such as the Mk84 with a glide kit and guidance can be released 50km away and devastate a cruiser. What protects the cruiser is the active weapon systems, not the armour.
Delete"What protects the cruiser is the active weapon systems, not the armour."
DeleteThis statement is at odds with both logic and history.
First, the purpose of armor is not to provide total immunity to weapons. The purpose is to mitigate the damage from weapons which allows the ship to stay afloat longer, stay in the fight longer, and have a better chance of survival. Your own examples of the Japanese ships proves the point. It required lots of weapons to sink the ships, thus proving the benefits of armor. No ship is unsinkable and no one has ever made that claim. However, an armored ship is much more survivable and effective than an unarmored one.
As far as the notion that active systems protect the ship, of course that's what they do! Did you think otherwise? However, active systems invariably fail. The British experience in the Falklands demonstrates this. Ships with active weapon systems but little or no armor were sunk. Active systems fail. Had the ships had significant armor the damage would have been mitigated and some or all might not have sunk and certainly not so easily.
It should be obvious that BOTH active systems and armor are required to maximize the chance of ship survival. Passive defenses also add to the survivability and, according to historical data, are far more effective than active defenses which have an historical success rate of 0%-25%.
How about in terms of strikes required to sink a ship from air delivered bombs. I get that WW2 ships were optimised against plunging fire from low HE content AP shells, but was it statistically easier to sink a ship via aircraft than another ships guns?
ReplyDeleteI think there was a rationale to later design philosophy beyond stupidity, it'd be a good starting point to understand it.
" easier to sink a ship via aircraft than another ships guns?"
DeleteAfter the initial experiences of the war, designers incorporated a dual armored deck system specifically to deal with aerial bombs. An upper (usually weather) deck contained 1"-2" of armor intended to deflect or detonate a bomb. Below the upper deck was a second, main armor deck of several inches of armor, depending on the specific type of ship. This was intended to prevent the exploding bombs from damaging the internals of the ship.
If there was ever a 'rational' evolution to the abandonment of armor, I've never seen it. If you find something, let me know.
Speaking of WWII armour against modern threats, here's a video that posits that Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles, as currently designed, are not serious threats to even WWII-grade STS armour at modest amounts of thickness.
ReplyDeletehttps://youtu.be/YasYnqRHkXk?t=920
Simply put, according to the video uploader, AShMs lack the necessary density and structural integrity to penetrate WWII-era STS steel, and on impact with armour, will just largely crumple in on themselves and inflict superficial damage to the armour even if they detonate.
I don't know how accurate this hypothesis is, but I'd like to hear CNO's thoughts on this if possible.
The only test of a missile against armor that I'm aware of was a test long ago by the US Navy using a ?Harpoon? against some ship armor plate. I don't know the thickness or type. The result was scratched paint and nothing else.
DeleteAP shells are designed to penetrate armor and armor is designed to destroy the AP cap of a shell. I'm not aware of any missile that has an AP type of cap so I'm quite skeptical that a modern missile would be successful against armor.
Russia claims to have missiles with shaped charges but, again, I'm quite skeptical that those would be effective against actual ship armor.
Even the largest anti-ship missiles, like BrahMos, are not much more than battleship shells, in essence, and, without a AP cap, would likely fare poorly against significant armor.
Of course, absent testing, who knows?
Speaking of testing, did you see the part of the video I linked above where they rammed a fuel-laden F-4 Phantom jet fighter into a concrete wall intended to protect a nuclear reactor, at 500 mph? That part (and the failure of the F-4 to penetrate any appreciable distance) is supposed to show that despite the high kinetic energy of AShM's, their poor mass-to-explosive filler ratio will just cause them to splat like a bug on a windshield against any decent thickness of STS armour instead of penetrating. Of course, the real question is whether or not you can apply that kind of lesson to missiles with shaped charges or not.
DeleteThe uploader also argues that even the largest AShMs don't compare to AP shells fired from battleships because those AP shells have an explosive-mass-to-total-munition-mass ratio on the order of 1%, which is much lower than what the largest AShMs carry.
There really needs to be some realistic testing to settle this.
"because those AP shells have an explosive-mass-to-total-munition-mass ratio on the order of 1%, which is much lower than what the largest AShMs carry."
DeleteThis demonstrates a serious lack of knowledge by the uploader. Explosive effects are determined not by the weight of explosive but by the pressure wave (and other effects) generated by the explosion. Just as gunpowder in open air does not explode but gunpowder in a container does, the explosive effect of naval shells is hugely amplified by the containment of the shell itself. The thick walls of the shell contain the explosion and allow the pressure to build to huge levels and then release it in a catastrophic burst as the strength of the wall is, eventually, exceeded. I'm grossly simplifying the process but that's the concept.
This is why a battleship's 16" shell carves out 50 ft diameter craters from just a relatively small weight of explosive. It's all about containment and compression, not weight.
This was clearly demonstrated in the Cole incident, for example.
I believe we have a bit of a misunderstanding here. The munition-to-explosive-filler mass ratio was mentioned by the video uploader to be a determinant of how good a penetrator (disregarding shaped charges) a missile or shell would be, not how large an explosion such a ratio would make.
DeleteAnd if anything, the USS Cole incident goes to show how vulnerable modern warships are to even low explosives like fertilizer bombs, due to lack of actual armour. It's doubtful it would hurt an honest-to-goodness Des Moines Class Cruiser much, if at all.
"The munition-to-explosive-filler mass ratio was mentioned by the video uploader to be a determinant of how good a penetrator (disregarding shaped charges) a missile or shell would be"
DeleteWell, now I'm really confused. The weight of explosive has no bearing on penetration unless the missile is contact fuzed and, if so, then by definition there is no penetration although the resulting explosion may create a hole.
Penetration is a function of kinetic energy of the missile (aided, possibly, by the shape/size of the AP cap - which no missile has). The explosive is ignited AFTER the penetration, if any.
Whatever your uploader was trying to say is not coming across or he doesn't grasp the concepts.
"if anything, the USS Cole incident goes to show how vulnerable modern warships are to even low explosives like fertilizer bombs, due to lack of actual armour."
DeleteThat's exactly what it shows. It also demonstrates that mere weight of explosive does not necessarily make for good explosive effects. By being uncontained, the very large weight of explosive used in the Cole incident produced a fairly mild explosive effect. The only reason it did the amount of damage it did was because the Cole was thin-skinned and had no armor.
'Even the largest anti-ship missiles, like BrahMos, are not much more than battleship shells, in essence, and, without a AP cap, would likely fare poorly against significant armor.'
DeleteWhat is to stop them changing the warhead to an armour piercing shell?
"What is to stop them changing the warhead to an armour piercing shell?"
DeleteNothing. As you know from your study of naval armor, the armor was designed to 'decap' AP shells before they could penetrate so armor would be an excellent counter to AP missiles if anyone chose to produce one.
Of course, an AP missile would have much less room/weight for explosive and/or fuel. The AP caps of shells were massively thick and heavy. Any weight and volume added to a missile to form an AP cap will necessarily require the removal of an equivalent weight and volume of explosive and/or fuel for a given size missile.
There are plenty of guided anti-tank missiles with shaped charges already. I don't see any reason why they couldn't be scaled up to do anti-armoured-ship work, instead of using a ballistic armour-piercing cap which might degrade a missile's flight characteristics.
DeleteAs for your confusion, I'll quote from the video:
"One of the findings from the following inquiries was that a successful penetrator had to be extremely strong and rigid on impact, and also have a very small explosive filler—neither of which describes ANY guided missile."
The video then goes on to outline a couple of cases where old-fashioned battleship shells failed to work against armour because they had too much explosive filler and thus weren't strong enough to avoid crumpling on impact instead of penetrating, essentially a roundabout way of saying that "kinetic energy is not necessary but not sufficient; enough structural integrity to retain a penetrating shape after impact is also necessary."
"There are plenty of guided anti-tank missiles with shaped charges already. I don't see any reason why they couldn't be scaled up to do anti-armoured-ship work"
DeleteI'm not an anti-tank weapon expert but my very limited understanding of anti-tank shaped charge missiles suggests that they CAN'T be effectively scaled up for anti-ship work. The anti-tank shaped charge creates a very small penetration via a plasma jet whose function is to penetrate a single small compartment (the interior of the tank) and render it unlivable/unusable). It creates not massive explosion and does not penetrate multiple 'walls'. Thus, a scaled up shaped charge for anti-ship work would penetrate a single compartment and do relatively little damage in the much larger compartments of a ship. Further, I suspect, but don't know, that the many fluid filled tanks and voids on a ship would absorb the shaped charge plasma effect with little damage done.
As I said, I'm way out of my area of expertise so anyone can feel free to correct me if I've got this wrong.
"The only test of a missile against armor that I'm aware of was a test long ago by the US Navy using a ?Harpoon? against some ship armor plate. I don't know the thickness or type. The result was scratched paint and nothing else."
Delete@ComNavOps: Do you have a cite/video for this? It would be interesting to look further into those test. Though I don't think most HE shells would do a good job penetrating armor plate anyhow.
"As I said, I'm way out of my area of expertise so anyone can feel free to correct me if I've got this wrong."
Delete@ComNavOps: You've got the basics down; that's the simplified explanation of how a shaped charge creates a damaging effect. A warship's compartments will effectively act like spaced armor. I've had this debate on and off elsewhere for the last 5 years. Sure, Russian HEAT rounds are claimed to penetrate 31 inches of armor, which is great and all, except that you've got a few hundred feet of ship to get through.
The other issue with using shaped charges in missile warheads is that the effectiveness and "power" of the shaped charge jet increases as the diameter of the shaped charge increases, which is why you see shaped charges becoming more effective as gun caliber increases. But this means that if you want a shaped charge jet to get through a ship... well you're going to have to build an utterly ridiculously large and wide missile, at point there's a thought that if you're going to make a missile that big, maybe you should instead give it an armored nosecap and male like an APHE shell (exibit a, Granit).
CNO and Wild Goose:
DeleteI can think of a couple major vulnerable spots for an armoured cruiser like the Des Moines or the Iowa-class battleship that an anti-ship missile using a shaped charge could target: the turrets and the armoured bridge.
The turrets have the main weaponry inside, and HEAT missiles could penetrate their thinner top armour, possibly taking out all the guns in a turret that's hit. The armoured bridge is its own compartment and could still be taken out by a couple HEAT missile hits there. Of course, without actual physical testing I'm not so sure of the outcome of a HEAT missile hit might actually be.
"missiles could penetrate their thinner top armour,"
DeleteThat's far from a certainty! The Iowa's main turrets roof armor consisted of 7.25 in (18.4 cm) Class A armor over 0.75 in (1.9 cm) STS. That's 8" of the best armor we were able to make. There is absolutely no evidence that a missile could penetrate that.
A HEAT round is an anti-tank round. It is designed to punch a VERY SMALL hole in a tank armor using a plasma jet. I'm not even sure this could effectively scale up to a missile and, even if it could, there is no evidence that it would cause sufficient damage. It's one thing to incapacitate a tank by disrupting the VERY SMALL internal compartment of a tank but it's another to incapacitate a battleship turret. We simply have no idea as the concept has never been tested, as you note. Personally, I'm extremely dubious about the ability of a missile to penetrate WWII type ship armor.
I know this is all speculation absent physical testing, but what is not speculation is that the Iowa-class' blueprints and armour thicknesses (and presumably those of other WWII ships) are public knowledge. Should the Iowas or Des Moines ever be reactivated, and assuming their armour is not upgraded, you can bet that the enemy will try their luck with the best odds they can get (i.e., they will try to hit the thinner parts of the armour, just like the US Navy did with the IJN Yamato after deducing the weaknesses of her class once the IJN Musashi had been sunk).
DeleteHEAT-using missile manufacturers like to spout on and on about how much Rolled Homogeneous Armour their missiles can penetrate too, though I'm not sure how different the Iowa-class' armour is from RHA. It could be a little different (it's largely reinforced steel, not composite armour to my knowledge), or it could be a lot different. Maybe we could borrow some BrahMos missiles from the Indian Armed Forces, put some HEAT warheads on them, and test them against WWII-era battleship armour plates to settle the issue.
"HEAT-using missile manufacturers like to spout on and on about how much …"
DeleteI'm pretty sure those claims are made up or, at best, someone's calculations. There has been no actual testing, as far as I know. For one thing, no manufacturer has access to armor plate.
Also, bear in mind that there is a world of difference between penetration and destruction. As I mentioned, anti-tank missiles create a very small hole in the tank armor which is sufficient to destroy a very small tank compartment. Comparatively, making a very small hole in a ship and then trying to destroy a, relatively, very large compartment may well not work.
For example, a 5" diameter anti-tank missile creates something on the order of a 1" hole in the tank (excuse the numbers, I'm not a land combat guy but the numbers are somewhere in the wild vicinity of right). Now, scale that up to an anti-ship missile of, say, 13" (the Harpoon diameter) which would produce a hole in the ship of 2.6". That would not seem to be a lethal effect. Of course, what damage is done inside the ship is the real question. Even a BraHmos missile with a 24" diameter would only scale to a 4.8" hole. Of course, I'm assuming that the shaped charge effect scales linearly and I have no reason to believe that; nor do I have any reason to believe it doesn't.
I'm just illustrating that the very small size of a tank magnifies the destructive effect of the missile whereas a ship is immensely bigger compared to a tank.
The US navy should just dust off the blueprints and build the ship.
ReplyDeleteNo extra radars or VLS cells.
Then fire 5-6 missiles at it in one go and evaluate the damage. If the ship can still fight and/or sail. then an upgrade with radar/VLS cells could be performed.
If the ship survived the live fire test the next test would to fire one salvo at a Burke, Zumwalt and LCS to evaluate combat effectiveness.
Question:
How big is the effective combat rage difference of the main gun and a ship missile. That is when the firing ship actually can see the other ship with radar?
/W
There's no need to actually build a ship to test the armor defense. We just fire a missile at a test square of armor plate and see what happens.
DeleteThe gun has a range of 17 miles. Anti-ship missiles have ranges from dozens of miles up to hundreds of miles depending on the size/type of missile. The gun is not a substitute for an anti-ship missile. It's a complement that is mainly for ground support and close in anti-ship work.
Cope former FT3 USS DesMoines. Slow? A Bt on the Des Moines when I was aboard said they had made larger spray bars and when DesMoines was ordered to "make all haste," to the Suez Canal they installed them and made 40+ knots easily.
DeleteMy understanding is that the expected use of tactical nuclear weapons was a big part of the reason that armor became deprioritized - no amount of armor was going to solve for that.
ReplyDeleteWhen I first started reading this piece, I thought it was going to be similar to the Virginia review. Instead, it is a thoroughly damning critique of modern US naval (surface) ship building and strategy. Weep for what we have become.
Also: I sure hope the Chinese don't read this BLOG...
I guess the only good news is all navies around the world are in the same boat, nobody as far as we can tell is really putting serious armor on any new ships.
Delete"nuclear weapons was a big part of the reason that armor became deprioritized"
DeleteI've heard that but I've been unable to find any writing or statements to support it. I suspect that was not a reason and that it's just an after the fact explanation being put forth by people like us who are trying to explain why we dropped armor.
If you ever come across any evidence of a link between nuclear weapons and the abandonment of armor, let me know!
"nobody as far as we can tell is really putting serious armor on any new ships."
DeleteWhich would seem to offer a significant advantage to the first navy that did!
"Which would seem to offer a significant advantage to the first navy that did!"
DeleteAbsolutely.
Armor and compartmentalization. War is about taking a lick and keeping on ticking, to paraphrase an old advert.
"My understanding is that the expected use of tactical nuclear weapons was a big part of the reason that armor became deprioritized - no amount of armor was going to solve for that."
DeleteWell, IJN Nagato took two nukes pretty well, and she had been laid down during World War One...
Yea she took it physically, but ALL the test animals that were in her died. My first professor at the NWC was at the test. Read up on those tests. CAPT Hughes wrote about it in Fleet Tactics pg160-165.BTW the whole book is great, I highly recommend reading it.
Deletepts97 - Even the animals in the armoured ships, such as the battleships used as targets during Operation Crossroads? You'd think that that steel armour they used would help to shield against the radiation. Do you have a source on the fate of the animals onboard the armoured ships after the test?
DeleteOK, I know you thought my independent cruiser concept was overdone, but let's look at Des Moines, which was my model. Keep the triple 8-inch in the A and Z positions. Replace the B turret with as many VLS as you can fit comfortably. I'm guessing you could get 96 in there. Do the same aft in the Y position. I don't think the 5-inch, 3-inch, or 20mm add much against modern air threats, particularly when you've got 192 VLS cells. Add at least 2 SeaRAM and 4 Phalanx instead. 2 Phalanx could go in the two stern gun tubs and one on each side of the superstructure, and 1 SeaRAM could go just aft of the forward VLS and just forward of the aft VLS.
ReplyDeleteI would give it AEGIS/AMDR or similar radar. Primary missions would be AAW coordinator for a task group and flagship for an escort squadron. Secondary mission would be NGFS for an amphibious landing.
Now eyeballing, it looks like you've got about 150-200 feet between the forward and after VLS batteries. You could shift the superstructure to starboard and lay out a small flight deck at the 02 level, big enough to operate helos and UAVs. Underneath, put a hangar and launch points for small USVs and UUVs on the main deck.
It's not an aircraft carrier, just a surface combatant with an enhanced UAV/USV/UUV capability. The AAW and NGFS missions might conflict to some extent, but I don't think you're going to get the Navy to build a gun-only cruiser, and there is plenty of room for a bunch of VLS. The UAV/USV/UUV capability is an add-on. If that's too much, drop it, but I think that a Des Moines is plenty big enough to handle it.
For propulsion, probably go with some sort of gas turbine or CODAG or maybe CODLAG or IEP, in order to reduce the engine room crew size. I am undecided about a sonar. You clearly don't want this ship chasing subs, but there are plenty of times that it wouldn't hurt to know what's out there.
I'm not a fan of combining the NGFS and AAW/ASW escort missions. It's useful to have a gun on a cruiser for a variety of reasons, but serious NGFS/NSFS should be on a separate platform. It doesn't make sense to put your most expensive surface combatant close to shore, where it's not in position to perform its primary AAW escort mission, and where it's far more vulnerable to fires from shore.
DeleteIf we still need NGFS/NSFS, do it on a cheaper monitor-type vessel, or commercial conversion.
With a 17-mile range for an 8-inch gun, it doesn't have to get that close in to be effective. You need larger caliber guns on something, and it needs to be pretty big to carry them.
DeleteDo it with a commercial conversion, and it will be on the bottom in a heartbeat. Where's your fire support then?
It still has to move away from the ships its escorting to conduct fire missions and thus becomes ineffective as an escort during this time.
Delete17 miles isn't that much. Modern land-based 152mm guns have ranges up to 25 miles or more with non-guided munitions. Therefore 17 miles isn't sufficient to conduct counter-battery fires against shore based artillery.
Why would a commercial conversion be on the bottom in a heartbeat? They only way you'd put your multi-billion dollar cruiser close to shore is by sanitizing that area beforehand. If anything, you'd be better off with cheap commercial conversions because you can buy more of them and if they're hit and sink, it's not that big of a deal in the grand scheme of things.
IMO, there really is no need for large guns on anything, especially if there is no need for large amphibious assault capability.
Well, it's going to take a lot more than one 6-inch round to put a cruiser, with armor and Navy DC standards , on the bottom. It'll take a whole lot more to put it on the bottom than it will take to sink a commercial conversion.
DeleteNot necessarily. One lucky 6" to the Mk41 might very well sink a cruiser, even armored. One lucky 6" to the AMDR might knock out its AAW capability, rendering it a kill for its primary mission.
DeleteIt really depends on what commercial vessel you use to start with. A 6" hit on a converted tanker wouldn't do that much to it either, unless it detonated munitions. Offshore support vessels are fairly hardy as well.
You could build an armored citadel around the munitions and weapon mount, the same way you might with a cruiser.
Consider an OSV that carries a pair of 155mm ERCA XM1299 turrets with autoloaders and a pair of MLRS turrets. Under the main deck houses munitions in armored magazines.
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2020/03/06/army-takes-40-mile-shots-from-extended-range-cannon-in-demo/
Four such ships would have the equivalent firepower of an M109 artillery battery plus an MLRS battery. I guarantee all four would cost a fraction of an 8" gun-armed, AAW cruiser.
They could fire rocket assisted artillery rounds out to 40 miles, GMLRS to 70 miles or more (with TC upgrade), and PrSM to 310 miles.
"Consider an OSV..."
DeleteSounds like something else we should be building.
"They could fire rocket assisted artillery rounds out to 40 miles, GMLRS to 70 miles or more (with TC upgrade), and PrSM to 310 miles."
DeleteThat's nice but the mission of an amphibious assault is to secure a few miles of beach so it doesn't really require thousand mile rounds. We have many, many other long range delivery systems that can handle the deep strike.
"One lucky 6"
One lucky anything can sink any ship. A sniper with a 0.50 cal rifle could sink a carrier under just the right circumstances. When we design ships and discuss them we have to stay within the realm of probable rather than lucky.
" I guarantee all four would cost a fraction of an 8" gun-armed, AAW cruiser."
DeleteAnd, would be capable of only a fraction of the missions of an 8" gun armed, AAW cruiser. You get what you pay for.
"That's nice but the mission of an amphibious assault is to secure a few miles of beach so it doesn't really require thousand mile rounds. We have many, many other long range delivery systems that can handle the deep strike."
DeleteIn amphibious assault, NGFS/NSFS is a proxy for land-based artillery and rocket fire until those units can be landed. The same types of missions apply. Counter-battery certainly requires a range of more than a few miles past the beach, out to the range of enemy indirect fire systems. Rapid attack of enemy forces out to the FSCL/BCL is another traditional artillery mission, and that can range 18km or more past the FLOT.
Adapting the same land-based systems to for naval use ensures assault forces can count on the same types and depth of fires they have on land. Their doctrine can assume they have similar fires regardless of whether the have the sea or land to their backs.
"When we design ships and discuss them we have to stay within the realm of probable rather than lucky."
The risk assessment of a single, even low probability, hit against a very expensive, and low-density asset will lead to hesitation by commanders to commit it to near-shore NGFS missions.
Risk pawns. Don't risk the queen.
"In amphibious assault, NGFS/NSFS is a proxy for land-based artillery and rocket fire until those units can be landed. "
DeleteNo, it's really not. As demonstrated in WWII assaults, naval gunfire is primarily tasked with destroying fortifications, obstacles, and emplacements that are close threats to the landing troops. Deeper threats are handled by air power. Review WWII operations and you'll see the assignment of resources. The Normandy assault is an excellent example of naval gunfire providing the immediate, up close firepower needed to overcome the beach obstacles and fortifications. Air handled the deeper strike and interdiction.
"will lead to hesitation by commanders to commit it to near-shore NGFS missions. "
It's a poor commander who is deterred by minor, unlikely risk. Sadly, these are the types of commanders we have today and they will have to be quickly weeded out when war starts, as happened in WWII.
There are no more Atlantic Walls, or anything close. Given that you’ve established there is no need for opposed amphibious assault, it makes no sense to spend lot on expensive NGFS capabilities.
DeleteCombining existing, land based capabilities on inexpensive platforms, than can be stamped out as needed, makes way more sense than tying new, undeveloped systems to expensive, vital, limited-number, AAW assets.
Spend less. Risk less.
"Given that you’ve established there is no need for opposed amphibious assault, it makes no sense to spend lot on expensive NGFS capabilities."
DeleteI absolutely see no need for amphibious assaults. I do, however, see a need for shore bombardment/strike and the occasional anti-ship work.
"makes way more sense than tying new, undeveloped systems to expensive, vital, limited-number, AAW assets."
I agree completely that combining AAW and gun support makes no sense. That idea was someone else's!
I would point out, however, that an 8" gun is fully developed. If we wanted to, we could put it into production tomorrow using the Des Moines gun as is. Going just a bit further, we could modify it to add a bit more automation, perhaps. In contrast, an MLRS system would need some fairly extensive developmental work to create a brand new magazine ammo handling and loading system. Even more important would be to marinize the system which would require all new corrosion resistant materials of construction, waterproof seals, protected electronics, etc. Historically, very few land weapons have been successfully adapted to naval use for exactly those reasons.
'One lucky anything can sink any ship. A sniper with a 0.50 cal rifle could sink a carrier under just the right circumstances. When we design ships and discuss them we have to stay within the realm of probable rather than lucky.'
DeleteIt is hard to take you seriously when you write such drivel. A 0.50 cal round will never sink an aircraft carrier....Unless you mean an armoured personnel carrier moving ashore.
"It is hard to take you seriously when you write such drivel. A 0.50 cal round will never sink an aircraft carrier"
DeleteIf you wish to participate in discussions, refrain from personal insults. Discuss the ideas, not the people.
Now, to demonstrate that you're actually wrong, this nearly exact scenario actually occurred. On the USS Forrestal, a single Zuni rocket accidentally ignited and triggered a series of major explosions that nearly sank the ship. A single Zuni rocket nearly sank a carrier. Similarly, one could imagine the perfect set of unlucky circumstances where a single rifle bullet could start a small fire or explosion that then cascades into more and more fires and explosions, eventually sinking the ship.
Is it likely? Of course not! The statement was made that a single lucky hit could sink a cruiser. While theoretically possible, this illustrates that if we're going to consider lucky hits, there's no end to what's possible but 'lucky/unlucky' is not a realistic basis for discussion about ship operations.
So, having demonstrated that a single rifle bullet could, theoretically sink a carrier, we'll now move on to more realistic scenarios and considerations. If you'd care to continue discussing, you'll do so with respect for all.
"I would point out, however, that an 8" gun is fully developed. If we wanted to, we could put it into production tomorrow using the Des Moines gun as is. "
DeleteThere's no way we could put a 75 year old gun and ammunition into service tomorrow. We can't just 3D print it. We don't have replicators. We would undoubtedly redesign significant parts of it to use modern techniques and sub-systems.
It would take a couple orders of magnitude more work and cost to resurrect an 8" gun system than it would to marinize MLRS. MLRS just isn't that complex.
An OSV-based MLRS doesn't need any fancy reload system. A simple elevator to move pods up to the deck and a crane to move them into position. That's all you need. It takes 5 minutes or more to reload a land based MLRS. That kind of reload speed would be fine for a naval MLRS.
The old LCI-Rs and LSM-Rs were manually reloaded. That worked fine, given their usage pattern.
The XM1299 turret would need more marinization, like the German MONARC. But given that an NSFS-only OSV wouldn't used very often, it may not need the same level of marinization as a system going on a frigate or destroyer.
"There's no way we could put a 75 year old gun and ammunition into service tomorrow."
DeleteOh good grief, of course not. The point is that we would not have to do an entire, ground up, development program just for the gun. We've already designed and built one. All that would remain is to set up the manufacturing process, if we wanted an exact duplicate. Try not to be so pedantic.
Marinizing land systems is very difficult as history will atest. The Navy is still struggling with the 30mm guns on the LCS that have not adapted well. The Germans attempted to marinize the 155 mm MONARC gun and failed. And so on.
I like the article! Kinda gives more context and legitimacy to the action of modernizing and returning the Iowa class battleships to service that was done in the 80s and 90s. Pity the same wasn't done with other hull designs that have been proven and not held on to (like those poor Perry class frigates)!
ReplyDeleteWhat we did to the Perrys and the Spruances is at best borderline criminal. If we had kept them for the nominal 40-year lives, we would still have 6 Sprucans and 51 Perrys. That would go a long way toward addressing our current ASW shortcomings.
DeleteIts a good idea, except the concept doesn't work without an extended range projectile for the 8-in guns. Its guns are the limiting factor once it's missiles are expended. An extended range projectile would serve two purposes. First, with some type of terminal homing, it would provide offense against other ships, provided the enemy is out of missiles too. Second, an extended range projectile would allow the ship to position itself further out to sea to support an amphibious assault or for shore bombardment.
ReplyDelete"extended range projectile"
DeleteI see no justification for this. The guns are NOT a primary anti-ship weapon so range doesn't really matter. For shore bombardment, a few more miles, closer to or further from shore won't matter so snuggle up close and fire away. If you haven't got local air supremacy then you shouldn't be attempting an assault and, if you do, then you can handle any threat, just as was done in WWII. Remember, there's no need to provide gun support a hundred miles inland. The purpose of an amphibious assault is to secure a landing site. That only requires gun support for a few miles in, perhaps as much as ten.
Finally, the only way to achieve extended range and precision guidance is to decrease the explosive in the shell, if not the shell size itself, which totally defeats the purpose of having 8" guns.
Even with local air supremacy, being 17 miles offshore puts you well within rocket and artillary range. Not to mention any coastal antiship missiles a decent enemy would likely have. Plus, this separates your cruiser from the main amphibious force, which is another 35 miles or so out to sea, which could require extending your air defense zone even further to protect the cruisers.
DeleteIt occurs to me that an amphibious force may want to include the actual landing area in its air defense zone. Would this not automatically encompass the intermediate space between the main amphibious force far offshore and the coast to be attacked.
DeleteAdditionally in terms of gun range, a lot of this discussion seems to get bogged in the details of past examples (Des Moines 203mm is good to 17 miles, etc) without using the full range of historical examples to include 1960s experimentation with saboted sub-caliber rounds to substantially increase range to distances of 60+ km. This experimentation seems to have encompassed both 16 inch and 8 inch guns and would probably be a worthwhile area to explore using modern metallurgy and fire-control.
Any amphib assault would have complete air superiority before beginning( think multi-CVN umbrella). Cruise missiles would also be heavilly used to soften the defenses to a point where the cruiser could move in. At that point the amphibs shouldnt be 35 miles out. Shouldnt need to be. This is where NGFS shines. Heavy, reasonably accurate fire that need not stop until there arent targets, and can restart at a moments notice, unlike air or missile strikes. And armored ships can shrug off the artillery survivors to a large extent until it kills them. A proper assault with combined arms wont see GFS ships subjected to massive risks. Theyll come in to eliminate threats to the landing forces, not to try to survive and supress an overly hostile coast singlehanded.
Delete"Even with local air supremacy, being 17 miles offshore puts you well within rocket and artillary range. … separates your cruiser from the main amphibious force,"
DeleteYou've got to think operationally. Sure, if you send a single ship, all by itself, to stand close offshore of a heavily defended, unhindered enemy, it won't turn out well. That's essentially the scenario you just described.
Now, in a real, operational scenario, the assault force won't be 25-50 miles offshore because we can't launch an assault from there. The amphib force will be 3-5 miles offshore, protected by Burke/Aegis umbrellas, with continual airstrikes against any enemy artillery or missile batteries. Our notional cruiser will be a few miles offshore, STILL WITH THE ASSAULT FORCE, and equipped with a basic counterbattery radar so the enemy only gets one shot before counterbattery fire eliminates the threat or forces it to move (which means not able to shoot again for some time). When you understand the cruiser's place in the operational scheme then it makes perfect sense.
Too many people want to consider these things in isolation - one ship against an entire enemy military. That's not how it's done.
So, we've just established that a cruiser CAN stand a few miles offshore, conduct bombardments, conduct counterbattery fire, contribute to AAW, all while under the protection of Burke/Aegis. So, there we have the bare bones of a viable CONOPS.
" force may want to include the actual landing area in its air defense zone."
DeleteOf course it would! That would be mandatory!
"saboted sub-caliber rounds "
NO, no, no! In a previous comment, I listed the reasons why this is not a good idea. I'll briefly recap:
-sub-caliber rounds mean sub-explosive power; what's the point of an 8" gun firing 3"-5" equivalent shells?
-gun support is ONLY intended to help establish the landing site; thereafter, the Army brings ashore its own long range artillery for the push inland
Everyone has this impulse to try to win an entire war with a single ship. Let the ship do its part and no more because more means more money and we can't afford it. Are you aware of how many different ways we already have of providing inshore firepower? We have rockets, missiles, artillery, MLRS, bombers, strike aircraft, etc. Why add more cost to a ship when the result will just be a duplication of what we already have in spades and will offer only a very much reduced firepower after sub-calibering the round?
For a future cruiser, I'm not sure it makes more sense to use the same 6" round the Army uses (synergies!) even if it means separate powder bags (complicating reloading and adding handling risk) vs. the proven 8" design from the 1940's. It's a good thing we have the Bureau of Ships to provide an unbiased expert opinion before we commit billions of $$$ to projects like these.
DeleteI think the important part of ship gun systems to look at, especially for NGFS use is shell weight. The weight does not increase linearly with bore size. 8in is where you see the significant spike. 5 to 6in sees a gain of 30lbs...but stepping up to 8in sees more than a doubling in throw weight, yet the gun is still manageable size for today's ships. And destructive power is truly whats important, even if nobody seems to think so anymore...
DeleteCNO - Speaking of sub-caliber rounds, I remember reading your "Long Range Naval Guns" post but you didn't voice an opinion on those sub-caliber rounds (granted, they were going to be fired from 16-inch naval rifles so you have more room to work with before you start trading off too much explosive power for increased range). What were your thoughts on those?
DeleteIn my view, I would think that extended-range unguided rounds for naval gunfire support would fill a vital gap in the transition from a successful opposed amphibious landing to getting a foothold established on enemy territory (i.e., before artillery divisions and land-based air support in enemy territory are established), as well as provide all-weather firepower in locales close enough to the coast once the land war really gets going. All of this depends on the locale, of course; naval gunfire support is useful for, say, much of North Korea and largely useless for a landlocked place like Afghanistan.
" "Long Range Naval Guns" post but you didn't voice an opinion on those sub-caliber rounds"
DeleteThat was an informational post about what the Navy was trying, or could have accomplished. It's most emphatically not what I would have done or wanted.
I have no use for sub-caliber rounds of any size/type.
Theoretically, if I had a ship, say a battleship, with an infinitely large magazine then, sure, why not toss in several hundred sub-caliber rounds. However, in the real world where magazine sizes are limited, I wouldn't want to lose a single regular 16" shell to a sub-caliber round. We just have far too many other ways to deliver munitions deep into enemy territory.
I was thinking that a Battleship (let's use the Iowa-class just for the sake of argument) is somewhat unique among artillery assets in that it's both very resistant to counter-battery fire due to its armour and is still capable of shoot-and-scoot at the same time so as along as it doesn't run aground (ground artillery assets generally need to be fortified, giving up their mobility, to achieve that level of armoured protection against counter-battery fire).
DeleteIsn't there a period of vulnerability between "successful amphibious landing" and "established beachhead" during which ground artillery and ground-based aerial support can't be effectively brought to bear by the invading force? Other users have mentioned ground artillery ammunition with longer ranges than the 16-inch rounds used by the Iowas, which means they are out of range for the Iowas should ground artillery using that ammunition attack the invading force. Even modest range-extending technologies for battleships shells (like rocket assist or base-bleed, which don't reduce as much of the shell's explosive payload as sub-caliber rounds would) would allow ships using those shells a greater ability to retaliate within the reach of their ammunition.
Even if you decide to use cruise missiles instead for counter-battery fire from an Iowa-class, they can't carry many of those, and cruise missiles take much longer than battleship shells to get where they need to be, which means more time for the enemy to "scoot" away. Even modest range-extending technologies for battleships shells would allow the battleships to stay relevant for longer and allow them to support operations that much further inland.
An amphibious assault will see one of two general situations develop:
Delete1. The operation is fiercely contested and the assault remains in doubt. This being the case, the battleship (or any gun support ship) is far better utilized supporting the assault directly which means concentrating on near range targets that are directly impeding the progress of the assault. These would be troop concentrations, armored vehicles, fortifications, and the like.
2. The assault is a success and the assault force is free to move inland to whatever their ultimate objective might be. In this case, the assault force is moving and far less susceptible to enemy artillery and can maneuver to attack the enemy artillery directly without needing naval gun support.
Thus, in neither case is naval gun support required for far distant counterbattery missions. Add to this the fact that any amphibious assault would have aircraft assigned, specifically, to far distant artillery suppression and that further lessons the need for naval ships to perform the far distant counterbattery mission.
Now, if we happened to have several extra ships laying around with nothing to do then, sure, why not let them do some far distant counterbattery fire - but that's not likely.
Remember that enemy artillery that is forced to 'shoot and scoot' can't be very effective. Such a weapon would do well to get off a couple of shots every 15-30 minutes. That's hardly a sustained, effective, artillery barrage! It would be annoying, somewhat, but not an assault stopper, by any means!
(Don McCollor)...in the Falklands, the Brits had escort ships with aluminum superstructures (to compensate for all the fancy electronic stuff mounted high up). Aluminum melts and burns like shingle factory once it gets set afire...
ReplyDeleteWhich ships? Sheffield was all steel.
DeleteAluminum has a lower melting point than steel but it's not really a major issue.
Before anyone throws out Belknap, realize that it had a giant flame thrower of burning JP-5 directed at its opened, damaged superstructure (1,000 gallons per minute). It would have been massively damaged even if built entirely from steel.
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.694.7036&rep=rep1&type=pdf
"Aluminum has a lower melting point than steel but it's not really a major issue."
DeleteSlow down, there! As I understand it, Belknap had a steel hull and aluminum superstructure. As photos conclusively demonstrate, the superstructure was almost entirely melted away while the hull was visually untouched. That's pretty damning when comparing aluminum and steel exposed to the exact same conditions!
There are other aspects to the consideration of aluminum versus steel in a fire. The ability of aluminum to conduct heat to surrounding compartments can cause secondary fires in adjoining spaces. I believe aluminum deforms at a lower temperature and to a greater degree than steel but I'm not a metallurgical engineer so I could be wrong.
The Belknap photos kind of speak for themselves.
A little more history. https://apnews.com/fb3c5f5bb2688593dadac51dae591dd4
Delete'The fact that the Sheffield had both a steel superstructure and a steel hull has been confirmed to us by the United States Navy and by the Aluminium Federation in Great Britain. In addition, aluminum as used on ships cannot, under any circumstances, burn.
DeleteOn his return from the Falklands to Great Britain, James Salt, commanding officer of H.M.S. Sheffield, commented on BBC: ''Now, people have said aluminum catches fire. It doesn't, actually. It melts, or certainly deforms, and becomes soft at a temperature of about 600 degrees centigrade. (The melting point of aluminum actually is 1,220 degrees Fahrenheit.) Well, that is so hot that anybody in the vicinity would be stone cold dead, long before the aluminum had melted.
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''People have said that it made it more difficult to fight the fires. I myself doubt whether this is true. I had nothing whatever to do with fitting aluminum there, but I unhesitatingly would support it, because it's the only way that you can preserve stability in a small hull.'' At this point the BBC interviewer said, ''What's been overlooked in the aluminum debate is that the Sheffield was made almost entirely of steel. The fire which raged through her was not caused by aluminum.''
The reports that falsely blame aluminum for loss of ships in the South Atlantic, can only have a deleterious effect on the Navy and on the aluminum industry and its thousands of employees. Now that hostilities in the have ceased and a careful investigation of the war can be made, I am hopeful that the facts will be reported. I am certain that they will vindicate the use of aluminum on modern warships. JOHN E. BLOMQUIST, President, Reynolds Aluminum, Richmond, Va., June 24, 1982'
ComNavOps your post is unscientific and based on opinion not fact. There are plenty of examples where steel ships have succumbed to fire. The Lexington at the battle of the coral sea for example.
"ComNavOps your post is unscientific and based on opinion not fact. There are plenty of examples where steel ships have succumbed to fire."
DeleteWould you kindly provide the quote where I claimed that steel ships cannot be lost to fire?
Please note, you appear to have authored a series of comments which are uniformly disrespectful, argumentative, and incorrect. I have granted you a great deal of leeway as you appear to be a new commenter. However, I have reached the limit of tolerance. No further comments of this nature will be allowed. If you wish to participate, you'll do so respectfully or not at all. Thank you.
A quote from a President of an aluminum manufacturing company would certainly have bias, and his delving into ship design is probably unqualified. If he was previously a naval architect/engineer than Ill withdraw the comment, but what are the odds?? "Only way to preserve stability in a small hull"-??? The British ships he was discussing were slightly larger than the Gearings or Sumners, and were stable ships without aluminum upperworks. Just saying...
Delete"Now, people have said aluminum catches fire. It doesn't, actually. It melts, or certainly deforms, and becomes soft at a temperature of about 600 degrees centigrade. (The melting point of aluminum actually is 1,220 degrees Fahrenheit.)"
DeleteIn general, aluminum alloys lose about a third of their strength in the 350 to 400 °F range (about 175 to 205 °C) which covers many, if not most, military and aerospace applications.
We went to aluminum because we kept adding more and more high weight, and aluminum reduced that problem. But we had dissimilar metals issues and then the Belknap happened. Also all that high weight means bigger radar signature. There are always tradeoffs.
DeleteWhat you say about armour is largely correct. What you need to be reminded is that the enemy gets a a vote. We have already had an arms race in which ships of increasing speed and armour were built and then the enemy built bigger ships with better armour, guns and speed. Who do you think would win an arms race using those requirements in the present time. The USA with a greatly reduced ability to build such ships compared to ww2, or China whose ability to build ships and make steel far exceeds the US capacity? What is to stop the enemy from building armour piercing warheads in their cruise missiles?
ReplyDeleteYou often say 'they have forgotten how to build fast armoured ships like they used to.' That is just rubbish. In reality, they are incapable of building such ships. The real issue is the destruction of the manufacturing and ship building prowess of the USA over the last 40 years. Until that issue is resolved, everything you propose is moot. The industrial prowess of the USA was sacrificed at the altar of neo-liberal capitalism and globalisation to the detriment of the people who will be asked fight your future wars.
If you'd care to participate in discussions, do so with respect for all. I will not allow insults directed towards me or anyone else.
DeleteChina makes steel at enormous rates but produces very little iron ore and what it does produce is not high quality.
Delete60% of all her iron ore comes from Australia and about 20% from Brazil. Worth keeping in mind.
China simply doesn't have large iron ore deposits.
The only realistic alternative to her massive dependence on high grade Australian iron ore would be theoretical African iron ore deposits, which is a big part of her attempt to woo African countries.
It would take at least a decade to establish such a source and in a war scenario virtually 90% of her iron ore needs could be stopped virtually overnight regardless of whether it comes from Africa or Australia.
Every country, the US included, has strategic resource weaknesses (rare earths for the US, for example). A weakness, however, isn't going to stop China from its global conquest vision. What it will do is alter the methodology. Clearly, China isn't hiding in a corner of the world, trembling in fear over the prospect of facing the US in a war. Quite the opposite! So, recognizing their own weaknesses (and strengths!), how does that recognition alter China's view of how to conduct a war with the US?
DeleteFor example, one might imagine that China would plan for a very fast, short war so that resource shortages are not an issue. From their perspective, how could they achieve such a fast, short war and still achieve their objectives? One could imagine them planning for a series of short wars, each with a very limited objective (as opposed to Japan's plan to conquer the entire Pacific/Indochina region in one action). And so on.
Perhaps we should be giving some thought to how and weaknesses might alter China's war plans rather than congratulating ourselves on our inevitable victory over a resource-starved China. It's remotely possible (just barely conceivable) that China doesn't agree with our assessment of our own swift and inevitable victory and that China has their own plans for their own victory. Perhaps we should try to discern what those plans are.
The US has enormous deposits of rare earth metals. There's just not the financial incentive at the moment to exploit them. Australia, Brazil and Canada also have enormous deposits, some of which are being exploited. I think we've discussed this in the past, but to summarise, China has simply undercut the market by offering rare earth metals at lower prices subsidised by government funding. This has meant that they are the largest exporter of REMs, but REMs are actually really common, despite their moniker. The US could start producing large quantities of them fairly rapidly with government funding. They could also simply import them from countries like Aus, Canada or Brazil, who are all producing them now in large quantities. It's actually just that it's cheaper to buy them from China.
DeleteThe difference with iron ore is China just doesn't have a lot of deposits at all. They couldn't mine it if they wanted to, because it doesn't exist. What they do have is low quality, with little magnetite, which is a requisite for producing high grade steel (the kind you find in warships and tanks etc).
Putting that aside, I don't disagree that there's nuance in terms of the strategic consequences of their reliance on iron ore imports.
It will influence their behaviour though. In the same way that Germany's massive lack of petroleum reserves in WW2 heavily influenced her strategic behaviour and the course of her war, particularly in Russia.
It doesn't make war impossible at all, but it changes the paradigm in which such a war might be fought.
In terms of China's strategy, I happen to believe that it's quite asymmetrical. At the risk of being trite, it's very Sun Tzu. They want to win by threatening to fight, and using political, economic and social pressure to get their way. They are trying it right now with Australia - they've put bans on Australian imports, bribed Senators and major business leaders in Australia, infiltrated enormous numbers of espionage agents into the country (they are still big fans of large scale HUMINT), offered massive loans to regional governments to increase their influence, conducted large scale cyber attacks on Australian governmental and industry websites and databases (there's one happening right now) and conducted a whole bunch of other assymetrical attacks and attempts at influence. They are trying through threats, economic incentives, briery, cajoling and basically anything they can think of, short of actual military conflict to influence Australia politically to be pro-China, or at least to shut up and get out of China's way.
That's their primary strategy. They think they can win without needing to fight a real war. They need to be disavowed of that notion. The danger then of course is they may feel that fighting is their option of last resort.
"They think they can win without needing to fight a real war."
DeleteWhy wouldn't they think that? We, the US, Aus, and the West, have done nothing to disavow them of that viewpoint. At some point, we need to pick a fight and force an escalation in order to make military intervention a real option again. Of course, we also need to implement the full scale of non-military attacks, just as China is doing. However, until we actually fire some weapons, we're ultimately doing nothing but bluffing and China knows it.
"they may feel that fighting is their option of last resort."
You're thinking in Western terms. We view fighting as a last resort. China views it as just another, equal, tool to call on WHEN THEIR CALCULUS SHOWS THAT THEY CAN GAIN MORE THAN THEY LOSE. Thus, fighting is not a last resort - it's a perfectly acceptable option that just hasn't been needed yet since the rest of the world has been so accommodating towards their expansion.
We need to stop assessing China from a Western perspective and start seeing them as they see themselves.
I'm actually thinking in Eastern terms. Decisive battle is much more of a Western concept.
DeleteTraditionally, Eastern warfare emphasises asymmetrical tactics and winning without large scale battle.
The idea is to win through positioning and influence.
Victor Davis Hanson (who I don't always agree with but who is particularly strong on this point), makes this argument very persuasively in a lot of his work. The idea of brining the enemy to battle and crushing them that way is a very western idea.
The Chinese don't really think that way.
Proxy wars, economic warfare, asymmetrical warfare - these are conflict approaches they are much more comfortable with.
And to be clear I'm not suggesting fighting is impossible, but that it is not their objective or the way they even think about the contest with the US for strategic and political influence in the Pacific region.
"The idea of brining the enemy to battle and crushing them that way is a very western idea."
DeleteWhile it may (or may not?) be a Western view, I do not believe it is unique to the West. For example, one of the major objectives of Japan in WWII was attempting to bring about the major fleet battle. The US declined (early on, due to lack of major fleet units!) and the Japanese grand naval strategy was frustrated and rendered moot, in that respect.
I've seen no particular tendency in Chinese history to avoid major battles. They seem to gladly embrace them when they have the strength and they seem perfectly willing to engage in guerilla style warfare when they don't. All the evidence that I can see (meaning the actual fleet build up and planning as well as their rhetoric) points to a desire for a major showdown in the future when they have achieved a favorable relative position.
Have you seen the underwater stockpiles of iron ore and coal China has?
DeleteHaving seen a Des Moines class cruiser in action ( Newport News) I will say it is very impressive when the eight inch flies by. But I do believe most of their NGFS missions were 5 inch fire. But, we often talked about what would happen if we ( Knox class Rathburne) were ever hit by anything bigger than a pea, what with our aluminum superstructure. The general conclusion was that in that case we would much rather be on the Newport News. And , fortunately the other guys never managed to hit us so we didn’t have to discover what really would happen. As far as escort/ ASW types and NGFS, we managed to fire over 10000 rounds out of our single 5”/54 mount.
ReplyDeleteAlways good to hear from someone who was there! Thanks for sharing your experience.
Delete(Don McCollor)…[At the risk of stirring up another hornet's nest] The Brits in the Falklands learned what every naval power forgets between wars. Layers of paint burn long and hot. Every flammable ship comfort will burn, wood, carpet mattresses (the synthetics pouring out toxic fumes as well, and the more comfortable synthetic shirts do not burn like cotton, they melt and stick). And they seemed to have brought back the hot, uncomfortable anti-flash hoods and gauntlets...
ReplyDeleteStrip ship! The ancient mandate still applies. Great comment.
DeleteImagine if the hull of a 150m warship were built with engines, but with 4 inch steel armour around it.
ReplyDeleteAnd then it was rammed into a cargo ship.
I think the whole world would realise how dainty warships had become
Andrew
Sorry, a little late to the party here.
ReplyDeleteI would arm my Des Moines as follows:
My radar would be a 4 x fixed panel TRS 3/4d located on the top of the superstructure forward of the smoke stack. It would be in an armored box with drop down armored doors to protect the radars against incoming attacks. This would be supplemented by a rotating TRS 3/4d radar aft of the stack that could quickly drop down into a recessed armored enclosure.
It would have the most up to date ECM equipment available.
It would have a twin 5"/62 turret located at the fore and aft of the superstructure behind and above the 8" gun turrets. This would provide the ability for the two turrets to fire to either port or starboard. I see no reason why radar controlled anti-missile fire using VT fused 'beehive' rounds wouldn't be effective against both missiles and fast moving Iranian speed boats.
Above and behind these 5" turrets on the fore and aft of the superstructure would be twin-arm ESSM launchers, each capable of firing to both port and starboard.
I would also place a 30mm Goalkeeper CIWS as far forward on the bow as heavy seas would allow and as far aft on the fantail as possible. These would provide defense against missiles coming into the bow or stern and provide a heavier weight of shot to the CIWS defense to all azimuths from the ship.
The port and starboard superstructure and deck would have at least three Phalanx 20mm and three SeaRAM on each side.
The ship would need to have at least 100 VLS cells. These could be loaded out with whatever mix of Standard, ESSM, or anti-ship missiles that the mission required.
If I ended up with enough deck space for more than 100 VLS cells I'd add them. They all don't need to be filled for every mission, but at least you'd have them if you ever wanted them.
I would need a space for launch and recovery of 'inexpensive' drones that would provide situational awareness to the ship captain and the commander of the task force (along with drones from the other task force ships as well).
I would retain all three of the 3 x 8" guns turrets as long as I had the space to accommodate the VLS cells and drones. Only if I needed more space for those items would I eliminate one of the forward turrets.
I would build intend to build 8 of these ships and create task forces out of these and their escorts.
I believe that these would be extremely useful in a peer fight with China and also scare the poop out of the Iranians in the Persian Gulf while providing NGFS that the navy desperately needs (even if they don't realize it).
A solid design. I'd buy it!
DeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
DeleteAnon, "I would arm my Des Moines as follows:…"
DeleteComNavOps, "A solid design. I'd buy it!"
So ComNavOps, you like Anon's proposed cruiser but panned mine? Just kidding, they’re pretty similar.
I would build 20 cruisers and see them as bigger Ticos with more VLS cells and bigger guns. They would be flagships for 20 escort squadrons, each consisting of 1 cruiser in the inner ring, with 2 AAW destroyers (like Burkes) in second ring, 3 GP escorts (like mini-Burkes) in third ring, and 4 ASW frigates (like ComNavOps ASW frigate) in outer ring. Squadrons would screen task forces, singly or combined with other squadrons, or operate independently.
For radar, Anon uses the combination of a 4x4 fixed TRS-3/4D together with a rotating TRS-3/4D. I like that, or APAR/SMART-L (which I would have on my GP escorts). That probably means passing primary AAW control to one of the Burkes, while remaining backup. This addresses my concern of relying too heavily on AEGIS/AMDR, and avoids the conflict of having the AAW control ship do NGFS.
Agree totally on most up-to-date ECM equipment.
I'm not sure how much the 5"/62s add. You’re not going to use them for NGFS when you have the 3x8” and I’m not sure their rate of fire is sufficient for the anti-missile role. I might want to use the weight and space for other things.
I would increase the VLS cells from 100 to 192, including at least 16 with 4-packed ESSM. The extra VLS cells could be a tradeoff for the 5”/62s, or perhaps you could get both.
I really thought the drones would be the most controversial part of my proposal. I was looking at something like the proposed WWII flight deck cruiser, which had a 350 foot flight deck on a light cruiser hull. That would allow two 3x8” mounts, fore and aft, with the VLS cells arrayed across the ship at the front and rear of the flight deck. We don’t really need a 350-foot flight deck for a drone, but it would be nice to have the room for multiple drones and helos. I would also have the hangar below the flight deck, with an elevator, so the flight deck is a through-deck unobstructed by a hangar, with superstructure to starboard. The hangar would be a multi-use area that could also carry USV and UUV drones and launch them over the side. I think am proposing a more capable drone area than Anon. The tradeoff there is probably the third 3x8” mount.
I like the fore-and-aft Goalkeepers for the heavier weight of shot. I agree on the 3 SeaRAM and 3 Phalanx to either side, at corners of flight deck and to either side of the superstructure.
I can go either way on sonar. You don’t want this ship chasing subs, but in an escort role or independently, it might be nice to have another set of ears, and it would have helos and plenty of VLS cells to carry ASROC for remote prosecution capability. Ticos have sonar, so I lean yes, although maybe leave the towed arrays to the ASW frigates.
The tradeoffs between the two would seem to be:
- TRS-3/4D combination versus AEGIS/AMDR
- 5”/62s versus another 92 VLS cells (and I make room for the ESSMs in the VLS)
- Third 3x8” mount versus additional drone space (including USVs and UUVs)
I would go along with Anon on the radars, for reasons noted above. As for the second, we might be able to get both. I think the third tradeoff would depend a lot on how much space you actually need to operate drones and how effective drones would actually be in combat.
Like Anon, I believe that these ships would be extremely useful in a peer fight and also scare the Iranians, while providing (along with battleships, of which I would build 8) the NGFS that the Navy desperately needs.
One question for Anon, how would you power this ship? Steam plants take too many operators for current Navy crewing patterns. I would consider the Makin Island plant, if there’s room. It drives a 40,000 ton, boxy hull, through the water at 28 knots, so should be able to get well over 30 with a 20,000 cruiser hull.
"I would increase the VLS cells from 100 to 192"
DeleteAnd put what in them? Have you thought this through? I've repeatedly proven that more than a few dozen VLS are unnecessary unless you want to create a pure cruise missile barge which is better done in the form of an SSGN.
Yes, I've thought it through.
DeleteI've already said that I'd have 64 ESSM in 16 4-pack cells. That leaves 176. If I gave it a sonar, I'd do 8 ASROC, not that you'd want this ship chasing subs, but you don't want another USS Indianapolis. That leaves 168 cells, and I'd do a mix of Standard, anti-ship, and anti-surface. As someone noted above (I think), because of the range of shore batteries it would be nice to have counter battery radar and something with longer range than the 8" guns.
Again, I haven't done intense analysis of the tradeoffs, and you certainly might want to do with fewer VLS cells, maybe down as low as 128, in order to get another 3x8" mount or a 5'/62 mount or two. Those are things to be determined from more in-depth analysis than I have the data to do here.
Agree that the SSGN would be the best missile barge, and I'm including a bunch of them, too. But maybe not the only one, and the cruiser might have some fire control solutions (from counter battery radar, for one thing) available to it that would be hard to communicate to a submarine in timely fashion.
I still find it interesting that people have picked at every part of this e except the drone decks, which is what I thought would be hardest to justify.
What would you change?
ReplyDeleteCan you discuss armor and any relevant uses of Metal Foam for armor on ships? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metal_foam
ReplyDeleteWould this type of armor be a game changer due to the reduced weight, and excellent strength?
Other than the basics, I don't know much about it. Metal foam armor has, thus far, been focused on small applications like body armor. Some have speculated on the foam use for armored vehicles but I'm not aware of any actual test units.
DeleteI'm completely unaware of any ship applications.
All that said, it is certainly an intriguing development and might well be useful in ship armor applications. Bear in mind, however, that ship armor has to meet some criteria that body, or even vehicle, armor does not. For example, ship armor, depending on the definition and application, sometimes becomes part of the structure of the ship and must meet certain structural performance specifications. Ship armor is also subjected to continual stress and flexing with body and vehicle armor is not. And so on.
So, it's an interesting possibility but would require a great deal of additional research before anyone could evaluate its suitability for ship armor.
Of interest is the 50 minute video on YouTube "A Brief History Of Naval Armour - Successfully Forging Onwards" by
ReplyDeleteDrachinifel explaining the development of the material science from 1830's to WWII, one highlight to me was the size involved in forging steel plate armor, started with an steel ingot 42 x 150 x 250 inch weighing 425,000 lbs !
Would be of interest to know how steel tech has evolved since WWII and what is now possible.
ComNavOps: Did you get my post on this? I've been anxious to get your thoughts.
ReplyDeleteI'm sorry but I don't see any other comments from you on this post and I have no moderation-pending comments so everything has been posted. If you'd like to repeat your thought/question, I'll gladly respond.
DeleteI'm new to the site, and thus late to this discussion but I would like to give my thoughts about a "new" Des Moines class ship. I would acquire the actual USS Salem and remove her from museum duty. This is what I would do:
ReplyDeleteGuns:
I would refurbish or replace the 8" guns and leave them ALL where they are, since removing them would be a travesty! It would remove the biggest reasons to have the ship in the first place.
The 5" guns are obsolescent and should be replaced. It appears to me that the sizes of the current 5" guns compared to those currently being tested with the longer 155mm barrels for the Army are similar. They should fit with some modifications. Only if necessary, have one of these guns in place of the two previous guns.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24238/armys-new-huge-barrel-packing-155mm-howitzer-doubles-range-to-40-miles-in-tests
Those guns can reach out much farther than current guns, especially with base-bleed, ramjet and the Hypervelocity Projectiles. Of course, regular shells are preferred, without trade-offs limiting explosive power, when range is not an issue.
For this ship, the Hypervelocity Projectile using pyrophoric depleted uranium would be particularly devastating to other ships with about 100+ miles range. It would also allow these guns to serve as additional anti-air protection.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36345/mq-9-reaper-howitzer-rocket-toting-f-16-all-shoot-down-mock-cruise-missiles-in-huge-test
CIWS: I would utilize the existing spaces for the AA guns with Phalanx and SeaRAM systems: I believe this would mean two Phalanx and two SeaRAM on each side in the center, more on the front and the back. These stand-alone units could serve the role that machine gunners and sailors dumping shells into guns just pumping out rounds served in the past.
ReplyDeleteBoth of these systems have recently been upgraded to also be effective against drones and small boats. Icing on the cake will be the radar units acting as redundant systems if comingled into an overall system.
Missiles and Vertical Launch Systems:
ReplyDeleteOf course, I would utilize the ESSM and Tomahawk but I would certainly add the SM-6, since it is the only weapon that can perform anti-aircraft/cruise missile warfare, ballistic missile defense and anti-surface warfare missions. Yes, the only currently fielded and tested hypersonic (or nearly so?) anti-ship missile. The perfect match for a MULTI-PURPOSE Cruiser.
https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/capabilities/products/sm6-missile
Many people seem to only remember these ships being there to fight other ships or shell landing sites. However, when they were built, a major purpose could also be anti-aircraft defense. Thus, the ship would dominate the airspace over a landing zone as well as serve a powerful function when landings are not taking place. Using the SM-6 would probably require the Aegis radar and I'm all for it, albeit with armored shutters after reading “Navy-Matters, Return Of The Broadside.”
Where will all of these missiles go, you ask? Putting the vertical launchers on the outside of the ships, Zumwalt style, would create a buffer-zone between the impact point and the armor. These could be placed along the lines of the "All" zone of the "All or Nothing" armor (along the central portion of the ships).
http://www.seaforces.org/wpnsys/SURFACE/Mk-57-missile-launcher.htm
I would also suggest DeepStrike missiles. These could serve in land attack and are currently being tested to attack such moving targets as ships.
https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a26960/army-new-long-range-tactical-missile-deepstrike/
Updated Armor:
ReplyDeleteMany people have wondered how the armor would fare with current missiles. I have done the same. If I understand the armor on this class correctly, it was installed in belts with space in between.
Modern ceramic armor, already available in economical forms, may be added between the belts. Putting this along the inner belts would work against that part of the shaped-charge that will penetrate the steel armor.
https://tanks-encyclopedia.com/composite-armored-vehicle-advanced-technology-demonstrator-cav-atd/
I would also include Kevlar sheets in those spaces. Yes, it has weight but the weight is low enough that the sheets like I am speaking of currently hang on the outer walls of our troop-carrying helicopters going into war zones. It is somewhat low cost, readily available (I have had trouble researching this without being bombarded with sites for companies selling it) and very effective in controlling blast effects. It is also effective at mitigating heat and fire.
I would replace the “teak deck” wood planking with hollow steel tube decking. This will add protection and with ventilation, help to cool the ship in the same way that the wood planking has done. Line the inside of these with Kevlar for further protection.
ReplyDeleteIt would be much less expensive to encase the entire ship with a V-Shaped hull than to build an entirely new ship. Below the waterline, the previously mentioned protections could be included as well as including compartments both empty and those holding fuel for back-up diesel generators. This outer hull could also serve to house the afore mentioned Vertical Launch Tubes lining the outside of the current hull.
When adding an additional hull, I would research not tapering around the rear of the ship. Rather, I would continue in a straight line, Zumwalt style, making the helicopter pad much larger and increasing the number of VLS further. Also, since widening the hull will degrade speed, this would add space for extra propulsion to compensate.
Power:
ReplyDeleteEliminating the fuel oil would reduce many thousands of pounds of weight -- which could then be put into extra armor and weaponry.
This could happen with "Small Modular Nuclear Reactors" replacing the boilers. Steam is an old fashioned, basic and very reliable system. Nuclear Reactor systems are currently being designed that could replace the boilers. This would mean nearly unlimited range and a lot of power, in a tiny space relative to 1960's style reactors.
https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2020/04/us-dod-funds-three-mobile-nuclear-microreactors-designs.html
Thus, the steam systems could be refurbished and used nearly as-is, with generators be spun instead of the propellers. Additional power back-up generating systems could also be built in. Perhaps replacing the propellers with a number of electric-powered water jets, each located mostly within the outer hull armor and running on separate but redundant power lines.
https://www.marinelink.com/news/waterjets-warships312784
The current fuel containers could then be used as flooding units to account for hits or to aid in extreme fire trajectories, as well as continuing to function as spaced-armor.
Forward Command and Control:
ReplyDeleteChina and Russia are able to target satellites and their electronic warfare capabilities are growing daily. The days of controlling foreign wars like a video game in the Pentagon are about gone. Even the distance from the battlefield to a carrier may have become too far. This ship could become the Forward Command and Control necessary to keep our forces from being cut off from their leadership.
It could serve as a link, or even control, for USV, UUV and UAV. Powerful Electronic Warfare Suites and E.C.C.M. could be installed. It has the space to house the vast computing power that will be required in the future for known systems as well as Strategic and Tactical AI.
I have seen the arguments against capital ships. One is the “Putting all your Eggs in One Basket.” To this, I ask if any Chess players out there would exchange one Queen for a dozen pawns. Another argument would be that those advocating for ships like this are just longing for symbols of the good ol’ days -- which is disregarding lessons learned in history. Don’t forget the bankers out there saying that they are just too expensive – when this would cost a fraction of a new carrier to update. This would add a long lost capability to our Navy quickly and relatively cheaply.
ReplyDelete